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Abstract 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the understanding of credit risk dynamics in 
the Sterling Eurobond market. The background to the thesis is the increasing size, complexity 
and volatility of all debt markets, where the tasks of measuring, understanding and forecasting 
credit risk are of central importance to investing institutions and to corporate and sovereign 
borrowers. 
We investigate the changes in the perceived credit quality of bond issuers through three 
different approaches. 
First, we describe the evolution of credit spreads over time, exploring whether they reflect 
economic fundamentals, or whether they represent a self-generated force. This question is 
central to the fixed income literature in general, and to the pricing of risky debt and credit 
derivatives in particular. The time-series properties of our credit spreads provide strong 
evidence of mean-reversion, non-linearities, and directional and persistent volatility. All 
these stylised facts are captured by time-varying volatility models. 
Second, we assess the information value of bond ratings, by examining the dynamics of 
bond spreads around rating revision dates. In contrast to standard event studies we apply 
a novel GARCH model to the panel data. This lets us examine the effects of the re- 
grading event on the volatility of bond yields as well as the yields themselves. We find 
that downgrades are viewed as informational events, but upgrades are not. An 
asymmetric pattern is also observed in the dynamics of volatility. 
Third, we build a predictive structural model for the downgrade probability using a two-step 
estimation procedure. This allows us to disentangle the effects of credit rating and 
various financial and accounting ratios. We find evidence of non-linear effects from both 
company indebtedness and credit risk. The forecasting model is benchmarked against 
both a naive model, and a more sophisticated neural network model. Unlike the field of 
default prediction, little research has been done on forecasting the downgrade event. 
Filling this gap is of interest to banks and investors in periods of relative economic 
stability, in the context of value-at-risk models, and for the pricing of credit risky 
instruments. 
ix 
Introduction 
INTRODUC'T'ION 
Possible contributions and structure of the thesis 
The overall objective of the thesis is to contribute to the understanding of credit risk 
dynamics in the Sterling Eurobond market. My interest in this topic arose from two facts. First, 
this market is little researched. Second, the interest by academics and practitioners alike to learn 
more about credit risk is growing remarkably over the recent years. 
This work comprises two parts. The first part discusses credit risk along its main dimensions 
and statistical properties and critically reviews various quantitative models for assessing a 
company's default probability. It also introduces regulatory issues, crucial in the context of 
credit risk and its impact on financial market stability. An extensive overview of the studies 
conducted in the credit risk area is offered as well. The aim of this first part is twofold. First we 
would like to provide the reader with the main theoretical concepts and general issues regarding 
credit risk. Second, this allows us to correctly pose and outline the problems originating the 
empirical investigations performed in the second part of the thesis. 
The second part is structured as follows. Firstly, we describe empirically the dynamic 
evolution of credit spread changes, exploring whether they reflect economic fundamentals, or 
whether they represent a self-generated force. Secondly, we assess the information value of 
bond ratings by examining the dynamics of bond spreads around rating changes 
announcements. To this aim we carry out a novel event-related GARC H methodology that 
allows the rating change to impact volatility as well as market yields. Finally, we develop a 
predictive model for the downgrade probability introducing a two-step estimation procedure to 
disentangle the effects of default risk and financial/accounting variables. In summary, changes 
in the perceived credit quality of bond issuers are captured and investigated through different 
approaches: a time series approach to credit spread changes, an event-related GARCH-type 
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approach to a rating revision, and finally a two-step probit regression approach to forecast the 
downgrade probability. 
While credit risk is important to all fixed income markets (including the sovereign risk of 
government bond markets), this study is primarily concerned with credit risk in the Eurobond 
market. Although there is some sparse published evidence on the behaviour of the prices of 
US-dollar denominated bonds in the euro-market, no empirical work has employed UK- 
sterling denominated issues to test the theory about the determinants of bond yields in general 
and credit spreadsin particular. A potential of our research is to fill this void in the literature. A 
brief outline of the empirical studies on the Eurobond market along with its historical 
developments, current features and structure is presented in Chapter I. 
Credit risk is often compared with its counterpart, market risk, and many of the techniques 
developed to measure and control market risk have been applied to credit risk. In chapter II we 
review the factors that tend to differentiate credit risk from market risk, and that dominate the 
assessment, evaluation, management and pricing of credit risk in general and credit derivatives 
in particular. While we highlight fundamental differences between the two risks we also 
acknowledge the relevance of their interactions. The difficulty of modelling these interactions, 
in addition to the scarcity of readily available input data, the subjective nature of the estimation 
of default probabilities, correlations, and recovery rates, the typical illiquidity, and the dynamic 
nature of credit risk are all barriers to the design and implementation of credit risk models. 
Once the main features and properties of credit risk are established, the next step is the 
measurement of default timing, default events, and recoveries. A long debate among 
practitioners, academics, and regulators has been taking place about these fundamental 
measurements. Various statistical nd probabilistic credit risk models have been introduced to 
estimate the probability density function on a portfolio basis. These models are responses to the 
increasing role of credit risk and the growth of credit derivatives, on one side, and to regulators' 
pressures to define correct economic capital requirements, on the other side. Credit risk models 
and internal capital allocations play increasingly important roles in banks' risk management and 
performance measurement processes, including performance-based compensation, customer 
profitability analysis, risk-based pricing, active portfolio management and capital structure 
decisions. Chapter III offers a comprehensive overview of the better-known credit risk models 
and of related regulatory issues. 
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Introduction 
The first part of this work concludes with Chapter IV where a synthesis of the literature 
related to credit risk is presented. The literature has focused on three main aspects: explanation 
of credit risk premia, specification of the risk structure of credit risk premia, and valuation of 
risky debt. The first works in this field study the determinants of bond yields or yield premia 
using cross-sectional regression analysis. A second stream of the literature concentrates on the 
term structure of credit spreads according to the idea that spreads on corporate bonds vary with 
maturity holding all other bond characteristics constant. Third, we consider a variety of default- 
risk pricing models. The basic idea is that the inherent risk of any credit transaction should be 
compensated by way of return (calculated as the spread received) commensurate with the risk 
of default (both on expected and unexpected losses), the credit exposure, and the recovery rate 
in the event of default. 
The second part of the thesis is largely empirical and looks at changes in perceived credit 
risk from three different perspectives. Changes in the credit quality of bond issuers are captured 
first by movements in credit spreads, second by rating revisions (downgrades and upgrades), 
and third by modelling and forecasting the downgrade probability. We outline below the aim of 
our investigations, their possible contributions, and the main results we achieved. 
In Chapter V we investigate the forces driving credit spread changes (and their volatility) as a 
proxy for a mark-to-market change in the credit quality of bond issuers. Credit spreads, 
computed as the difference between corporate and government yields of similar maturity, are a 
fundamental tool in fixed income analysis. Being theoretically attributable entirely to the 
corporation's default option, they are used as measures of relative value in the pricing models of 
corporate debt. 
Unlike most of the credit spreads literature, we follow a time series approach. The 
identification of a process that describes the dynamic evolution of credit spreads is of interest 
both to practitioners and academicians. This type of analysis is in line with the current need for 
a continuously updated information and for the understanding of the dynamic process of credit 
risk. This has implications for teen structure models of corporate yields, the pricing of credit 
derivatives, and methods for measuring credit risk. 
Banks have been devoting resources to the development of a benchmark model enabling 
them to set the credit spread on a loan sufficiently high to earn the bank target return on the 
economic capital that has to be set aside for the loan. Bond investors are also interested in 
understanding how credit spreads are determined in the market as essential element in their 
3 
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risk-reward analysis. A better comprehension of credit spreads will be beneficial for issuers too, 
by helping them to manage investor perception of their credit risk and ultimately improving 
their access to the capital markets. 
Modelling and predicting credit spreads volatility might have also risk management 
implications. If volatility increases so will Value at Risk (VaR). Investors may want to adjust 
their portfolios to reduce their exposure to those assets whose volatility is predicted to increase 
in order to achieve an optimal proportion of assets in the portfolio. Predictable volatility means 
also that assets directly depending on volatility, such as options, will change in value in a 
predictable fashion. Moreover, the returns investors earn on risky debt must not only 
compensate them for an higher average of default risk, but also for the risk that the credit 
spread could differ substantially from its historical average. Concluding, in a rational market, 
equilibrium asset prices will be affected by changes in volatility and investors who can reliably 
predict changes in credit spread volatility should be able to better control the risk associated to 
credit positions. 
Knowledge of the time series dynamics of credit spreads, and their basic relationships with 
variables of interest, is also useful when bonds of different credit ratings are actively traded 
and/or hedged. If the interest rate risk of a risky bond or debt portfolio has to be hedged using 
government bond based derivatives, traders have to know how the credit spread behaves with 
respect to interest rate changes to minimise basis risk. For example, hedge funds often take 
highly levered positions in corporate bonds while hedging away interest rate risk by shorting 
treasuries. As a consequence, their portfolios become extremely sensitive to changes in credit 
spreads rather than changes in bond yields. Finally, new hedging tools, the so-called credit 
derivatives, are priced on the basis of the credit spread (e. g. credit spread options). Evidently, 
the stochastic process followed by the credit spread has to be determined. 
The main results of our first empirical investigation can be summarised as follows. First, we 
find that credit spreads are characterised by a cyclical behaviour and by a clustering of outliers 
across time, which is symptomatic of a persistent volatility process. Second, the unconditional 
distribution of both credit spread levels and changes is found to be more peaked and fatter 
tailed than a nominal distribution. Third, credit spreads result to be integrated of order 1, and 
weak long-run co-movements (cointegration) are observed with the FTSE All Share return 
index. Fourth, credit spread levels and changes are not an izd process and they are 
characterised by mean reversion, nonlinearities and persistence in the conditional variance. 
Nonlinear dynamics and time-varying volatility structure are captured by a GARCH model able 
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to explain 30 percent of the variation in credit spreads using factors suggested by traditional 
models of default risk 
-return on the stock market, exchange rate, and the term premium. 
Finally credit spread volatility is found to be directional, rising with higher spreads. 
After studying the time series pattern of credit spreads, we narrow our analysis to look at 
spreads over a shorter time period around the announcement of rating revisions. In this case 
adjustments in the credit quality are captured by rating changes, and are measured by the spread 
between the re-graded bond and a stable bond with similar characteristics. Our aim is twofold. 
On one side, we want to assess the information value of bond ratings, on the other side, we 
want to look at the impact of the event on the spread volatility. This exercise is done in Chapter 
DTI. 
Research on whether bond-rating information is valuable has produced mixed results so far. 
The reason for this might be the lack of an established theoretical framework or the use of an 
incorrect methodology. We propose a new approach, an event-related GAR(H methodology, 
to directly address both spreads (Le., the differences between downgraded corporate bond 
yields and the yields of equal-maturity non downgraded bonds) mean and volatility dynamics 
surrounding rating change announcements. 
This work provides insight on the relative importance of downgrades and upgrades as 
conditioning factors and on their asymmetric behaviour. Moreover, testing yield reactions to 
rating changes may provide evidence of the joint hypothesis of market inefficiency and of non- 
publicly available information incorporated into the assigned ratings. This paper also offers 
preliminary evidence of the magnitude of the profitability of trading strategies following the 
announcement considered. 
Our main results are as follows. While downgrades are accompanied by a significant increase 
in the bond spreads during the announcement and post-announcement periods, the 
incremental information content of upward revisions is not statistically significant. An 
asymmetric effect is also observed on volatility. Upgrades are associated with significant 
increases in volatility during and around the event period The results are reversed in the case of 
downgraded bonds where volatility is significantly depressed uring and around the time the 
information is released. The persistence of volatility is also evaluated. Announcement shocks do 
not persist and rating information takes 1-2 days to be incorporated into yields. This implies 
that bond yields quickly incorporate public information and that the trading process does not 
generate persistent volatility in response to news. 
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The behaviour detected in the mean and volatility dynamics for downgrades and upgrades 
might be exploited accordingly to execute appropriate trading strategies. If it is known in aiuvue 
that a rating revision is taking place in the near future, one might anticipate changes in the mean 
(or variance) during the period preceding or following the disclosure and act consequently. 
According to our results there is evidence of significant cumulative abnormal returns for 
downgrades and various sub-samples of downgraded bonds even afto- the release of the new 
information. 
Finally we move away from a daily marked-to-market picture, to approach a longer-term (1- 
year) perspective. Also in line with the results from the event-related GARCH study, Chapter 
VII proceeds in budding a predictive model for the downgrade probability. While a large 
number of theoretical and empirical studies have provided evidence about the variables helpful 
in predicting bond ratings and defaults, no empirical work has been done to model directly the 
probability for a bond rating to be downgraded. We attempt to fill this gap identifying the bond 
and firm specific factors beneficial to predict a rating downgrade. 
Modelling transitions has started recently and only within the framework of rating transition 
matrices. Reasons for the early stage of these studies might be three. First, it was only recently 
that the rating agencies began releasing their data about rating actions. Second, most banks still 
think in "default mode". Because loan trading has developed only recently, they have just 
started to care about transitions short of default Third, transitions are not really a fundamental 
economic event, whereas default is. Transitions might be seen just as changes in the rating 
agencies' opinions, so modelling transitions means modelling the agencies opinions. Thus, the 
first question might be why caring about those opinions. 
However, it is increasingly common for banks to sell loans, to securivse loans, or to enter into 
credit swaps, all of which are means of transferring credit risk This has lead banks to shift from a 
"default mode" way of thinking to a transition short of default perspective. Moreover, despite 
default is considered the ultimate outcome, it is dearly not the only credit event. Events such as 
rating migration may have significant impact on the pricing of credit risk as documented in Chapter 
VL For an investor holding a bond, a downgrade in the bond's rating can result in a financial loss 
even if the bond's issuer has continued to make all scheduled payments. Furthermore, we may 
detect whether the causes of downgrade are different from the causes of outright failure. Finally, 
while a default model might be a fundamental tool during periods of exceptionally high failure rate, a 
downgrade model might serve more during periods of relative stability in the economy. 
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Having outlined the theoretical and practical justifications for a downgrade model, we want 
in particular to assess the role of company financial information and of credit quality in 
determining the downgrade probability of firms issuing sterling-denominated Eurobonds. To 
this scope we develop a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step the conditional 
expectation of default risk is estimated as a function of bond specific and firm specific 
characteristics by an ordered probit model. In the second step, we disentangle the impact of 
default risk 
-as obtained from the conditional mean estimate in step 1- from that of accounting 
ratios on the downgrade probability using a binary probit model. 
The model developed in the first step might be useful for updating ratings ahead of ratings 
agency announcements, monitoring short-term changes in the credit quality of corporate 
obligors, and identifying profitable bond strategies. This last contribution is of special interest in 
light of the evidence of significant cumulative abnormal returns and bond spreads reaction 
presented in Chapter VI 
We find that the probability of being assigned a higher rating class is inversely related to 
leverage, firm growth rate, and increases in tangible fixed assets. On the other hand, it is directly 
related to size, profitability, earnings coverage, and earnings' instabi ity. Moreover, a downgrade 
is less likely to happen in the presence of a negative pledge guarantee and when growth 
opportunities are higher. In contrast it is triggered by positive changes in tangible assets. There 
is also evidence of a non-linear relationship between leverage and downgrade probability on 
one side and risk of default and downgrade probability on the other side. Finally, accounting 
ratios and market-based risk measures result to be more informative for larger firms than for 
smaller firms. 
Further studies in this field may provide several practical benefits for risk measurement and 
management practices. A deep understanding of credit risk requires further contributions to 
keep the pace with the overall increase of risk in debt markets and with creation of innovative 
and complex types of securities. In an environment of increasing complexity and volatility of 
debt markets, the task of correctly measuring and forecasting credit risk becomes essential to 
investment decisions. Investors will require access to timely and adequate information regarding 
the true nature of their credit risk exposures. Equally there is an essential need for a framework 
of credit risk evaluation that enables comparisons across the new diversity of issues and issuers 
and that helps investors to price debt securities properly. Finally, market regulators stimulate 
further the development of new (internal) credit risk models and innovative ways to manage 
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credit risk in the ultimate attempt to improve the capital standards of financial institutions. 
Future research topics in these areas are proposed in the conclusions alongside with a brief ex 
post critical discussion of the thesis. 
PART ONE 
Chapter I: the Eurobond market 
Chapter I
THE EUROBOND MARKET 
This study is primarily concerned with credit risk in the sterling Eurobond market, generally 
neglected by the financial-academic literature despite its size and relevance. Therefore, we start off 
by introducing the reader to the basic conceptual issues and the existing literature related to this 
market. We also present an historical background of the developments of the whole Eurobond 
market from its birth to its current structure and composition. Finally, we narrow our attention to 
the sterling "portion" of the market to provide a brief description of the specific features of the 
bond issues constituting our database. In fact, some of the special characteristics we are going to 
discuss below are relevant for our successive mpirical analysis 
- 
ie., rating quality, tax treatment. 
1.1. Main features of the Eurobond market 
Domestic bonds are bonds issued by a domestic issuer in the domestic currency. They are 
subject o domestic law and are usually traded via a national clearing system. Unlike domestic 
bonds, Eurobonds are bonds underwritten by an international syndicate and sold in more than 
one country 
- 
in most cases mainly outside the issuer's country. The issuing currency is in most 
cases not the issuer's own currency. They are traded via the international Bearing-houses 
Eurodear or Cedel. Eurobonds differ also from foreign bonds, which are bonds issued by a 
foreign issuer but denominated in the domestic currency, subject o domestic law, and placed on 
the domestic market mainly through a domestic syndicate. 
The Eurobond market is virtually unregulated Although most issues are made in the London 
market and subject o UK law, it is a market in which self-regulation has worked remarkably well 
The result has been a market distinguished by its variety of participants and its products. In fact, 
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the US bond market has been influenced by many of the innovations coming from the 
Eurobond market, including floating-rate notes, zero-coupon bonds and convertible put bonds. 
Many Eurobond issues are placed privately. This avoids virtually all attempts at regulating this 
market The presence of huge underwriting syndicates helps to form the networks required to 
assure placement of large issues. Bond issues are typically underwritten by a syndicate of banks 
and financial institutions. To help place such issues, many work to give such bond issues a liquid 
secondary market. Banks can do this by acting as market makers and by actively trading their own 
portfolios of Eurobonds. Many issues are accompanied by sinking funds or purchase funds. In 
both cases the company commits to a gradual bond buy-back, increasing the market liquidity. Call 
provisions sometimes are also included to allow the issuer to benefit (partially) from the falling 
interest rates. 
Aar* levels in the Eurobond market has fluctuated over time, as these bonds are sometimes 
dose substitutes for other financial instruments. Like other Euro-markets, they are rapidly 
evolving financial products that change in response to changing regulations, market conditions 
and oppomuiities. 
Why does the Eumknd Market exist? 
Like most of the rest of the euromarkets, Eurobonds exist because innovative competitive firms 
found a market niche for them. The waxing and waning of their popularity reflect their 
competitiveness with other financial products both as other products evolve, and as regulations 
vary. To understand their niche and competitors, we should understand their link to the domestic 
bond market, the Eurocredit markets, and the swap market. 
Firms will issue Eurobonds just as long as such bonds are competitive with domestic bonds, one 
key factor being the cost, both in money and time, to issue the bond. From this perspective, 
Eurobonds can look attractive as long as they can avoid delaying regulations and sharp competition 
keeping underwriting costs low. Tax implications are also relevant. Unlike the U. S. (and some other 
nations) where publicly issued bonds must be registered Eurobonds are usually bearer bonds. This 
helps to streamline bond issues and lower administration costs. Since there is no central record of 
ownership, declaring the coupon payments received on personal income taxes is left for the honour 
of the individual Just as importantly, this means there is no wiinffig tax on interest payments. 
Finally, the presence of any arbitrage opportunity that lowers the cost of financing should be taken 
into account. Note that some investors may have only limited access to the Eurobond markets, 
while risk perceptions may differ between the Euro and the domestic markets. 
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As far as the relationship of Eurobonds we Eurocunency loans is concerned, evolution has 
brought the Eurobanking market much closer to the Eurobond market in terms of the services 
they provide. Both offer fast cash in large quantities in a choice of currencies. Both offer 
syndication of risk and underwrite the sale of the firm's paper. As a result, the line between the 
two has blurred somewhat However, Eurobonds have typically longer maturities and provide 
only annual coupons payments. Moreover, note issuance facilities (NI 
- 
ie. a facility that 
guarantees the company the right to borrow from a group of banks up to some agreed maximum 
- 
and loans put more conditions on how the business must be run, while Eurobonds do not This 
means that a good reputation (and therefore a good bond rating) does matter more for 
Eurobonds. 
Finally the growth of the Eurobond market should be related to the introduction of swap 
contracts. Swaps are designed to cover the foreign-exchange risk associated with servicing 
outstanding bonds. Therefore, borrowing via Eurobonds and swapping the risks gives the 
equivalent of a domestic bond. Moreover, since domestic and foreign lenders may have different 
opinions of the borrowers, the rates offered might be different. 
1.2. Research studies on Eurobonds 
Mendelson (1972) is the first paper addressing specifically to the Eurobond market (EM) and 
its relation to the Eurodollar market. The paper inquires into the Eurobond market potency and 
limitations as an integrative force within the capital markets. The limitations of integration are 
explained in terms of legal impediments and of the structural character of the securities industry. 
Mahajan and Fraser (1986) conduct a study to test the null hypothesis that no yield 
differentials exist between similar securities in the Eurobond and US bond markets. A sample of 
dollar Eurobond and domestic bond issues is carefully matched on five criteria. the same parent 
company, the same ratings, comparable coupon rates, comparable time to maturity, and yield 
observations belonging to the same month Results support the null hypothesis. Market 
participants on the supply and demand side in the dollar Eurobond market and the US bond 
markets are able to arbitrage away yield differences. Finally, the issue size, the issuer's rating, and 
the market's familiarity with the issuer do not influence Eurobond pricing differently than 
domestic US bond pricing. 
Kim and Stulz (1989) using a sample of 183 Eurobonds issued by US corporations during the 
period 1975-1985, present evidence of a significant positive stock-price reaction to the 
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announcement of Eurobond issues. The pattern of abnormal returns over time is explained by 
the clientele hypothesis, which states that firms can increase shareholders' wealth by exploiting 
their comparative advantage in providing securities that are high in demand by a financial clientele. 
The hypothesis implies that, for periods of time, some firms can borrow at lower costs in the 
Eurobond market han in the domestic bond market. An estimate of the gains that accrue from 
issuing debt in the Eurobond market can be obtained This estimate is helpful in explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in the stock-price responses to announcements of Eurobond offerings. 
Beer (1995) provides a broad outline of the origin of the US dollar segment of the Eurobond 
market, its functioning, its legal aspects, and its future prospects. In addition, the actual 
characteristics of the market are studied using a sample of US denominated Eurobonds issued by 
European, Japanese, and US companies. The evidence indicates that the US dollar Eurobond 
market shares have dropped The evidence also shows that issues by US companies have the 
longer life and the highest coupons. Four features have been shown to differentiate Eurobonds 
from domestic bonds: i) Eurobonds are of shorter maturity with a greater degree of sinking fund 
provisions; ii) Eurobonds are virtually free of regulation by monetary authorities; iii) in the EM, 
annual payments are typical; and iv) Eurobonds attract different investors than other bonds. 
Batten, Ellis and Hogan (1999) investigate the scaling relationships for daily credit spreads, 
from January 1986 to May 1998, between AAA, AA and A rated Australian dollar denominated 
Eurobonds for various maturities. They find dear evidence of a credit teen structure and co- 
movement in credit spreads by maturity. The credit spread return series is found to be time 
variant, leptokunic, autocorrelated and exhibited different degrees of negative long-term 
dependence. 
Clare et al. (2000) present evidence of the systematic relationship between macroeconomic 
and financial sources of risk and the U. S. dollar Eurobond market between 1992 and 1997. A 
small set of macroeconomic and financial variables, more frequently used to model the equity risk 
premium, can help explain the Eurobond risk premium. They are the default premium, the term 
premium, the exchange rate, a measure of unexpected inflation, and the return on the S&P. This 
multifactor model is applied to the problem of tilting portfolios to insulate returns against the 
individual sources of systematic risk. 
Abou-Zeid and Savvides (1995) investigate the determinants of the yield on Eurobonds 
denominated in the European Currency Unit (ECU). Results show that the yield on ECU 
Eurobonds depends significantly on investors' perception of the attractiveness of such bonds, and 
that such attractiveness is negatively related to the real return on DM-denominated Eurobonds, 
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while the ECU/dollar exchange rate and the yield on Eurodollar bonds do not significantly 
influence attractiveness. 
Batten, Hogan and Pynnonen (2000) investigate the long-term equilibrium relationship 
between Australian dollar bonds of different credit quality. The results suggest that yields of 
different risk classes of Eurobonds are cointegrated with one another, with the higher-rated bond 
yields tending to lead the lower-rated yields. The paper also demonstrates that the cointegration 
relationship can be utilised in modelling the dynamics of the spread changes between Eurobonds 
and Government bonds. 
Nickell, Pemaudin and Varotto (2001) use price data on large dollar-denominated Eurobond 
portfolios to backtest systematically rating-based and equity-based credit risk models. Korean 
convertible Eurobonds are valued by Bailey, Chung and Kang (1996). Athanassacos and Schnabel 
(1997) empirically assess stockholder wealth gains from the issuance of Canadian dollar 
denominated Eurobonds, in lieu of domestic bonds, for a sample of Canadian firms which 
employed both types of bond financing during the period 1983-1990. Esho, Lam and Sharpe 
(1999) examine the determinants of incremental debt financing decisions made by large Asian 
firms from ten countries over the period 1989-1998. Their results suggest hat floatation costs, 
agency costs and renegotiation and liquidation risk affect the choice between obtaining a 
syndicated bank loan or making a public issue in either Eurobond of foreign bond markets. 
Merk (1999) uses Republic of Argentina US dollar-denominated Eurobonds to estimate the 
impact of the Russian default crisis on the expected recovery ratio and the default probability term 
structure on Argentine credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices. De Almeida, Duarte, and Augusto 
(1998) identify and simulate the most important factors driving the movements of a term 
structure of interest rates in the Brasilian Eurobond market Scholtens (1999) focuses on the 
relationship between Eurobond yield differentials and country risk in the 1990s by calculating 
rank correlations for more than a dozen countries - both developing countries and industrialised 
ones. 
1.3. Development and future of the Eurobond market 
The impetus leading to the emergence of the Eurobond market and the influences that led to 
it being based in London arose principally as a result of the political and economic environment 
in the international capital markets after the Second World War, and the economic, monetary and 
fiscal measures undertaken by the US monethary authorities between the late 1950s and the early 
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1970s to redress the substantial US balance of payment deficits. Equally important was the 
regulatory environment in the major European and Japanese financial markets, which contributed 
directly and indirectly to the development of the Euromatkets. 
Ongin mzdgmzuh ofthe Eurkndmarket 
In the early days of the Eurobond market, before institutional investors came to play a 
significant role in the market, most issues were sold to groups of private investors, or to banks 
that dealt on their behalf. These retail investors, who stiU pay an important role in the market are 
attracted to these instruments because they are free from withholding tax, and the bearer nature 
of the bond in that it is a security for which the main determinant of ownership is the possession 
of the certificate and the attached coupons, as opposed to a registered security where ownership is 
recorded by the issuer, offers them anonymity. 
Political and economic factors played a major role in the development of the Euromarkets. 
Possibly the earliest political factor of significance to contribute to the emergence of the 
Euromarkets was the Soviet and the Eastern block fear of their US dollar deposits by the US 
government as a result of some unforeseen development in the cold war. The Soviet bloc 
authorities transferred their US dollar balances to Western European banks outside the control of 
the US government and courts. These funds were then invested profitably as US dollar 
denominated currency loans via the European banks, giving birth to the Euromarket. 
When banks found that these deposits could be used profitably they started to actively trade 
them London banks began to use dollars to finance trade and make loans outside the restrictions 
of the Bank of England. The demand for these deposits was boosted by the restrictions imposed 
in 1957 on the use of sterling by third parties to finance trade credit in order to reduce the 
country's vulnerability to the threat of a politically induced currency crisis. In their attempt to 
overcome this restriction and maintain what was a highly profitable business UK banks used US 
dollars to finance the foreign trade activities previously financed in sterling. 
This embryonic market was given a boost by regulations introduced by the US monetary 
authorities on domestic interest rates. Regulation Q imposed a relatively low deposit ceiling, and a 
relatively high lending floor. This ceiling encouraged the diversion of funds from the US to the 
Euromarkets. In contrast to the low deposit rate, a relatively high lending rate drove US high- 
grade or credit-rated borrowers to resort to the Euromarks. 
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The outflow of US dollars in the early 1960s had created balance of payment problems for the 
United States. To redress the persistent US balance of payment deficit, the US government 
enacted the Interest Equalisation Tax (IET) in July 1963. This was the imposition of a levy of up 
to 15% on all purchases by US citizens of foreign debt and equity from Western Europe, Canada 
and Japan. The IET was followed in 1965 by a voluntary programme (later turned in a legal 
constraint) intended to stop the flow of funds from the US domestic economy in view of the 
escalating cost of the Vietnam war. These measures were responsible for the flow of net 
investment in favour of the US, but they also created a unified European capital market. They 
were also partly responsible for the creation and development of the Eurobond market and the 
internationalisation of investment banking. 
The restricted amount of domestic funds that US firms could use to finance their overseas 
activities forced them to rely further on the Eurocurrency market. Moreover, European investors 
had a huge appetite for bonds issued by well 
-known US firms. These factors created 
opportunities for the European financial centres to compete with the United States to provide 
capital for foreign borrowers. As most of the European markets were diverse and highly 
regulated, London, being in an advantageous position, adopted the role of an entrepot for foreign 
capital, by lending and borrowing foreign capital. Several specific measures were undertaken by 
the UK monetary authorities to make London market more attractive to non-residents. The issue 
of bearer securities was again permitted and the tax on security transfers or sale was also reduced. 
Investment bankers for their part developed the technique of floating these issues of bonds 
denominated in US dollars or any alternative currency in ways which avoided both restrictions on 
borrowing in local currency, by placing the issue outside the country of currency denomination. 
This became known as the Eurobond market 
The stimulus to Eurodollar borrowing by US banks was the 1966 US monetary restraint 
programme, under which the discount and the prime rates were raised with the effect to cause 
interest rates on secondary market commercial deposit to rise to levels above the regulation Q 
ceiling. This created an interest rate differential in favour of the Eurodollar market and ultimately 
induced banks to withdraw from CD instruments, leading to huge reserve losses. In an attempt to 
finance these reserve losses, US banks turned to borrowing in the Euromackers, increasing their 
liabilities to their overseas branches. The large volume of US borrowing exerted a strong impact 
and had a few long-term repercussions on the Eurodollar market. 
In the 1970s the currency market opened up to the Eurobond market, when the first Australia 
dollar issue was launched in 1972. This was a dual currency A$ issue, where interest and principal 
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were to be repaid at the investors' option either in Australian dollars or in Deutschmarks. A dual 
currency Eurobond is generally a bond issued in one currency bearing a coupon in that or 
another currency, upon redemption the principal can be paid in a different, usually a major, 
currency. Dual currency Eurobond issues involve investors in a forward foreign exchange 
transaction, but they are compensated in two ways for assuming the currency risk. Firstly, the 
coupon rate on the bond is usually higher than that available to holders of a comparable straight 
Eurobond issue. Secondly, the redemption amount usually includes a premium above the 
prevailing spot rate. The borrower, on the other hand, obtains relatively low cost finance without 
exchange rate risk The proceeds of the issue are converted to a preferred currency at the spot 
rate. The issuer also chooses the currency to which interest payments are to be converted, at a 
forward rate fixed at the time of issue for the life of the bond. 
In 1975 the first pre-priced deal took place. In a pre-priced deal the lead manager and its 
syndicate price and underwrite the whole of the issue, thereby substantially reducing the number 
of participants in the managing and selling group. In this kind of deal the competition in 
underwriting is much fiercer than in a traditional deal, where a syndicate is formed and terms 
agreed between its members after a period of open pricing to determine the final price that will 
ensure the success of the issue. With the introduction of pre-priced deals the syndicate members 
had to anticipate market conditions before the issue was placed, which would consequently 
increase the members' risk exposure. 
The advent of right wing governments in the major industrialised countries in the 1980s, with 
market-oriented policies, introduced a constant deregulation and elimination of barriers in their 
financial markets. This, coupled with the steady decline of interest rates between 1982 and 1986, 
led to a spectacular growth in the volume of new issues. This growth made possible the 
introduction of swaps, exchange rate options, futures, and commodity linked products. These, in 
turn, enabled both borrowers and investors to hedge their positions and to reduce most of the 
traditional risk associated with international investment. 
The 1980s also saw the emergence of the institutional investor as a major player in the 
Eurobond market, resulting in larger issues and bigger average sizes. Japanese investors and 
borrowers also became major players in the market in the 1980s, partly as a result of Japan's 
substantial trade surplus between 1981 and 1987, and partly due to the rise in value of the Tokyo 
stock market. The latter made possible for Japanese issuers to place substantial equity-linked and 
convertible Eurobond products at a cheaper all-in-cost than was possible in their domestic 
markets. 
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The 1980s experienced also the introduction of the bought deal, where the investment bank 
gives a firm comm=ent to buy the entire issue outright from the issuing firm, and then 
undertakes to arrange the syndicate, participating and underwriting. This differs from a stand by 
commitment, where the syndicate agrees to buy the unsold part of an issue, and from a best effort 
commitment, where the syndicate agrees to use its best effort to sell the issue. Bought deals mean 
that the investment banks involved have to allocate more capital to each issue as they may find 
themselves with large quantities of unsold paper if the market moves against them or if 
syndication is not successful. On the other hand this form of issue favours the borrower, who can 
time the acceptance of the deal to the most opportune moment in terms of interest rates. 
In July 1984 the US authorities lifted the 30% withholding tax on interest paid byUS issuers to 
non-resident investors. The outcome of this was that the traditional relationship between US 
dollar Eurobonds and foreign bonds, where the yield on foreign bonds was higher because of the 
withholding tax, started to fade. This liberalisation spread to other markets in 1985, particularly to 
the yen and the Deutschmark sectors. The cautious decline in US interest rate levels in 1985, 
which was accompanied by an approximately 16% depreciation i  the value of the US dollar on a 
trade weighted basis, enhanced liberalisation efforts in the non-US dollar sector of the Eurobond 
market. Non US dollar denominated Eurobond issues grew in popularity, while the growth of the 
dollar sector declined. The Euroyen market continued to expand as a consequence of continued 
relaxation in the Japanese financial markets as well as swap-driven Euroyen issues. Asset swaps 
also came into prominence with over US$10 billion of existing fixed rate Eurobonds being re- 
packaged and re-issued as high yielding FRNs by the use of interest rate swaps. The FRN market 
became the fastest growing sector of the Eurobond market from 1984 to 1986. This enabled 
issuers to successfully place novel and innovative instruments such as the reverse FRN, high 
margin FRNs and collateralised mortgage obligations, as well as introducing new currencies of 
denomination. 
The inverting of the yield curve as a result of the rise in short-term interest rates between 1987 
and 1990 created problems for the bond market, bringing the long bull market to an end as 
investors switched their holdings to cash or near cash instruments. Liquidity vanished and many 
traders stopped quoting prices. Intense competition and narrowing margins, on one side, and 
falling interest rates, on the other side, induced most issuers to go into fixed rate funding or the 
more flexible Eurocommercial paper market The problems in the FRN market were the first 
sign that the growth of the Eurobond was coming to an end. In 1987 new issue activity dropped 
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for the first time since 1980. The drop in public debt issued by sovereign borrowers reduced the 
liquidity of the market because of the small size of most corporate bonds. 
The stock market crash in October 1987 made matters worse. The effect was to add to the 
weakness of the Eurobond market, in spite of the accepted conventional wisdom that in periods 
of falling equity values investors will switch to fixed income securities. Any switch to bonds was 
confined to government issues as investors looked for protection in high quality paper. Falling 
equity prices affected the credit standing of corporate Eurobond issuers and this helped depress 
prices further, while government bonds behaved as expected and increased in value. Since most 
bond traders had gone short of the market, this created a general problem of finding paper to 
cover their exposed positions. Liquidity in government bonds started to dry up and the spread 
between government bonds and Eurobonds widened, turning hedged positions in Eurobonds 
into losses. 
The advent of event risk from 1988 onwards caused by the use of junk bonds for leverage 
buyouts and other unforeseen special events meant hat corporate debt was avoided by investors, 
who took flight into quality names, namely issues by sovereign states and supranationals. 
Borrowers and investors began to rely on currency diversification as means of increasing their 
portfolio returns and reducing their exchange rate risk, prompting increased holdings in issues 
denominated in currencies uch as the ECU, sterling, the Canadian dollar as high yielding 
alternatives to the US dollar. 
Amid all this gloom, however, issues in US dollar values in the Eurobond market continued to 
increase. In the sterling sector, Eurosterling issues for the first time outstripped UK gilt volumes, 
especially during 1988. The effect of this capital inflow was a fall in sterling interest rates, which in 
turn affected the attraction of the currency, as well as narrowing spreads. The steady decline in 
short-term rate in 1991, as a result of attempts by the US authorities and the governments of 
most other English-speaking countries to reduce recessionary pressures in their economies, 
resulted in record issuing activity in the Eurobond market in 1991. 
Cr rnt state 
Over the last few years the significance of the Eurobond market has assumed an increasingly 
important role as a conduit for the financing of public and private-sector issuers. Figure 1.1 shows 
the annual Eurobond issue volume in Euroland currencies. It has tripled since the beginning of 
the 1990s thus impressively underlining the enormous dynamics and growing significance of this 
market segment Within the overall Euroland bond market Eurobonds play an important role 
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with a volume outstanding of ECU 628 bn (as of end of the first quarter of 1997) with 
government bonds and bank bonds predominating (Figure 1.2). 
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The clearly dominating issuing currency on the Eurobond market (Figure 1.3) is the US dollar 
(USD). In mid-1998, the USD accounted for roughly USD 1 tr or 38% of the total volume. This 
is due to the history of the Eurobond market (regulation Q, collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system) and the position of the USD as the most important trade and reserve currency. The most 
recent developments, however, show that Eurobonds in Deutschmarks (DEM), lira (ITL) and 
French franc (FRF) are catching up. Before the start of EMU the outstanding volume of all 
Euroland Eurobonds (approximately USD 900 bn) accounted for 35% 
- 
almost the share of 
USD Eurobonds (Figure 1.3). 
Leaving these two large blocks aside, the EU-4 block (i. e. the pound Sterling (GBP), the 
Danish krone (DKK), the Swedish krone (SEK), and the Greek drachma (GRD)) account for 
USD 335 bn or 13% of market capitalisation, with the GBP alone accounting for USD 315 bn or 
12% of market capitalisation. Apart from the traditional importance of the GBP as issuing 
currency, the revaluation of the British currency after the currency crises in Europe in 1992 has 
contributed to this increased weight measured in USD. Furthermore, investors who used to be or 
still are wary of the EUR regard the GBP as a diversification alternative to Euroland currencies. 
The fourth largest block are Eurobonds denominated in yen (1PY) with USD 262 bn or 10% of 
the total. The Canadian, Australian and New Zealand dollars (CAD/AUD/NZD) only play a 
subordinate role on the Eurobond pauket with 4% or USD 92 bn. 
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The analysis of the structure of the Eurobond market cannot neglect issues like maturity and 
type of issuer. Figure 1.5 shows the maturity structure of Eurobonds as of end of 1998. It is based 
on the original maturities at issuance. The chart reveals that Eurobonds with an original maturity 
of four to seven years prevail In the last few years, issuance of bonds with a maturity from eight 
to ten years has increased to cover the growing demand by institutional investors who wanted to 
profit from the steep yield curve and the ongoing rally on the international bond markets. The 
share of bonds with a short maturity (one to three years) and maturities over 10 years is rather 
small. As far as the sterling Eurobonds' maturity structure is concerned, a detailed presentation of 
the dynamics of the maturity composition from 1992 to 1999 is offered in Appendix [A]. From 
this analysis it emerges the decreasing portion of 7-10 years maturity bonds (from 40% in 1992 to 
20% in 1999) and the increasing importance of 3-7 years maturity bonds (from only 3% in 1993 
to 30% in 1999). 
The composition of issuers on the Eurobond market is very heterogeneous. We can 
distinguish the following main groups: private and public financial institutions, states, supra- 
nationals, corporations and local or regional entities. Financial institutions comprise banks and 
insurers, with banks surpassing insurance companies in issuance volume. Private and public 
financial institutions used to be the most active issuers in the past. The volume of Eurobonds 
issued by them accounts for USD 295 bn or USD 202 bn respectively, i. e. 34% or 22% of all 
bonds issued in Euroland currencies. The most important borrowers are German and French 
institutions. Among public financial institutions the volume of German borrowers is by far the 
largest. 
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The third rank among issuers is taken by the group of states. The total outstanding of 
Eurobonds issued by them accounts for roughly a fifth of the overall volume. Primarily European 
industrialised states such as Italy and Spain belong to this group. The largest emerging market 
issuer is Argentina. Its first DEM Eurobond was issued in the mid-1990s. Since then market 
capitalisation has constantly increased so that Argentina meanwhile occupies the tenth rank 
among issuers on the Euroland Euromarket. Half of these bonds are denominated in DEM. 
Other emerging market issuers play nothing but a subordinate role for the time being. 
With a market share of 13%, supranational institutions rank fourth among issuers. The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) is by far not only the largest issuer among supranational 
institutions but even among all issuers on the Eurobond market. The outstanding volume of its 
bonds accounts for 7% of all Eurobonds. As the financing institute of the European Union its 
tasks comprise the support of projects furthering the integration of member states. 
Corporate bonds have played a minor role on the Eurobond market in the past. Their share 
covers only 10%. Also the bond volume of regional and local entities, i. e. provinces and 
municipalities, is still negligible. However, they 
- 
as well as corporate bonds 
- 
show a significant 
growth potential. 
In the UK Eurobond market, the composition by issuer has been rather stable in time with 
financial, industrial, and government issuers covering 45%, 30%, and 20% of the market, 
respectively. 
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Another important characteristic for selection and pricing of a bond is its liquidity. Liquidity is 
mainly determined by the outstanding volume and investor st ucture. The bonds issued by 
different issuer groups differ largely in their average loan principal. This is, on the one hand, 
caused by the size of the individual issuer, and on the other hand, by its capital needs. For 
example, an industrialised state such as Italy can act differently as an issuer on the capital market 
than a corporation. Since there are also differences between issuers of one group, the volumes of 
the bonds issued by them partly differ largely, too. 
Eurobonds issued by states have the largest average volume. By mid 1998 its value ran at USD 
455 m (Figure 1.7). Italy and Spain have the largest issuance volumes with an average of over 
USD 1 billion. Although the outstanding total of Eurobonds issued by the Republic of Argentina 
surpasses Spain and Italy, the average loan principal is only one third. Further liquid bonds are 
issued mainly by supranational institutions. The most frequent issuer showing at the same time 
the largest average issuance volume is the EIB. Bonds issued by private financial institutions and 
corporations tend to have the lowest average loan principal. 
The liquidity of a bond is closely tied to the structure of its investors. Issuers try to tailor their 
Eurobonds to the needs of their investors so that they can be well placed. Basically, investors can 
be split up in two groups: institutional and private investors. Institutional investors usually focus 
on liquidity and credit standing. Therefore, they are an important target group for liquid 
Eurobonds issued by industrialised states, supranational institutions and partly by large public 
financial institutions. The influence of investor needs on the structure of outstanding bonds was 
underlined by the following development which started in the mid-1990s. In the face of the steep 
yield curve in Europe and the permanent rally on the international bond markets many 
institutional investors extended the duration of their portfolios. The growing demand of long 
bonds led to increased issuance of Eurobonds with longer maturities by industrialised states and 
supranational institutions. 
For a long time, private investors used to be the most important investors on the Eurobond 
market. Since this group often favours a buy-and-hold strategy the liquidity of a bond is of minor 
importance to them. Bonds mainly held by private investors, therefore, tend to be less liquid. 
Instead of going for price gains private investors usually prefer a higher coupon, which they 
achieve by buying bonds issued by borrowers of a lower or at least not a first-rate credit standing. 
These are primarily emerging markets and corporations. 
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In the short-term the leading players in the Eurobond market will continue to be the 
supranational organizations (EIB will be one of the leading issuers, since around the 85% of its 
outstanding debt is in Emu currencies) and government agencies (CADES in France and KFW 
in Germany) rather than sovereign borrowers themselves. Though sovereign borrowers will no 
doubt continue to have a presence in the Eurobond market, the severe budget constraints 
imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and the stronger captive domestic market of retail investors 
should influence them to opt to issue more domestically. 
As the EMU gets under way, there is also significant growth potential with regard to the 
market for corporate and municipal bonds. However, we believe that several are the obstacles 
that will prevent an immediate development: the fairly limited propensity of European companies 
to fund themselves through the debt markets, the strong competition of structured banking 
products such as revolving credit facilities which often allow greater financing flexibility to 
corporate bonds, the presence of bureaucratic constraints in the case of municipalities wishing to 
tap the market for their funding, the decentralisation of taxation powers that will occur only 
gradually for many countries. 
The start of EMU has not immediately influenced the legal framework of the Eurobond 
market. In spite of this, issuer behaviour is reckoned to change fundamentally. This is directly 
caused by the fact that from the viewpoint of currencies, monetary union leads to an 
amalgamation of the majority of what used to be foreign markets into one common Euroland 
bond market. This will drastically reduce the future foreign market and the share of foreign 
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issuers. Figure 1.8 shows that the Euro countries themselves account for roughly two thirds of 
the total EUR Eurobond market. This is a volume of USD 540 bn. The outs UK, Denmark, and 
Greece have a share of only 7% or USD 63 bn. Supranational issuers launched 13% or 
approximately USD 120 bn with supranationals from the EU accounting for two thirds. Only the 
"remainder" of a fifth is issued by non-EU countries uch as the US and Canada (8%) and Japan. 
As to the nationality of issuers, one has to differentiate between two groups. Only indirect 
changes will concern the group of issuers non-resident in Euroland. For them, the introduction of 
EUR means that they can attract the interest of a larger group of investors particularly if they had 
issued only bonds in one Euroland currency in the past. Due to the significance of the European 
bond market which becomes the second largest bond market in the world more and more 
foreign borrowers are likely to use this market. States as well as private issuers should increasingly 
issue Eurobonds denominated in EUK 
The group of issuers resident in Euroland will face partly fundamental changes. In particular 
states such as Italy and Finland used to issue Eurobonds denominated in ECU or another 
Euroland foreign currency in the past to diversify their investor base. For a long time, arbitrage 
trades between the individual markets were another eason. With the introduction of EUR issuers 
can address all investors resident in Euroland with domestic bonds per se. The transparency of 
markets will further increase and arbitrage possibilities will vanish. Important reasons for a 
Eurobond issue will thus be eliminated However, particularly for smaller states such as Finland 
and Portugal marketing their bonds via an international syndicate, i. e. via the euro-market, will 
remain attractive specially when investors outside Euroland are to be attracted. Since the share of 
Eurobonds issued by these small states is relatively small this market segment will probably 
decline. 
The situation is somewhat different for the issuer groups of financial institutions and 
corporations. The amalgamation of the bond markets will certainly also affect their investor base. 
But there were other reasons apart from investor base why corporations and financial institutions 
decided to issue Eurobonds. These were primarily taxes and law. For example, due to the limited 
duty to publish an issuing prospectus issuing a Eurobond is often easier than issuing a domestic 
bond Since the legal framework will not be changed in the short run these advantages will 
continue to exist. 
The different behaviour of issuer groups will influence the stnictuire of the Eurobond market. 
Approximately a fifth of the outstanding volume of all EUR Eurobonds was issued by states. 
Eurobonds by the 11 member states (as at 1998) account for almost half (Figure 1.9). These 
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Eurobonds will gradually disappear. The share of issuers such as corporations, emerging markets, 
and supranational institutions will, however, grow. The last two years have already seen more 
Eurobonds denominated in Euroland currencies by foreign corporations for example from the 
UK and US. 
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Furthermore, issuers from emerging markets will have a stronger bearing. The box 
miscellaneous in Figure 1.8 comprises mainly these issuers (of course with the exception of Japan 
and Switzerland whose volume is, however, negligible). Among the emerging markets, Argentina, 
Mexico, Hungary, Brazil, Turkey, Russia, the Czech Republic, and Poland are worth to be 
mentioned. 
This development also shifts the rating structure of the Eurobond market. Since states with a 
top-class rating will withdraw and, at the same time, issuer groups with a regularly lower rating will 
increasingly use the euro market the total rating level on the Eurobond market will decrease. This 
pattern has already been recognised in the sterling market, where AA-rated issuers have been 
replaced by A- and BBB- rated issuers (see Appendix [All). At the same time, rating should 
become more and more common despite the high costs since it is increasingly demanded by 
international investors and is likely to become a srne-qtu-n for a successful, tightly priced 
and broadly based issuance on the Eurobond market. On the whole, the Euroland market should 
get closer to the USD Eurobond market (Figures 1.10 and 1.11). 
The monetary union will, furthermore, entail growing competition among investment banks. 
Particularly European investment banks will compete stronger with one another because the 
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common currency abolishes the advantage for individual banks of playing at home. On the 
whole, the variety of currencies and issuers will stay around also in the "new" EUR Eurobond 
market. Due to the high share of EUR countries on the international bond markets in EMU 
currencies, the traditional division between domestic and foreign markets will hardly survive the 
next few years. The introduction of EUR in fact turns roughly two thirds of today's EUR 
Eurobond market into a EUR domestic market. The remaining new EUR Eurobond market is 
dominated by issuers from the developed markets outside Euroland, above all the EUR-4 (ui 
particular the UK), the US, Japan, and Canada as well as by supranational issuers. The same 
applies in analogy to the currencies USD, GBP, JPY, and CAD for the international Eurobond 
market. In both categories emerging markets play a rather subordinate role. Their weight should, 
however, increase 
- 
if crises are stabilised. This holds primarily true for Eurobonds from South 
Afiica (attractive yields) and emerging Europe, in particular Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic (the new "convergence play"). 
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The 20% witl iddmg tax p wsal 
The pending proposal of a 20% withholding tax application to be deducted by agent banks on 
all interest earned by private investors residents in the EU has been strongly contested by all 
Eurobond market participants. The withholding tax would only apply to individual investors 
"avoiding domestic tax" and not to pension funds or institutional investors. By charging the tax at 
source, the proposed 20% savings tax is intended to stop individuals in high-tax countries such as 
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Germany from moving investments to countries with low or no tax on the interest on them or 
on non-residents' savings. Because of its attractiveness to non-residents, the UK has cornered the 
Eurobond market. By issuing Eurobonds, companies can borrow money over a longer period 
than they could at the bank without renewing the loan, and investors getan attractive rate of 
interest. But if the legislation is passed, banks in which the interest from investing in Eurobonds is 
deposited will have to notify non-residents' tax authorities or withhold 20%. 
If this proposal were to be passed into law, it would be a downfall for the Eurobond market, 
as it would affect between 5% and 7% of the outstanding bonds. The gxxs-up dauw application 
(according to which the investor's income loss due to changes in taxation would be compensated 
directly by the issuer) would involve an outright loss for investors since the issuer may reimburse 
bond at par. Moreover, were such a tax to be implemented, it would prompt a Euro Eurobond 
market's flight of funds toward Eurodollars and EuroYen. Despite it will be probably very 
difficult to get this proposal enacted into law, were it to be approved, it would pave the way for 
the disappearance of the Euromarket in the Emu area, and it would anticipate the fiscal 
harmonization process within the EU. 
Sterling Eurobond ata 
The sterling Eurobond data used in this study are from ISMA and Datastream International. 
We collected information from January 1991 until December 1999. We remind that the 
Eurobonds for which ISMA provides information must have a price history since their issue date 
and must also be quoted by at least three market makers. The prices of the bonds in the sample 
are therefore not based on matrix pricing. In the Appendix [A] we present information about 
issuing volume, rating, sector, maturity for the sterling Eurobonds issued over the sample period 
1992-1999. 
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Chapter II 
THE NATURE OF CREDIT RISK 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with the main theoretical concepts and general 
issues relevant to the study and modelling of credit risk. The reader is first introduced to the 
discussion of credit risk along its main dimensions and statistical properties. We highlight that 
credit risk is a continuum with multiple states with each state representing an associated 
probability of default. This represents the first step towards the quantification and identification of 
credit risk. The focus is then posed on the conceptual differences between credit risk and market 
risk While it is important that they are separately identified, the recognition of their interactions is 
essential in the correct modelling of credit risk We conclude discussing the rapid expansion of 
credit markets and the factors that will stimulate the analysis of credit risk beyond the present role. 
2.1. Credit risk definition and dimensions 
Credit risk is defined as the loss in the event of default of the borrower, or in the event of a 
deterioration of the borrower's credit quality. In the case of traded omits credit risk is the 
potential decrease in value generated by a change in credit standing during the holding period, 
while the risk in a bank loan lies primary in the possibility that the borrower may not be able to 
make scheduled payments. Credit risk can arise also from other sources such as cash payments, 
long-term supply contracts, derivatives and other off-balance sheet contracts. The definition of 
credit risk and the risk premium investors require to assume the risk of higher losses can be 
developed further along its four major dimensions: default risk, credit migration risk, exposure 
risk, and recovery risk. 
A default event can take the shape of a missed payment 
-when a scheduled payment has not 
been made for a minimum period after the due date-, a broken covenant or technical default - 
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when a financial ratio hits and breaks an upper or lower bound-, or an economic default 
-when 
the economic value of assets goes below the value of outstanding debts. Rating agencies consider 
that default occurs when a contractual payment has been missed for at least three months. Note 
that the various events of default do not necessarily generate immediate losses, but they certainly 
increase the likelihood of ultimate default, which is bankruptcy. 
Credit migration risk captures less extreme changes in credit quality. In the case of a corporate 
bond, credit risk takes the format not just of default or insolvency risk 
-in which case the credit 
exposure is simply the face value of the bond-, but also of credit spread changes and thereby 
market values, changes in credit ratings, and generic hanges in credit quality 
-in which case the 
credit exposure is given by the decrease in the price of the bond. Although it is usually the first 
stage of the financial distress of a firm, is the most important stage for the bondholders. In 
general, except for the lowest credit securities, the investor is concerned more with changes in the 
"perceived credit risk", than the actual event of default, since they can have an immediate impact 
on the value of a security. Due to the relative liquidity of bonds, bondholders are always in a 
position to sell them before the issuer's financial state deteriorates too far. Nonetheless, they will 
incur any fall in price resulting from the deterioration of the credit quality of the issuer. 
Exposure risk is the outstanding balance lent to the borrower and generated by the uncertainty 
prevailing with future amounts at risk In some cases, generally for all credit lines for which there 
is a repayment schedule, this risk can be considered as small or negligible. In other cases, 
committed lines of credit allow the borrower to draw on those lines whenever she wants to, so 
that the exposure is contingent upon her needs, some specific event, and subject o a limit fixed 
by die bank 
The amount at risk differs from the loss in case of default because of potential recoveries. 
Those depend upon any credit mitigators, such as guarantees, either collateral or third-party 
guarantees, the capability of negotiating with the borrower, and the funds available, if any, to repay 
the debt after repayment of other lenders. The recovery rate depends also on the 
industry type 
-the recovery rates are generally higher in the industries that generate 
tangible/tradable assets-, economic onditions 
- 
the recovery rates rise and fall depending on the 
market for corporate assets-, and seniority of the debt 
- 
senior loans enjoy a higher recovery. 
Estimates of recovery rates are available from several sources such as Moodys. Industry data 
shows that the recovery rates vary between 70% for secured bank loans to 30% for unsecured 
subordinate debt. Thus trade creditors who rank with other unsecured lenders can expect 30-50% 
recovery rates. 
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2.2. Credit risk versus Market risk 
Credit risk encompasses both default risk and market risk. Default risk is the objective 
assessment of the likelihood that a counterparty will default, while market risk refers to the 
possibility of losses due to changes in the prices of financial assets. Shares of stocks are subject 
only to market risk because they do not carry a promise of payment. A US Treasury bond is the 
quintessential example of a security that has interest rate risk, but no credit risk On the other 
hand, a bank loan carves only the risk that the borrower may default on its promised payments. 
However, the distinction between market and credit risk is not always so precise. A corporate 
bond, for example, caries both types of risk because its value is sensitive both to interest rates and 
to the creditworthiness of the issuer. Although both risks result from variations in value, they are 
generated by different sources. While market risk is the potential loss resulting from adverse 
market movements during a liquidation period, credit risk results from interactions between 
market risk and liquidity risk. 
The first practical problem when dealing with credit risk is that input data is much harder to 
obtain than market risk input data. While market risk data (mainly market factor returns, and their 
variance/covariance matrix) is largely available on the market, most credit risk data is not readily 
available. Most companies do not have official ratings, so that default probability must be 
subjectively estimated. This is true for recovery rates and default correlations as well. The real 
reason for this difference is that the object of credit risk modelling is a (relatively) rare event like 
default, so that only He and often outdated historical data can be found. 
Credit risk has many properties that make it different from market risk in other respects 
- 
especially for modelling purposes. Markets for credit risky debt are illiquid. The illiquidity is due in 
part to the size of the credit market, in part to the fact that the market for risky debt is segmented 
- 
each corporation issues its own debt that trades at prices representing the investors' perceptions 
for that particular corporation. As a result, instruments that would allow one to assume the credit 
risk of a particular corporation at a particular tenor may simply not exist; sometimes those that do 
exist either do not trade or trade for large transaction costs. 
Moreover, changes in credit risk often cause the price of the associated debt instrument to 
"jump" and that jump can be very large, particularly when it is caused by default An additional 
difference lies in the liquidation time horizon, which is very short (10 days) in the case of market 
risk, but are typically much longer (years) in case of credit risk, implying that the pricing 
approximations used for market risk management are inadequate. Finally, legal issues are very 
important for evaluating credit risk, while they are not applicable for market risk. 
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Asa results of all these factors credit risk is more difficult to model than market risk. As we 
have seen the lack of a liquid market makes it difficult 
- 
or impossible 
- 
to price credit risk for a 
specific obligor. Moreover, true default probabilities and recovery rates in the market cannot be 
observed. Users must determine these probabilities by either inferring default rates based on 
observed historical experience of the public credit ratings, or determining the default rate through 
a subjective credit approval process. Default correlations are also difficult to observe or measure, 
making it hard to aggregate credit risk. For equities, the correlation can be directly estimated by 
observing high-frequency liquid market prices. For credit quality, the lack of data makes it difficult 
to estimate credit correlations from history. Finally, as Figure 2.1 shows, credit returns are highly 
skewed and fat-tailed while equity returns are relatively symmetric and are well approximated by 
normal distributions. The long downside tail of the distribution of credit returns is caused by 
defaults and is explained in terms of a large likelihood of earning a small profit and a small chance 
of losing large amount of investment. This implies that a credit portfolio's distribution cannot be 
simply represented by its mean and standard deviation and, ultimately, the computation of the 
appropriate capital/equity cushion will be more complex because of the estimation of tail risk 
probabilities of typical asymrrrtric, fat-tailed loss (credit) distributions. 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of credit returns versus market returns 
The growing complexity of credit risk has fuelled the development of sophisticated methods 
for measuring credit risk at a portfolio level, rather than just at the level of an individual bond or 
loan. These methods are largely statistical and build on probabilistic models of creditworthiness 
and asset values. The variety of credit risk models available is even wider than for market risk 
models. While market risk models differ mainly in the way they try to obtain the same result (i. e. 
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the VaR of the trading portfolio), credit risk models often diverge even on the result they try to 
achieve. As for market risk, today some ready-to-use credit risk methodologies have become 
available (See Chapter III), however, most large banks rely on models developed or assembled 
internally and based on an internal credit rating systems. Despite the huge modelling effort, credit 
risk action following model results (for example the reduction in loan exposure to an individual 
counterparty or to a specific industry) can be hard to put in practice in some cases, due to 
commercial and customer relationship links. Lending is still a very personalised activity, where the 
weight of individual loan officers and commercial staff is still very relevant. This is in sharp 
contrast to trading activity, largely impersonal, where prices and execution quality are the main 
drivers. 
Despite the differences outlined above, economic theory tells us that market risk and credit 
risk are intrinsically related to each other and, more importantly, that they are not separable. If the 
market value of the firm's assets unexpectedly changes 
-generating market risk- this will affect the 
probability of default 
-generating credit risk If interest rates increase to a critical extent, borrowers 
may be default on their (floating) interest payments. Conversely, if the probability of default 
unexpectedly changes 
-generating credit risk- this may affect the market value of the firm -turning 
credit risk into market risk. 
Some institutions have found it necessary to combine the oversight of credit and market risk. 
As Allen (1996) points out, integration of the two functions is desirable for at least three reasons. 
1) There is a lot of transactional interaction between credit and market risk; 2) there is a need for 
comparability between returns on credit and market risk, 3) the emergence of hybrid credit and 
market risk product structures makes this necessary. We also remind that the integration between 
market and credit risk affects also the determination of economic capital, which is of central 
importance to regulators. It also affects the risk-adjusted return on capital used in measuring the 
perfommance of different groups within a bank (Ciuuhy, et aL 2000). This integrated approach, 
however, is far from being straightforward and requires a deep understanding of the correlation 
between credit and interest rate risk. A few papers have examined the degree of the con-elation 
(Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Duffee, 1999; Morris, 1999). 
Simulations to obtain an integrated market and credit risk distributions were run by Stein 
(1998). The distributions are shown in Figure 2.2. The lower credit-quality bond has an integrated 
distribution very different from the stand-alone market distribution of the same bond. On the 
other hand, the high-grade bond distribution highlights the marginal effect of the credit risk 
component Although the credit quality of the bond has a dear impact on the risk measure, it 
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affects the overall risk of higher-grade bonds by a significantly lesser amount Results such as 
these may be relevant to recognise and promote an integrated view of market and credit risks, 
which in turn would allow for a more complete picture of the risk underlying trading activities. In 
fact, market and credit risk measures are very seldom successfully integrated in a single firmwide 
risk measure. The reasons that hamper a successful integration of the measures are the followings. 
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a) Cboxe of nelewnt tvne horizons 
The daily horizon is an accepted industry standard for internal market risk management analyses. 
The choice of the daily horizon is based on the conviction that the unwinding of trading positions 
should be possible in 24 hours. This hypothesis is not always realistic, especially during sharp 
market movements when liquidity on some omits tends to dry up considerably. Regulators, 
as an example, do not share such an optimistic view on the unwinding of trading positions and 
require that the market risk measure be calculated on a 10-day period. 
Understanding which correct ime horizon for a credit risk measure should be is unfortunately 
much more difficult. The first logical step should be establishing a criterion for the choice. In the 
market risk measure the criterion was given by the time needed to unwind the position. The 
unwinding criterion is more difficult to accept for credit risk measures, and even if accepted 
would lead to a very wide variety of different time horizons. The time needed to liquidate a 
position with a defaulting counterparty depends for example on the severity of the credit crisis, on 
the regulatory constraints, on the quality of the relationship with the counterparty. 
An alternative criterion might be to use as a measurement horizon the time needed to 
appreciate a change in the counterparty credit quality. As credit quality changes are very slow to 
show up, we understand that also under this alternative criterion the time horizon should be 
much longer than one day, although it is not known how longer exactly this horizon should be. 
Assuming longer time evaluations inevitably widens the range of potentially acceptable horizons, 
so that achieving an industry standard in this field is much harder. The current practice of large 
international banks 
- 
when this figure is disclosed 
- 
is to use horizons induded between two weeks 
(10 working days) and 1 year. 
b) Scaling ktzan tvne hnriwns 
Assuming the achievement of a satisfactory solution to problem a), i. e. two time horizons have 
been chosen respectively for market and credit risk measurement with which the bank feels 
comfortable. The next step is to make the two measures comparable. In other words we must be 
able to understand if a 10 mit credit risk figure calculated on a 1-month basis is higher or lower 
than a1 mit market risk figure estimated on the traditional 1-day horizon. One way to tactile the 
issue is to scale the two figures to a common time horizon. Given that the market risk horizon is 
usually shorter than the corresponding credit risk measure, there are just two alternatives: either 
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scaling up the market risk figure to the longer credit risk time horizon or scaling down the a -edit 
risk figure to the corresponding market risk value. 
Following the considerations expressed under point a), the first alternative (scaling up the 
market risk figure) seems more reasonable. While the choice of a long-term horizon for credit risk 
measures reflects the impossibility of obtaining a meaningful measure under a short-term horizon, 
the short-term choice in market risk is mainly dictated by technical reasons, ie. the availability of 
more data under a daily horizon. A long-term horizon measure in market risk is perfectly 
meaningful, representing the risk related to holding the position for a longer period. However, if a 
rule existed that allowed us to stretch the market risk measure up to the longer credit risk horizon, 
then the two measures could be compared with a higher significance. 
Such a rule exists, and it is known as the "square root of time" rule. The rule tries to model the 
behaviour of volatility in dependence of the time horizon on which it is measured. If we compare 
a return volatUity measured on daily and on monthly data, we would expect 1-month volatility to 
be higher than 1-day volatility. This reflects the fact that longer time horizons are associated to a 
greater dispersion of potential returns. If we assume that daily returns are not serially correlated, 
then it is easy to show that 
Q,, =1Ina (2. i)
where n is the number of short-term periods that build up the long period. Some care should be 
taken in using relationship (2.1) (Diebold, 199? ).Whether rule (2.1) is a good approximation of 
reality depends on the level of serial correlation among returns, which is an empirical question. 
This rule might work for some time series and not for others; it might work better during some 
time periods than in others. Furthermore, it is evident that extreme time stretching is more 
dangerous, under a model risk point of view, than limited time stretching. Scaling 1-day volatility 
into 1 year volatility produces more dubious results than scaling 1-week volatility into 1-month 
volatility. Moreover, some of the hypotheses that allow the construction of the 1-day measure are 
hard to retain in longer horizons. For example the zero-mean hypothesis, which is plausible in the 
1-day environment, can be questioned on sensibly longer time horizons, and especially on 
markets characterised by definite trends. 
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c) C, o»dJaü nlu marketandc risk nxzsuns 
Assuming we have successfully gone through steps a) and b), by building relevant market risk and 
credit risk measures and by expressing both of them on a common time horizon. The next issue 
would be combining the two measures, i. e. formulating some hypothesis on the correlation 
between the two measures. The simplest possibility would be to compute the global exposure as 
the sum of the two individual (credit and market risk) exposures. This could be motivated only by 
extremely conservative assumptions, i. e. implicitly assuming that extreme market events, mainly 
related to the trading environment, will be coupled to extreme credit risk events. 
A second, much more frequent approach is to assume that the market risk measure and the 
credit risk measure are not linearly correlated. This assumption can be justified whenever we 
expect factors affecting market and credit risk to be independent. A third alternative is to try to 
model explicitly the relationship between market and credit risk measures, determining in this way 
a correlation coefficient as a result either of a formal model, or simply estimated by qualitative 
assessment. 
It is therefore necessary for the bank to evaluate which economic linkages might exist between 
market and credit risk. Possibly the most immediate link between market and credit risk measures 
is related to extreme market movements affecting both the profitability of the bank's business and 
the creditworthiness of some of the bank's counterparties. In the trading book, this could happen 
because market movements producing losses in the bank's own trading book undermine the 
financial solidity of other banks with higher trading exposure to the same factors. In the banking 
book, sharp foreign exchange and interest rate market movements could lead to a simultaneous 
reduction in the market value of loans and to a worsening of the creditworthiness of interest-rate 
sensitive and foreign exchange sensitive companies. However, in principle, the relationships 
described should not lead to a concentration of risk thanks to some form of internal hedging 
occurring in these two examples. In the trading example, at least the positions with the defaulting 
bank should be profitable, so that there should be little market risk associated to them; in the 
banking book example, the reduction in the market value of loans should tend to mitigate the 
counterparty's financial crisis. 
d) O th a ald v in dxadxet ztofa fmn nzmwm 
When trying to achieve afirm-wide risk measure, one major difficulty can derive from the cultural 
differences between credit and market risk management s aff. This potential cuhural clash stems 
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from the contrast between the mainly quantitative trading environment where market (e. g. Value 
at Risk) measures were developed and the mainly qualitative credit department activity. While 
market risk VaR, no matter how it is calculated, has a strong dependence on quantitative 
assumptions, credit risk measurement is still largely the result of subjective human judgment. 
Introducing consistent firm-wide credit risk measurement procedures involves switching part of 
this subjective evaluation to objective quantitative models. This passage is often very hard to 
achieve because of natural resistance within the credit department. Credit staff can resist because 
they fear the model can be wrong, or because this will reduce their power within the institution 
(Carey and Hiycay, 2001). Furthermore, loan commercial staff will oppose the introduction of 
quantitative models, because high loan volumes are easier to achieve if risk is poorly or not 
controlled. 
23. Credit risk and diversification 
Financial companies can be considered as levered portfolios with long positions in assets of 
varying liquidity, and short positions in diverse debt obligations. Daily movements in interest 
rates, equity prices, and exchange rates affects the overall value of the portfolio/firm In response 
to market conditions or customer demand portfolio's composition can be adjusted by managers. 
An ideal risk measurement system would produce a probability distribution of returns conditional 
on the firm's current portfolio composition. If such a distribution were available in real time, 
Value at Risk regulatory constructs could be easily calculated 
Measuring the diversification of a portfolio means specifying the range and likelihood of 
possible losses associated with the portfolio. All else equal, a well-diversified portfolio is one that 
has a small likelihood of generating large losses. The expected loss (EL) of a credit portfolio is not 
considered risk but is what we expect to loose. EL 
- 
defined as the probability of default times the 
loss we expect should default occurs 
- 
is not, therefore, subject to diversification: a portfolio's 
expected loss is simply the average of the expected losses of the assets in the portfolio. By 
contrast, risk is the deviation of the actual loss from what we expected, that is the unexpected loss, 
UL If banks were able to diversify its credit risk so that unexpected losses were negligible in 
comparison to the expected losses, then the cost of capital would approximate to the bank's 
expected losses. It would follow that the price for the trade would be equal to the expected losses. 
If the degree of relatedness of the risks of the assets in the portfolio is high there will be little 
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space for diversification. On the other hand, if the default risks are relatively unrelated, then 
considerable risk reduction via diversification is viable. 
In practice, credit risk cannot be diversified away 
- 
and unexpected losses are not zero because 
of the illiquidity of the assets and liabilities hold, or because of the lack of adlxx derivatives related 
to them. For example, long-term goverment securities can be hedged with futures to lessen or 
eliminate the risk of adverse movements in interest rates. In the case of corporate bonds, interest 
rates futures can hedge only a portion of the price volatility. Alternatively, for corporate bonds 
that are relatively liquid, the firm can alter its credit exposure simply by liquidating the position. 
However, with an illiquid portfolio, prices are not usually available, so that even for the part that is 
theoretically hedgeable with a derivative, the appropriate hedge ratio is hard to estimate. Often the 
firm cannot even terminate the position. As an ultimate consequence, risk managers often 
ignored illiquid positions and leave the job to diversification. Unfortunately concentration risk in 
credit portfolios of financial institutions is very high. This is the result of a number of factors. 
Specialisation of banks/fm mdal institutions. Limited resources and competitive forces, such as the 
knowledge and competence of the institution, relative competitive position and return 
requirements have inevitably forced banks into specialisation. This specialisation may take the 
form of industry specialisation, geographic specialisation (country or region) or type of client as 
classified by credit ratings. 
Mismatch 1
'tz rn orginatim capzcrty and dir nocatiaz objecti There is a parallel limitation in the 
scope of a financial institution being able to directly originate credit assets outside its natural 
markets. This is due to the focus of its client relationship, the presence and knowledge 
requirements of penetrating new markets, as well as the competitive behaviour of institutions with 
established market positions in the relevant market segment 
Incanpleteness of credit markets The lack of available credit assets with the required term structure 
and industry clharacteristics may itself increase specialisation. 
High positire condalion. Many individual bonds share a common systematic component of credit 
risk If we take into consideration a portfolio of many individual bonds, the net interest rate 
sensitivity can be hedged in large part with interest rate derivatives changes in credit quality of 
individual companies do not result in significant volatility either, provided that the position is well- 
diversified. However, the interest rate position will still be risky because yield spreads move 
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together. As a consequence, investors must reassess the probability- of default for all bonds as the 
general outlook of the economy changes. 
Changing sinictarre of credit markets. Several trends in the pattern of capital market activity also 
create concentration risk. The trend to direct issuance of securities to i vestors by higher quality 
issuers as an alternative to bank financing has resulted in a change in the composition of credit- 
risk structure of bank-loan portfolios. fliese portfolios tend to have higher proportionate 
exposure to lower rated borrowers who do not enjoy the same access to capital n-larkets. 
Moreover, the trend to corporations reducing the size of their core banking groups has increased 
the relative size and scale of bank exposure to individual clients. 
Client relationship press/ryes. Banks have increased individual loan exposures to clients as a primary 
resource in establishing and tnaintaining major relationships. 'lhis has been done in the 
expectation that the dominant position as a major lender will allow the bank to gain access to 
other non-credit businesses from the clients. The inability to reduce this direct credit risk exposure 
often creates substantial concentration risks within credit portfolios. 
From the viewpoint of portfolio theory the impact of concentration risk within credit-risk 
portfolios leads to the impossibility of the direct applicability of the traditional mean-variance 
theory. This reflects the typical features of credit portfolios we have discussed so far and that we 
summarise in the box below. 
r returns appear to be skewed in well-diversified portfolios 
y credit risk appears to be non-linear in nature 
the correlation between credit risks is generally highly positive 
the credit risk itself is dynamic and subject to large fluctuations 
credit risk appears to be exacerbated by the traditional illiquidity of credit risk 
¢ credit risk can be reduced by increasing the size of the portfolio and increasing diversification, 
but the size of portfolio rcquircd to reach frill diversification is large:. 
These factors which tend to differentiate credit risk from types of risks such as market risk 
dominate both the quantification and pricing of credit risk in general and credit derivatives 
specifically. It has also a significant impact on credit risk management. The portfolio manager that 
wants to cover the increased risk of concentration adequately- will require returns that increase in a 
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non-linear fashion (at an increasing rate), reflecting the fact that portfolio risk is a function of the 
individual exposures squared (see Figure 2.3). ' This, in turn, dictates that the institution which has 
high levels of exposure to a particular credit should be prepared to pay a premium to market 
returns to reduce the risk of concentration. Similarly, the institution may require a lower than 
market return in increasing its exposure to credits to which is underexposed. This is predicated on 
the fact that while the returns on individual credits are determined by market prices, the return 
required to compensate for risk for a particular investor is related to the portfolio structure. 
Additionally, this view of diversification has an immediate concrete implication for capital 
adequacy 
. 
Given the frequency distribution of loss, we could determine the likelihood of losses 
which exceed the amount of capital held against the portfolio. This probability could then be set 
to the desired level by varying the amount of capital 
Required return on credit risk 
10 
b 
O Current market return 
Y 
c 
Y 
u 
Credit Exposure in portfolio 
Figure 23 Required target return on credit-risk exposure in a portfolio context 
2.4. An increasing role for credit risk analysis 
The credit markets have been developing very quickly. Their rapid expansion is mainly due to 
the trend of the disintermediation, securitization, and globalisation of the credit markets. Along 
with the development of financial markets, a deep understanding of credit risk dynamics is 
increasingly guided by a growing recognition of the need for a mechanism that assesses credit risk 
and helps investors to price debt securities properly. 
Levin (19971) finds that the degree of diversification achievable in an equity portfolio with 30 names would 
require 350 names in a comparable debt portfolio to achieve an equivalent degree of diversification. 
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A more cost-efficient process in the public securities markets has progressively replaced the 
traditional role of banks as intermediaries between savers and users of capital Recently in Europe, 
users of capital in the industrial, public utility, and financial sectors have chosen to finance their 
short-term capital needs through commercial paper, having realised that short-term funding costs 
are generally lower in this market. Capital markets therefore have become accessible to small and 
middle market firms producing a "winner's curse" effect on the credit portfolios of traditional 
financial institutions. The growth of large, financially sophisticated institutional investors, such as 
pension funds and mutual funds, has also spurred this trend. From the borrower's point of view, 
the advantages offered by this process of disintermediation are mainly in terms of a substantial 
cost savings. Lending rates in the public markets are often very competitive, because credit- 
worthy borrowers can choose the most economical source of funds from a wide range of 
domestic and international alternatives, rather than from a few banks. 
A result of the disintermediation process is securitisation. The borrowers issue securities 
directly to investors in the public debt markets. The money they once would have borrowed from 
banks is now being borrowed by means of securities, that is, being securitised. The 
disinteimediation and securitisation are fast becoming global phenomena. Many corporations, 
financial institutions, and sovereign nations have recognised the efficiencies of scale and the 
competitiveness inherent in the public securities market. The result has been a globalization of 
credit markets. 
There are several additional trends that will further stimulate credit risk analysis and expand its 
applications beyond their present role. We discuss them below. 
Finý market »n&gratiaz. Removing barriers to capital movements and harmonising 
standards should stimulate greater cross-border financial activity and the number of potential debt 
issuers will expand dramatically. 
The tra7d tozw7th priwtrsatxn Around the world, governments are realising that the task of 
national resource allocation is extremely difficult and that highly centralised authorities simply 
cannot process information fast enough to manage vast economies and their financial systems 
efficiently. From a public point of view, the open-market discipline inherent in a broad and 
competitive public marketplace offers a more efficient means of channelling savings to national 
and local development. Continuing privatisation of formerly state-owned entities coupled with 
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their subsequent need to fund their capital requirements in the public markets instead of the 
national budget will add to the ranks of potential issuers. With greater capital market integration, 
issuers will be able to diversify their funding sources well beyond their own domestic markets 
with relative ease. This trend is creating long-term risks for investors. 
Expanding fw7ds for vnvsnern The pool of investment funds is likely to expand because, as 
the European population ages, there should be a greater propensity to save rather than consume. 
The individual may be reluctant to bean active and direct participant in the market and may 
prefer to invest through a pension fund or a life insurance company. Since, in an integrated 
market, the investor will have a wider selection of investment opportunities from which to 
choose, there is reason to believe that over time more of the investment decision making process 
will pass to the professional institutional investor. 
The gmzthcg ccmplexity ofcredit analyst's. The growth of information technology continues at an 
exponential rate making the creation of global communications networks and the completion of 
complex transactions easier and cheaper. There is also a growing list of investment options 
available across thousands of possible issuers who operate in many different countries, with 
differing cultures, languages, and business practices. At the same time, financial engineering 
continues to create new types of securities with complex and often riskyfeatures. Investors will be 
forced to commit more resources to credit analysis because appropriate, reliable means must be 
found to compare relative risks across the new range of debt instruments and cross-border debt 
issuers. Increasingly, portfolio managers are concerned with optimising the value of their 
portfolios on a total return basis, taking into account income from interest payments and 
reinvestments as well as the current market value of each bond in the portfolio. The value of each 
debt security must be continuously evaluated according to current market value and quickly 
adjusted for any changes in credit quality that may have a direct and immediate impact on 
secondary market prices. The role of the credit analyst is thus becoming increasingly time sensitive 
-the objective being not only to weight the relative risk of default over the life of each debt 
instrument, but also to monitor and to forecast changes in credit risk over time. 
Rise in crtfrz risk. There is an overall trend towards increased credit risk. Most bankruptcy 
statistics show a significant increase in bankruptcies to the went that they speak about a 
permanent or structural increase in bankruptcies world-wide possibly due to the increase in global 
competition. The same forces that are driving market growth are having a fundamental effect on 
the underlying credit quality of issuers. Improvements in information technology and the wozid- 
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wide trend towards open-market economies are having serious consequences for the competitive 
business prospects and risks of a broad range of issuers. Technology is also driving competition 
by shortening the traditional product development cycle. 
In addition to added risks for well-established issuers, the trend towards privatisation of 
government-owned enterprises throws up new challenges for the credit analyst. Following 
privatisation there is a major shift from government funding to investor funding. One aspect of 
privatisation is that the credit risks of an enterprise inevitably rise when it moves from 
government control to private ownership and management 
In a globalising and increasingly competitive free-market-oriented economy, the credit 
strenght of issuers is becoming less certain and more volatile. The most profound implication of 
the shift in financial intermediation from governments and the banking system to the individual 
debt investor is that it is the investor, not the banking system, who is absorbing all of the credit 
risk. 
Technological dadopnents It has been also a steady increase in the willingness of corporations, 
financial institutions, and sovereign issuers to go beyond the confines of their own domestic 
markets and to seek out the efficiencies and competitive benefits that are available in other larger 
financial markets. The most conspicuous example of this is the Eurobond market. Advances in 
information technology have improved the efficiencies in the security markets by lowering the 
expense of communication and calculation. More importantly, information technology has 
enabled financial intermediaries to remove the barriers of geography, thus gaining opportunities in 
new markets. 
The d 
=A nature of ar it d u. Market liberalisation and technological innovation have 
created an explosion of opportunities in terms of broad-based debt markets for both investors 
and issuers. Investors are offered a vast range of debt instruments from which to choose. They 
can optimise yields on the securities they buy picking securities with the currency, maturity 
structure, and other features to match particular portfolio requirements. Borrowers, on the other 
hand, are offered a wide range of potential funding options, which may translate into an increased 
ability to finance in markets where interest rates are low or where particular funding needs in 
terms of currency or maturity can be more easily met. 
From the perspective of asset managers in Europe, a greater capacity to analyse credit risk and 
a greater tolerance for credit risk could be expected to result from the euro's elimination of 
currency risk. Greater attention will be given to the duration and credit portfolio's choices and, in 
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the search for higher yields, a greater tolerance of risk in both dimensions. With the euro, the 
capacity to perform from country allocation will be reduced, especially for European investors, 
who traditionally had a liking for diversification. Credit risk will become an important factor for 
helping fund managers in the selection of stocks, in particular non-government bonds, and will 
also allow them to enhance the performance of their portfolio. 
More mit P nwwzs. Despite the decline in the average quality of loans, interest margins or 
spreads, especially in the wholesale loan ma ket, have become very thin. Among the possible 
reasons, an important factor has been the enhanced competition for lower-quality borrowers, 
much of whose lending activity has been concentrated at the higher risk-lower quality end of the 
market 
Iodine g and zdatile uVua of callaterals. Concurrent with the recent Asian crisis, banking crises 
in well-developed countries such as Switzerland and Japan have shown that property values and 
real asset values are very hard to predict and to realise through liquidation. The weaker and more 
volatile collateral values are, the more riskylending is likelyto be. 
The growth of off baLmw sheet dom. The growth of derivative markets has extended the 
need for credit analysis beyond the loan book The growth in credit risk off the balance sheet was 
one of the main reasons for the introduction by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) of 
risk-based capital (RBQ requirements in 1993. Under the BIS system, banks have to hold a 
capital requirement based on the marked-to-market current value of each OTC derivative 
contract plus an add-on factor or potential future exposure. 
The BIS risk-basal capital mqui traits. Despite the importance of all the reasons discussed 
above, probably the greatest incentive for banks to develop new credit risk models has been 
dissatisfaction with the BIS and central banks' imposition of capital requirements on loans. Until 
1992 all loans to private-sector counterparties had been subject to the same 8 percent capital ratio, 
irrespective of the size of the loan, its maturity, and the credit quality of the borrowing 
counterparty. Since 1997 in Europe and 1998 in US regulators have allowed certain large banks to 
calculate at their discretion capital requirements for their trading books using "internal models" 
rather than the "standardised" regulatory model. Despite much work needs to be done to replace 
the 8 percent Wile with internal models, these models may still have a significant value to bankers, 
risk managers, and corporate treasurers. These issues are more extensively discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter III 
MEASURING CREDIT RISK 
As outlined in the previous chapter, credit risk carries specific features and properties that need to 
be incorporated into credit models. Obtaining adequate data and devising a satisfactory way of 
handling the covariability of credit exposures are only two of the various barriers to the design of 
these models. In this chapter we critically review a variety of statistical and probabilistic models 
introduced by the academic and professional world in the recent years. We will see how the 
radical changes undergoing the traditional commercial lending (i. e., securitization and credit 
derivatives), have lead to the abandonment of the expert systems traditional approach, where 
credit risk was managed at an individual level Newer methodologies have been introduced that 
analyse credit risk in a portfolio context. Among these, econometric techniques, neural networks, 
optimization models, along with option theoretic formulations have all contributed to the 
progress in credit risk measurement. Practitioners and regulators have recommended the 
implementation of these "internal" models accompanied by rigorous validation methods. We 
therefore dedicate the last section of this chapter to present a review of the regulation and internal 
capital allocation issues that play increasingly important roles in credit risk investment and 
management decisions. 
3.1. Background and recent developments in credit risk modelling 
It is important to understand the background to the current interest in credit risk modelling. 
Recent developments should be seen as the consequence of three factors. First, banks are 
becoming increasingly quantitative in their treatment of credit risk. Second, new markets are 
emerging in credit derivatives and the marketability of existing loans is increasing through growth 
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in securitizations and the loan sales market Third, regulators are concerned to improve the 
current system of bank capital requirements especially as it relates to credit risk. 
These three factors are strongly self-reinforcing. The more quantitative approach taken by 
banks could be seen as the application of risk management and financial engineering techniques 
initially developed in the fixed income trading area of banks' operations. However, they raise the 
possibility of pricing and hedging credit risk more generally and encourage the emergence of new 
instruments such as credit derivatives. Furthermore, if banks are adopting a more quantitative 
approach, regulators may be able to develop more sophisticated and potentially less distortionary 
capital requirements for banking book exposures. On the other hand, if regulators do permit the 
use of models in capital requirement calculations, banks will have a substantial incentive to invest 
further in the development of credit risk models. 
Methods and models for evaluating and pricing credit risk have been around for as long as 
individuals and institutions have extended credit The measurement of credit risk has grown 
substantially more complicated in recent years. In the past, banks made loans and generally held 
the loans on their books. Their success relied on their ability to gauge the credit-worthiness of
clients. But it is increasingly common for banks to sell loans, to securitize loans, or to enter into 
credit swaps, all of which are mean of transferring credit risk Fund managers are also taking 
advantage of new ways of transacting in credit risk through, for example, aburgeoning market for 
credit derivatives. 
The basic problems in developing models of credit risk are (a) obtaining adequate data and (b) 
devising a satisfactory way of handling the covariability of credit exposures. On data, banks face 
the difficulty that they have only recently begun to collect relevant information in a systematic 
manner. Although serious, this difficulty is transitional and will be mitigated as time goes by and 
perhaps also as banks make arrangements to share data. The more serious data problem is that 
bank loans and even many corporate bonds are either partly or totally illiquid and mark to-ma ket 
values are therefore not available. This means that one must rely on some other measure of value 
in order to establish and track the riskiness of credit-sensitive exposures. Two approaches have 
been followed by credit risk modellers. JP Morgan and CSFP in their respective modelling 
methodologies, CreditMetrics and Credit Risk+, employ ratings and probabilities of ratings 
transitions as basis for measuring value and risk. The consulting firm KMV uses equity price 
information to infer a borrower's underlying asset value and the probability that it will fall below 
some default trigger level. 
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The second major problem faced by credit risk analysts is that of modelling the covariation in 
credit risks across different exposures. It is particularly difficult to do this in a tractable way while 
respecting the basic nature of credit risk, i. e., return distributions which are fat-tailed and highly 
skewed to the left. Two approaches have been taken. The CraditMetrics approach to covariation 
consists of supposing that ratings transitions are driven by changes in underlying continuous 
stochastic processes. Correlations between these processes (and hence in ratings transitions) are 
inferred from correlations in equity returns (to some degree therefore relying on the KMV 
methodology). Credit Risk+, on the other hand, allows parameters of the univariate distributions 
of individual exposures to depend on common conditioning variables (for example the stage of 
the economic cycle). 
3.2. Approaches to risk measurement 
3.2.1.7iae poýtfolio apprazch 
Despite their different methodologies, all credit risk models create a distribution of possible 
credit portfolio values at some point in the fun=. Correlated changes in the credit quality of 
obligors result in changes in the value of exposures. These exposures are then aggregated to 
produce the portfolio loss distribution, which indicates the probability of achieving a certain 
portfolio value at the horizon date. The resulting loss distribution in Figure 3.1 is similar to those 
produced by VaR models for market risk. 
Theoretically, the annual expected loss represents the amount that should be charged against 
the profit and loss account and added to the institution's loss reserve account Referring to one 
standard deviation, the "unexpected loss" measures risk in the portfolio. Combining the expected 
loss and economic capital 
- 
the extra capital, in addition to the expected loss, needed to sustain 
possible losses within a defined confidence level 
- 
results in a VaR number indicating the 
maximum likely loss in a particular portfolio over a specified holding period and within a given 
confidence level The confidence level indicates the probability of portfolio losses exceeding 
economic capital: a triple A institution may require a very high confidence level such as 99.98%, 
while a triple B institution may only require 99.85%. 
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Figure 3.1 Loss distribution 
Before discussing how the models predict loss, the meaning of loss must be defined. There are 
two fundamental methods of evaluating loss in a credit portfolio. The first, the default mode 
paradigm, only recognises a loss in the portfolio if the obligor has defaulted on its legal obligations 
within the modelled time horizon. The second method, the mark-to-market paradigm, recognises 
any gains or losses in the value of a debt security caused by changes in the credit quality of the 
obligor over the measured time horizon. 
3.2.2. The default mad and the mark-to-market marls 
The default mode (DM) is sometimes called a "two-state" model because only two outcomes 
are relevant: non-default and default If the loan does not default, there is no credit loss. If the 
loan defaults there generally is a credit loss equal to the present value of the difference between 
the customer's contractual obligations and the loan's actual net cash flows over the workout 
period (e. g., recoveries less workout costs). The debt of a company that is near bankruptcy will 
thus be valued fu ly at par, although it will be trading on the market well below this price. The 
DM paradigm can be thought of as a representation of the traditional "buy and hold" lending 
business of commercial banks. Under this view, secondary loan markets are not sufficiently 
developed to support a full mark-to-market or trading approach to risk measurement The default 
mode paradigm is therefore useful when market prices are not available or maturities are short At 
present it is the most common approach used by banks for defining credit losses. 
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The MIM paradigm generalizes the DM approach by recognizing that the economic value of 
a credit instrument may decline even if the counterparty does not formally default within the 
planning horizon. The MTM model is "multi-state" in that default is only one of several possible 
credit rating grades to which the instrument could migrate over the planning horizon. In other 
words, MTM adopts the broader economic perspective that credit events short of default may 
generate falls, or increases, in the value of a debt security caused by changes in the credit quality of 
the obligor or by a widening of credit risk spreads in financial markets over the measured time 
horizon. If the credit of the obligors in a portfolio deteriorates as a result of recession, for 
example, the portfolio value will be lower, even without any defaults. 
A market price for each debt security is obtained by discounting cash-flows on the obligor's 
credit curve. Two methods are generally used to value cash-flows which correspond to the way 
credit quality is measured. The first method uses discrete measures of credit quality such as ratings 
from Standard & Poor's or Moody's Investors Service. The second uses an obligor's probability 
of default as a continuous measure of credit quality. Instead of jumping from rating to rating, the 
obligor's credit quality smoothly adjusts between rating categories. The debt security at the end of 
the time horizon is then calculated using the default probability, remaining time to maturity and 
estimated recovery value in the event of default, as inputs into a valuation model 
While few banks currently use the MTM framework outside their trading accounts, many 
practitioners believe the industry is likely to evolve from largely DM-based risk models for the 
banking book to the more general MIM-based models over the coming years. 
The two methods are identical if the debt instruments mature before the end of the time 
horizon. However, for portfolios with maturities much longer than the time horizon, the two loss 
paradigms can produce divergent values. A portfolio with a long average life and deteriorating 
credit qualitywill suffer a significant mark-to-market loss despite being valued at par by the default 
mode paradigm. Each of the credit models we present below assumes a different loss paradigm 
CreditRisk+ assumes a default mode paradigm, while CreditMetrics uses a discrete mark-to- 
market loss paradigm Portfolio Manager assumes a continuous mark-to-market paradigm Either 
of the loss paradigms can be used in CreditPortfolioView. 
3.2.3. Aggatirxwsus Structural Models 
Measurement approaches can also be classified as "aggregative" and "stnzctiual" models. 
Aggregative approaches to risk measurement attempt to infer total risk (i. e. the sum of credit, 
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market, and operating risks) directly from the capital ratios of competitors or from the historical 
volatility of the cash flows associated with an activity. Structural approaches, on the other hand, 
estimate total risk through a multi-step process encompassing separate models for credit, market, 
and operating risk This section presents an overview of these alternative methodologies. 
Aggregative models typically are "top-down" approaches that attempt to infer the total risk of 
a broadly defined business or product line using peer analysis or historical cash flow analysis. Peer 
group or "market comparables" analysis attempts to estimate the capital that would be needed to 
achieve a hypothetical "target" credit rating for a given activity (as if operated on a stand-alone 
basis) from the capitalization rates of competitors engaged in that activity. Typically, this approach 
is applied only to complete lines of business or broad product groupings (e. g. credit cards), for 
which data on publicly traded competitors are readily available. The other major aggregative 
technique, historical cash-flow analysis, attempts to estimate an activity's total risk from the 
volatility of its historical cash-flows. Implicitly, historical cash flow volatility (per dollar of notional 
size) is assumed to equal future volatility. 
While aggregative models for allocating economic capital are quite common among 
nonfinancial fines for which operating risks predominate, they are less prevalent among banks, 
which are affected more significantly by credit and market risks. Among banks, aggregative 
models tend to be used mainly for assessing the performance of broad business or product lines, 
for making large-scale strategic business decisions (such as acquisitions or divestitures), or for 
validating structural risk models, rather than for day-today investment and risk management 
purposes. 
`This pattern of usage reflects two perceived limitations of aggregative models. First, as noted 
above, data availability often makes it difficult to apply these models at the level of individual 
transactions or customer relationships (e. g. in product pricing decisions). A second drawback is 
these models' relative insensitivity to variations in portfolio composition within the business lines 
that are separately analyzed. Peer analysis, for example, may be misleading if the credit quality of a 
bank's portfolio differs significantly from that of its competitors. Simiariy, the historical cash-flow 
approach may be inappropriate if the current composition of the bank's portfolio (e. g., its sectoral 
make-up or the credit quality of the underlying customers) is substantially different from that 
historically observed 
In contrast to aggregative models, structural modelling approaches estimate total risk through 
the separate modelling of credit, market, and operating risks. With respect to the modelling of 
credit risk, most banks use multiple modelling approaches within the organization. Where 
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changes in portfolio composition are a significant concern, banks appear to be evolving toward 
"bottom-up" approaches to credit risk modelling. This is already the predominant method for 
measuring the credit risks of large and middle-market customers. Unlike top-down methods, 
bottom-up models explicitly consider variations in credit quality and other compositional effects. 
A bottom up modelling process attempts to quantify credit risk at the level of each individual 
credit facility (e. g., a loan or a line of credit) based on an explicit evaluation of the financial 
condition of the underlying customer and the structure of the credit facility. To measure credit 
risk for the portfolio as a whole, the risks of individual loans are aggregated, taking into account 
diversification/correlation effects. 
3.2.4. Aduv=gps of Portfolio Chit Risk Modelling 
A portfolio approach to credit risk management is the most important alternative to the 
current standardised capital rules that should be made available to financial institutions. Portfolio 
credit risk modelling shares the same advantages of portfolio market risk modelling that have 
already been recognised by the international supervisory community. These include: 
i) The ability to take an für rateä view of cra lit risk across af wndal bwz ut i. A modelling 
approach provides a comprehensive measure of risk across a fine, measuring credit risk regardless 
of where it arises 
- 
traditional lending activity, bond and equity trading or explicit credit trading 
through credit derivatives. By providing a common measure of credit risk, management is able to 
make judgements about the relative risk and return of different types of activity. Also, a common 
yardstick is provided to allow trade-offs between risk tenor, exposure size and collateral 
protection. Thus the relative risk of a 1-year $10 million loan, a 10-year $1 million bond and a 10- 
year partly collateralised swap with $10 million positive mark-to-market can be determined This is 
a significant improvement over the current standardised rules for credit risk, which treat each 
form of risk in a separate category, subject to disparate rules. 
ii) Rational vn nazt daici w and risk-niztigating artirvis. Another important reason to take a 
portfolio view of credit risk is to more rationally and accountably address credit extension 
decisions and risk-mitigating actions. The bank lending marketplace has become increasingly 
competitive. As a result, good customer relationships have often become synonymous with 
heavily concentrated exposures as corporate borrowers command smaller bank groups and larger 
commitments from relationship banks. Yet, banks are often caught in a paradoxical trap whereby 
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those customers with whom they have developed the most valued relationships are precisely the 
customers to whom they have the least capacity to take incremental risk Bank portfolio managers 
have begun to harbor suspicions that they may be vulnerable to a possible turn for the worse in 
global credit cycles, and that current levels of spread income may not justify the concentration of 
risks being accumulated Such concerns cannot easily be evaluated nor systematically reflected in 
pricing and credit extension decisions in the absence of a portfolio model. 
iii) The ability to assess cons-ntration and diz mficatibn 
. 
By taking a portfolio approach, a credit 
risk model recognises the risks of concentrated exposures to a single name or names that are 
highly correlated and 
- 
conversely 
- 
the benefits of diversification. In a portfolio context, the 
decision to take on ever higher exposure to an obligor will meet with ever higher risk. If 
relationship demands the extension of credit to a customer to whom the portfolio is overexposed, 
a portfolio model allows the portfolio manager to quantify (in units of under-compensated risk) 
exactly the extent of envisaged investment in relationship development Consequently the risk- 
return trade-off of concentrated lending activity can be better managed Conversely, the portfolio 
manager can rationally take increased exposure to under-concentrated names. Indeed, such names 
may be in &th lly riskyyet offer a relatively small marginal contribution to over-all pa#5b risk due 
to diversification benefits. By incorporating this feature into the regulatory capital regime, firms 
would be rewarded for diversifying their credit positions and avoiding undue concentrations to 
single names. The current regulatory capital requirements for individual names provide no 
incentive for prudent portfolio risk management. For example, a single $100 million loan and one 
hundred $1 million loans to names of equal credit worthiness presently attract the same capital, 
even though the risk of the latter portfolio is demonstrably lower than that of the former. 
iv) Respnndmg to market mu an. There are also other, more practical, reasons why a 
quantitative approach to credit risk is important in response to continuing innovations in financial 
markets. Financial products have become more complex The growth of derivatives activity has 
created uncertain and dynamic counterparty exposures that are significantly more challenging to 
manage than the static exposures of traditional instnunents such as bonds or loans. End users and 
providers of these instruments need to understand such credit risk and its interaction with market 
risk There has also been a proliferation of credit enhancement mechanisms that make it 
increasingly necessary to assess credit risk at the portfolio as well as the individual asset level 
These include: third-party guarantees, credit derivatives, posted collateral, margin arrangements, 
and netting. Moreover, improved liquidity in secondary cash markets and the emergence of credit 
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derivatives have made possible more active trading of credit risk based on rational pricing. 
Prudence requires that institutions thoroughly review existing risks before hedging or trading 
them Finally, innovative credit instruments explicitly derive value from correlation risk or credit 
events such as upgrade, downgrade or default Such risks are best understood in the context of a 
portfolio model that also explicitly accounts for credit quality migrations. 
3.3. Assessing the probability of default 
Credit risk models provide the decision-maker with objective insight or knowledge that would 
not otherwise be readily apparent or that would be available at prohibitive costs. A variety of tools 
are used in building financial models, including econometric techniques, simulation, optimization, 
neural networks, rule-based and expert systems, or hybrid systems. 
The traditional credit risk analysis is mainly a "straight ratios-based" analysis. Changes in the 
credit quality of a firm could be estimated from inspection of the counter-party's financial 
statements. This type of approach was appropriate when interest rates were stable and investors 
bought bonds to hold them to maturity. Bonds are nowadays bought and traded with the 
purpose of making a profit on changes in interest rates or in absolute or relative credit quality. In 
this new environment a new modem analysis is taking place, focusing on changes in the perceived 
credit risk. We now present and discuss the main credit risk modelling approaches developed over 
the years. 
3.3.1. The traditional ppraxdh" Expert System 
Classic credit analysis is an expert system that relies mostly on the subjective judgement of 
trained professionals. The credit decision is left to the local or branch lending officer who decides 
on the basis of both its expertise and subjective judgement, and the weighting of key factors such 
as the reputation of the firm, the firm leverage, the volatility of the borrower's earnings, the 
provision of collaterals, the state of the business cycle, and the level of interest rates. The main 
problems that this system faces are consistency and subjectivity, which make comparability of 
rankings and decisions very difficult for an individual monitoring. 
Historically, the primary mission of a bank was to finance working capital and trade, and 
bankers generally made loans that were secured by assets or other forms of collateral As a 
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consequence, deciding whether or not to make a loan was largely a matter of deciding whether 
the proposed collateral was sufficiently valuable. Additionally, banks used to make loans with a 
term of one year or less and while they were carefully reviewing balance sheets, they essentially 
ignored income statements. Classic credit analysis evolved in response to fundamental changes in 
the banking business and in the last 50 years banks moved from financing working capital to 
financing their customers' fixed assets. As a result, collateralization became irrelevant in the credit 
process and banks began to meet the demand for longer-term loans. Cash-flow lending replaced 
secured lending in the way that the value of a firm and its creditworthiness were estimated from 
the amount of cash-flow generated by its business. Still today marry banks rely on annual review 
of their credits, basing their analysis upon the company's published financial reports. These 
reports are often obsolete by the time they arrive at the bank and they may not provide insight 
into the true risk that the company faces. Banks should therefore adapt the intensity and the 
frequency of their credit monitoring process to the size of the exposure and its riskiness in order 
to make their expect system work. 
3.3.2. Loan and land rating systons 
Rating systems have been used for long time by regulators and bankers and originally were 
used to place an existing loan portfolio into five categories (OOC system) from four low-quality 
ratings to one high-quality rating. Different percentages of loan loss reserves were attributed to 
each category. Over the years the OOC system has developed to more finely subdivide the rating 
categories. It has been estimated that currently about 60 percent of US bank holding companies 
have developed internal rating systems for loans on a 1-10 scale (Fach, 1997). Note that these 
loan-rating systems do not necessarily and exactly map into bond rating systems, especially at the 
lower-quality end. 
Rating schemes, both internal and external, are also used for grading bond credit risk. Such 
ratings characterise debt issues rather than issuers. The reason is that some debt issues, from the 
same borrower, are less risky than others and because investors are more interested in the risk of 
the single issue, given its specific protection. External rating systems are provided by official rating 
agencies capturing and qualifying the risk of loss in the event of default through the combination 
of default probabilities and recoveries. As a result, ratings are rankings, not quantitative measures 
of risk quality. Common rating systems include from six to ten different ranks, which is sufficient 
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to discriminate among risk lasses. For bonds, future migrations across ratings, and down to 
default, can be projected from transition matrices across ratings. Any downgrading results in an 
additional market spread discounted in the bond value. The distribution of values, over a given 
horizon, is the image of all possible credit quality changes and measures directly the credit risk. 
This rating process has been frequently criticised of being a lagging rather than a leading indicator 
as it does not provide any new information that the market has not already absorbed. 
Internal credit rating systems are designed to differentiate the credit quality of borrowers much 
more finely than under the five-point grading scale used by bank examiners (1. e., pass, special 
mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss). For risk measurement purposes, the importance of the 
credit rating process derives from the fact that, within most credit risk models, the internal credit 
risk grade is treated as a "sufficient statistic" for summarizing a facility's probability of defaulting 
within the relevant planning horizon. In general, the process of arriving at a credit rating for a 
customer or facility is accomplished through a three-step rocess involving first the traditional 
"spreading of numbers" in which financial and other characteristics of the customer (e. g., country 
and SIC code) and specific features of the facility (e. g., maturity) are incorporated into a relatively 
subjective approach to determining grades. Second, the construction of a concordance table 
relating the bank's internal credit grades to some external rating standard, usually S&P's or 
Moods ratings for corporate bonds. For example a grade-1 loan may be deemed roughly 
equivalent to a S&P's bond rating from AA to AAA, a grade-2 loan equivalent to a bond rating of 
single-A, and so on. Finally, given this concordance, the probability of a customer defaulting on 
its obligations (or migrating to another credit risk grade) is usually inferred from (a) published 
tables of the historical default frequencies of similarly-rated corporate bonds, (b) any available 
internal data on the historical default rates of loans originated by the bank itself, and/or (c) 
consultants' knowledge of the default rates experienced by other banks. As a matter of fact, no 
bank relies solely on formal credit scoring models, whether developed internally or externally. 
3.3.3. Aarnmling- Credit Scoring Systems 
Credit scoring models identify the key factors that determine the probability of default 
(bankruptcy) and combine them into a quantitative score. In some cases the score can be 
interpreted as a probability of default, in others the score is used as a classification system. 
Accounting-based credit scoring systems involve the comparison of various key accounting ratios 
of potential borrowers with industry or group mean and trend for these variables. In the 
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univariate approach the credit analyst bases its decision on a particular ratio for a potential 
borrower and assesses whether it is significantly different from the norm of its industry. 
Generally, the most significant indicators used in univariate studies are profitability, liquidity, and 
solvency ratios (Beaver, 1966; Deakin, 1972). However, empirical studies disagree on which is the 
most effective predictor of bankruptcy potential. Moreover, it may be difficult to make credit-type 
judgements when individual ratios leads to different conclusions and when comparison measures 
are categorical rather than quantitative. These limitations lead to the extension of univariate 
studies to combine several measures into a meaningful predictive model (multivariate approach). 
The most well known score model is the Altman (1968) Z-score model where both 
quantitative and categorical variables are combined and weighted to produce a measure (credit 
risk score) that discriminates between failing and non failing firms. Loan applicants would either 
be rejected or accepted according to whether their score falls below or above a critical benchmark 
The model is constructed using multiple discriminant analysis, a multivariate technique that selects 
a set of variables to maximise the between-group variance while minimising the within-group 
variance. After assessing the contribution of each independent variable and evaluating the 
intercorrelations among the relevant variables, the predictive accuracy of the alternative sets of 
variables is assessed and the analyst expresses her judgement on the final profile of variables. 
Specifically, Altman Z-score model classifies corporate borrowers on the basis of the worming 
capital ratio, retained earnings ratio, earnings before interest and taxes and sales to total assets 
ratios, and market value to book vale ratio. Revisions and extensions to the original Z-score 
model were introduced in order to score privately held companies (Ahrnan, 1993) and to 
minimise the potential industry effect (Z'-score model), which is more likely to occur when an 
industry-sensitive variable is included in the model 
The basic Z-score model and credit scoring models in general have endured to this day and 
have been applied to emerging market companies and used to assign a bond rating equivalent to 
each score. They generally enable the analyst to assess the default probability of an applicant by 
observing the historical experience of each bond rating. From this point of view they can be 
viewed as an alternative to internal risk-rating system where this is lacking. They can also be used 
to review and update the credit quality of borrowers providing an early warning system to the 
lender. These models provide a low-cost and quick assessment of risk in terms of credit spreads 
or unexpected losses to include in pricing equations. Finally, they can facilitate the stratification 
and structuring of commercial loans for securitization. In order for these models to be effective 
over time, their coefficients need to be periodically re-estimated The fact that, since after the 
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scoring were first developed, a lot of attention has been given to choosing the right ratios to be 
used, may account for the continued stability of their predictive power and robustness. 
Artificial neural network analysis (ANN) has recently been applied to credit scoring models 
(Altman, Marco and Varetto, 1994; Jensen, 1992 and 1996). ANN can be viewed as a 
development of discriminant analysis towards a nonlinear framework to solve the problem of risk 
classification. ANN drop the assumption that variables entering into the distress prediction 
function are linearly and independently related while introducing the potential explanatory and 
predictive power of "hidden" correlations, which are consequently included among the 
independent variables in the nonlinear distress prediction function. Despite ANN allow going 
beyond the linearity limitation of linear probability models and linear discriminant analysis, they 
have been criticised for their ad hoc theoretical foundation and their use of data mining to identify 
the hidden correlations. 
All multivariate models are criticised for being "fitted" and "associative" since they are 
empirical models lacking a theory. However, the strongest criticism focuses on the book value 
accounting data that these models use. Since accounting data is measured at discrete time 
intervals, it provides an incomplete and not contemporaneous picture of a firm's true condition 
and prospects. As a result, models based on this data fail to identify subtle and fast changes in 
borrower conditions. Moreover, for resource valuation, balance sheet structure, and regulation 
reasons, these models result to be unable to measure risk for utilities, financial companies, new 
companies, and companies in extraction industries such as oil and mining. 
3.3.4. Bond pncec app ad) 
The bond prices approach estimates the probability of default of a counterparty on the basis 
of the credit rating assigned by rating agencies. Bond traders have developed procedures for 
taking credit risk into account when pricing corporate bonds. They collect market data on actively 
traded bonds to calculate a generic zero-coupon yield curve for each credit rating category 
. 
The 
probability of default of a company in a given year is therefore estimated from the yield curves for 
bonds of the same credit quality as those of the company. The idea is that the probability of 
default (PD) of a company in sector X and rated BB can be estimated using the aggregate fair 
market yield curve for BB-rated bonds in sector X. 
To understand how this method works, let r and r* be the current one-year risk-free rate and 
risky rate, respectively. For a $1 principal, the repayment on the risk-free and riskyborrowings are 
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$(1 + r) and $(1 + r? ), respectively. Given that repayment under the risky borrowing is uncertain, 
the payoff of $(1 + r) occurs with a probability of (1- p), where p is the probability of default on 
the risky loan over the course of one year. Assuming that investors are risk-neutral, the expected 
repayment under the risky loan should equal the repayment from the risk-free loan. If we assume 
a fraction f of the loan is recovered in case of default, then 
(1+r)= (1+rß)(1-p)+fp (3.1) 
which gives us the probability of default p for a period of 1 year from now. 
(r*-r) 
P (1+r*- fl 
(3.2) 
In the case of a corporate bond, credit risk evolves from i) default, in which case the credit 
exposure is simply the face value of the bond, as well as from ii) credit migrations (up/down- 
grades), in which case the credit exposure is given by the decrease in the price of the bond 
Assuming then that the higher yields on the corporate bonds are entirely compensation for 
possible losses from default, in both cases we can derive the present value of cost of defaults as 
difference between the value of a Treasury bond and the value of a corporate bond. 
EXPECTED CREDPT LOSS 
= 
Pt (riskfir) 
- 
P, *(risky) (3.3) 
In order to treasure the value of the risky bond between the current imet and maturity T, the 
horizon ti 
-T-t is chopped into n increments At = -r/n. We define A as the instantaneous rate 
of default, over a time interval At, default occurs with a probability of AAt. The probability of no 
default will be equal to (1- ), At). We also define f as a fraction representing the recovery rate, that 
is the residual payment to investors (after legal expenses) if default occurs and that can be 
modelled from historical experience. 
Given all these factors, the price of the corporate bond at each point in time can be derived 
from the probability of default, the probability of no default, and the recovery rate as follows: 
(1- AAOP, + AjtfP (3.4) 
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If ), is constant, the cumulative probability of no default is given by (1- At)' which tends to e -'t 
as n increases. The price of the risky bond at time t is given by two terms: 
Pt ý'=e)TP, +(1-eýT)fPt (3.5) 
The first component of the right-hand side involves a fractional default-free bond and the second 
component is the default probability times the loss. Assuming no recovery, we have: 
P*=e-ArJt (3.6) 
The rationale underlying eq. (3.6) is that for the same expected return to prevail from holding 
either the corporate bond or the government bond, it must be that the price of the corporate 
bond equals the price of the government bond times the probability of survival. To make this 
argument rigorous, we would have to make additional assumptions, e. g., that the corporate 
defaults are uncorrelated with changes in interest rates. Also the probabilities we obtain in fact 
reflect both the actual default probability and investors' risk aversion. 
If y is the default free yield, the current price of the risk-free bond is given by: 
Pr=eY" 
Substituting eq. (3J) into eq. (3.6) we obtain: 
(3.7) 
P*=e A=eYr= e-6+2T (3.8) 
In this way we can deduce the probability of default from the yield on the risky bond, y*: 
P"'=e""` 
From eqs (3.8-3.9) we find. 
y*=y+2 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
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where the credit spread (' 
- 
y) a? represents an annualised default rate more generally 
accounting also for partial recovery. Credit spread can be transfomled to a default probability by 
the logfit function: 
pt =1 /(1 + eat) (3.11) 
The pattern of dynamic credit exposure can be combined with future default probabilities to 
create a credit risk profile. At each point in time, the expected credit loss can be derived as: 
ECL 
=P-P*=e-Ar-e"'r=e-''r(1-e-'r) (3.12) 
In general the rate of default X can vary over time, being correlated with the economic cycle, 
the age of the bond, corporate profitability indicators, geographical and industry considerations, 
and the state of the economy. The most general formulation for modelling the default probability 
allows there to be numerous macro and microeconomics variables that influence its level For 
example, we could include the level of interest rates, the GDP, a market stock index, and the 
foreign exchange rate. Hence, the rate of default, given by the credit spread, can be modelled as a 
stochastic process of various forms. 
The shortcomings of this approach are the following. In reality, investors are risk-averse, 
implying that probabilities of default are overestimated by a risk-neutral bond prices approach. 
Another disadvantage of the bond spreads approach concerns the nature of the input data 
available for the model. Corporate bonds typically have options embedded in them and it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to extract prices of pure bonds from the data. Also, factors other than 
credit quality can affect bond prices in the short run. For example, the spread over the treasury 
rates for corporate bonds of a given rating can be affected by the available supply of bonds in that 
rating relative to the treasury bonds. Also, the liquidity of the US Treasury market far exceeds that 
of any other bond market, and so corporate bonds require a premium to compensate for their 
liquidity risk. Finally, the probabilities of default are sensitive to the recovery rates. Recovery rates 
depend upon many factors including bond seniority and in practice they are difficult to measure 
due to the complexities involved in the bankruptcy process and its prolonged nature. Also, the 
recovery rates are usually not constant over time. 
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3.3.5. The structural appmacb and the KM V Chit MonitorMoodel 
To the extent that stock price changes reflect and provide reliable evidence of a firm's 
creditworthiness, they constitute a powerful tool of credit risk management. The leading example 
of stock market-based credit measures is the expected default frequency (EDF) model of Y. W. 
The model is a default prediction model for all major firms and banks whose equity is publicly 
traded. The KMV model extends the idea of applying option-pricing theory Merton, 1974) to the 
valuation of risky loans and bonds. Thus credit risk is essentially driven by the dynamics of the 
asset value of the issuer. Given the current capital structure of the firm, i. e. the composition of its 
liabilities, once the stochastic process for the asset value has been specified, then the actual 
probability of default for any time horizon can be derived. 
This approach, pioneered by Black, Scholes and Merton, views the equity of a fine as a call 
option on the assets of the fine, where the exercise price and maturity correspond to the face 
value and maturity of the outstanding debt. Equivalently, using put-call parity, the debt-holders of 
the firm can be considered to have sold a put option based on the firm's assets to the equity 
holders. The put option will be exercised whenever the asset value of the fine falls below the debt 
level. The probability of default of the firm then equals the probability that the put option is 
exercised, that is the probability that the value of the firm is less than the value of the debt. 
The loan repayment incentive problem for the borrower (the equity owner of the firm) is then 
presented as a standard call option payoff. The value of the default option on a risky loan depends 
on the amount borrowed (B), the market value of the borrower firm's assets (A) at the end of the 
period, the short-term interest rate (r), the maturity of the bond or the time horizon for the loan 
(t), the volatility of the firm's equity value (ß), and the volatility of the market value of the firm's 
assets (6p). 
There are essentially three steps in the KMV methodology to determine the default probability 
of a firm. The first step is to estimate the market value and volatility of the firm's assets. As 
variables A and cr, are not directly observable KMV have solved this problem introducing a 
theoretical relationship between as and aA. Specifying explicit functional forms for the option 
pricing model of equity (OPM) and for the stock-price-asset volatiEty linkage, the A and ßA values 
are estimated from the market value and volatility of equity and the book value of liabilities. This 
process is similar in spirit to the procedure used by option traders in the determination of the 
implied volatility of an option from the observed option price. These estimates are used together 
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with the values assigned to B and ti to produce a theoretically based expected default frequency 
(EDF) score for any given borrower. 
The second step consists in the calculation of the distance-to-default (DD), which is an index 
or measure of default. The objective is to provide an empirical EDF to overcome the strong 
assumption of normality of asset values and the simplifying assumptions about the capital 
structure of the fine necessary to produce theoretical EDFs. There are six variables that 
determine the default probability of a firm over some horizon H (see Figure 3.2): 1) the current 
asset value; 2) the distribution of the asset value at time H, " 3) the volatility of the future assets 
value at time H, " 4) the level of the default point, the book value of the liabilities; 5) the expected 
rate of growth in the asset value over the horizon; 6) the length of the horizon, H. 
Market 
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Figure 3.2 KMVDistribution of the firm assets value at maturity of the debt obligation. 
If the value of the assets falls below the default point, then the firn defaults. Therefore, the 
probability of default is the probability that the asset value will fall below the default point This is 
the shaded area (EDF) below the default point in Figure 3.2. If the future distribution of asset 
values were known, the default probability would simply be the likelihood that the final asset value 
was below the default point However, in practice, the distribution of the asset values is difficult to 
measure. Moreover, the usual assumptions of normal or lognormal distributions cannot be used. 
Consequently, the distance-to-default is measured as the number of standard deviations the asset 
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value is away from default and uses empirical data to detemune the corresponding default 
probability. The distance-to-default is calculated as 
Mkt Valueof Assets 
- 
DefaultPoint [DD]= (3.13) 
MarketValueof Assets 
- 
Asset Volatility 
and represents the number of standard deviations between the mean of the distribution of the 
asset value, and a critical threshold, set at par value of current liabilities (including short-term 
debt). 
In the last step the relationship between distance-to-defauh and default probability is obtained 
from data on historical default and bankruptcy frequencies. This is done building up a large 
worldwide database of firms and firms defaults and from these data a frequency table can be 
generated which relates the likelihood of default to various levels of distance-to-default. In other 
words, the percentage of firms that defaulted within a period t0+i and with asset values of x 
standard deviations from B at t9 over the total population of firms that were x standard deviations 
away from default at to is derived. 
The probability of default therefore results to be a function of the firm's capital structure, the 
volatility of the asset returns and the current asset value. The EDF incorporates through the DD 
and via the asset value and volatility, the effects of industry, geography and firm size. Although 
EDF is firm-specific, it can be mapped into any rating system to derive the equivalent rating of 
the obligor. EDFs can be viewed as a "cardinal" ranking of obligors relative to default risk, instead 
of the more conventional "ordinal" ranking proposed by rating agencies. 
To derive the loss distribution for a portfolio, KMV use the "risk neutral" or martingale 
approach to the pricing of securities, which derives prices as the discounted expected value of 
future cash flows. The valuation of risky cash-flows involves first the valuation of the default-free 
component and, in the second place, the valuation of the component exposed to credit risk. The 
full loss distribution of the portfolio at a given credit horizon is derived analytically, not simulated. 
The EDF model differentiates from other approaches in a few major aspects. First, it relies on 
the information in equity prices. Historically, banks have ignored stock market prices in their 
lending decisions. By contrast, the KMV model stresses the need to monitor equity market 
valuations constantly and interpret the implications for credit risk. Second, it does not try explicitly 
to be predictive. It simply relates the cu rent value of the firm to its default point and historical 
volatility. Thus, if it has predictive power, it is because the current value of the firm is a good 
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predictor of future values. Finally, it is a conceptual rather than empirical or statistical approach, in 
the way that it is the option theory and the relation between debt and equity prices that drive the 
choice of the variables to be included in the model 
The strenghts of the KMV approach are the following. First, it can be applied to any public 
company. Second, by being based on stock market data rather than historic book value 
accounting data, it has a greater sensitivity and it is forward-looking. Third, being a structural 
model based on the modem theory of corporate finance and options, it has strong theoretical 
foundation. However, the model presents also some weaknesses. Theoretical EDFs can be 
constructed only under the strong assumption of normality of asset returns; EDFs for private 
firms cannot be calculated directly, bonds and loans are not distinguished by seniority, collaterals, 
covenants, and other features; finally the model is static in the sense it assumes the firm's debt 
structures is kept unchanged even for different levels of firm's assets. Since the probability that a 
finn's asset value will fall below a boundary B declines remarkably as the default horizon 
approaches to zero, the KMV model implies that credit spreads at the short end of the time 
horizon also tend to zero. Since there is no empirical evidence for this implication, KMV type of 
models seem to underestimate the probability of default over short horizons. Finally, the 
assumption of deterministic interest rates limits the usefulness of the KMV methodology when 
applied to loans and other interest rate sensitive instruments. 
3.3.6. The VaR appromb and the J. P. Morgan cC &Met, *s Modd 
JP Morgan and its co-sponsors introduced CreditMetrics in April 1997. This represents one of 
the first publicly available attempts using probability transition matrices to develop a portfolio 
credit risk management framework that measures the marginal impact of individual bonds on the 
risk and return of a portfolio. The objective is to provide a process for estimating the value 
distribution of any portfolio of assets ubject o changes in credit quality (including default). 
The CreditMetrics model of default is familiar to econometric fans as an ordered probit model 
Credit events are driven by movements in underlying unobserved latent variables. The latent 
variables are assumed to depend on external "risk factors". Common dependence on the same 
risk factors gives rise to correlations in credit events across obligors. 
Like KMV, CreditMetrics is a Merton-based model, relying on Merton's model of a firm's 
capital structure: a firm defaults when its asset value falls below its liabilities. A borrower's default 
probability then depends on both the amount by which assets exceed liabilities, and the volatility 
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of those assets. If changes in asset value are normally distributed, the default probability is 
expressed as the probability of a standard normal variable falling below some critical value. In 
other words, CreditMetrics is a value at risk (VaR) framework applied to the valuation and risk of 
tradable and nontradable assets bonds. 
In addition to the credit-portfolio related difficulties generated by a non normal distribution 
and by the complex effect of credit diversification, applying VaR to nontradable loans, such as 
loans and privately placed, involves further problems such as the non observability of the current 
market value of the loan (P) and consequently the impossibility of calculating the volatility (a) of 
P. The problems related to P and a are solved in CreditMetrics using i) data on borrowers' credit 
rating, u) probabilities from the rating transition matrix iii) data on recovery rates on defaulted 
loans; and iv) credit spread and yield data. To overcome the problem of assnr metry of the credit 
return distribution, CreditMetrics produces two VaR measures based on both a theoretical 
normal distribution and the actual distribution of loan values. 
CreditMetrics risk measurement framework is well summarised by Figure 3.3 that shows the 
two main building blocks, ie. value-at-risk due to credit for a single financial instrument, and 
value-at-risk at the portfolio level. The first step in this model is the specification of the transition 
matrix and the calculation of critical values corresponding to each borrower's default probability 
(mapped from the borrower's credit rating). The mean of the bond/loan's value after 1-year 
horizon is derived as the sum of each possible bond/loan value at the end of year 1 times its 
probability to "transit" to any other rating dass. Unlike in KMV's framework, CieditMetrics 
assumes that all issuers are credit-homogeneous within the same rating class, with the same 
transition/default probability. 
In the second step the credit risk horizon is specified. By convention, much of the academic 
and credit agency data states the risk horizon on an annual basis. In a sense, the use of a one-year 
horizon is merely a convenient convention as is the use of annualized interest rates. Also in this 
respect, CreditMetrics differentiates from KMV model that uses market data, easily updated daily. 
In the third step, the forward pricing model is specified For each possible credit quality, a 
spread curve is required to price the bond in all possible states, with all obligors within the same 
rating class being marked-to-market with the same curve. The spot zero curve and the forward 
zero-curve are used to determine the current spot value and the forward price of the bond in 1 
year, respectively. The sum of the discounted 
- 
at the appropriate rate 
- 
cash flows will provide the 
value of the bond in 1 year. In case the issuer defaults at the end of the year a recovery rate factor 
is estimated from rating agencies' historical information. 
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Exposures Value-at-risk due to credit Correlations 
portfUserolio F Credit rating Seniority Credit spreads Ratings equities eries series, -11 1F 
Market Rating migration Recovery rate Present value Models (e. g., 
volatilities likelihoods in default bond revaluation correlations) 
Exposure Standard deviation of value due to credit Joint credit 
distributions quality changes for a single exposure rating changes 
Portfolio value at risk due to credit 
Figure 3.3 CreditMetrics framework 
In the fourth step the forward distribution of the changes in portfolio value due to eventual 
changes in the credit quality is derived. Under the normality assumption, the a confidence level 
VaR for the bond/loan is obtained multiplying the z« value and the standard deviation of loan 
value around its mean. However, we well know that credit distributions often exhibit long 
downside tails leading to a VaR measure that in fact underestimates the actual or true VaR To 
overcome this problem, an additional "actual" VaR measure is computed using the actual 
distribution of bond values and transition probabilities. In either way, VaR measures the 
maximum loss of value on a given bond or loan (or a portfolio of bonds and loans) over the time 
period of 1 year at a given a confidence level 
Dealing with a portfolio of loans or bonds, joint default events amongst borrowers in the 
portfolio are related to the extent that the borrowers' changes in asset value are correlated ('input 
in the form of a pairwise correlation matrix determined according to country and industry 
groupings). The accurate estimation of these correlations is determinant in portfolio optimization 
from a risk-return prospective. Equity prices are used as a proxy for the asset value of the firme to 
estimate the correlations between the equity returns of various obligors. Correlations, like in 
KMV model, are derived from a structural model that links correlation to a set of fundamental 
factors that are systematic or common to all firms. The correlations between changes in credit 
quality are then inferred from the joint distribution of equity returns. 
In the second building block the analysis carries on for large portfolios. The portfolio loss 
distribution is generated by a Monte Carlo simulation as follows. First, drawing random correlated 
Z Which is equivalent to assume that the firm's activities are all equity financed. 
67 
Chapter III. 
- 
Measuring Credit Risk 
standard normal variables representing the change in asset value for each borrower. Second, 
comparing this standardized change in asset value to the pre-calculated critical value to determine 
which borrowers default. Third, summing the losses resulting from each borrower default to 
arrive at a total portfolio loss. Fourth, repeating thousands of times to build a distribution of 
portfolio losses. 
In addition to the overall credit-VaR analysis for the portfolio, CreditMetrics calculate the 
marginal standard deviation, ie. the marginal risk contribution of each individual asset on the 
overall portfolio standard deviation. 
A few problems remain however with the VaR methodology employed in CreditMetrics. 
Specifically, the transition matrix is assumed to be a stable Markov process (Alm= and Kao, 
1992) meaning that movements between rating classes are independent. In contrast, the empirical 
evidence supports the hypothesis of autocorrelation in rating transitions, so that a bond or loan 
that has been previously downgraded is more likely to be downgraded in the current period 
(Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto, 2000). The second weakness is related to the stability 
assumption of the rating transition matrix. That is, the same matrix is used for different borrower 
types, for different countries of the borrower, and for different points in time. Also in this case 
the evidence contradicts this assumption. Nickell et aL (2000) show how industry factors, country 
factors, and business cycle factors have a significant impact of rating transition. 
An additional issue related to the rating migration computation is the impact of bond "aging" 
on the transition probabilities. Altman and Kishore (1998) show that significant difference are 
observed according to whether the transition matrix is computed on newly issued bonds or on all 
bonds outstanding in a rating class at a particular moment in time. Moreover, using bond 
transition matrices to value loans lead to ignore all the features that make loans behave differently 
from bonds, such as collaterals, covenants, etc. The assumption that recovery rates, interest rates, 
and credit spreads are all nonstochastic leads to the underestimation of the VaR and capital 
requirements. The underlying reason for this assumption lies in the controversial separation rather 
than integration of market risk and credit risk. 
Finally, a key difficulty in the structural-based approaches of KMV and CieditMetrics is their 
estimation of the asset correlations from equity returns. Crouhy et al. (2000) show that credit VaR 
produced by these methodologies are sensitive to the correlation coefficients on asset returns and 
that small errors are important. 
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3.3.7 The Macro Sbnukim Appirnch and the McKinsey Model 
The McKinse ?s CreditPortfolioView model bases its strength on the dear evidence of a 
significant cyclic behaviour of downgrades and defaults. On the basis of this observation, 
CreditPortfolioView simulates the joint conditional distribution of both default and migration 
probabilities for various rating groups in different industries, for each country, conditional on the 
value of macroeconomic factors such as the unemployment rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the 
level of long-term interest rates, etc. The McKinsey multi-factor model links those 
macroeconomic factors to the default and migration probabilities. 
The model starts with the empirical derivation of the relationship driving each borrower's (or 
"segment" of borrowers) default rate p,, according to a normally distributed "index" of 
macroeconomic factors for that borrower (Wilson, 1997). The macroeconomic index y,,, s 
expressed as a weighted sum of macroeconomic variables xk, each of which is normally 
distributed and can have lagged ependency. 
Xk, t =ak. o +ak. lxk, r-1 +'ak, 2xk, t_2 +... 
+6k. 
r 
(3.14) 
Yi, t = b,, o + b,. tx la + bj, 1x 2, t + ... + V,, 1 (3.15) 
where the and u, are normally distributed random innovations. The factor loadings b; k, fror the 
index are determined by the empirical relationship between sub-portfolio default rates and 
explanatory macroeconomic variables, using logistic regression. The coefficients ah, m the macro- 
economic variables can be determined by an appropriate econometric model. The index is 
successively transformed to a conditional default probability by a logic function: 
_1 (3.16) 
The default probabilities are therefore determined by lagged macro variables, a general 
economic shock factor or innovation (u) and shock factors for each of the macro variables (F-J. 
To calibrate the default probability model the system (3.14)-(3.16) has to be solved. The estimates 
of the fitted model are successively used to simulate the evolution of transition probabilities over 
time by generating macro shocks to the model. Structured Monte Carlo simulations are used to 
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generate random values for both types of innovations according to their covariance stxacture. 
Macroeconomic variables outcomes according to their lagged past values and random 
innovations, on one side, and index values according to the macroeconomic values and the index 
random innovations, on the other side, are computed and the resulting default probabilities 
derived. The distribution of default outcomes for this iteration is calculated by successively 
convoluting each obligor's distribution of outcomes. All the previous steps are repeated 
thousands of times to build a distribution of portfolio losses. Simulated scenario values for each 
transition probability (each cell in the matrix) in the next periods are obtained. The new transition 
matrix will be conditional on the state of the economy and the ratio of the simulated probability 
values and the uncondional ones (based on Standard & Poor's or Moodys historical data) gives 
the percentage of the under- or over-estimation of the unconditional transition matrix. The new 
simulated matrix could be used to calculate VaR at the 1-year horizon in a way similar to the 
CreditMetrics framework. In this sense the macro simulation approach should be viewed as 
complementary to CreditMetxics, overcoming its biases resulting from its assumption of 
stationary transition probability matrix. Since p; r can 
be simulated over any time horizon to 1, 
... , 
T, this approach can generate multi-period transition matrices. 
Although both KMV and CreditPortfolioView base their approach on the same empirical 
observation that default probabilities vary over time, the former links the probability of default to 
the market value of the obligor's assets (microeconomic approach), while the latter links the same 
probability to macroeconomic factors. Reliable data for each country and each sector within each 
country are necessary for the McKinsey model's calibration. 
3.3.8. The Actuarial Appraifi: the Cwit Risk + Model 
Credit Swiss Financial Products (CSFP) apply an actuarial approach to the derivation of the 
loss distribution of a bond/loan portfolio. Specifically Credit Risk+ makes use of mathematical 
techniques in loss distribution modelling common in the insurance industry (CSFP, 1997). Crdit 
Risk+ is based on a portfolio approach to modelling default risk taking into account information 
relating to size and maturity of an exposure and the credit quality and systematic risk of an 
obligor. Credit spreads risk is viewed as part of market risk and the focus in on expected and 
unexpected loss calculations rather then expected and unexpected changes in value (VaR) as in 
CreditMetrics. Unlike the latter, Credit Risk+ model is a default mode P4 model in that, in any 
period, it considers only two states of the world, default and non-default. The second major 
70 
Chapter III: Measuring Credit Risk 
difference with CreditMetrics is that the default probability in any year is no longer discrete, but is 
modelled as a continuous variable with a probability distribution. Each individual oan is regarded 
as having a small probabIty of default that is independent of the default probability of other 
loans. As a result, the distribution of default probabilities of a loan portfolio during a given period 
of time resembles a Poisson distribution: 
n e-11 P(n defaults)= P for n0,1,2,..., (3.17) 
n! 
where the annual number of defaults per year, n, is a stochastic variable with mean u (average 
number of defaults per year) and standard deviation J. As the mean default rate is expected to 
change over time depending on the business cyde, Credit R. isk+ introduces the assumption that 
the mean default rate is itself stochastic with mean u and standard deviation vµ. Asa result the 
distribution of defaults is more skewed with a fat right tail. 
In the extended model CSFP encompasses three sources of uncertainty. 1) the uncertainty of 
the default rate around any given mean default rate; 2) the uncertainty about the severity of loss; 
and 3) the uncertainty about the mean default rate itself. In the first step of the Credit Risk+ 
methodology, borrowers are allocated amongst "sectors" or "bands" vi, each of which is viewed 
as an independent portfolio of loans/bonds with an own mean default rate and a default rate 
volatility. The default rate volatility is the standard deviation that would be observed on an 
infinitely diversified homogeneous portfolio of borrowers in the band Assuming the existence of 
k bands, each one represented by a random variable xk, which is the number of defaults in the k`' 
sector, and which is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution with parameters a and 13k set o 
yield a given mean default rate, ryý and a default rate volatility of : 
xk 
- 
rlakjpliklg (3.18) 
2s 
=k where ak =1, and 6k 
a 
Ck "k 
In the single-sector case, a borrower's default rate is scaled to this Gamma-disc ibuted sector 
default rate. This analysis is repeated for each severity loss band v; taking into account the 
observed mean default rates for these different exposure bands. For multiple sectors, aborrower's 
default rate is scaled according to the weighted average of sector default rates: 
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pIX= py-cok "-* (3.19) 
k Pk 
where p is the unconditional default rate, and t is the weight in sector k, E ulk =1. 
k 
The next step would be aggregating the band exposures into a total loan loss distribution. 
Since borrowers' joint-default behaviors are independent conditional on fixed default rates, the 
unconditional default distribution for the homogeneous sub-portfolio can be obtained by 
"averaging" Poisson conditional default distributions according to default rates from the Gamma 
distribution 
- 
statistically, the convolution of the Poisson distribution with the Gamma 
distribution. This convolution leads to an analytic (dosed form) expression for the resulting 
unconditional distribution of portfolio losses. 
Modell Modelt Model 3 Model 4 
Dimensions from 
Comparison CreditMetrics CreditPortfolioView Credit Risk Phu KMV 
E q"Risk A Market Value O Market Value Default Losses Default Losses 
(1V! IM) OvTIM or DM) (DA (MIM or D" 
OakEw2 Downgtade%Default Downgrade/Default Default Continuos Default 
Probabilities 
Risk cbiws Asset values Macro factors Expected default Asset values 
rates 
Vol i gtaw& Constant Variable Variable Variable 
etaz (fixed or discrete value (logistic furrrion of macro (the prof default is a (varies with changes in based on historic data) factors and shocks) Poisson disnibuäon; stock prices) 
the mean default me is 
nmddled as a Gamma 
distribution) 
Ca? d, 6 icfaak Multivariate normal Factor loadings Independence Multivariate 
wo asset rmurns assumption normal asset 
rennns 
R«rmyrat Random Random Constant within Constant or 
band Random 
Nwie" i Simulation or Simulation Analytic Analytic 
analytic 
Fast mope m Bottom-up model Bottom-up model Top-down Bottom-up 
model model 
Reh nMasaaewt N/A N/A N/A RAROC 
Table 3.1 Comparative analysis of credit models 
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The major advantage of the Credit Risk+ methodology is the rather minimal data input and 
computation required (the probability of default and the loss given default). Moreover, no 
information is required about the term structure of interest rates or probability transition matrices. 
Its major limitation is that it is not a full VaR model since it focuses exclusively on loss rates rather 
then loan value changes. Additionally like CreditMetrics and KMV, Credit Risk+ assumes no 
market risk and does not deal with nonlinear products (options, swaps, etc). 
CreditMetrics CreditPortfolioView CreditRisk+ 
Distribution of 
Systemic Factors 
(Normal) 
Joint-Default 
Behaviour Conditional 
Default Rate 
Pam 
Merton Macroeconomic 
Model Regression 
Default Rate 
Distribution 
(Gamma) 
----------------------------------- 
Conditional Default 
--------------------------------------- 
Binomial 
----------------------- ------------ 
Poisson 
Distribution 
----------------------------------- 
Distribution 
--------------------------------------- 
Distribution 
----------------------------------- 
Monte Carlo Numeric 
Aggregation Simulation Algorithm 
Figure 3.4 Statistical features of credit models 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.4 summarise the main features of some of the models presented above. 
Comparing credit risk models, strong statistical tests of effectiveness should be considered. The 
simplest test of the predictive accuracy of a model is to compare a specific prediction with the 
actual outcome. The forecast error, calculated from ex ante value (estimate) and ex post value 
(realisation), would be the best test of performance. As the absolute results of such tests depend 
on the particular sample used, the models we want to compare must use exactly the same sample 
population and include only firms for which all model values are simultaneously available. Models 
can also be compared from a different perspective in the context of portfolio risk and return 
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framework. A more direct evaluation would be carried out through trading simulations based on 
consistent decision rules and constraints. The resulting profit and loss figures, rather than 
prediction error rates, could then be compared. This method, however, relies on good-quality 
debt price data, which are not always currently available. 
Although practitioners and policy makers have invested in implementing and exploring each 
of these models individually, not much progress has been done with comparative analyses. Direct 
comparison of the models is not straightforward since the models are presented within rather 
different mathematical frameworks. We conclude this section saying that it is probably prudent 
neither to accept not to reject any of these approaches ii taro but to subject them to objective 
examination and use them in combination with other sources of information in making credit risk 
decisions. 
3.4. Model Validation 
Given the extensive judgment required in specifying credit risk models, the need for effective 
nH man procedures is dearly important The components of model validation can be 
grouped into a few broad categories: (a) backtesting; (b) stress testing; (c) structured Monte Carlo 
simulations; (d) assessing the sensitivity of credit risk estimates to underlying parameters and 
assumptions; (e) benchmarking and (fl ensuring the existence of independent review and 
oversight of a model At present, few banks possess processes that both span the range of 
validation efforts listed and address all elements of model uncertainty. This suggests hat the area 
of validation will prove to be a key challenge for banking institutions in the foreseeable future. It 
remains that the validation of credit risk models is also fundamentally more difficult than the 
backtesting of market risk models. We present below the main reasons. 
3.4.1. Backtesting 
In many ways, the task of estimating the extreme tail of the PDF is comparable to predicting 
the frequency at which credit losses in any year will exceed many multiples of a normal year's 
losses. The only entirely objective method for evaluating the statistical accuracy of a credit risk 
model is to compare (over periods spanning multiple credit cydes) the model's exe estimates of 
74 
Chapter III. 
- 
Measuring Credit Risk 
PDFs against ex jxut realizations of actual credit losses. That is, only the realization of more 
frequent, extreme credit losses (relative to the model's predictions) can provide a purely statistical 
basis for concluding a model is deficient. 
The backrests must compare daily VaR measures calibrated to a one-day movement in rates 
and prices and a 98 percent confidence level for istance, against two measures of the profit and 
loss (P&L): a) the actual net trading P&L for the next day, and b) the theoretical P&L that would 
have occurred had the position at the dose of the previous day been carried forward to the next 
day. Assuming that the risk factors are correctly modelled and that markets behave accordingly, 
we expect on average the absolute value of actual P&L to be greater than the VaR only 5 days 
over the last 250 days. Backtesting should be performed daily and net trading losses exceeding the 
corresponding VaR must be identified and reported. 
However, while backtesting a VaR market risk model is relatively straightforward, the 
methodology is not easily transferable to credit risk models due to the data constraints noted 
above. The Market Risk Amendment (see section 3.6) requires a minimum of 250 trading days of 
forecasts and realised losses. A similar standard for credit risk models would require an impractical 
number of years of data given the models' longer time horizons. For these reasons, it is very 
difficult for users own validation and for validation by third parties, such as external auditors or 
bank regulators, to conduct out-of-sample testing and statistical backtesting on the PDFs 
predicted by credit risk models. 
These difficulties are the basic reason for the fact that a formal backtesting programme for 
validating estimates of credit risk 
- 
or wx4apri loss 
- 
is not operational within most banks. 
Where analyses of ex-ante estimates and ex-post experience are made, banks typically compare 
estimated credit risk losses to a historical series of actual credit losses captured over some years. 
However, the comparison of opaiai and artal credit losses does not address the accuracy of the 
model's prediction of zn ul losses, against which economic capital is allocated. While such 
independent work on backtesting islimited, some literature indicates the difficulty of ensuring that 
capital requirements generated using credit risk models will provide an adequately large capital 
buffer. 
In lieu of formal back-testing, credit risk models tend to be validated indirectly, through 
various market-based "reality' checks such as peer group analysis, rate of return analysis and 
comparison of market credit spreads with those implied by the bank's own pricing models. Peer 
group analysis is used extensively to gauge the reasonableness of credit risk models and internal 
capital location processes. Another market-based validation technique involves comparing the 
75 
Chapter III: Measuring Credit Risk 
bank's hurdle rate with the expected risk-adjusted rate of return (Le., the RAROC) that could be 
achieved by investing in corporate bonds or syndicated loans having a particular credit rating, say, 
BB. An implied RAROC well below (above) the bank's hurdle rate might be interpreted as 
evidence that the model's capital allocation for BB-rated credits was too high (low), possibly 
requiring some re-calibration of the model's parameters. 
However, the assumption underlying these approaches is that prevailing market perceptions of 
appropriate capital levels (for peer analysis) or credit spreads (for rate of return analysis) are 
substantially accurate and economically well founded. Otherwise, reliance on such techniques 
could raise serious concerns regarding to the comparability and consistency of credit risk models 
over time, an issue that may be of particular importance from a supervisory perspective. 
3.4.2. Stress Testing 
Since credit data are scarce in the time dimension, but plentiful in the cross-sectional 
dimension, users of credit risk models have constructed alternative methods for validating these 
models. For example, credit risk models have been evaluated using "stems tr üg". Stress testing 
(ST) is a process which consists of generating market "extreme scenarios" for which key 
assumptions in the VaR model may be violated We could say that while VaR considers unlikely 
events under normal market conditions, ST considers likely events in abnormal market 
conditions. ST should assess the impact of the major uncertainties in credit risk models 
- 
such as 
the estimation of default rates, the joint probability distribution of risk factors, correlations. ST 
should also investigate some causal relationships between market factors, between market and 
credit risks, and other exceptional relationships which may be triggered by abnormal events. In 
other words, stress testing allows firms to assess the impact of possible extreme "fat-tail" events. 
The model's performance and the adequacy of bank capital will be evaluated with respect o those 
event scenarios, regardless of the probability that such events may occur. Scenarios may be either 
artificially constructed or based on historical outcomes, and they may cover a wide range of 
events, including the performance of certain sectors during crises, the magnitude of losses at 
extreme points of the credit cycle, deterioration in credit ratings or market spreads, or shifts in 
default probabilities and changes in correlation structures. Although these scenarios generally do 
not occur, this practice may provide a consistency check regarding the model's assumptions. 
In theory, a robust process of stress testing could act as a complement to baditesting given the 
limitations inherent in current backtesting methods. Stress testing is used routinely by the credit 
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rating agencies, who often assign credit ratings on the basis of a security's ability to withstand 
various stress scenarios: to qualify for a AAA rating, the security would have to avoid defaulting 
under a AAA-scenario, to quality for a AA rating, the security would have to withstand a AA- 
scenario, and so forth. Similarly, with respect to banks' trading activities, stress tests designed to 
simulate hypothetical market disturbances (e. g., the October 1987 stock market crash) provide 
useful checks on the reasonableness of the required capital levels generated by banks' VaR 
models. In some ways, stress testing allows banks to derive some kind of confidence interval on 
its VaR numbers. 
The advantage of this method is that it may cover situations completely absent from the 
historical data and that management might otherwise ignore 
. 
However, it does not appear that 
banks have dedicated a significant amount of resources to devising appropriate stress testing 
procedures. This might be due to the completely subjective nature of this approach with the 
possibility that bad or implausible scenarios may lead to wrong credit risk assessment. Moreover, 
the choice of scenarios may be affected by the specific portfolio position held. That is, scenarios 
change over time according to whether the portfolio is invested in national fixed-income rather 
than in currencies and measures of risk will change just because of changes between these 
positions. Finally, stress testing does not specify the likelihood of worst-case situations and poorly 
handles correlations by examining the effect of large moves in one financial variable at a time. We 
conclude saying that this method may be appropriate in situations where the portfolio depends 
primarily on one source of risk and that should be considered a complement rather than a 
replacement to other measures of risk 
3.4.3. Monte Carlo Sim i/ations 
In contrast to scenario analysis, structured Monte Carlo (SMC) simulations cover a wide range 
of possible values in financial variables and fully account for correlations. This method 
approximates the behavior of financial prices by using computer simulations to generate random 
price paths. It proceeds in two steps. In the first step a stochastic process for financial variables 
and process parameters is specified, parameters such as risk and correlations can be derived from 
historical or option data. In the second step, price paths are simulated for all variable of interest 
At each horizon considered, the portfolio is marked to market and each realization is then used to 
obtain a distribution of returns, from which a VaR can be measured. Details of SMC simulations 
for credit risk are provided in Box [3.1]. This method is very expensive to implement in terms of 
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systems infifrastructure, computational cost and intellectual development, but is by far the most 
powerful. It is very flexible and can potentially account for a wide range of risks, including credit 
risk, nonlinear price risk, volatility risk, and model risk. It can also incorporate fat tails, time 
variation in volatility, and extreme scenarios. However, SMC relies on a specific stochastic model 
for the underlying risk factors as well as pricing models for securities such as options and 
mortgages. This suggests that simulation results should be complemented by sensitivity analysis to 
check if the results are robust to changes in the model. 
Stntiwd Maue Gab SiraLwn The first crucial step will consist of choosing an appropriate stochastic model 
for the behavior of credit spreads. For example the dynamics of credit spreads can be modelled as a mean 
reverting process of the form: 
clop 
- 
k(B- css) dt + a, a5 cz (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985) (1) 
An alternative way to the formulation of a stochastic process is forecasting credit spread changes through ARMA, 
ARQ-1, and GARCH models. Interactions with interest rate innovations can be introduced through correlation in 
the random terms. According to the simple formulation (1), the only source of uncertainty in the future value of 
the portfolio is due to credit quality changes 
-both up(down) grades, but it doesn't take into account the risk of 
default. A solution could be the introduction of a jump component The variance of this process is proportional 
to the level of credit spreads. Additional factors can be eventually added (mukifactor model). 
In practice the process with an irrfinites orally small increment c$ is approximated by discrete moves of size dt. 
Integrating Acs/cs over a finite interval we have approximately: 
L3r 
- 
k( 0- csj-d At + a, cS. 1 6dtA (2) 
where c is a standard normal variable with mean zero and variance one. 
II) To simulate the credit spread path, we start from cs at time t and generate a sequence of E for 1n 
scenarios. Then a at time t+ 1 is set at 
+, rk + (k(0- q) A+ or, qr' EI d021 (3) 
is at time t+2 is similarly computed from a at t+ 1, and so on for future values, until the target horizon is reached 
at which point cs, +. - csr. 
III) We can now calculate the value of the risky bond at the target horizon P'tt - P*, 
, 
under this particular 
sequence of credit spreads. 
Having previously modelled the price of the risk-free bond P, using standard simulation models, we can now 
derive the E(1 at each point in time and at the target horizon. 
Repeating steps II) and III) as many times as necessary (10,000) we obtain a distribution of ECL. from which the 
VaR can be reported At the selected significance level c, the VaR is the ECL exceeded in c time 10,000 
replications. 
Box 3.1. Structured Monte Carlo for modelling default on bonds 
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3.4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
The following compensating controls may be employed to validate a credit risk model. 
Q I-Tz i rirl Frackft An historical backtest is a comparison of the capital that would have been 
calculated to the historic loss that would have occurred for a hypothetical portfolio over some 
past time interval. The hypothetical portfolio could either be randomly created by simulation or 
have been an actual loan portfolio of the bank at some past date. The historic loss in value could 
be ascertained from the defaults (and loss, given default) that actually occurred during the period 
and the loss in portfolio value that would have occurred from the historic changes in credit 
spreads and changes in credit ratings during the period By choosing a severe economic downturn 
as a historic period, the robustness of the capital calculation could be tested. 
Q Parte A credit risk model's simulation of potential economic loss will depend on many 
parameters, uch as the probability of default, given a risk rating, or the expected loss, given 
default. A model can be made more robust by taking into account he instability of the parameters 
it uses for simulation. For example, instead of using only an expected loss, given default, a credit 
model could use historical data to estimate the probability distribution of loss, given default and 
could draw from that probab7ity distribution in its simulation. Alternatively, a model could use 
parameters that are dependent on a particular economic scenario. A first step in a simulation 
would be a draw from a probability distribution of potential economic scenarios over the coming 
year. Corresponding to the economic scenario that is drawn would be a set of parameters used for 
simulation. 
Q Capital hfas Some additional controls that could be taken include identifying the uncertainty 
in capital corresponding to the uncertainty in the parameters used in simulation. An additional 
amount of capital could be allocated as compensation for the uncertainty in parameters. This 
analysis would depend on the sensitivity of the calculated capital to changes in the parameters and 
the degree of uncertainty in the parameters. The practice of testing the sensitivity of model output 
to parameter values or to critical assumptions is also not common. In the case of certain 
proprietary models, some parameter (and even structural) assumptions are unknown to the user, 
and thus sensitivity testing and parameter modification are difficult. 
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3.4.5. Bentnarking 
Benchmarking isan efficient way of approaching the validation of internal ratings for publicly 
traded companies. It involves contrasting the output of an internal rating system against 
estimations of default/migration probabilities or losses obtained using other rating sources. For 
such comparison to be meaningful, the degree of conceptual consistency between the two 
systems being compared must first be assessed. 
o Using rata g agam It is common practice for banks to benchmark their ratings against those 
developed by agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's in order to be able to use the 
relatively long time series of default/migration rates assembled by these agencies. Benchmarking 
against external ratings has potential limitations however. Fast, for banks whose portfolio 
contains a substantial proportion of externally rated assets, validating against external ratings may 
create a large selection bias. Including mostly publicly rated companies in the sample may lead to 
the development of internal models able to capture factors typical of such firms and leave out 
variables describing the features of non-rated companies. 'I1iis in turn could compromise the 
reliability of the validation process itself, which can provide good results on a publicly rated 
sample, but not necessarily on a mixed or non-rated one. Second, rating agencies' default histories 
have tended to be US-focused, which may lead to question their relevance in countries where 
default patterns have been distinct from those observed in North America. However, most 
agencies are actively expanding their activities into Europe and Asia 
Q Us dk dam Collective databases offer another potential benchmark Such databases 
exist in certain countries, where they have been assembled at the initiative of the industry, 
commercial firms or even the supervisors themselves. In the context of the Basle review, 
supervisors might need to consider the need for setting-up such databases, since these are a 
prime mean of checking the distribution of bank ratings across a sample of counter-parties. It is 
important to note in this respect that some supervisors may benchmark banks' ratings against 
their own rating systems (e. g., Banque de France). 
Q Usmg 
-nzth acva Banks may also assess the outcome of their internal rating models by 
running other models and comparing outputs. For this purpose, they may for example attempt to 
replicate any of the publicly available credit risk models (e. g. CreditMetrics, KMV, etc). They can 
feed the same data used in their internal model (and other pertinent information) to an alternative 
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methodology. The study of differences in output between the internal rating system and the 
alternative method can reveal inconsistencies. 
3.4.6. Extemal assessment 
Internal ratings can further be subjected to external type of assessments. 
f Assam by rating a axäex Banks may use external rating agencies to validate their own ratings. 
Public securitization involves precisely this process: rating agencies review the loss characteristics 
of the underlying portfolio in order to be able to rate the notes issued to investors. 
f Assemrv by cuzwkmts. Consultants can also play a role in validating internal systems, including 
the audit of the validation process itself. 
" 
Asswn by dx wpaum In some countries, supervisors have already reviewed their banks' 
internal rating systems. This practice would become standard with the implementation of the 
proposed capital adequacy standards. 
f 71xmwki tat One should not forget that a compelling validation process is already performed 
by the market. The price which investors are ready to pay for collateralised bond/loan obligations, 
CBOs/CLOs, is itself a function of the underlying portfolio's credit quality and may be used as a 
basis for assessing the underlying rating system. 
All the methods we have presented have some advantages and all of them are related to each 
other. Perhaps the best we could do to measure credit risk is to check measures with different 
methodologies and investigate the sources of differences. 
3.5. Capital-based pricing 
Analogous to trading account VaR models, internal credit risk models are used in estimating 
the &mn r capital needed to support a bank's credit activities. By design, these systems create 
strong incentives for managers to economize on a bank's most expensive funding source. equity 
capital Internal capital allocations are the basis for estimating the risk-ac and profitability of 
various bank activities which, in turn, are used in evaluations of managerial performance and in 
determinations of managerial compensation. Credit risk models and economic capital allocations 
also have been incorporated into risk management processes, including risk-based pricing models, 
the setting of portfolio concentration and exposure limits, and day-to-day credit risk management 
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It is complicated to define bank capital. A technical definition is that bank cctal is the bank's 
net worth More immediately, capital is the bank's cushion against possible losses due to various 
risks such as market, credit, and operational risk. This cushion capital is held mostly in the form of 
liquid, secure assets. When losses exceed the total amount of capital, the bank defaults and the 
excess loss is passed along to the creditors. Therefore it is important that a bank holds enough 
capital so as to have a small likelihood of default. 
We ought to mention that in practice bankers speak of at least two kinds of capital: rgdafiry 
afiti and annvnk Regulatory capital is determined by rules set by the regulators. The 
estimated amount of capital needed to support a bank's risk taking activities is typically termed the 
bank's required or allocated "economic capital. " Economic capital is determined by each bank's 
own internal policies. So it is customised to its own products and its own view of risk The 
calculation of economic capital has generally been more scientific and has evolved to keep up 
with the new banking activities. It is sometimes calculated using some kind of actuarial method. 
This means the calculation of risk is statistical in nature and is based on historical experience. 
Purportedly, both regulatory and economic capitals are a measure of the bank's risks. When 
banks where simply lending money, the two kinds of capital were nearly equal. At present, they 
are diverging. Indeed, banks are lobbying hard to convince regulators to adopt new rules to bring 
regulatory capital more in line with the banks' economic capital. Regardless of whether the two 
kinds of capital are the same, it is true that the capital concept is one kind of measure of risk and 
therefore is relevant to determining a fair price for that risk 
The systems for allocating economic capital against credit risk are based on the bank's estimate 
of the "probability density function" for credit losses ("PDF"). An important property of PDFs is 
that, for a hypothetical level of losses denoted by X in Figure 3.5, the estimated probability of 
actual credit losses exceeding this level is equal to the area under the PDF to the right of X. These 
systems generally assume that it is the role of reserving policies to cover expected credit losses, 
while it is the role of equity capital to cover credit risk. The precise definitions of "credit loss" tend 
to vary across banks depending on the conceptual frameworks underlying their risk measurement 
and management systems. Risk measurement systems generally "collapse" the estimated PDF 
into a single metric, termed the "economic capital" allocation for credit risk Specifically, the 
economic capital allocation is determined in theory so that the probability of unexpected credit 
losses exhausting economic capital (Le., the probability of insolvency) is less than some targeted 
level. 
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Once the parameters of the credit risk model have been specified, the bank must invoke a 
particular rule for determining how much economic capital should hold against this risk As 
indicated above, at most institutions this "capital allocation rule" is expressed as the capital 
necessary to achieve some target insolvency rate (X) over the planning horizon. Note that the 
higher the target insolvency rate, the lower the allocated capital, other things the same. The 
portfolio's PDF generally is computed by one of two methods: (a) Monte Carlo simulation, or (b) 
approximations using a mean/variance methodology. In cases where the portfolio's PDF is 
estimated directly via Monte Carlo simulation, the economic capital allocation against credit risk is 
computed directly from the estimated PDF whose "shape" is consistent with the parameters of 
the underlying credit risk model. The Monte Carlo techniques employed in credit risk modelling 
are essentially identical to those used within VaR models in the trading account. Relatively few 
banks, however, currently use Monte Carlo methods to estimate PDFs. The vast majority use 
mean/variance approximations, which are viewed as computationally less burdensome. With 
mean/variance approximations, the general shape of the PDF is assumed, rather than inferred 
from the underlying credit risk model. In this case economic capital is generally calculated as some 
multiple of the portfolio's estimated standard deviation of credit losses, where this multiple is 
chosen to be consistent with the target insolvency rate and the assumed shape of the PDF. In 
practice, these multiples can vary widely (for example, between 3 and 7) depending on the target 
insolvency rate and on whether the "true" PDF is assumed to be beta- or nominal-shaped Final 
economic capital allocations, therefore, can differ considerably across banks owing to differences 
in their respective capital allocation rules (VaR, RAROC, ROE, ROA, etc). 
1--, x 
Figure 3.5 The Relationship between PDF 
and Allocated Economic Capital Losses 
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3.6. Credit risk and regulatory capital 
Dealing with credit risk issues has become a major activity for both banks and bank regulators. 
The main concern of bank regulators is to ensure that a bank's capital reflects the risk it is bearing. 
The traditional approach they have adopted has been to specify minimum levels for balance sheet 
ratios. However, this became inappropriate in the late 1980s because of the rapid development of 
derivatives such as swaps and options, which do not appear on the balance sheet and that began 
to account for a significant proportion of the total risk. The Bank for International Settlanent 
(BIS) proposed a first scheme in 1988 that was widely accepted by central banks worldwide. 
3.6.1.71x 1988 Basle Acrrnd 
The Basle accord (Basle, 1988) concluded on July 15,1988, by the central bankers from the 
Group of Ten (G-10) countries was designed to ensure a minimum uniform capital standard 
applied to all financial institutions worldwide. Originally, the focus was on credit risk and only 
later the Accord was amended to capture market risk. According to the 1988 proposal, each on- 
and off-balance sheet item is assigned a weight reflecting its relative credit risk and minimum 
levels are set for the ratio of bank capital to total risk-weighted exposure. This ratio is known as 
the Cook ratio (eq. 3.21), fully implemented in 1993. Specifically, the following two capital 
requirements must be satisfied 
Tierl capital 
>4% (3.20) Risk 
- 
Adjusted exposure 
Tier 1 capital+ Tier 2 capital 
>8% (3.21) 
Risk- Adjusted exposure 
where Tier 1 is shareholder's equity not including goodwill Tier 2 capital consists of subordinated 
debt, loan reserves, and other sorts of long-term capital that is not equity. Therefore, banks are 
required to hold at least 8% of capital to support the value of their risk-weighted assets. Of this 
8%, at least half has to be made of Tier 1 capital and at no time may the amount of Tier 2 capital 
exceed the Tier 1 level. 
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The novel feature of this regulation is that, for the first time, it recognises the risks associated 
with off balance sheet instruments such as swaps by converting them into on balance sheet risk- 
weighted asset equivalents. In determining the Cooke ratio it is indeed necessary to consider both 
the cn-h6 xe sheet as well as specific cf ixe sheet exposures. On-balance sheet items have risk 
weightings from 0 percent for cash and OECD government securities, to 100 percent for 
corporate bonds and others. Off-balance sheet items are first expressed as a credit equivalent, and 
then are appropriately risk weighted by counterparty. The risk-weighted amount is then the sum 
of the following two components: i) the risk-weighted assets for on-balance sheet instruments 
and ii) the risk weighted credit equivalent for off-balance sheet items. Table 3.2 gives the risk- 
capital weights (WA) by asset categories, and Table 3.3 shows the weights that apply to credit 
equivalents by type of counterparty (DUCE). 
Risk-weighted amount = '(assets * WA) +I (credit equivalent * WCE) (3.22) 
The risk weights for corporates are apparently inconsistent in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The weight 
for off-balance sheet instruments is half what is required for on-balance sheet assets. BIS' 
rationale for this asymmetry is the better quality of the corporates that partecipate in the market 
for off-balance sheet products. In the case of off-balance sheet exposures, the first step is to 
calculate the credit equivalent as follows: 
Credit equivalent = Current exposure + (add-on factor) (3.23) 
The current exposure (CE) is the greater of the current value of the derivative and zero. The 
add-on factor (f) is a percentage of the notional principal according to the risk capital weights by 
asset categories as indicated in Table 3.4. The add-on factor differs quite substantially from one 
category to the other, although the rationale for such differences is not always clear. The sum of 
CE and f is then multiplied by the risk weight of the counterparty (Table 3.3) to give the risk- 
adjusted exposure. The result of this calculation is the final risk-weighted amount. It is important 
to realise that the capital requirement must be calculated not only at the time the contract is 
negotiated, but also during the life of the derivative. To this aim many financial institutions carry 
out Monte Carlo simulations to determine confidence limits for their regulatory capital at future 
times. 
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The BIS capital requirements do not distinguish between credit corporate counterparties weh 
different audit ra gs. A counterparty with a AAA rating is treated as one with a BBB rating. For 
internal use, some financial institutions have developed more sophisticated capital allocation 
procedures. An amount of capital is allocated to each deal entered into by a financial institution 
and traders are evaluated on the basis of their return on capital employed. This has the advantage 
that motivates traders to take credit risk into account when quoting prices. 
Basle regulations do not account for the pm* risk of the bank. Correlations between 
components of the portfolio may significantly alter total portfolio risk. Credit risk can be in fact 
offset by diversification across issuers, industries, and geographical locations. The 1988 regulations 
actually raise the capital requirements from hedging operation. 
Finally, the BIS 1988 proposal does not take into account what is known as neig. A bank that 
has offsetting open positions towards the same counterparty, may have a very small net exposure. 
Regulatory authorities have become progressively more sympathetic to the use of netting in the 
calculation of capital requirements. 
Risk Weights Asset Category (%) 
Cash and gold bullion, claims on OFD govennents Lice Treanuy bonds, 
insured residential mortgages. 
20 Claims on OED banks and OECD public sector entities 11se securities issued 
by US Government agencies, claims on municipalities. 
50 Uninsured residential mortgages. 
100 All other claims lice corporate bonds and less developed country debt, claims on 
non-0E® banks, equity, real estate, pnenises, plant and equipment 
Table 3.2 Risk-capital weights by on-balance sheet asset category (WA) 
Risk Weights Type of Counterpacty 
OFD governments 
20 OECD banks and public sector entities 
50 Corporate and other counteiparties 
Table 3.3 Risk-capital weights for of balance sheet credit equivalent by type of counterparty 
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Residual Interest Rate Equity Precious Other Exchange 
Maturity Contracts (%) metals s except cone odities Rate Contracts (years) ( (%) n N N 
<1 Nl 6.0 7.0 10.0 1.0 
1-5 0.5 8.0 7.0 12.0 5.0 
>5 1.5 10.0 8.0 15.0 7.5 
Table 3.4 Add-on factors by type of underlying and maturity 
3.6.2. The Eun pema Diiwtites 
The original Basle Accord, although it has been adopted across a wide number of jurisdictions, 
was not legally binding. Within the European Union, the substance of the Accord was 
incorporated into two key banking directives issued in 1989, the OwiFioris and the SolwxyRath 
Dim. These directives were legally binding and required the national regulators to amend their 
domestic legislation accordingly. 
'With minor differences, the process for determining capital requirements under the EU 
directives is the same as in the Basle Accord. However, the EU regulators were aware that the 
provisions of the Basle Accord applied only to credit-related activities and the EU directives were 
later extended to cover market risk as well. These were specified under the 1993 C, # d Adaytxy 
Dirac (CAD) which came into force in 1996. 
The first step under CAD is to analyse the types of financial activities undertaken by an 
investment firn or credit institution. CAD divides the activities of an institution into a bararg 
&aak and a trad&g hZ The trading book covers trading in short term instruments, positions in 
financial instruments arising from matched principal broking, instruments used to hedge elements 
of the trading book, exposures arising from unsettled transactions in debt and equity securities 
and OTC derivatives, and exposures from repurchase and securities lending/borrowing 
agreements. The trading book excludes activities such as deposits and loans, along with other 
traditional banking products, which are part of the banking book 
The main innovation in CAD was to regulate the capital provisions necessary to sustain the 
market risk on the institutions' trading books. The details of the CAD rules are very complex and 
the following is just an overview of some of the salient features: 
The risks on a trading book are analysed in terms of position risk, settlement and 
counterparty risk, foreign exchange risk and large exposure risk 
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f Position risks are further analysed in terms of their general and specific risks. Different risk 
conversion factors are applied under each of these risks, depending on the nature of the 
financial i6uument 
" 
In addition to the capital required to cover position risk, a basic capital requirement of 8% of 
risk weighted assets is applied to cover settlement and counterparty risk Additional imits are 
imposed on log eTawu to specific counterparties, which must be reported to the national 
regulators. Large exposures in the trading books may exceed the approved limits but any 
excesses over the limits attract supplemental capital charges. 
fA capital charge of one-quarter of an institution's administrative expenses during the 
preceding financial year is levied to cover all other types of risk, including operational risk 
Another innovation of CAD was to broaden the definition of capital to include Tier 3 capital. 
This includes certain types of short-term subordinated debt, as well as daily N1IM profits of the 
trading book. This was a helpful addition in that it allowed institutions to offset some of the 
negative impact of profitable trading positions on their capital requirements. 
One interesting feature of CAD is that it allows institutions to use their own proprietary value 
at risk (VaR) models to estimate the market risks on their positions, provided the models used 
come up with a capital requirement that is not less than the amount calculated using the 
regulatory approach. 
3.6.3. The 1995 BIS market risk pmposaL the 1996 anx, ic8nert 
The Basle 1988 proposal poorly accounts for market risk Assets are in fact recorded at book 
values, which may substantially differ from their current market values. As a result, accounting 
lags may create a situation where an apparently healthy balance sheet hides losses in market values. 
In recognition of this drawback, soon after the introduction of CAD in Europe, the BIS 
published its Amendment to the Basle Accord to Incorporate Market Risk The Basle Committee 
on Bank Supervision (1996) specifies qualitative and quantitative standards that institutions must 
observe in order to cover market risk, in addition to the existing provisions for covering credit 
risk. This proposal was implemented by the national regulators in 1998. To this aim a scenario 
analysis was suggested and the use of internal credit risk models allowed for the first time. 
The initial accord still applies to the non-trading items both on-balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet. Market risk must now be measured for both on- and off-balance sheet traded instruments. 
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However, on-balance sheet assets are subject o market risk capital charge only, while off-balance 
sheet derivatives are subject o both market risk and credit risk capital charges. 
On-balance sheet Off-balance sheet 
Trading book Maiket Risk Market Risk + Cr dit Risk 
Non trading book 1988 Accord 1988 Accord 
Table 3.5 The 1996 Amendment 
The initial BIS agreement was modified to allow banks to reduce their credit equivalent when 
bilateral netting agreements are in place. According to some surveys, netting reduces the banks' 
gross replacement (or current) value by half on average. The new BIS formula for add-on 
amounts is now: 
Add-on amount = notional * (add-on factor) * (40 % +60 % *NPR) (324) 
The add-on factors are the same as in Table 3.2. NPR denotes the replacement ratio which is 
the net replacement cost when positive, or zero otherwise, divided by the gross replacement cost 
calculated as before, without taking netting into account, i. e. the sum of the positive replacement 
cost for the transactions covered by the netting agreement. However, the new BIS formula does 
not allow for complete offsetting, even if netting agreements are in place. 
In the 1996 Amendment to the original BIS Accord, a third tier of capital has been added only 
to meet market risk requirements. Tier 3, or sub-supplementary capital, consists of short-term 
subordinated debt with an original maturity of at least two years. It must be unsecured and fully 
paid up. It is also subject to lock-in clauses that prevent the issuer from repaying the debt before 
maturity, or even at maturity should the issuer's capital ratio become less than 8 percent after 
repayment. Banks will be entitled to use tier 3 solely to satisfy market risk capital charge, which in 
turn should be met also with tier 1 and tier 2 capital not allocated to credit risk. 
According to BIS, market risk encompasses both "general market risk" and "specific risk". 
General market risk refers to changes in the market value of on-balance sheet assets and liabilities, 
and off-balance sheet tents, resulting form broad market movements, such as changes in 
the level of interest rates, equity prices, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Specific risk refers 
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to changes in the market value of individual positions due to factors other than broad market 
movements like liquidity, exceptional events, and credit quality. 
BIS authorities recognise the complexity of correctly assessing market risk exposure, especially 
for derivative products. Flexibility in the modelling of the many components of market risk is 
thus allowed. The most sophisticated institutions that already have an independent risk 
management division in place will have the choice between their own "internal VaR model", 
referred as the internal approach, and the "standard model" proposed by BIS, referred to as the 
standardised approach, to determine market risk related regulatory capital 
The new capital requirement related to market risks should largely be offset by the fact that the 
capital charge calculated under the 1988 Accord to cover credit risk no longer need to be held for 
on-balance sheet securities in the trading portfolio. The capital charge for general and specific 
market risks should be, on aggregate, much smaller than the credit risk capital charge for large 
trading books. Then, banks adopting the internal models approach should realise substantial 
capital savings, probably of the order of 20-50 percent, depending on the size of their trading 
operations, and the type of instruments they trade. 
The standaniisa1 app vacb. The standardised model uses a "building block" type of approach 
where VaR is first computed separately for portfolios exposed to interest rate risk, exchange rate 
risk, equity risk, and commodity risk The bank's total VaR is then obtained from the summation 
of VaRs across the categories to obtain the global capital charge related to market risk Although 
the objective is to identify banks with unusual exposures, this approach still have some problems. 
It applies the same capital charge to vastly different financial instruments. The duration of some 
instruments (Le. mortgages) cannot be easily identified The issue of diversification across risks 
and the interaction of credit and market risks, although difficult to deal with, remain still ignored. 
The capital charges are arbitrary as only loosely related to the actual volatility of each asset 
category, which would distort portfolio choices as banks will tend to move away from assets for 
which capital charge is particularly high. 
The inter al madc appn ich. the internal models approach (Basle, 1995) remedies many of 
these criticisms, and attempts to improve the accuracy of the standardised approach. In particular, 
the committee recognised that many banks have developed sophisticated risk management 
systems, in many cases far more complex than what can be shaped by regulators. To be eligible to 
use its own internal model an institution must have a strong risk management group which is 
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independent from the business units it monitors, and which reports directly to the senior 
executive management of the institution. Moreover, the internal models should be fully integrated 
in the daily risk management of the institution. In addition, the regulator requires that systematic 
backtesting and stress testing be conducted on a regular basis. 
As far as the quantitative and modelling requirements is concerned, the latest "internal model" 
proposal suggests the computation of VaR with a horizon of 10 days, a 99 percent (one-tailed) 
confidence interval, an observation period of at least a year of historical data and updated once a 
quarter. The capital charge should be set at the higher of the previous days VaR or the average 
VaR over the last 60 business days, times a multiplicative factor k, which normally should be 
equal to 3. 
1 r-6o 
Market Risk Capital Charge (t) 
= max VaR 
_, ,k"- 
VaR (3.25) 
60 
=71 
This factor intends to provide additional protection against environments that are much less 
stable than historical data would lead to believe. This multiplier should also be viewed as an 
insurance against model risk, imperfect assessment of specific risks, and other operational risks. A 
penalty component shall be added to the multiplicative factor if backtesting reveals that the bank's 
internal model incorrectly forecasts risks. Because of all these extra components, this proposal has 
been severely criticised as leading to capital requirements generally higher than the standard model 
and consequently discouraging the development of internal risk models. 
Institutions are allowed to take into account correlations among risk categories. Volatilities and 
correlations hould be estimated based on past historical data with a minimum history of 250 
days. Market parameters hould be updated at least once every three months. If empirical 
correlations are unavailable, then the aggregate VaR is calculated as the simple arithmetic sum of 
the VaR for each block, like in the standard approach. 
The prewrwnez model. The Federal Reserve Board (1995) proposed a "pre-commitment" 
approach (PCA) to bank regulation. Under this alternative, the bank would pre-commit to a 
maximum trading loss over a designated horizon. This loss would become the capital charge for 
market risk. The supervisor would then observe periodically whether trading losses exceed the 
limit. If so, the bank would suffer a penalty in terms of a fine, regulatory discipline, or higher 
future capital charges. The PCA is an interesting initiative since it aims to replace regulatory capital 
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requirements based on ex ante estimates of the bank's risks, with a capital charge that is set 
endogenously through the optimal resolution of an incentive contract between the bank and its 
regulators. It can be shown that the PCA takes the form of a put option written on the bank's 
asset and issued to the regulators. The value of this liability for the bank increases with the penalty 
rate, set by the regulator, and the riskiness of the bank's assets, while it decreases with the striking 
price of the put, ie. the pre-commitment level When the bank increases the risk of its assets it 
increases the value of its pre-commitment liability, which is more or less than offset by the 
increase in the value of the fixed-rate deposit insurance. 
The main advantage of this "incentive-compatible" approach is that the bank itself chooses its 
capital requirement The optimal design of the incentive contract becomes bank specific and 
should be such that the bank finds itself the right trade-off between the riskiness of its trading 
book and the level of pre-conunitted capital with the objective of maximising the shareholder 
value and of minimising the exposure of the deposit insurance institution (Kupiec and O'Brien, 
1997). However, the PCA has been criticised by Gumerlock (1996) for the slow periodical 
verification in comparison to the real-time daily capital requirements of the Basle proposals. 
Moreover, there is some worry that dynamic portfolio adjustments to avoid exceeding the 
maximum loss could exacerbate market movements. 
3.6.4. The proposad New Cap" Adequacy Frznne wrk 
- 
BIS, 1999 
In mid-1999 the BIS issued a consultative document acknowledging the need to revise the 
1988 Accord principles. This new capital framework consists of three pillars: minimum capital 
requirements, a supervisory review process, and effective use of market discipline. The 
Committee believes that, taken together, these three elements are the essential pillars of an 
effective capital framework 
The BIS recognises that the world financial system has recently witnessed considerable 
economic turbulence and, while these conditions have generally not been focused on G-10 
countries directly, the risks that internationally active banks from G-10 countries have had to deal 
with have become more complex and challenging. The review of the Accord is designed to 
improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks. It is also designed to 
better address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years, as shown, for example, 
by asset securitisation structures. 
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The review is also aimed at recognising the improvements in risk measurement and control 
that have occurred. With regard to minimum capital requirements, the Committee recognises that 
a modified version of the existing Accord should remain the "standardised" approach, but that 
for some sophisticated banks use of internal credit ratings and, at a later stage, portfolio models 
could contribute to a more accurate assessment of a bank's capital requirement in relation to its 
particular risk profile. In so doing, the Committee proposes to clarify and broaden the scope of 
application of the current Accord. With regard to risk weights to be applied to exposures to 
sovereigns, the Committee proposes replacing the existing approach by a system that would use 
external credit assessments for determining risk weights. It is intended that such an approach will 
also apply, either directly or indirectly and to varying degrees, to the risk weighting of exposures to 
banks, securities firms and corporates. The result will be to reduce risk weights for high quality 
corporate credits, and to introduce a higher than 100% risk weight for certain low quality 
exposures. A new risk weighting scheme to address asset securitisation, and the application of a 
20% credit conversion factor for certain types of short-term commitments are also proposed. For 
some sophisticated banks, the Committee believes that an internal ratings-based approach could 
form the basis for setting capital charges, subject to supervisory approval and adherence to 
quantitative and qualitative guidelines. At a later stage those institutions may also be allowed to use 
probabilistic models to assess net credit exposures on a portfolio basis. 
The existing Accord specifies explicit capital charges only for credit and market risks (m the 
trading book). Other risks, including interest rate risk in the banking book and operational risk, 
are also an important feature of banking. The Committee therefore proposes to develop a capital 
charge for interest rate risk in the banking book for banks where interest rate risk is significantly 
above average, and is proposing to develop capital charges for other risks, principally operational 
risk 
The second pillar of the capital adequacy framework, the supervisory review of capital 
adequacy, will seek to ensure that a bank's capital position is consistent with its overall risk profile 
and strategy and, as such, will encourage arly supervisory intervention. Supervisors should have 
the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of minimum regulatory capital ratios 
-a point 
underscored in the course of the Committee's discussions with supervisors from non-G-10 
countries. Furthermore, the new framework stresses the importance of bank management 
developing an internal capital assessment process and setting targets for capital that are 
commensurate with the bank's particular risk profile and control environment. This internal 
process would then be subject to supervisory review and intervention, where appropriate. 
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The third pillar, market discipline, will encourage high disclosure standards and enhance the 
role of market participants in encouraging banks to hold adequate capital. The Committee 
proposes to issue later this year guidance on public disdosure that will strengthen the capital 
framework 
In summary, credit-risk models represent a substantial advance in the quantitative analysis of 
portfolios of credit exposures. Output from such models can help, for example, in identifying 
inadequate diversification, suggest hedging strategies and provide useful guidance for the 
allocation of economic capital Questions remain, however, about the reliability of the risk 
measures they supply. These methods and models are still not sufficient for the pricing of credit 
derivatives. Moreover, in order to price a credit derivative one needs a model that describes the 
dynxnics of credit risk, starting with modelling the considered measure of the firm (or industry, 
country, etc) and successively describing the possible ways the creditworthiness may evolve over 
time. 
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Chapter IV 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CREDIT RISK 
T is chapter provides a throughout review of the literature in the area of credit risk. It identifies 
several approaches used for the quantification, explanation, and pricing of credit risk. It also 
highlights the shortcomings associated with some of the methodologies and the unexplored 
topics from which our investigation originates. 
4.1. Introduction 
The literature relating to credit risk premia has focused on three main aspects: a) explanation 
of credit risk premix; b) specification of the risk structure of credit risk premia; c) valuation of 
risky debt Section 4.2. will be dedicated to the first aspect, that is to the presentation of the main 
studies focused on the determinants of the bond yield or yield premium Most of these works 
implement cross-sectional regression analysis in order to determine what are the factors that are 
significant in explaining credit risk premia. Among the most common factors we can mention: 
various proxies for the risk of default (earnings variability, time of no default, market equity value 
over par value of the debt), marketability, supply and demand factors, business cycle and 
macroeconomic variables (interest rates, inflation), specific features of the bond (callability, 
coupon rate, sinking fund, security status, recovery factor, industrial classification), actual default 
rates, returns on the firm's assets and the firm's capital structure. 
Section 4.3. concentrates on the second topic, the term structure of credit spreads. The idea 
underlying the risk structure of credit risk is that spreads on corporate bonds vary with maturity 
holding all other characteristics of the bond constant. The idea reflects the fact that, in general, the 
market values bonds as if corporations have a higher probability of defaulting each year into the 
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future. We will see that this is not always the case. Most of the theoretical and empirical worms 
related to this topic present the consistent result of a mean reversion in the credit quality of the 
firms. High quality firms are unlike to default in the short term, but over the longer term might be 
facing a decrease in quality or ultimately default whereas lower quality firms face immediate 
prospect of default but over time can overcome their state of financial distress. 
In Section 4.4. we present default risk pricing models. The basic idea of these models is that 
the inherent credit risk of any credit transaction should be compensated by way of return 
(calculated as the spread received) commensurate with risk as measured by the risk of default 
(both on expected and unexpected losses), the credit exposure and the recovery rate in the event 
of default. 
The last sections are dedicated to more specific issues. In Section 4.5 the ideas of the CAPM 
are profitably applied in credit-selection decisions. Section 4.6 presents the first time series analysis 
applied to credit spreads. In Section 4.7 extreme value theory is implemented in order to estimate 
credit spread risk Some conclusions are finally drawn in section 4.8. 
4.2. Determinants of the credit risk premium 
The basic theory and the idea underlying the concept of risk premium on loans was first 
introduced by McCullough (1830), which pointed out how risk premix have to be higher, the 
higher is the lender's risk of default and the more difficult is to turn the securities into cash. The 
first systematic treatment of the subject, however, will have to wait more than one century, till the 
contribution of Fisher (1959). Fisher (1959) defines the risk premium as the difference between 
the market yield on a bond and the corresponding pure rate of interest. Where, the market yield is 
given by the rate of interest at which the principal and interest payments must be discounted if 
their present value is to equal the cun-ent market price of the bond, and the pure rate of interest is 
given by the market yield on a risk-free bond with the same maturity as the bond under 
consideration. 
The works presented below make abstraction from several market imperfections. Most 
importantly, they assume that the risky bond is identical to the risk-free bond, save for its default 
risk. In practice, government bond markets are larger and more liquid than corporate bond 
markets. This implies that in addition to the credit spread, investors will need to be rewarded for 
holding bonds less liquid than government bonds. The spread thus also contains a li y 
pm=m. Therefore, changes in the measured `credit' spread may also be due to time-varying 
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liquidity premia. In the theoretical analysis that follows, we will to a large extent ignore the liquidity 
premium Also in the empirical analysis the distinction between pure credit spread and liquidity 
premium will not be made because of the difficultyto disentangle them. 
4.2.1. Risk of default and m rrketability 
Fisher (1959) develops a cross section analysis to find what are the main factors explaining the 
risk premium on US domestic industrial corporations. Public utilities and transportation 
companies were excluded from the sample as being subject o forms of regulation which prevent 
them from maximising profits, and that, other things being equal, make them less llkelyto default 
on their bonds than industrial companies with the same earnings variability. The factors under 
observation are a) the risk of default of the firm, and b) the marketability of the bond. 
The risk of default is estimated by a function of three variables: 
i) the variability of earnings, measured by the coefficient of variation of the fine's net income 
over the last nine years (after all charges and taxes). This variable is expected to affect positively 
the risk premium as a firm with a small coefficient of variation of earnings is less likely to default 
on its bonds than a firm with a large coefficient 
- 
other things being equal. 
ei) the length of time the firm has been operating without forcing its creditors to incur into losses. 
This variable provides a correction for the estimate of risk of default derived from earnings 
variability. In fact, the longer the solvency period of the fine, the less likely it is that the estimated 
coefficient of variation in earnings is much less than the coefficient in the hypothetical underlying 
population of annual net incomes. 
in) the ratio of the market value of the equity to the par value of the firm's debt. This is a measure 
of how much the fine's assets can decline in value before they become less than its liabilities. 
The marketability of the bond can be estimated by a single variable, the total market value of 
all the publicly traded bonds the fine has outstanding. The smaller the amount of bonds 
outstanding, the less frequently we should expect bonds change hands, the thinner is the market, 
the more uncertain is the market price, the higher the expected risk premium' 
3 Note that marketability influences the risk premium only if it measures: the degree of imperfection of the market for a 
partiailar security. The degree of imperfection might be measured by the random fluctuations in the price of a bond over a 
short period, but if it is too short, the non random changes in bond prices are negligible and no random fluctuations can 
happen. The volume of trading can be a measure of marketability only for bonds listed on some securities exchange. The 
spread bawem bid and ask prices could be applied to both listed and unlisted seaundes, but published quotations for listed 
bonds are actual prices, and quotations for over-the-counter securities are generally nominal prices. 
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The hypotheses are tested regressing cross-sectionally the logarithm of the average risk 
premium on the logarithms of the following variables: earnings variability, period of solvency, 
equity/debt ratio and bonds outstanding. Fisher finds that a) for each cross section the four 
variables account for three-forts of the variance in the log of the risk premium; b) the elasticity of 
the risk premium with respect o each of the four variables is stable over time. 
Fisher's paper is the first contribution to a structured approach in the area of risk premia, 
however, it presents ome limitations as no macroeconomic factors are taken into considerations 
and variables like call provision, security status, and coupon level are omitted. The importance of 
indenture provisions such as call options is minimised. Also the effect of differential capital gains 
and taxation has been rationalised away. Finally, Fisher doesn't discuss the influence of tern to 
maturity on the risk premium either through the level and shape of the underlying basic curve or 
more directly in its possible effect on the yield differential itself. 
4.2.2. L)a=zd and supply factors 
Fair and Malikiel (FM, 1971) introduce demand and supply factors to explain risk premia. 
Investors may have different preferences for alternative types of bonds of the same risk level and 
maturity, or, in other terms, different types of bonds may not be perfect substitutes for one 
another because of one of the following factors: 
) legal restrictions which affect portfolio allocations of many investing institutions. 
ii) the window dressing quality of bonds; government bonds may provide and enhance the public 
image of the financial institutions, especially of those who are subject o examination by public 
authorities. 
iii) marketability, liquidity and transaction costs considerations. This attribute is partly a result of 
the existence of the fomler two attributes. 
Monthly data 
-from January 1961 to June 1969- on the stocks of utility, industrial and 
government bonds are used to test the main hypothesis that yield differentials are determined by 
supply and demand factors. The analysis was applied to long-term US government, high quality 
utility, and high quality industrial bonds. 
On the demand side of the FM model, since the different types of bonds are not perfect 
substitutes, each of them is characterised by a demand schedule that depends positively on its 
own rate of interest and on the stock of wealth to be distributed among the assets, and negatively 
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on the rates of interest on the other assets. The supply side of the model assumes that supplies of 
government, utility and industrial bonds are exogenous. 
Assuming that the securities markets are in equilibrium, so that each supply equals its demand, 
FM derive that the spreads between the assets yields are function of the relationship between the 
supplies of the assets themselves. The results, therefore, confirm that yield differentials are 
influenced by the stocks of bonds outstanding and by the relative flow of anticipated new 
financing during the future six-month period. 
Jaffee (1975), developing a demand-supply model to explain cyclical variations in credit 
spreads, achieves different results from FM (1971). In his model the investor demand function 
for bonds of risk category depends positively on its own rate, negatively on the rates of the other 
categories, and also on a vector of exogenous variables. The supply function of issuing firms is 
negatively affected by their own rate, and depends, as the demand function, on a vector of 
exogenous variables, but is not affected by the other risk rates. Assuming the equilibrium in each 
risk market and equalling demand and supply, Jaffee obtains that interest rate for any risk category 
is a function of the risk-free rate and of the various exogenous demand and supply factors 
affecting the risk market. In the case of corporate bonds the demand and the supply variables are 
found not have a statistically significant effect on the risk structure. 
4.2.3. Business cycle and coyd x ztz7iables 
According to finance textbooks, credit spreads behave cyclically over time (e. g., Van Home, 
1998). During periods of economic downturn credit spreads are expected to increase, as investors 
are more concerned with safety. On the other hand, during periods of economic expansion, 
investors are likely to seek the highest-yielding investments, implying reduced risk premia. 
Liquidity and marketability aspects might have an additional effect on the cyclical nature of credit 
spreads, to the extent that investors want to hold more liquid instmments in periods of recession, 
the spread will increase. 
Jaffee (1975) was the first to introduce the idea that risk spreads between low and high quality 
bonds move with the business cycle. In particular, he suggests that top quality bonds might be 
risk-free regardless of the business cycle, while low rated bond quality are expected to deteriorate 
significantly during recessions. Hence, in recessions low quality bonds' credit spreads widen more 
than top quality bonds' credit spreads. 
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Assuming that the rating service can su manse the riskiness of a fine's debt issue in temis of 
a single grade at any moment in time, since a firm's risk is presumably varying over the business 
cycle while its rating is fixed, the risk associated with the rating must be changing. Changes in risk 
spreads, hence, are not the result of changes in the individuals' risk aversion or changes in the 
flow of funds to different investors in relation to the actual phase of the business cycle. Rather, 
risk spreads' changes are a technical feature deriving from the fact that rating agencies don't adjust 
their ratings in relation to short-run developments. Cohan (1973) had already raised this point 
stressing that the relative infrequency of changes in ratings for a particular company indicates that 
the risk associated with a given rating must vary over the business cycle. 
The hypothesis is tested by Jaffee regressing each risk spread against a constant to account for 
the average level, and against different variables that are proxy of the business cycle to account for 
the cyclical variations. The data used in the analysis are quarterly risk spread indexes time series 
tabulated by Moody's Investor's Services for debt issued by corporate and municipal issuers (from 
Aaa to Baa ratings). The sample period covers the 1954-1969 period 
From the regression analysis it emerges that the variables correlated with optimism and peaks 
in the business cycle 
-the consumer sentiment, the growth of retained earnings of corporations, 
and the growth of investments- are negatively related to risk spreads. The unemployment rate and 
the growth of the output price index are positively correlated with spreads, since they are related 
with uncertainty and low levels of business activity. Changes in the level of interest rates show to 
have a negligible ffect on changes in risk spreads. 
The consumer sentiment variable plays by far the most important role and if we consider that 
this variable can be explained as a function of other economic variables, it's dear that this is 
important if rate spreads equations are used to forecast into future periods. The consumer 
variable has a particular explanatory power in the utility sector, and the most intuitive explanation 
for this would be to consider the utility sector's revenues less dependent on the general state of 
the economy and more dependent on the lags in regulatory price-settings than for industrial fines. 
Fons (1987) tests for the impact of n znaanic surprises on the credit spread by using 
deviations from expected inflation and industrial production. In periods of unanticipated rising 
prices, firms with fixed nominal financial obligations tend to benefit In other words, the 
unanticipated part of inflation should have effect on the probability of default Other indicators of 
macroeconomic activity correlated with default expectations are the industrial production index 
and the unemployment rate estimate. For various sample periods, the first difference of implied 
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default rates is regressed on a constant, actual default rates, unanticipated inflation, unanticipated 
industrial production and unanticipated unemployment Of all the macroeconomic indicators, 
deviations from expected inflation contribute the most to changes in expected default rates. 
Fama and French (1989) show that the default spread seems to be related to long-term 
business episodes that span business cycles. In particular, they state that if bonds are priced 
rationally, the default spread is a measure of business conditions. In fact, although the default 
spread shows some business-cycle variation 
-low during periods of stronger and more stable 
economic onditions, and high during periods of general economic uncertainty-, its major swings 
seem to go beyond the business cycles measured by the NBER. 
Moreover, business conditions are also likely to impact default risk: as debt-service becomes 
more difficult in periods of economic downturn, the required risk premium may increase. Arok 
and Corcoran (1996) find some empirical corroboration of the anticipated credit spread 
behaviour. They study yield spreads on privately placed issues, both investment-graded (Arated) 
and sub-investment graded (Ba rated) issues. They find that credit spreads are negatively 
correlated to economic activity as well as to the direction of change: when economic activity is 
high or expanding credit spreads tend to decrease. Finally, even if the probability of default 
remains constant for a firn, changes in credit spreads can occur due to changes in the expected 
recovery rate. The expected recovery rate in turn should be a function of the overall business 
climate. 
As a result of the relationship between credit spreads and business cycle variables we would 
expect the rating transition probabilities to be "conditional" on macroeconomic variables (m 
addition to various firm-specific factors), such as the cyclical volatility of the firm's earnings and 
indicators of the current stage of the business cycle. In practice, however, there is generally 
insufficient data with which to estimate transition probabilities at such detail with reasonable 
precision. Thus, at most banks, the same rating transition matrix usually is applied to all 
borrowers, with no adjustment for business cycle effects. One potential implication of using 
"unconditional" transition probabilities is that estimates of expected losses and credit risk could 
be biased downward during the early stages of recessions, and biased upwards during the early 
stages of recoveries. 
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4.2.4. Disarimtd certainty aquitdl zt flows 
Silvers (1973) introduces a new measure of the bond incremental riskiness, tlx certainty 
affident, which is the ratio of certainty equivalent value divided by the promised payment. It is, 
therefore, a measure of overall reaction to a risky future prospects at a point in time, and it does 
not separate risk aversion from risk assessment as happens in the usual theoretical literature of 
finance and decision theory 
. 
This approach differentiates from the traditional approach, the yield differential model In the 
latter the bond price is represented as the sum of the promised payments discounted at a constant 
risk adjusted yield; in the certainty equivalent model the bond price is given by the sum of the 
discounted value of future certainty equivalent payments. In addition, in the yield differential 
model, a constant yield spread between the risky and the risk-less rate across all maturities would 
imply an identical adjustment for all promised payments in each period However, in the certainty 
coefficient framework, a constant yield differential implies a non-uniform pattern of risk 
adjustment. In time of crisis, when default may be imminent, the certainty coefficient of near term 
prospects drops off very rapidly, but, because of the general lack of confidence, the absolute level 
of the curve will be lower as well Hence, the certainty equivalent approach provides a more 
accurate picture of risk compensation in this extreme case. A decreasing pattern of yield spreads 
may indicate the presence of crisis at maturity, but it provides a poor measure of degree; while, the 
certainty coefficient precisely specifies the percentage reduction in payment assumed by the 
market. 
In order to find the determinants of a corporate bond price, the market price of a corporate 
bond is regressed on discounted certainty equivalent flows, on marketability risk, and on call risk 
and capital gain effects. The vector of certainty coefficients is intended to capture the risk 
structure inherent in the evaluation of the cash flows. 
Annual data are collected for the 1952-1964 period and the entire sample is divided into four 
investment-grade rating categories. Silvers concludes that each of the independent variables, with 
the exception of the marketability measure, are significant determinants of price. The overall 
explanation power of the regression is in the 0.92 to 0.97 range for high-grade bonds and in the 
0.53 to 0.88 range for lower quality bonds. Most of this high correlation comes from the highly 
significant relationship between corporate bond prices and the underlying overnment structure. 
Two are the main drawbacks of Silvers' work. First, the process of forcing a functional form 
onto the default risk structure may be too rigid, the data should have been tested unconstrained 
by any process and in a second step it should be observed how well the empirical results confirm 
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the particular hypothesised relationship. Second, many other variables that have an impact on 
price 
-security status and price volatility- are not considered at all. 
4.2.5. Cäu n, sinking md, secuzty status, and prievditility 
In Boardman and McEnally (1981) Silvers' constraints on the default risk stucture are relaxed 
and additional variables are added to the regression in order to observe the role of these 
influences in different interest rates environments. The price of a bond is expressed as the present 
value of all future payments. Each payment is adjusted by a discount factor that has two 
components: one representing the impact of time and one representing the impact of default risk. 
In addition, the price is affected by the following factors: coupon rate, security status, sinking fund 
status, marketability, industry and price volatility. 
All these factors constitute the independent variables of a regression where the bond's price is 
the dependent variable. The equation is estimated cross-sectionally for 515 randomly chosen 
seasoned corporate bonds4 at four different points in time with a separate regression for each 
rating class. The bonds included in the analysis are those listed in Moody's Bond Record. The 
explanatory power of the regression tends to decrease with lower rating classes, which is 
consistent with the standard observation that lower quality bonds are less homogeneous than 
those in the higher quality groups. 
71x coupon rate 
In general, credit spreads on coupon bonds are not equal to credit spreads on zero-coupon bonds 
because of either a non-flat term structure or a non-flat credit spread structure. To the extent hat 
the credit-spread curve is upward sloping, higher coupon bonds will have lower credit spreads 
than lower coupon bonds with the same maturity (Litterman and Iben, 1991). 12wwise, if the 
bond's duration shortens, e. g. because of an interest rate increase, the credit spread will decrease if 
the credit spread curve is upward sloping. Therefore, even if there is no relation between the 
interest rate level and credit spreads of zero coupon bonds, there still might be a relation between 
the former and the credit spread on coupon bonds. A smaller coupon rate relative to the yield 
implies a lower price, hence a larger capital gain on the bond (even if not held to maturity), and a 
higher present price. 
4A seasoned corporate bond is one which has been available for wading long enough that its underwriters and initial 
purchasers have ceased to malte an active market in it 
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Si &ig fi stow 
Sinking funds provide a means by which the issuer is forced to retire a part of the issue 
periodically or accumulate money to retire the bond at maturity. As a mean to resolve uncertainty 
with respect to eventual repayment, and as a mean to enter the market to buy the needed bonds 
through purchase rather than sinking fund call, a sinking fund should increase the bond's value. 
The sinking fund status is found to be significant only for the highest quality groups. This implies 
that the sinking fund provision is liked primarily for its effect on the after-market for the bonds. 
Seatnty status 
The security status dummy variable measures the presence or absence of a claim on the asset. In 
the presence of a claim, the lender's control over the borrower is greater and she has a priority on 
assets proceeds in liquidation. For this reason we expect a positive relationship with the bond 
price. The dummy for security status is found to be significant in the higher groups, consistently 
with the suggestion of Cohan (1973) that security is demanded only when a credit is below 
average. 
Price zdatility 
Bond beta coefficients are introduced to account for the bond's systematic price volatility. While 
duration measures the elasticity of a bond's price with respect to changes in its yields, beta is a 
more general measure because it reflects a bond's price sensitivity to aggregate market movements 
regardless of the source. The beta coefficient is estimated regressing bonds' holding period returns 
(HPR) on a constant and on a proxy for the market's beta - measures as a simple unweighted 
average of the HPRs on all the bonds. Standard pricing models hypothesize the beta coefficient to 
be negative. However, the beta variable is significant in half cases with a generally positive rather 
than the negative sign predicted by standard asset pricing models. This result night be due to the 
period (the preceding 12 months) over which the betas are estimated and that is not long enough 
to cover both bear and bull markets (60 months). 
4.2.6. Actual default rates and uzriaWes nwavemnam 
Fons (1987) is the first paper that tries to establish a relationship between the risk premium 
and the actual default experience. In order to test this relation, Fons develops a risk-neutral model 
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of the expected probability of default for speculative grade bonds. Since the holding-period 
returns have shown to be poor indicators of expected default rates, he used an alternative "naive" 
model of expected default rates in which the yield spread is taken as a measure of default risk. 
An index of yields to maturity for low-rated bonds from 1979 to 1985 is obtained from 
Salomon Brothers' Corporation Bond Research departments The yields to maturity for high- 
grade corporate bonds were taken from Salomon Brothers' New Medium Term Industrial index. 
This index is based on estimates of the required yields on issues coming to the market that are 
rated Aaa and that will mature in ten years. The Aaa/AAA-rated yields are chosen to represent 
the default-risk-free rates. Using the yields on long-term US Treasury issues would have 
introduced some difficulties because these securities lack call provisions, their returns are subject 
to a different tax treatment, and, finally, may have different marketability. 
These data are used to test the correlation between yield spreads and actual default rates. The 
expected payment rate, P, was found to be negatively related with the risky rate of interest, r. The 
implicit function results to be convex over plausible values of r, so that cross-sectional verage of 
P will be greater than or equal to the measured payment rate. The implication is that the implied 
expected default rate, (1- F), is biased ownwards. 
Additional insight is gained by using regression techniques. The expected default rates (1-1') are 
regressed on a constant, on a raw default series, and on the smoothed default rates series. The null 
hypothesis that the market's estimate of default corresponds to actual default rate experience is 
rejected. Implied default rates exceed actual default rates by roughly five percentage points. As a 
consequence, holders of well-diversified portfolios of low rated corporate bonds appear to be 
rewarded for bearing default risk. 
The discrepancy between the two series suggests two possible conclusions. Either the market 
for low-rated debt is inefficient or the risk-neutral model is deficient. Fons tries to improve the 
model by introducing a simple rule of thumb' to use in the market for low rated corporate debt. 
According to this model, the difference in the values of the indexes for the yields to maturity of 
low- and high-grade corporate bonds is a direct measure of expected default rates on low-rated 
debt and is regressed on a constant and smoothed actual default rates over the period 1980-1985. 
The results indicate that the rule of thumb model doesn't outperform the risk-neutral model as a 
predictor of actual default rates. 
5 Defaulting bonds are removed firm the sample, as are issues that are upgraded to investment-gx-ade status. 
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4.2.7.71v teen stnimm of vtterzst rates 
The relationship beta een credit spreads and interest rates is rather complex. Many are the 
articles focusing on the valuation of corporate securities that allow for both default risk and 
interest rate risk. These include Teerton (1974), Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1986), Hull and 
White (1992), Maloney (1992), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995,1997,2000), Kim, Ramaswamy and 
Sund resan (1993), Ginzbu g, Maloney and Willner (1993), Shimko, Tej ma and Deventer (1993), 
Genotte and Marsh (1993), Nelsen, Saa-Raquejo and Santa Clara (1993), and Longstaff and 
Schaue (1995a). While these marks, by modelling risky debt, provide important conceptual 
insights, generally they have not pro-- ided empirical evidence to their theoretical implications. The 
comparative statics of these models predict that equilibrium credit spreads are negatively related to 
the risk free rate. Despite there are strong theoretical arguments to assume that there is a relation 
between credit spreads and the risk-free interest rate level, it is difficult to provide a convincing 
intuitive explanation for this negative relation. 
Wile it is possible that a )kgk to quality' could induce a temporary negative relation between 
corporate and government rates, it seems more likely that high nominal rates would be associated 
vah a high risk premium for corporate debt For example, the model in Bemanke and Gertler 
(1989) implies that higher interest rates, a ens pizriL s, will raise agency problems for borrowers. 
This increases credit spreads because it widens the gap between internal and external financing 
Costs. 
In favour of a positive relationship is also a maöxna&al aigcaiaa 
. 
Under the simplifying 
assumptions that investors are risk-neutral and the recovery rate given default is constant and 
lciio n, a purely mzthemarical relation between credit spreads and the default-free rate can be 
derýved. Consider for simplicity a one period risky bond and assume that the recovery rate given 
default is zero. If EDF denotes the expected default frequency (or the probability of default), 
nwkr-t egwlbcium implies 
(1+i) 
- 
(1-EDF) (1+Y IM + EDF (0) (2.1) 
s sere i is the default-free one period rate and YTM the promised yield on the risky debt. This 
relation is fully derived by Bierman and Hass (1975). We can apply it to the computation of the 
credit spread a as follows. 
b If aauA dstc rxa are X pa 1 chap the reTirmd yidd to maturäy on low rxed dcbc should exceed that on h4 i. 
pdcdebt byXPen g 
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cs a YTNI ia (1+) EDF/(1-EDF). (2.2) 
As long as EDF is a proper constant probability residing between 0 and 1, a positive relation 
exists between the default-free rate i and the spread a. Of course, if investors are risk-averse, the 
reaction of the credit spread also depends on the risk premium the spread contains. If the risk 
premium decreases as the risk-free rate increases, this lowers the positive risk-neutral effect. Also, 
if the probability of default EDF is negatively correlated with the risk-free rate, the positive 
relation between the credit spread a and i may be altered. 
A positive theoretical relation between credit spreads and interest rates is also supported by a 
fiscal v of which is based on the different tax rates applicable to corporate and Treasury 
bonds. If, as it generally happens, corporate bonds are more heavily taxed than Treasury bonds, 
an increase in bond yields amplifies the tax wedge between corporate and Treasury bonds. To 
offset this increased tax wedge, corporate bond yields should rise more than Treasury bond yields. 
On the other hand, spreads and rates can be negatively related if we rely on the option 
framework of Merton (1974). According to this approach, a corporate bond can be seen as 
equivalent to a default-free bond and a short position in a put on the firm's assets. An investor 
who purchases the risky bond and then sells it prior to maturity will find that, if interest rates 
increase (decrease), the default-free component will decrease (increase) her wealth, while the short 
put will increase (decrease) her wealth. However, there is no holding period, short of maturity, 
that immunises since the investor will always be worse (better) off if interest rates increase 
(decrease). This is true also for default-free bonds, implying that the default-free component 
dominates the put component in terms of interest rate sensitivity. 
Despite the relevance of the issue, few papers have empirically tested the interrelations 
between interest rates and credit spreads and the (scarce) empirical evidence documents generally 
a negative relationship. The empirical literature has focused and presented evidence about the 
time evolution of both corporate default spreads and interest rates in relation to business 
conditions, thus suggesting that default risk and interest rate risk are correlated. 
Jaffee (1975) suggests that top quality bonds might be risk free regardless of the business cycle, 
while, one might expect low rated bond quality to deteriorate significantly during recessions. 
From their analysis it emerges that changes in the level of interest rates have a negligible effect on 
changes in risk spreads. Mella-Barral and Tychon (1996) cany on a sensitivity analysis of the term 
structure with respect to movements in various factors. They show that changes in the risk-less 
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interest rate do not affect much the magnitude of credit spreads for short-term contracts. Credit 
spreads are only marginally increasing in the risk-less interest rate for longer maturities. 
Nielsen, Saa-Requejo and Santa-Clara (1993) develop a model for the term structure of credit 
spreads that takes into account default risk, interest rate risk, and the interactions between the two. 
The interaction arises from two sources. Both the uncertainty of the value of the film's assets and 
the default boundary are correlated with the interest rate uncertainty. In addition, both the rate of 
growth of the default boundary and the rate of return on the firm's asset depend on the level of 
the risk-less interest rate. They prove that the more negative is the correlation between the interest 
rate and the default risk, the smaller the spreads are, which is explained by the fact that the risk of 
default becomes easier to diversify. 
Kinn, Ramaswanry and Sundaresan (1995), following the suggestion given by Jones, Mason 
and Rosenfeld (1984), test whether the introduction of stochastic interest rates might improve the 
performance of contingent claims valuation frameworks for pricing corporate and Treasury 
bonds. They introduce a stochastic process for the evolution of the short interest rate and 
characterise the behaviour of yield spreads with respect to the parameters that govern the 
stochastic process that drives interest rates. Numerical solutions to the valuation equation show 
that default risk is sensitive to interest rate expectations 
-in terms of the location of the interest 
rate relative to its long-run mean rate- when default risk is relatively high (a high P/V ratio, where 
P is the face value of the bond and V is the value of the firm), but never to the volatility 
(uncertainty) of interest rates. Irrespectively of the debt ratio, the spreads decrease with the level of 
the interest rates. 
Longstaff and Schwartz (LS, 1995a) provide a valuation framework for risky coupon bonds 
allowing also for empirical evidence supporting their theoretical implications. Their valuation 
framework differentiates from the traditional approach, which implies that credit spreads depend 
on only an asset value factor, while the interest rate is assumed to be constant. In contrast LS state 
that credit spreads are driven by an asset-value factor, an interest rate factor, and by the correlation 
between the two factors. Specifically, the static effect of a higher spot rate is to increase the risk- 
neutral drift of the firm value process. A higher drift reduces the incidence of default, and in turn, 
reduces the credit spreads. To examine whether the properties of credit spreads are consistent 
with the implications of their two-factor framework, they regress changes in credit spreads on 
proxies for the two factors. Changes in the 30-year Treasury yield is used as a proxy for the 
changes in the interest rate and returns from Standard & Poor's industrial, utility and railroad 
stock indexes as a proxy for the return on the underlying assets. The empirical investigation 
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confirms that credit spreads are strongly negatively related to the level of interest rates, credit 
spreads narrow as interest rates increase 
-as implied by the model. An increase in the short-term 
interest rate tends indeed to reduce the probability of default because of the effect on the drift of 
the risk-neutral process that drives the total value of the assets of the firm. The second result is 
that credit spreads are negatively related to returns on the firm's assets. The reason for this is 
simply that an increase in the value of a firm's assets decreases the probability that the default 
boundary will be reached As a third result, the magnitude of the decrease in the credit spread, 
however, depends on the value of the correlation coefficient between the risk-free interest rate 
process and the total value of the assets process. The interest rate sensitivity of credit spreads 
increases as the correlation coefficient increases. The intuition for this is similar to the intuition 
why the credit spread itself increases with the correlation. When the correlation is positive, 
changes in interest rate are reversed by changes in the default risk of the firm. Conversely, when 
the correlation is either negative or zero the total effect on credit spreads is higher. 
The LS correlation argument in fact interacts with a xtVon &mgcan which can also explain 
a negative strong relation between credit spreads and the slope of the Treasury yield curve. 
Corporate bonds have higher coupons than Treasury bonds, implying that a corporate bond that 
has the same maturity as that of a Treasury bond will have a shorter duration. Short-duration 
instruments are more sensitive to short-maturity discount rates than are long-duration 
instruments. Therefore an increase in the slope of the Treasury yield curve, raises the yields on 
Treasury bonds more relatively to yields on corporate bonds of equal maturity and hence 
decreases the yield spreads of corporate coupon bonds over Treasury coupon bonds. This 
"coupon effect" is stronger for long-maturity bonds than for short-maturity bonds because 
coupon-induced differences in duration are larger for bonds with more coupon payments 
(Duffee, 1998). 
Duffee (1998) investigates the relation between yields on noncallable Treasury bonds and 
spreads of corporate bond yields over Treasury yields. This relation conveys information about 
the covariation between default-free discount rates and the market's perception of default risk. 
Yield spreads on both callable and noncallable corporate bonds fall when Treasury yields rise; 
specifically this relation is much stronger for callable bonds. In the case of noncallable bonds, for 
every combination of maturity and credit rating an increase in the level of the Treasury term 
structure corresponds to a decline in yield spreads. This relation strengthens as credit quality falls. 
Also the relation between yield spreads and the slope of the Treasury term structure is generally 
negative. Empirical results for noncallable and callable corporate bonds are found regressing 
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monthly changes of credit spreads on changes in the three-month Treasury bill yield and changes 
in the slope of the term structure, as measured by the difference between the thirty-year constant- 
maturity Treasury yield and the three-month bill rate. The period spans from February 1985 
through March 1995 and month-end data are collected for the bonds that make up the Lehman 
Brothers Bond Index. In the case of callable bonds, the negative relation between yield spreads 
and Treasuryyields i more strong but the differences across credit ratings are substantially smaller 
than those for non callable bonds. Duffee (1998) investigates also the persistence of changes in 
corporate bond yield spreads associated with changes in Treasury yields using vector 
autoregressions (VARs) of the 3-month Treasury bill yield, the slope of the Treasury term 
structure, and corporate bond yield spreads. Changes in yield spreads appear to persist for more 
than a year, but the VARs' coefficients result to be too uncertain to draw any firm conclusions 
about the persistence of changes in yield spreads in response to innovations in Treasuryyields. 
Malitz (1994) documents that firms tend to issue less debt when interest rates are high, 
suggesting that stochastic interest rates are a relevant factor in determining credit spreads. Arak 
and Corcoran (1996) also find a negative relation between yield spreads on privately placed issues 
and risk-free rates when all variables are measured in levels. The relation is significant for A aril 
Baa-rated paper, at least when influences of other economic variables are taken into account, but 
not for Ba-rated paper. Fridson and J6nsson (1995), however, report that they did not find any 
relation between the level of Treasury rates and the spread on high-yield bonds, which are also 
below investment grade. 
The empirical studies presented above focus on the short 
-term behaviour of corporate 
spreads and Treasury rates while failing to incorporate information on the co-movement of these 
two variables over time. In other words, the empirical specifications in these studies focus on 
changes and do not incorporate equilibrium relationships between the variables. This is important 
because the predictions of the theoretical models are long run or equilibrium predictions. Since 
the models do not specify the transition path from one equilibrium to another, it is questionable 
to draw inference about the equilibrium spread from the short-run dynamics. Moreover, if 
corporate spreads and Treasury rates are cointegrated, the estimated coefficients relating changes 
in yields and changes in spreads are biased and inconsistent unless the level of the variables is also 
considered in the econometric analysis. 
Morris, Neal and Rolph (1998) point these statistical pitfalls in previous studies and show that 
the relation between corporate bond spreads and Treasuryyields depends on the time horizon. 
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Using 10-year constant maturity Treasury bonds and Moody's Aaa and Baa seasoned indices over 
the period January 1960 to December 1997, they find that each of the corporate yield series is 
cointegrated with Treasury rates. In both cases the long-run relationship turns out to be positive. 
When Treasury rates increase by 1% point, Aaa (Baa) rates increase by 1.028 (1.178)% points, 
implying that credit spreads increase. Using more appropriate first difference regressions, 
however, they show that in the short-nun the relationship between Treasury rates and corporate 
spreads reverses and becomes negative. As time progresses, an initial rise in Treasury yields 
translates into proportionately greater increase in corporate bond rates, widening the credit 
spread. 
This leaves us with some apparent contradictions. Firstly, although the negative relation seems 
at odds with the simple mathematical argument, a sufficient condition for consistency is a 
negative correlation between interest rate risk and default risk, implying a decrease in the 
probability of default when the interest rate increases. This is actually what follows in the model 
by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995a). Moreover, their model entails that the higher the value of the 
company is correlated with changes in interest rates, the stronger the rate sensitivity of the credit 
spread will be. The Arak and Corcoran (1996) and Fridson and J6nsson (1995) can therefore be 
made consistent with those of Duffee (1998) if below-investment-grade issuers were more 
negatively correlated with interest rate changes than investment-grade issuers. 
Secondly, the cointegration results of Morris, Neal and Rdph (1998) imply that bond yields 
are non-stationary, which seems hard to explain economically, as this would imply that yields may 
grow to infinity. Structural breaks in the series under study, which may hamper correct statistical 
inference of cointegration models, may be an explanation for their results. Morris et al. 's (1998) 
results have important implications for models of capital structure and for models of pricing 
corporate debt and for managing the interest rate risk of corporate bonds. 
Chance (1990) and others have argued that the presence of default risk shortens the effective 
duration of corporate bonds. The duration of a default-free zero coupon bond can be seen as the 
maturity multiplied by the present value of the face value divided by the price. When the bond is 
subject to default, a similar representation can be given, but expected values are replaced with 
certain values. The duration is, thus, the maturity multiplied by the present value at the default- 
free rate of the face value times the probability of solvency, divided by the price. 
Comparative static analysis are performed by Morris et aL (1998) to examine the behaviour of 
duration in light of changes in the underlying variables. In particular, duration was found to 
decline steeply at low debt ratios and levels off at higher debt ratios irrespectively of the time to 
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maturity. This reflects the fact that at high debt ratios the put has little time value, as default is 
likely, and the put price is primarily driven by the difference between the asset value and the face 
value of the bond. Duration was also studied in relation to the level of the default-free interest 
rate. Duration showed to increase with the level of the interest rate as it does for default-free 
coupon bonds; however, for short-maturity bonds, duration increases at much lower rate, but the 
duration of all bonds asymptotically approaches the maturity While the negative short-run 
relation between cs and the risk-free rate is consistent with Chance's logic, the positive long-run 
response of Morris et al. (1998) implies that corporate bonds are eventually more sensitive to 
interest rate movements than otherwise sinular Treasury bonds. 
Finally, it has been indicated that the spot rate process itself may depend upon other factors. 
For instance, Brennan and Schwartz (1979) introduce a model where short rate dynamics 
depends upon the long rate. Extending the logic of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995a), if the short 
rate is expected to mean-revert about the long rate, then an increase in the slope of the treasury 
curve should increase the expected future short rate, again leading to a decrease in credit spreads. 
From a different perspective, a decrease in yield curve slope may imply a weakening economy and 
it is reasonable to believe that the expected recovery rate might decrease in times of recession. 
Once again, theory predicts that an increase in the treasuryyield curve slope will create a decrease 
in credit spreads. 
4.2.8. Marketability 
Marketability should also be related to a bond's price. Marketability depends upon the elasticity 
of the demand curve the bond faces, but the lack of means to estimate the demand curve drives 
scolars to use a proxy variable. The most common proxy is a size variable, which could be: a) the 
total market value of all the issues the firm has outstanding b) a dummy variable to indicate if a 
bond is traded only over the counter or is also traded on one of the major exchanges as well. 
When liquidity is measured as the issue's size, many authors find a negative relation between 
spread and size: the larger the size, the larger the issue's liquidity, the lower the required yield and 
therefore the spread. 
Marketabiity was first introduced by Fisher (1959) as the natural logarithm of the dollar par 
value of bonds outstanding. According to Fisher, the smaller the amount of bonds outstanding, 
the less frequently we should expect bonds change hands, the thinner is the marke, the more 
112 
Chapter IV. 
- 
Literature Review 
uncertain is the market price, the higher the expected risk premium. Fisher's results support the 
relevance of the factor "marketability". Later on, Crabbe and Turner (1995) will show that size 
does not necessarily proxy for liquidity. To investigate whether issue size is a significant 
determinant of liquidity, they test for yield differences between medium-term notes and bonds of 
the same corporate issuers. If investors would value large offerings for their greater liquidity, then 
large issues will have lower yields than small issues. The yield difference is found not significant 
and no relation is found between the face amount of an issue and its yield. Their evidence 
therefore implies that the liquidity of a security reflects both the characteristics of the borrower 
and the features of the security. 
Successively, Silvers (1973) states that marketability (defined as in Fisher's work) will be 
independent of default expectations if it has a significant explanatory power when risk of default 
is held constant. However, if marketability is not significant within a risk class, it can be either that 
the bond market is efficient (differently from Fisher's research), or that the variable used as a 
proxy for marketability is misspecified. In fact, the volume outstanding as a measure of 
marketability results to be insignificant within a homogeneous risk sample. Therefore Silvers can 
imply either that the proxy used for marketability is in fact proxy for another measure of default 
risk, or that marketability may still be important but it is collinear with measures of risk, or that 
marketability is not a relevant factor and the bond market is efficient. 
Boardman and McEnally (1981) find a negative relation between size and yield for Baa or 
better-rated US corporate bonds, consistently with Silvers' but not with Fisher's results. The 
difference in significance between Fisher's and Silvers' quantity variable might be dependent upon 
the formulation of the estimating equation and the empirical procedure. Also for highly levered 
transaction loans Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) find a negative relationship between size and 
spread. This corroborated by Shulman, Bayless and Price (1993) who report a significantly 
negative relation between several spread and liquidity proxies for individual high-yield bonds. 
Besides the liquidity of a specific issue market-wide liquidity events' may also impact credit 
spreads. Cornell (1992) reports large abnormal returns on low-grade bonds due to changes in 
liquidity in the junk bond market. First, the bonds experienced positive abnormal returns 
(resulting in higher prices and hence in lower spreads) when Drexel Burnham Lambert 
exponentially increased the issuance of low-grade bonds, and then abnormal negative returns 
(higher spreads) when the market collapsed after Drexel's default in 1989. This is confirmed by 
Patel, Evans and Burnett (1998) and the same observation is made by Arak and Corcoran (1996) 
related to yield spreads on privately placed issues: investment grade issues had lower spreads than 
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expected in Lite 1989 and early 1990, whereas ub-investment issues yielded less than expected 
according to economic onditions. 
Similarly, after the Russian moratorium in August 1998 credit spreads rose sharply in the 
international secondary debt markets, at a moment when liquidity dried up, which reinforced the 
credit spread increase. Fridson and J6nsson (1995) also find significant relations between the high- 
yield spread and liquidity proxies. These proxies include the net inflows to high-yield bond mutual 
funds (negative relation), cash proportion held by these funds (positive), and the three-month 
moving average price of the high yield index (positive). 
It may be argued that these market-wide changes in spreads due to changes in liquidity do not 
really belong in a report on credit risk. Nevertheless, it is not always dear whether in all liquidity- 
induced changes credit risk is not involved It may be the case that due to dramatically altered risk 
perceptions, credit spreads explode or tighten. At the same time the changes in risk perception 
may equally impact the volume investors want to trade. The Bank for International Settlements, 
for instance, links both the sharply increased risk and liquidity premia in the wake of the Russian 
debt moratorium in 1998 to the drying-up of securities issuance. Both are "... suggestive of a 
large-scale retrenchment in the supply of risk capital" (Basle, 1999: 93). In any case, when the 
focus of interest is the credit spread (e. g. because of the fact that the pay-off of a credit derivative 
is related to the credit spread, or because the bond portfolio is marked to market), models should 
take into account that the level of the credit spread may dramatically wander through time 
regardless whether this is due to changes in liquidity or changes in risk perception. 
4.2.9. Ocher factors 
Clrllabi4 y 
Callability or other option features may be important as well. In efficient markets the value of 
these options is embedded in the bond's price and thus in the credit spread. The results in Duffee 
(1998) dearly indicate that the call feature can dramatically change the spread behaviour. He finds 
that spreads are negatively related to changes in risk-free rates. However, the relationship is 
stronger for callable bonds as the call feature's value is obviously related to interest rate level If 
rates increase, the calls move further to the out-of-the-money range. 11iis implies that prices of 
callable risky bonds do not drop as much as those of non-callable bonds, therefore lowering the 
credit spread stronger for callable bonds. On the other hand, Boardman and McEnally (1981) 
find that callability is significant only in the higher rating classes ince it is much less frequent 
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among lower quality bonds. Also Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1995) focus their attention 
on the can future which is found to have a differential effect in Treasury issues relative to 
corporate issues and it is relatively more valuable in the Treasury issues. Interactions between 
default risk and the call provision play an important role in explaining the observed yield spreads 
between noncallable corporate bonds and straight Treasuries on one side and callable corporates 
and callable Treasuries on the other side. 
Gnütratmg 
As the credit spread compensates the holder of the debt instrument for expected losses, there 
should be a link between the credit spread and the credit rating dass, given the fact that there exist 
ample evidence that rating categories indeed entail an indication of relative credit risk. Researches 
have indeed shown that there exists a dose relationship between credit rating classes and 
subsequent default experience. This is mirrored in empirical studies where it is always found that 
the credit spread widens at an increasing rate as the credit rating worsens. This is for instance 
depicted by Duffee (1998) for US investment grade corporate bonds. 
Moreover, the standard deviation of individual bonds' credit spreads wI zag rating ciEpy 
increases as the credit rating worsens. This indicates that not all bonds within the same rating class 
are assumed to bear the same credit risk. Apparently, the higher cross-sectional standard deviation 
in the lower rating lasses indicates that rating agencies allow for more heterogeneity in these 
classes. By re-valuing the debt instrument assuming a transition to a given credit rating class and 
then taking expectations, the mark-to-market mode of credit risk management models effectively 
take this empirical evidence into account. However, the relatively large standard deviations should 
also be taken into account when computing unexpected losses. 
Seniority and co lateral 
Both the seniority of a bond or loan and the collateral attached as security to it, have an impact on 
the credit spread because, arguably, both kinds of provisions will increase the recovery rate in case 
of default Indeed, Izvorski (1997) finds that for defaulted US bonds debt seniority is one of the 
most important determinants of the recovery ratio, thus implying a lower yield for senior issues. 
This is also the case for syndicated bank loans: a study by F= IBCA showed that while 
distressed bank loans recovered 82%, senior subordinated debt of the same issuers recovered 
42% and subordinated debt only 39% (Grossman, Brennan and Vento, 1998). 
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In some papers, however, the reverse relationship is reported: within a rating class security 
covenants actually nvnz the issue's yield (e. g. Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) for highly 
leveraged transaction loans). Roberts and Viscione (1984) explain this anomalous finding by 
differences in credit risk within the same rating category. Relatively risky bonds are more lkely to 
have covenants, which in turn may lead to higher credit ratings for the issue than it would have 
without covenants. To eliminate this bias Roberts and Viscione (1984) study the yield difference 
between bonds issued by the same company, with similar features except for seniority/security 
covenants. In their sample, they do find lower yields for higher security bonds. 
Cox es in lese ague and asset u atility 
In the Merton model corporate bond spreads widen as the firm's leverage increases. The latter is 
defined as the ratio of the present value of the nominal amount of debt outstanding to the market 
value of the firm's assets. The intuition for this direct proportionality is that increased gearing 
heightens the probability that the firne may be unable to make its promised payments. However, 
recent empirical evidence of Hotchkiss and Ronen (1999) and Collin-Dufresne, Geldstein and 
Martin (1999) finds small explanatory power of changes in leverage for changes in credit spreads. 
Moreover, according to the Merton model, a rise in the volatility of the fiml's value increases 
the probability of default, thus widening the credit spreads. In fact, in the context of option 
pricing, an increase in the volatility of the underlying asset raises the price of the put option, thus 
reducing the value of the corporate debt and increasing the yield spread relative to a risk free asset. 
(D) OdA 
D- min(V, X) 
(Vj Value o1 ere Firm 
(X) Sulks P4ct 
Figure 4.1 Vabii Risky Dd t 
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4.2.10. Do Crcdit Spreads differ by Type of Obligor? 
Distinctions are frequently drawn between exposures to sovereigns, banks and industrials. Of 
particular interest are the questions: (i) are exposures to sovereigns less risky than those to non- 
sovereigns with the same rating, and (n) are exposures to banks less risky than those to industrials? 
Jackson and Pesraudin (1999) show the amount by which average daily Bloomberg spreads for 
US dollar denominated sovereign debt exceeded those on US corporate debt of a similar rating. 
Average credit spreads were significantly wider for BBB-and BB-rated debt issued by 
governments than for US industrials with the same rating. However, the relatively small number 
of sovereigns in the sample (6,6 and 8 for the categories BB, BBB and AA, respectively make it 
difficult to draw firm conclusions. The higher spreads may in part reflect market concerns about 
the outcome of problems on sovereign exposures. When a corporate defaults, its assets can be 
attached and it can be declared bankrupt, enabling legal action to be taken. This may mean that 
recovery rates on sovereign exposures are typically lower and less timely than those on corporates. 
Some rating agencies take loss-given default into account in the ratings but not all do so. 
Another way to investigate the relative riskiness of different types of obligor is to study the 
behaviour of ratings transitions. Standard &Poor's one-year transition matrices, calculated on 
ratings data from 1975 to 1998, suggest that exposures to sovereigns and non-sovereigns differ 
(see Standard &Poor's (1999a) and (1999b)) but in the opposite way from that indicated by the 
spread data of Jackson and Perraudin (1999). No rated sovereigns defaulted in this period 
although some renegotiated their external debt, or needed emergency IMF packages. And, in 
general, sovereign ratings appear more stable. One-year transition matrices calculated by Bank of 
England staff from Moody's data covering the period 1970 to end-1997 also indicate that changes 
in ratings are less frequent for sovereign than for corporate obligors although the difference is less 
pronounced than in the case of the Standard & Poor's transitions. These differences in ratings 
transitions partly reflect the fact that only a few sovereigns were rated in the earlier part of the 
sample period and all these were high quality. For example, in 1975, Standard & Poor 's rated only 
seven countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. 
Even by 1990, there were only thirty-one sovereigns rated by Standard & Poor's, of which only 
nine were from the emerging markets. 
There is some evidence that rating agencies find sovereign exposures more difficult to rate 
than industrials, perhaps indicating that there could be more uncertainty surrounding risk 
assessments for sovereigns and providing some justification for stickiness in ratings. Cantor and 
Packer (1995) find, when comparing Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings, that there are 
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greater differences in the ratings given by the two agencies to particular low credit quality 
sovereigns than is the case for low-quality corporates. This may reflect the short track record in 
rating lower quality sovereign exposures and the greater subjectivity in sovereign measurement 
- 
countries do not fail as such and whether payments are met depends in part on political will. 
There are also questions over adequacy of information released by some governments. 
On the relative riskiness of bis and izka-rc, Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (1998) look at 
the ratings transitions for types of obligor. Data on default probabilities over ten year horizons for 
US obligors, calailated from the data used in the study, indicate that banks in all ratings categories 
down to B are significantly less likely to default than non-banks. For AAA-rated obligors the 
default probabilities are 0.09 percent for non-banks and 0.02 percent for banks and for BBB-rated 
obligors the figures are 9.6 percent for non-banks and 4.6 percent for banks. 
Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto find that the volatility of ratings changes is higher for banks 
than for industrials but large movements in ratings are just as likely if not more likely for 
industrials. When they focus on just US industrials and banks they find that, in a business cycle 
trough, highly-rated banks (AAA, AA and A) are more subject to downgrades than industrials. 
However, the opposite is true of banks rated BBB and below. These are more likely to experience 
an upgrade than would be the case for a corporate of the same rating. This may reflect the 
influence of regulation. Whereas all obligors face market pressure to deal with problems, banks 
also face pressure from regulators. As a bank became weaker, so some kind of regulatory action 
would become likely. For example in the United States, if a bank had many problem loans, and 
losses were likely, formal or informal action could be taken including discussions with 
management over the extent of any problems and following these the bank might be required to 
increase its provisions against future loan losses. A bank would not be able to pay dividends if that 
would leave it under capitalised relative to the regulatory minimum after taking into account any 
need for higher provisions. This would make it more likely that the decline in the bank would be 
arrested or timed round. 
Data on spreads on bonds issued by US banks, industrials and utilities with particular ratings, 
taken from Bloomberg, point to a rather different conclusion on the market's assessment of 
relative riskiness. For all ratings categories average spreads on bonds issued by banks are higher 
than spreads on industrial bonds or utilities. In part this will reflect the fact that many bank bond 
issues are subordinated. Because subordinated debt can count in Tier 2 capital under the Basle 
Accord, banks have an incentive to issue this kind of paper. 
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The Bank of England has a large database of bonds put together from Reuters data and this 
shows a much higher use of subordination by banks than other types of obligor and a much 
lower use of guarantees for bank-issued bonds. Both factors would tend to imply higher spreads 
on bank bonds. In their study of US dollar denominated international bonds, Penraudin and 
Taylor (1999), however, find that bank spreads are slightly higher even when allowance is made 
for seniority. The spread difference is small (eg 6 basis points for AA), but it does appear to be 
statistically significant. This may reflect perceptions about relative recovery rates. Altman and 
Kishore (1996), in a study of 700 US corporate bonds in default, find that financial institutions 
have lower recovery rates (36 per cent) than the average (42 per cent). The difference remains 
even after allowing for subordination. 
Summarising, the evidence on whether exposures to banks are less risky than exposures to 
non-banks is therefore rather mixed. The evidence for the United States is that banks do have 
lower probabilities of default than non-banks. In terms of ratings transitions, bank ratings are in a 
sense mean-reverting: highly-rated banks are more likely to be downgraded and low-rated banks 
are more likely to be upgraded than industrials. The evidence from spreads is, however, that 
banks are regarded as somewhat more risky than industrials perhaps because of perceived 
recovery rates. 
4.2.11. Bond spreads wnus lam spmads 
So far, little is known about differences between the credit risk of relatively liquid exposures 
(bonds) and illiquid exposures (loans). It is only during the last years that some research on the 
loan market has been done, spurred by the fact that secondary markets for loans start to develop 
and financial institutions realising the importance of this kind of research have started to make 
data available to researchers. The general conclusion of these studies is that spreads on loans are 
different from spreads on comparable bonds, but that they do show co-movement to some 
extent Therefore, care should be taken when bond market data are applied in risk management 
tools for loan portfolios. 
Arak and Corcoran (1996) use data on privately placed debt yields. They find that these yields 
do not closely follow yields of comparable-quality public debt issues, although there is more 
similarity for A-rated paper than for sub-investment grade issues (Ba-rated). Moreover, privately 
issued lower rated issues have a considerably lower spread compared to their publicly issued 
counterparts. Both observations are explained by the fact that lower rated private issues include 
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more covenants than similarly rated bonds, which implies lower default losses for the former and 
therefore a lower spread and less co-movement between the series as the credit risk profile is 
dramatically changed They also find that public issue yield spreads are far more volatile than 
privately placed issue yields. 
Similar results are found by Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) who study highly leveraged 
transaction loans. Spreads on these loans are stidfler than spreads on Baa- rated bonds as well as 
spreads on junk bonds. Nevertheless, the series do show some relation with each other although 
much less strong than a one-to-one relation. They estimate that when loan yields increase by 1 
percentage point, loan spreads increase by some 30 bp. 
Altman and Suggitt (2000) examine ratings transitions for US-syndicated loans and conclude 
that they behave very like bonds issued by similarly rated obligors. Their finding is not surprising, 
however, since the loan ratings are generally identical to those of bonds issued by the same 
companies; and in cases where Altman and Suggitt cannot obtain a rating for the loan, they 
actually infer it from the same obligor 's bond rating. 
There is reason to believe that credit risk in private debt portfolios is not entirely similar to 
credit risk in public debt portfolios. An interesting study by Carey (1998) examines default 
histories of a large sample of US privately-placed bonds over the period 1986 to 1992, arguing 
that such private placements resemble loans in that they are monitored quite actively by lenders as 
is bank debt. Carey (1998) finds that especially for sub-investment grade issues credit risk for 
private debt is lower. This is both due to lower default rates and lower losses given default. Carey 
suggests that this is evidence of private debt being better monitored by lenders. 
Kamin and von Kleist (1999) focus on spreads of primary issues of emerging market debt 
instmments, both bonds and loans. They find that both types of debt instruments react similarly 
to a number of issue-specific and general items, but that bond spreads are generally double as 
high as loan spreads with comparable characteristics. However, it is not clear whether this is due 
to the mere difference between loans and bonds or to the fact that all loans studied have a floating 
rate whereas all bonds have a fixed interest rate. 
Finally, Carey (1994) examines the consistency of pricing in the bond and loan markets by 
comparing the new issue terms of loans with spreads on bonds issued by the same obligor. He 
finds that, adjusting for the fact that loans are generally floating rate whereas bonds are generally 
fixed-rate obligations, differences between bond and loan pricing are not larger than could 
plausibly be attributed to contractual features of the debt Nevertheless, he stresses that the 
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standard errors associated with his estimates are too large for confident statements to be made 
about loan and bond market consistency. 
The evidence reviewed above suggests that the pricing of exposures and the probability of 
changes in credit standing are broadly similar in the bond and loan markets. However, there have 
been too few comparative studies of liquid and iilliquid exposures for one to be confident of these 
conclusions and more research in this area is needed. 
4.2.12. L bnitations of criit spreads as th&aton of crriit risk 
Credit spreads are only one indicator of risk and are not ideal. Kiesel, Perraudin and Taylor 
(1999a) dealt with a number of the drawbacks of spread data by calculating VaR measures for 
portfolios of exposures. Kiesel, Perraudin and Taylor generalise CzaditMetrics by allowing spreads 
for different ratings categories to change randomly. VaRs are calculated for a one-year holding 
period and a confidence level of 99.7% for portfolios of 500 exposures, each of equal face value. 
They focus particularly on VaRs for an "average portfolio", the credit quality profile of which 
mimics that of the average portfolio of large US banks surveyed by the Federal Reserve Board 
(see Gordy (1999)). They also examine VaRs for a "high quality portfolio" which resembles that 
of more conservative lending institutions included in the same Federal Reserve survey. Each VaR 
is divided by the expected value of the portfolio and multiplied by 100 and so is in the same units 
as a percentage capital requirement. Under reasonably standard assumptions about correlations 
between different exposures, VaRs for the average portfolio are dose to the 8% capital charge 
specified by the 1988 Basle Accord The VaRs are slightly higher if spread risk is included as well 
as rating change and recovery risk. For the high quality portfolio, VaRs are rather lower, being 
around 5%. 
Kiesel, Perraudin and Taylor find that VaRs depend markedly on the average duration of the 
exposures included in a portfolio. This maturity effect is greater for high credit quality portfolios. 
For the average-quality portfolios, their calculations yield VaRs for exposures of two and ten-year 
maturity of 5.4 and 10.0, respectively. For high credit quality portfolios, the corresponding VaRs 
are 2.7 and 7.6. 
An explanation for the somewhat flatter maturity profile of VaRs for lower credit quality 
exposures is a kind of survivorship bias. If low-rated obligors survive in the near term, their credit 
standing is likely to have risen, in which case the market may believe that they will remain solvent 
for a long time. Another reason for the steeper profile for the high-quality exposures may be that 
the VaRs are an estimate of the likelihood that there will be a change in credit standing during the 
121 
Chapter IV: Literature Review 
next year. With a prime-quality credit, it is more likely that information released within the year 
would point to problems at a later date rather than immediately. This would make a change in 
value of longer-term exposures more likely than shorter term 
The spreads they obtain may be regarded as average spreads for obligors from particular 
ratings categories. By analysing the errors from the spline fits, one may gauge whether the debt of 
obligors of different types is priced differently from the debt of the average obligor from the same 
rating category 
. 
Regressing the errors from the spline fits on a range of variables including 
dummies for different obligor domiciles, Perraudin and Taylor find that, allowing for rating, 
liquidity, seniority and some tax effects, spreads do appear to be affected by the domicile of the 
borrower. The effects are small, however. Bonds issued by AA-rated Japanese and European 
obligors are priced at a 10 basis point discount and a4 basis point premium respectively 
compared with those of AA rated US obligors. AAA-rated European bonds are priced at a4 
basis point premium compared with US AAA's while Japanese AAA-rated bonds are rated at a4 
basis point discount 9. 
43. The specification of the term structure of credit spreads 
Economists have paid a great deal of attention to the term structure of interest rates. However, 
relatively little is known about the term structure of credit risk, defined here as the behaviour of 
credit spreads as maturity varies. In other terms, the risk structure of interest rates may be defined 
as the interest rate differentials that exist between securities that are identical in all relevant aspects 
except for the likelihood of default on the payment of interest or principal. The risk structure of 
interest rates is thus directly analogous to the term structure of interest rates, in which term to 
maturity is the differentiating characteristic. The key difference between term and risk structure 
works is related to their distinguishing characteristics. While the term to maturity is explicit and 
well defined, the risk of default is not directly and objectively measurable. 
An important question for banks and regulators assigning capital to credit exposures is 
whether there is a significant maturity structure to credit risk and in particular whether shorter- 
matuuity exposures hould carry less capital than longer-maturity exposures. The current Basle 
Accord has a maturity dimension for interbank exposures but not for other types of exposure. If 
the horizon over which one wishes to evaluate risk coincides with the maturity of the debt then a 
reasonable measure of risk is the credit spread times the maturity of the exposure in question. The 
fact that the spread is multiplied by maturity means long maturity exposures are likely to be riskier 
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than short maturity. If the spreads themselves are on average upward (or downward) sloping in 
maturity, this would accentuate further (or mitigate) the effects of maturity. 
4.3.1. Term stnnru of tnterest rates for default fwlvndc 
The available theory and empiricism pertaining to the shapes of the basic yield term structure, 
have provided three main explanations: liquidity, expectations and institutional influences. 
According to the liquidity preference theory, long-term bond prices fluctuate over wider ranges 
than their short-term counterparts in response to changes in the level of basic interest rates. 
Investors that are afraid of having losses of principal value and are subject to the danger of forced 
sales, will sacrifice yield to obtain liquidity offered by the short-term bonds. Short-term bond 
yields have shown to be more volatile, so that if investors desire stability of income and are not 
subject to a forced sale risk, they will have a preference for long-term bonds. Ultirnately, if the 
relative importance of investors seeking liquidity is greater than investors seeking stability of 
income, the term structure will result to be upward-sloping. 
According to the expectation hypothesis, cunmt long-termyields can be derived from a series 
of expected future short-term yields; so that if short-term yields are expected to increase in the 
future, current long-term yields will be greater than current short-term yields and the result w1l be 
an upward-sloping term structure. 
More often the expectation hypothesis and the liquidity argument are combined together to 
explain the term structure. As a result, the term structure wi11 slope upwards steeply when interest 
rates are expected to rise in the future, amplifying the desire and need for liquidity of investors and 
speculators, who will avoid long-term bonds. The opposite will occur when there are strong 
expectations that interest rates will fall in the future. In absence of strong expectations about the 
direction of interest rates movements, the shape of term structure would be determined by the 
net importance of investors requiring liquidity ww those needing income stability. 
Finally, the monetary authority could determine, by itself the term structure through money 
and debt management operations that alter the outstanding supply and demand for bonds at each 
term to maturity (institutional influences hypothesis). Commercial banks also can influence the 
term structure by liquidating or buying short-term government bonds in response to changes in 
demand for bank loans. Depending on whether the business improves or declines bankers will 
sell or buy short-term bonds in order to meet the strong or weak loan demand respectively. 
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Hence the term structure would slope upwards or downwards if we are in the unfavourable or 
favourable phase of the business cycle. 
These theories are groundwork to go beyond and analyse the influence of term to maturity 
upon yields and performances of bonds not free of risk of default. Term to maturity has a 
potential influence upon financial risk of bonds and upon the probability of default. 
4.3.2. The term styzrc m of interest rates for risky bonds 
From a theoretical perspective, the credit spread should increase in line with increasing default 
risk and maturity, that is financial risk premix should be greater for bonds of longer terms to 
maturity. According to this view, the more distant the maturity, the greater the range of 
unforeseen difficulties that the obligor may face. Robinson (1960) and Hayes (1956) suggested 
that this time-function financial or credit risk should be greater for the intermediate quality than 
for high quality bonds. 
In practice, the observed behaviour of credit spreads how that credit spreads increase with 
maturity only for higher credit quality bonds, while they decrease for lower credit quality bonds. 
Hence the nearness of maturity does not insure repayment of the principal (Graham, Dodd and 
Cottle, 1962). Harold (1938) disputes the time-function risk argument by claiming that although 
short maturities are an element of strenght in good times, they become an element of weakness in 
crisis periods. No explanation is offered as to why, but most probably we think he is referring to 
potential difficulties in refinancing during tunes where earnings are low, interest rates are high and 
credit is simply not available. Risk premia are thus expected to be greater for shorter-term bonds. 
The behaviour of credit spreads reflects the impact of the crisis at maturity 
-predicated on the 
risk generated by the liquidity pressures created by the need to refinance near-terra maturing debt 
which is often confronted by lower credit quality and highly leveraged fines- and the pattern of 
marginal default risk for lower credit quality firms. While higher in absolute terms, the marginal 
default risk for lower rated fines decreases with maturity 
. 
In contrast, the marginal default risk of 
higher rated fines increases with maturity. The pattern of marginal default risk for lower credit 
quality firms is consistent with the life cycle of ratings outlook, whereby lower rated firms face 
higher short-term risk which is resolved by survival of default and with mean reverting processes 
in ratings outlook, where lower rated issuers improve, middle rated issuers stay the same and 
higher rated firms tend to decline on average. 
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4.3.3. Estnnation mtd measwvnoit of the teen stn, aure of crux spreads 
To identify relative value among corporate bonds, it's necessary to understand the relationship 
between the default risk and the yield spreads over Treasuries. The spread of a corporate bond 
reflects default risk, but as we have seen, the magnitude of the spread for a given corporation 
depends also on the bond's maturity and coupon, its degree of subordination, its call stricture, 
and the expected future volatility of interest rates. Thus, one corporation night have a number of 
bonds outstanding, each with its own spread 
The basic principle is that price of coupon bond is lower than price of a government bond 
because the former reflects default risk, that is the probability that the issuer will default For the 
same expected return to result by holding either bond, the price of the corporate bond, assuming 
a zero recovery rate, must be equal to the price of the government bond times the probability of 
solvency 
Rircf (Drporate Zoo 
= 
Prix Cöuarc or Zem *PAi rbikh'ofýmy (2.3) 
Or equivalently, since the probability of solvency is equal to one minus the probability of default 
P ixcf C. ar[ -ate Zoo = AixofG tt Zero (1- Th uUl cf iudt) (2.4) 
Solving for the probability of default, we obtain: 
PrýgWauk 
=1- (1'nceýCc» rats Zeivý/(1' ýGaar t7. eroý (2.5) 
Applying this procedure to bonds maturing in different years, we can determine the conditional 
probability of default in each year, given that the corporation doesn't default in the previous year. 
We refer to this probability as tL fon=d pity of defer 
Given the assumption that the expected return from holding a government zero for two years 
must equal the return from holding a corporate zero for two years times the probability of 
solvency, the forward probability of default can be calculated Repeating this procedure for the 
following years, we derive a term structure of credit spreads for zero coupon corporates for a 
given corporate issuer. 
In practice, the difficulty of applying this technique is that there are no issuers that offer a 
sufficiently wide range of corporate coupon securities to construct a zero-coupon spread curve. 
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The model developed in litterman and then (L. I, 1991) is able to measure the effective spread 
curve implied in the price of each bond, isolating the impact of credit risk, and facilitating the 
analysis of the sources of value in corporate bonds. 
The procedure used by LI is to construct a generic-zero spread curve by credit rating and 
industry using actual trading data. The first step is to estimate the term structure of Treasury 
interest rates from the prices of non-callable Treasury coupon bonds. Assuming there is a 
common shape of the spread curves of corporations with similar credit quality and within a given 
industry, for a particular industry we will have a vx par spread aaz derived from trader quotes 
for spreads of par coupon newly issued non-callable corporates of the specified industry and 
rating, with maturities corresponding to those of the current Treasury issues. From the generic 
par spread curve zero curve spreads are inferred. 
The generic zero and par spread curves provide a natural index of credit quality through which 
we can compare the default risks of corporate bonds. In order to summarise the size of the credit 
spread through one number and to facilitate this comparison we search for each bond along 
curves interpolated between the generic zero curves for the appropriate industry, until we find the 
unique zero spread curve, dx 45 e zero spread aacA that prices the bond with no error. We then 
generate the par coupon curve associated with it The height of the par coupon curve over 
Treasuries at the maturities of the two Treasury benchmarks 
-whose durations bracket the 
duration of the bond- constitute the effective par spreads. The epr sprard as e will be given 
by the set of different effective par spreads function of maturity. 
The result is an upward-sloping term structure of credit spread 
-credit spread increases with 
maturity- and the lower the credit rating, the steeper the curve. One implication of this term 
structure is that it is inappropriate to discount the cash flows from a corporate bond at a constant 
spread to the Treasury spot rate curve. The shorter-term cash flows will be undervalued, and the 
long-term cash flows will be overvalued. 
4.3.4. Evidmce of mdep ice lktvan default risk dii fe wtial and bond's nzounty 
Biermai and Hass (1975) present the first systematic treatment of the importance of default 
probabilities in determining risk differentials. They attempt to reinforce and extend Fisher (1959) 
by specifying the process and variables that determine the risk differential assigned by the market 
to the debt of a given firm with a given capital structure. 
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Bierman and Hass first look from the investor point of view and define tlxaa&aizd rate as the 
interest rate needed in order for the risky bond to have the same expected present value as a 
default free bond. The investor-required contractual interest rate decreases as the probability of 
survival increases. From the perspective of the fine issuing the debt, for a given level of 
outstanding debt, the probability of survival is inversely related to the contractual interest rate paid 
on the debt. The intersection of the two functions gives the minimum interest rate required by the 
market for a given amount of debt. Subtracting the risk-free interest rate from this amount we 
obtain the default risk differential 
The risk differential is invariant with the life of the bond when investors maximise expected 
net monetary value and the probability of survival is a constant over time. The explanation is 
grounded on the consideration that the risk differential does not change as maturity changes since 
the change in the expected present value of the principal repayment is exactly offset by the change 
in the expected present value of the interest payments. On the other hand, when the probability 
of survival changes over time and, in particular, when it is revised upward, the risk differential 
decreases as maturity increases. 
The drawback of this method is that investors may use more complex decision c iteria than 
the simple expected net present value. In addition factors that affect the likelihood and size of 
debt obligation payments cannot be summarised into well 
-behaved probability series. Factors as 
risk aversion and portfolio effects must be considered in the modelling of the investor behaviour. 
Furthermore, the characterisation of the survival process and how it changes over time must be 
enlarged upon in order to better ascertain the cost and the limit of debt fora firm. 
Yawits (1977) extends the analytical model presented by Bierman and Hass (1975) and 
demonstrates that their conclusion that risk differentials are independent of maturity for par 
bonds actually holds for premium and discount bonds also. Yawits starts from the definition of 
the value of a bond as the summation of values of a series of discount instruments, each of which 
caries a claim on a single payment in the future. The bond's risk differential is simply the 
weighted average of the risk differential on each of the discount instruments, where the weights 
are determined by each instrument's portion of the bond's value. Showing that the risk 
differentials are equal for every discount instrument composing the bond, he can conclude that 
the bond's risk differential will have this same value. The second step is to broaden the Bierman- 
Hass model to include the effect of a second parameter 
-in addition to the default probability-, 
the terms of settlement in the event of default. The main result is that the addition of this new 
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factor doesn't alter the independence between a bond's risk differential and its matu ity. For a 
multi-period extension of Biertran and Hass (1975) see Jonkhart (1979). 
4.3.5. Financial risks and the shape of the te»n stnxwm 
Johnson (1967) studies the influence of term to maturity upon losses on corporate bonds. 
Losses can be a result of two types of financial risk: they can be due to a default event, or they can 
be losses of market value due to apparently increased danger that the bond will default According 
to Johnson, term structures may be determined not only by time-function credit risk, but also by 
a) financial illiquidity as a positive function of term to maturity. Prices of longer-term bonds 
may fluctuate more than shorter-term counterparts (of the same quality) in response to identical 
changes in absolute abilities of obligors to pay. 
b) expectations about directional movements in premia for financial risk. Movements in 
financial risk premia influence term structures of corporate bond yields, if they are expected to fall 
(optimistic market) there may be a tendency for financial risk premia to be smaller the longer the 
term to maturity. 
In order to test for the different hypotheses, data are collected from the Corporate Bond 
Project of the National Bureau of Economic Research covering the period 1900-1944. 
(Mus at rntiaity. Bonds maturing during the test holding period experience greater default 
frequencies than bonds of the same quality which do not come to maturity. Crisis at maturity is 
important for bonds of the lowest qualities during both optimistic and pessimistic market 
conditions. In periods of strong business, crisis at maturity exists only for the lowest qualities 
bonds; in periods of market pessimism, it becomes relevant for bonds of successively higher 
quality ratings. 
& 
,d 4&i mpa&n, r= In order to capture default frequencies, losses on interest payments and the 
proceeds received after default, and average annual losses on control groups of bonds are 
computed. A strong positive relationship between loss rates and term to maturity are observed 
only for the three best qualities, while no consistent relationship exists for the lowest qualities 
bonds. Hence the positive time-function credit risk argument found in the literature is applicable 
only to the high quality bonds. Term to maturity allowed time for degeneration of quality and for 
improvement in quality. 
F&wxial il 
. 
To test whether financial iiliquidity might be a function of term to maturity, 
average performances of bonds purchased, held and liquidated over various periods are 
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computed The potential losses as a result of changes in basic interest rates and changes in abilities 
of obligors to pay are calculated for each quality group and each term to maturity group. 
The general result is that average potential loss rates 
-as the net result of declining basic yield 
components and increasing financial risk premium components of total yields- are greater the 
longer the term to maturity. The strong implication is that financial illiquidity is a positive function 
of term to maturity. Hence, in a liquidity preference market, an upward-sloping term structure 
would be the result of financial illiquidity and interest rate illiquidity for corporate bonds. This 
result adds substance to the theory that optimistic or pessimistic expectations will influence term 
structures of corporate bond yields. 
In fact, the final shape of the term structure will be the result of the various combinations of 
these risk phenomena, and in particular we can have one of the following 
" 
Ibeu=vd-&&#g f UsfV&yddamen. The crisis at maturity-which is correlated with rating 
quality and economic conditions- combined with an optimistic or pessimistic expectations 
function, gives as a result a negative and an U-shape, respectively, function of financial risk 
premia against term to maturity. 
" 
Upuwd-slopnzg yddd aaw In the absence of crisis at maturity, maturity values become certain 
and pricing decisions are based upon expectations of receiving face values at maturity. In a 
liquidity preference market, an upward-sloping curve is the manifestation of a pessimistic 
expectations function and a financial fliquidity function increasing with term to maturity. 
" 
Hll-slid yidd arm This type of curve occurs occasionally for lower qualities bonds and is 
the result of the summation of an optimistic expectation function (downward-sloping) and an 
increasing liquidity preference function (upward sloping. 
" 
hwmd. S slxr yedd am This type of curve occurs between upward-sloping and U-shaped 
curves. Bonds of this transitional quality are considered to have either little trouble refinancing 
at maturity so that at the very short maturities. 
Johnson (1967) is the first to assemble and interpret data on the structure of bond yields 
classified by a measure of risk status. His interpretation should be regarded as exploratory, and its 
limit lies on the lack of consideration of approaches to interest rate theory alternative to the 
expectation one. In particular, more explanatory role could have been given to variations in the 
structure of supply of securities and general dynamic theories. 
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4.3.6. The atiiit yield arne vrd the leuv-age factor 
Merton (1974) represents the first systematic theory of the risk structure of interest rates, 
defined as "the possible gains or losses to bond holders as a result of (unanticipated) changes in 
the probability of default" (Merton, 1974, p. 449). Along the line of Black and Scholes (1973) he 
derives a pricing theory to value a zero-coupon corporate bond with a face value of B, a term to 
maturity T, issued by a firm with value V. The price of the bond can be expressed as a function 
of Tand ci, the "quasi-debt ratio" of the fine (Be "/V), and also as a premium over the risk-free 
rate. In this way Merton shows that the premium increases with leverage (d) and the volatility of 
the firm's earnings, but can either increase or decrease with maturity depending on the risk of the 
firm 
The commonly used measure of the risk premium on debt, H, is given by the yield to maturity 
(R) in excess of the riskless rate (r). (R 
- 
r) is a valid measure of the riskiness of the bond under the 
necessary condition for the premium to move in the same direction as the standard deviation of 
the returns on the bond does to changes in the underlying variables: leverage, maturity and fine's 
returns standard deviation. 
Note that the risk premium and the earnings standard deviation change in the same direction 
in response to a change in the "quasi-debt" to firm value ratio, in the business risk of the firms or 
in the risidess rate of interest. However, they need not change in the same direction with a change 
in maturity. For values of d greater than or equal to one, the premium over the risk-free rate 
decreases with maturity. For lower values of d, the credit yield curve is either strictly upward 
sloping or hump-shaped (see Figure 4.2). Hence, the term premium on bonds of the same 
maturity is a valid comparison of the riskiness of such bonds, but we cannot conclude that a 
higher term premium on bonds of different maturities implies a higher standard deviation. 
R-r R-r R-r 
d a2 
Figure 4.2 Merton (1974)'s implications 
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The intuition behind these results is that the value of the bond depends on the probability of 
default, which varies with the value of the firm. The highest quality bonds face a probability of 
default that is very small at issuance and a possibility of substantial downward movement in credit 
quality is quite high after some time. Thus the credit yield curve is upward-sloping for high-grade 
firms. Speculative-grade bonds, however, are very risky at issuance, but the longer the maturity, 
the more time the bonds have to improve and the value of the firm to rise. The credit yield curve 
will be strictly downward sloping if the bond at issuance cannot go but up over time; for firms a 
bit less risky, the yield curve will be hump-shaped because in the short term the potential to 
deteriorate dominates, but in the longer term it's offset by the upside potential 
The limit of the Merton's approach is that default occurs only at maturity, when the default 
event is defined by the condition that the firm value falls short of the promised payment and 
occurs if and only if this condition is met. 
Lee (1981) disputes Merton's results, claiming that an increasing function of the term premium 
with respect to leverage is not consistent with the downward and hump-shaped yield curves for 
low-rated bonds. The explanation is that if the risk premium is a monotonically increasing 
function of the leverage ratio, for any given maturity, a discount bond with a higher leverage ratio 
pays a higher risk premium. Hence the hump-shaped curve should be no higher than the 
downward sloping curve. 
The term structure curves in terms of the leverage ratio have a different shape depending on 
the vale of the parameter d. The term structure curve with a unitary leverage ratio marks the 
borderline of two distinctive cases. When the maturity approaches to zero, those risk premix with 
d>1 approach infinity; those with d<1 approach zero. When the maturity approaches infinity, 
the whole family of curves approaches zero. For a leverage ratio close to zero, the term structure 
curve would asymptotically approach the horizontal axis. 
Despite Lee (1981) eliminates a source of confusion present in Merton's model, his re- 
examination is still partially incorrect, and his graphic representation of the risk premium, H, is not 
correctly depicted for small values of time to maturity. Pitts and Selby (1983) prove 
mathematically two properties of the risk premium which settle the disparities and give the final 
graph of H as a function of time: a) when d=1, H tends to infinity as time to maturity 
approaches zero; b) when d is between zero and one, and time to maturity tends to zero, the 
partial differentiation of H with respect o time to maturity is zero. 
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Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (KRS, 1995) examine an expanded model for the valuation 
of corporate debt. In their model, the issuing firm pays a dividend, the holders of the bond 
receive a continuous stream of "coupon" payments, default is possible prior to the maturity of the 
bond, and the return on the firm's assets is correlated with the stochastically varying instantaneous 
risk-free rate of return. Using numerical analysis, KRS find that the capital structure has a 
significant effect on the shape of the term structure of credit spreads only in the case of non- 
callable bonds. In particular, they obtain that the term structure of total yield spreads on a callable 
corporate bond is hump-shaped regardless of the debt ratio values, although the level of yield 
spreads is high when the debt ratio is high. This result is in contrast to the results for non-callable 
bonds. For firms with a low debt ratio, the yield spread increases with maturity. In this case, long- 
term bonds are riskier than short-term bonds because more coupons are subject to default risk 
With a high debt ratio, the spreads increase in the first place and then decrease as time to maturity 
increase. As a consequence, short-term corporate bonds are priced to provide a higher yield than 
long-term bonds. This results in a humped risk structure of interest rates. The levels of credit 
spreads, however, decline significantly with reduced debt ratios across all maturities. Ths suggests 
that the relation between time to maturity and risk premia is not confined to the simple world 
modelled by Merton (1974) and Lee (1981). 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) present a model for coupon bonds in which firm value is 
correlated with the risk-free rate. According to their model, the credit yield curve may be upward- 
sloping or hump-shaped, but not strictly declining. The peak spread for the hump-shaped curve 
occurs at the third year, however, so that most of the credit yield curve facing very risky issuers is 
negatively sloped. Given the appropriate parameter values, this model could also generate a 
downward-sloping curve for speculative-grade fines. Wei and Guo (1997) apply the LS model to 
Eurodollar spreads in 1992 and show that the credit term structure is mostly downward sloping 
for the values of credit risk observed in their data 
From the comparison between LS (1995) and Merton (1974) it emerges that although the LS 
model is less general in terms of default probability, as it permits default only at the maturity date 
the Merton model is more general in terms of the recovery rate. When the time to maturity goes 
to infinity, numerical calculations in LS (1995) show that the credit spread converges to zero, 
while in Merton (1974), it converges to a constant. As a result, for a solvent firm, which is the 
most common case in practice, the LS model can generate a hump-shaped credit structure that 
starts from zero and eventually converges to zero. Finally, both models are restrictive because of 
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the predictability of the arrival times of default, which implies that the credit structure has to start 
from zero. 
7 onpi id fxdiigý Sang and Wa7ga (1989) 
Previous empirical studies had focused on the difference between yields on coupon-paying 
corporate bonds and yields on coupon-paying overnment bonds of the same maturity Problems 
coming from using these data are related to the feature that most corporate bonds promise more 
than a single payment. As a consequence, it's not possible to estimate the default-risk premium 
for a single future date, because the price of a coupon-paying bond is the sum of the values of all 
of its cash flows components. In addition most of these bonds have sinking fund provisions and 
some are callable, which make their price depend on all these characteristics. It would therefore be 
impossible empirically to isolate the effect of default risk alone on the yields of these bonds. 
Considering these difficulties, Sang and Warga (SW, 1989) investigate the risk structure of 
interest rates using par dthunt Iznk The prices of pure-discount corporate bonds of various 
rating and maturities are analysed and their yields are compared to the yields of similar maturity 
pure-discount government bonds. The data set is obtained from Shearson Lehman Brothers for 
the period February 1985-September 1987. The set contains 137 corporate zero issues of 42 
companies rated AAA to C, and 119 strips of US government bonds. The yield spreads for each 
rating group are averaged to produce the risk structure. These data allow us to compare observed 
default risk premia to the theoretical premia suggested by Merton (1974), Lee (1981) and Pitts and 
Selby (1983). 
Each month, SW subtract the yield of a zero-coupon government from the yield of each zero- 
coupon corporate bond with identical maturity. These yield differences are then averaged across 
bonds in a given month and then across time to produce the following results. Staking is the close 
resemblance to the theoretical plot obtained by Merton (1974) and the other contingent claims 
models that followed The estimated term structures of the risk premia is upward sloping for high 
rating pure discount bonds, humped for medium rating bonds, and strictly downward-sloping for 
low rating bonds. However, the small number of observations doesn't allow an extensive and 
more formal study of default premia, and cannot sufficiently prove that the risk structure is 
upward sloping for investment grade and downward sloping for speculative bonds. Nevertheless, 
it is encouraging to see the theoretical model and the empirical results match up. 
Merton's results are based on the assumption that each firm has only one type of debt 
outstanding, the pure discount bonds. In order to see the shape of the risk premia for firms that 
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have a series of pure discount bonds outstanding, Sarig and Waiga look also at two firms in their 
sample who have issued large series of pure discount bonds. The result shows that the high rating 
firm's risk premix profile is relatively flat, while the low rating counterpart is downward sloping. 
This can be considered as an empirical demonstration that Merton's results hold even when more 
than a single bond is outstanding. I'bis is also a reaffirmation of the similarity between the profiles 
obtained byMetton (1974) and by Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresen (1987). 
4.3.7 Interaction bew= interest rate risk and default risk 
The empirical literature has presented evidence that the time evolution of both corporate 
default spreads and interest rates are related to business conditions, thus suggesting that default 
risk and interest rate risk are correlated On this line, Nielsen et al. (1993) develop a model for the 
term structure of default spreads taking into account default risk, interest risk and the interaction 
between the two. 
The interrelation between default risk and interest rate risk arises from two sources. First, the 
uncertainty of the value of the firm's assets and the default boundary are both correlated with the 
interest rate uncertainty. Second, the rate of growth of the default boundary and the rate of return 
on the firm's asset depend on the level of risk-less interest rates. Both sources of correlation are 
shown to affect he term structure of default spreads. 
The model for determining the default premium is developed for non-callable corporate zero- 
coupon bonds. The model assumes that trading occurs continuously in perfect and fiictionless 
financial markets with no taxes, transaction costs or informational asymmetries. The results show 
that an increase in the payoff in case of default leads to an important decrease in the risk spread 
for all maturities. Second, the term structure of risk spreads is highly sensitive to changes in the 
volatility of the assets of the firm (a small increase in the volatility increases substantially the 
spread). Third, the solvency of the firm powerfully determines the height and the slope of the 
term structure of default spreads. When the firm is solvent at the time the bond is priced, the 
spread on very short-term bonds is always dose to zero. When the time to maturity is short but 
greater than zero, the probability of default is very high for firms with a low leverage ratio, since 
negative shocks on the value of its assets can easily lead to default before the maturity of the 
bond For longer maturities this effect becomes less important since the probability of default in 
some years decreases through time due to the positive drift in the value of the firm. Fourth, the 
more negative is the correlation between the interest rate risk and the default risk, the smaller the 
spreads are, which is explained by the fact that the risk of default becomes easier to diversify. 
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Finally, the model produces a variety of shapes for the term structure of the probability of default 
it can be increasing, decreasing or humped, and so can be the shape of the present value of the 
expected writedown through time. 
4.3.8. The rexmy rate and t/ te»n stniaure of ch it spreds 
Fons (1994) provides a simple numerical model of bond pricing in which the value of the 
bond depends on the probability of default each period and the recovery rate if default occurs. 
Based on Moody's default data by rating over the period 1970-1993, Fons (1994) tests for the 
shape of risk structure of various rating groups. 
Marginal and cumulative8 default rates from 1 to 20 years for broad rating categories were 
estimated The cumulative default rates show a dear pattern of increasing risk as rating quality 
declines over any time horizon. In general for investment-grade marginal default rates they 
observe a rising trend as the time horizon lengthens, while the trend is declining for speculative- 
grade marginal default rates. This pattern of marginal default rates by risking category indicates an 
underlying mean reversion in the company credit outlook Over the long term, then, surviving 
low-rated issuers tend to rise to the middle ratings, middle-rated firms tend to stay middle-rated, 
and top-rated firms tend to slip to the middle ratings. 
Within the framework of a risk-neutral bond pricing model9, and using historical default and 
recovery rates, theoretical credit spreads are modelled. A steady upward trend with respect to 
maturity is observed for risk-neutral spreads of investment-grade bonds. At the Ba rating level, 
however, credit spreads rise through the fifth year but then slowly taper off At the single B rating, 
spreads fall from year 1. Despite the theoretical spread behaviour and the corresponding marginal 
default rates show similar pattern, it's surprising to find that spreads might actually narrow as 
maturity increases 
-especially for the lowest rating categories. 
Finally, risk-neutral credit spreads are quite sensitive to the recovery rate estimate. They 
increase as the recovery rate lowers, and they narrow as the recovery rate increases. In contrast, 
the model is much less sensitive to changes in the level of the risk-free yield. 
Yield spreads calculated using market data show patterns consistent with the modelled 
behaviour. No dear trend emerges in the plot of Aaa spreads. Bonds rated Aa and A, however, 
7 The marginal default rate 4 Q) is the average issuer-wdghred efault rate for R-rated issuers in their t-th year. 
8 The cumulative default rate Dt (Z) is the probability that a bond rated R w1 default byyear t. 
9 The following assumption are introduced to use the default data to compute ayield spread over a comparable-matura y: a)
bonds are priced at par, b) investors hold bonds until maturity or defaut5 c) investors are risk-neomal; d) capital madras are 
arbitrage fire. 
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exhibit a significant positive relation between spread and maturity. Bonds rated Baa also show a 
positive relationship, although not as strong as that for bonds rated A. Consistent with the 
modelled behaviour, credit spreads for bonds rated Ba decline only slightly as maturity increases. 
Furthermore, a negative spread-maturity relationship was found for B-rated bonds. 
Eventual discrepancies between the model estimates and market credit spreads are explained 
in teens of: 
1) liquidity factor. Investors in less liquid issues may require a premium as compensation for 
liquidity risk. 
2) Risk-neutral behaviour. Although individuals may exhibit risk-neutral behaviour with small 
portions of their wealth, they are likely to be risk-averse when large sums are concerned, 
requiring a higher premium 
3) Tax considerations. Individual investors are often willing to accept a lower yield on securities 
exempt from income taxes. 
4) Residual call provision effects and risk for which investors will demand compensation in the 
form of a higher yield. 
El Jahel (1998) sets up a model of default where credit spreads depend on the level of the 
discount bond price and indiictly on the level of interest rates. This result is supported by Duffee 
(1997) and Das and Tufano (1995), and credit spreads generated within this framework are 
consistent with the empirical findings of Sang and Waiga (1989), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
Kim et al. (1993), and Nielsen et aL (1993). 
The bond price, the credit spreads, and the term stricture of credit spreads all depend on the 
percentage r covery rate. The may rate, in turn, usually depends upon the existence of an equity 
committee, the strenght of ties between managers and shareholders, the outcome of the 
bargaining process between bondholders and the issuers of the debt and is also particular to each 
bond issue and class of security in the film's capital structure. 
Estimates of the recovery rates are derived from historical data on default recovery rate values. 
As the recovery rate increases, the bond price increases, the credit spreads decrease, and the risk 
term structure can take on different shapes. High and medium quality firms have an upward 
sloping credit spreads term structure. Lower quality finns, have humped-shaped or downward- 
sloping term structure. Also this result is consistent with the general empirical findings. 
Changes in the zddity ftv asps of the firm process are found to have a relevant impact on 
the teml structure of credit spreads. A small increase in the volatility from 15 to 30 per cent 
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increases the spread for a four years maturity bond from 150 to nearly 300 basis points. Changes 
in the volatility parameter and in the hazard rate process parameters seem to widen the spreads 
for medium and long term maturity bonds. 
Modelling the term structure of credit risk spreads as a Markov model, Jarrow, Lando and 
Tumbull (1997) can give an explicit representation for the credit risk spreads in teens of the 
recovery rate and the transition matrix for credit classes. Assuming risk neutrality and a zero 
recovery rate, credit spreads are plotted against maturity and for some parameter values, credit 
yield curves are similar to those in Merton (1974). Most investment-grade bonds have upward- 
sloping risk term structures, while B-rated and most BB bonds face downward-sloping credit yield 
curves, and QOGrated firms curves are strictly downward-sloping. 
4.3.9. The rnzpzct of different parxndv cations of the emit of default 
Melia-Barrat and Tychon (1996) illustrate how differences in the parameterisation f the event 
of default 
- 
the total value of the firm's assets or the fine's operating earnings as the economic 
fundamental, default triggers or the total value of the fine in default 
- 
affect not only the valuation 
of bonds, but also the implied term structure of credit spreads. Adjusting the expected bankruptcy 
scenario to the specificity of the firm and its economic context is therefore of crucial importance. 
Assuming that the whole firm is financed with a single debt contract, Mella-Barral and Tydwn 
illustrate the impact of a particular choice of i) underlying economic fundamental, and ii) default 
trigger rule, on the value of debt, and on the term structure of credit spreads. In case i) the 
economic fundamental is the total value of the firm's assets and the debt is protected. In case ii) 
the economic fundamental is the firm's operating earnings and the bankruptcy is triggered by a 
strict liquidity constraint. 
The term structure corresponding to the second set of assumptions is much more hump- 
shaped. The spreads increase until an intermediate maturity of either 8 or 4 years and then 
decrease as the maturity increases. This is the result of a trade-off between the exposure to credit 
risk and the expected present value of the coupon payoff stream, which both increase with 
maturity. 
The fact that the first set of assumptions generates much smaller credit spreads is explained 
observing that when the total value of the firm's assets is the economic fundamental, the chances 
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that the process hits a barrier from above are lower than when the dynamics are driven by the 
operating earnings. 
A sensitivity analysis of the term structure of credit spreads with respect to a 10% upwards or 
downwards movement in i) initial face value of the debt contract, ii) volatility, iii) interest rate, and 
iv) bankmptcy costs, is carried out. A rise in face value, volatility, and bankruptcy costs increases 
credit spreads. Changes in the safe interest rate do not affect much the magnitude of credit 
spreads for short-term contracts. Credit spreads are only marginally increasing in the risk-less rate 
for long maturities. 
4.3.10. Altematixmcdds forthe term stru=mofdefault risk 
Cumby and Evans (CE, 1997) examine alternative methods for making inferences about the 
value and dynamics of credit quality from market prices. In doing so they ask if the time series 
behaviour of the prices of risky debt is consistent with five models of the time series behaviour of 
credit risk. 
Models of the term stricture of default risk are applied to a sample of risky Brady bonds 
issued by the governments of Mexico, Venezuela and Costa Rica in 1990. These bonds are 
considered an ideal vehicle with which to examine the dynamics of credit quality. They are risky, 
and judging from the large fluctuations in their prices, they have experienced large movements in 
their perceived credit risk. Moreover, the market for Brady bonds is large and highly liquid 
In the first model, the probability of a borrower defaulting at any future time is assumed to be 
constant (geometric term structure of credit risk). The term structure of credit risk is monotonic 
and approaches one as the time horizon increases. Although this assumption results in attractive 
simplifications, it implies that current and anticipated future credit quality are identical. 
In the other models 
-that we indicate as Model II, III, IV, and, V, respectively- 
creditworthiness is treated as an unobservable variable that follows a specified stochastic process. 
Model II assumes that credit quality follows a continuous-time diffusion process. Although this 
provides scope for anticipated changes in credit quality, the long run behaviour of default risk is 
constrained to be either one or zero. With model III, IV and V CE move to discrete time and 
allow respectively for a random walk with drift, a mean-reverting stationary autoregressive 
process, and a random walk with drift and stationary higher-frequency dynamics ARIMA(1,1,1). 
This last process has the advantage of imposing fewer restrictions on the dynamics of credit 
quality and can therefore produce a wider range of term structures of credit risk. 
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Specification tests are applied to the first model in order to see whether the estimated 
probabilities evolve randomly as the model assumes. Model I is found to be dynamically 
inconsistent in that changes in the default probabilities are predictable. The runs test confirms this 
result too few runs are found to be consistent with randomness. The data are also inconsistent 
with model W. The models allowing for non stationary dynamics, and in particular Model V 
provides a better fit for the bonds in the sample. 
Maximum likelihood estimates, diagnostic tests for serial correlation in the levels and the 
squared innovations show that model V has the best overall fit. The differences in the models can 
yield significant divergences in the term structures of credit quality that they imply. As expected, 
the term structure computed from the constant conditional probability model shows a gradually 
declining survival probability. The ARIMA model yields a greater variety of term structure shapes 
than any other model. Note that the differences in the term structures can in turn lead to 
substantial differences in the valuation of new debt instruments. 
4.3.11. Implications of bnpeifrt accounting data 
Duffie and Lando (1998) provide a simple model of the implications of imperfect accounting 
data for the term structure of credit spreads on corporate bonds. The model of Leland (1994) is 
extended assuming that outside investors cannot observe the issuer's assets directly, and receive 
instead only periodic and imperfect accounting reports. For a setting in which the assets of the 
issuer are a diffusion process satisfying technical conditions, a formula for the hazard rate process 
for default is provided in term of the conditional distribution of the assets of the issuer, 
conditional on accounting data and on survivorship. 
A numerical illustration is implemented and the theoretical shape of the term structure of 
credit spreads is compared for fines of various credit qualities and various levels of precision of 
accounting data. It emerges that in the presence of perfect accounting data credit spreads go to 
zero as maturity goes to zero, regardless of the level of assets. For lower-credit quality firms, credit 
spreads would widen sharply with maturity, and then typically decline. With imperfect accounting 
data, however, the model implies that credit spreads remain bounded away from zero as maturity 
goes to zero. 
Moreover the term structure is plotted for various lagged accounting reports; with perfect 
accounting information, the previous accounting report would have no impact, given the current 
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report. Hence the shape of term structure of credit spreads may provide some indication of the 
quality of accounting information assumed by investors. 
So far we have seen that academics and market practitioners tend to agree that the risk 
structure is upward-sloping for high quality credits. As far as the slope of the curve for high yield 
issuers is concerned, practitioners usually do not agree it is negative. From this perspective 
Helwege and Turner (1998)'s investigation provides some empirical support for the practitioners' 
view: contrary to many bond pricing models' predictions, the credit yield curve for most 
speculative-grade fines appears upward-sloping. 
4.3.12. An u =d sloping chit yield ao for spaulath gnzde fines 
Helwege and Turner (1998) criticise the empirical studies done so far because of sample 
selection bias associated with maturity choice and due to the lack of control for credit quality. 
Credit ratings wouldn't reflect fully the differences in credit quality across firms that belong to the 
same rating category and this is particularly true for the high-yield universe. "This statistical error 
in ratings can lead to a sample selection bias in the estimated slope of the credit yield curve 
because of the endogeneity of bond maturity" (Helwege and Turner, 1998: 5). The more 
creditworthy firms in a given rating category are most likely to issue long-term bonds. This causes 
the average yield spread to decline with maturity, even though for an individual firm the spread 
typically might increase with maturity. 
Helwege and Turner correct for this bias by looking at pairs of BB- and B-rated bonds issued 
by the same company at the same moment, having the same seniority but having different 
maturities. Differences in credit spread (computed using the primary market offerings) are 
therefore only due to maturity (and also potentially different call features). The database is 
composed by all non-investment-grade bond offerings listed in the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) from 1977 to 1994. The sample is restricted to straight public bonds sold in the US on the 
same day as other bonds of the same company (multiple bond offerings). In a large majority of 
cases, these comparisons point towards upward sloping credit spread curves and noncallable 
bonds provide the most reliable information in the sample and these also point to an upward- 
sloping credit curve. 
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The shape of the credit curve is tested further by applying t-tests and rank tests. The two-tailed 
t-test tests whether the average change in the spread is significantly different from zero; the signed 
rank test is non parametric and tests whether the spread rises or falls as maturity lenghtens, giving 
higher weights to observations with large differences in spreads. Both t-test and the rank test 
indicate that the credit curve facing high-yield issuers is positively sloped 
To check whether the difference between their results and those of previous studies is due to 
the method of analysis, Helwege and Turner estimate the regressions of spreads on maturity 
without holding constant issuer quality. In all but the highest rating class, the coefficients tend to 
be negative, consistently with the findings of Sang and Warga (1989) and Fons (1994) that are 
based on secondary markets prices. 
The analysis is extended to secondary bond price data from Lehman Brothers Fixed Income 
Database. The results are similar to those reported for the SDC data. The majority of the fines 
face yield curves that are strictly or mostly upward sloping. Moreover the cases that are not 
upward-sloping are not necessarily downward sloping or hump-shaped as the theory predicts. 
This does not necessarily imply that the theoretical pricing models are wrong. It may be the 
case that for the bonds in the sample, the probability of an improvement of credit conditions is 
insufficiently high (due to low earnings volatility or a too low a debt-to-equity ratio 
- 
both are 
important factors in the theoretical models). In any case, many other authors also fail to find other 
than positively sloped credit spread curves. Litterman and Then (1991) indicate that in their sample 
the credit spread curve is upward sloping, although they only study BBB or higher rated bonds. 
Ma, Rao and Peterson (1989) report a positive relation between yield spread and duration and 
Duffee (1996) also finds (using investment-grade bonds that for typical firms the term structure 
of yield spreads is upward sloping, with a slope which is positively related to the level of the 
spread. Fons (1994) computes credit spreads using historical default rates and assuming risk- 
neutrality. Although the credit spreads increase with term to maturity for investment-grade bonds, 
the credit spread curve for Ba-rated bonds is slightly humped, whereas the credit spread curve for 
B-rated bonds is negatively sloped. In contrast, Angbazo, Mei and Saunders (1998) find a positive 
relation between term to maturity and credit spreads on loans for highly leveraged transactions. It 
is remarkable that even for these highly risky loans no humped or downward sloping curve is 
found. 
Explanations of the discrepancy between predicted and actual yield curves might be due to: 
1) the parameterisation of the corporate bond pricing models. The downward-sloping credit 
yield curve occurs in the models because the equity-Ike optionality of the bond eventually 
141 
Chapter IV: Literature Review 
dominates the pricing. If the actual corporate bond market includes few bonds with such upside 
potential, the observed yield curve will not be downward-sloping. 
2) the speculative-bonds included in the sample may be not sufficiently risky on average to 
exhibit a downward-sloping curve. 
3) corporate bond pricing models may suffer from inappropriate assumptions about parameter 
values, such as incorporating an excessively high volatility of operating earnings to boost the 
spreads on high-grade bonds. 
4.4. Valuation of risky debt 
The default pricing models seek to combine the loss exposure, recovery rate and default 
probability into a quantification of the credit risk of transaction and the fair value that 
compensates for that risk Models for valuing defaultable bonds can be divided in the following 
groups: proprietary models (sections 4.4.1), structural models (section 4.4.2), intensity based 
models (section 4.4.3), credit-spread based models (section 4.4.5). and rating-based models 
(section 4.4.6). 
4.4.1.71ae propnetarymaids 
Proprietary default prediction models are typically based on the original thesis by Black and 
Scholes (1973) that the equityin a risky firm is equivalent to a call option on the net asset value of 
the firm The net asset value is calculated as the market value of the firm's assets minus the claims 
on the assets which include traditional financial claims such as debt and other claims including 
erosion of asset values which may result upon default. Another way of restating this is to view the 
position of the bond holder as a combination of the long position in the underlying bond plus the 
sale of a put option on the company's assets where the option has a strike price equal to the value 
of the debt- 
On this line Merton (1974) used the option theory to price defaultable bonds. Apart from the 
standard assumptions of continuous time no-arbitrage models (continuous costless trading and 
short-selling, no taxes, perfectly divisible assets, price-taking investors, no borrowing lending 
spread), additional assumptions are: a) constant interest rate; b) the default event occurs at the 
maturity if the value of the firm falls short of the face value of the debt at that time; c) the loss 
142 
Chapter IV. 
- 
Literature Review 
distribution conditional on default is endogenously determined; d) bankruptcy is cost-less; e) the 
debt has a zero coupon; f) films have very simple capital structures with only one type of debt; g) 
f im's assets trade in the secondary market. 
Given these assumptions, the film's liabilities are viewed as contingent claims issued against 
the firm's underlying assets10, with the payoffs to the various debt-holders in bankruptcy 
completely specified in terms of seniority and covenants. Bankruptcy is determined via the 
evolution of the firm's assets in conjunction with the various debt covenants. This model allows 
derivation, calculated from the distribution of asset values, of the default probability that asset 
values will be lower than the value of the claims on the asset. 
All the assumptions of the model are rather crude description of reality. They largely concern 
the nature of the debt contract and the way that bankruptcy is triggered and settled As a result, 
this approach is difficult to implement in practice. Firstly, all of the firm's assets are not tradable 
nor observable. Secondly, to utilise this technique, the complex priority structure of the payoffs to 
all the firm's liabilities need to be specified and included in the valuation procedure narrow et aL 
1997). Thirdly, the market value of the real assets, the volatility of the asset values and the 
measurement of liabilities are difficult to estimate. Furthermore, since this approach does not use 
credit rating information, it cannot be used to price credit derivatives whose payoffs depend 
directly on the credit rating. Also from the point of view of valuing corporate debt, these models 
have not had much support from empirical evidence. They indeed generate default prania 
smaller than those observed in practice ([ones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984), Franks and Toraus 
(1989)). In addition, since the above models assume that firms have a simple capital structure, 
their approach becomes intractable when applied either to more complicated capital structures, or 
to more complex securities like coupon bonds. 
In order to generate credit spreads that were similar to those observed in reality, much of the 
subsequent effort in this area has been directed at relaxing the assumptions underlying the Black 
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) models. A "perfect" version of the model would require at 
least the following extensions: multiple classes of coupon-bearing debt with realistic covenants, 
stochastic interest rates, the inclusion of taxes, costly bankruptcy and financial distress that can 
occur throughout he life of the debt, and possible violation of strict priority rules. 
A number of papers have extended Merton's approach. Geske (1977) extends the analysis of 
Merton (1974) to risky coupon bonds that have a finite time to maturity and discrete coupon 
lo The value of a corporate discount bond is equal to an equivalent riskless discount bond minus the value of a pia option 
on the value of the firm with sinke price equal to the face value of the delt. 
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payments. Black and Cox (1976) extend Merton (1974) to the study of safety covenants, 
subordination arrangements, and limits on the financing. A distinct feature of this latter model is 
the possibility that default could occur before the maturity date. Brennan and Schwartz (1977) 
model convertible debt with stochastic interest rates. Mason and Bhattacharya (1981) also extend 
the analysis to firm value that follows a discontinuos process and to more complex boundary 
conditions. Tumbull (1979) generalises Merton (1974) from a different perspective. In a study of 
debt capacity, he extends the Merton's mode to an economy with both corporate tax and 
bankruptcy costs. He derives dosed-form solutions for a firm's common stock and pure discount 
bonds. On the same line is the work by Leland (1994) which makes it possible to work with 
notions of optimal capital structure. Kiln, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1989) extend Merton 
(1974) by assuming that the riskless interest rate follows the square root process of Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross (1985) and is correlated with the firm value process. Cooper and Mello (1991) and 
Rendleman (1993) demonstrate the insight provided by Merton (1974) into the valuation and 
analysis of risk sharing in swaps with default risk We finally mention other contributions: 
Brennan and Schwartz (1980), Shimko, Tejima, and van Deventer (1993), and Merton (1977). 
The subsequent literature on defaultable bond pricing has taken two approaches: the muctural 
approach and the reduced form approach. 
4.4.2.7 he approadd 
The structural models (or models based on the value of the firm) view risky debt as payoff an 
exogenously given fraction of each promised unit of currency in the event of default In these 
models bankruptcy is allowed to occur at a random time and the causality of default is directly 
linked to information on the asset of the firm 
-the total value of the firm's assets is employed as 
the economic fundamental In other words, default time is determined by an underlying process 
describing the value of the firm and default will occur when this process hits a some boundary 
which may be either deterministic or random 
This approach is used in Hull and White (1995) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Kim, 
Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1992), and Nielsen, Saa -Raquejo, and Santa-Clara (1993). These 
models 
-as Merton, 1974- assume that the value of the firm follows a diffusion process; and in 
contrast to Merton's allow for stochastic interest rates and for the correlation between interest- 
rates and firm value. The latter two allowing also for deviation from strict absolute priority rule, 
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they are able to generate realistic credit spreads, although the payment upon default is 
exogenously defined. 
While this approach is convenient in the presence of scarce data, it has the drawback that 
funs whose assets are modelled by a diffusion process will have a defaulting probability on short- 
term debt equal to zero. In addition, even if it simplifies computation by avoiding the need to 
understand the complex priority structure of payoffs to all the firm's liabilities in bankruptcy, it still 
requires estimates for the parameters of the firm's asset value, which is a somewhat abstract 
quantity typically not observable. Even if many quantities are observable which could lead to 
sensible estimates of firm value, it would seem to be a formidable task for a financial institution 
dealing with thousands of default-prone counter-parties to work out and update these estimates 
for each counter-party. Some sort of easily observed proxy for firm value might be preferable. 
Also, as noted in Kim et aL (1993), realistic values of leverage and volatility of the value of the 
firm seem incapable of producing the yield spreads observed in the market. Moreover, it may be 
unrealistic to assume that default is equivalent to a situation in which the market value of assets is 
reduced to or below that of liabilities. Finally, this framework still cannot handle various credit 
derivatives whose payouts depend on the credit rating of the debt issue. 
4.4.3. The iaiuad firm a ppn ach 
The reduced form models or intensity based models, as the structural models, view debt as 
paying off a fraction of each promised unit of currency in the event of default; but the time of 
default is now given as an exogenous hazard rate process and does not explicitly depend on the 
fine's underlying assets. Contrary to the previous approach, the default event is not defined and 
occurs at a random time. The default time is specified in terms of a hazard rate, within a Poisson 
process 
-Ike environment to describe the idea that the timing of default takes the bond-holders 
by surprise. These models allow one to derive the term structure of default probabilities from 
credit spreads, while assuming an exogenous and somewhat arbitrary recovery rate. 
The simplest cases is considered in Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) where the recovery rate is 
constant and the default process is modelled as a jump process and the default time is 
exponentially distributed. This assumption for the default process achieves two effects. The first is 
that it removes the dependence on the value of underlying assets, so that the model may be 
applied to situations where this is not observable. Secondly, it cures a technical problem with 
models of the Merton type. The assumption of a jump process nukes the default time 
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unpredictable and avoids the implausible behaviour of credit spreads for short maturities (Pitts 
and Selby, 1983) due to the fact that default becomes predictable when the value of the 
underlying assets approaches the default boundary. 
On the other hand, the assumption of a constant default intensity is too simple and effectively 
imposes the independence of the bankruptcy process from the default-free interest-rate process. 
The default intensity of a highly rated firm would be expected to be low in the near future, but 
increase in the distant future as the effects of a possible worsening of the firm's conditions come 
into play. This is one motivation behind the work of Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997). 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull OL. T, 1997) model default time as the first time a continuous time 
Maxkov chain hits the absorbing state represented by the default event. With enough securities 
trading one could in principle imply out the relevant parameters of this Markov chain from 
market prices, but in reality this will be difficult Furthermore, since there is a lot of empirical data 
on the transition matrices it would seem natural to use this information. JLT (1997) relied on the 
transition probabilities reported in Standard and Poor's Credit Review, 1993; the recovery rates 
were found in Moody's Special Report of 1992 and risk premix were estimated using yield-to- 
worst data for coupon bonds with varying maturities and credit ratings. 
Using credit ratings is a controversial issue since it is debatable to what extent prices react to 
rating changes. The overall conclusion of Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) is that there are 
stock and bond price effects associated to up-and downgrading, but the evidence is mixed. Clearly 
if ratings are slow to react to infonnation about firms it poses a problem for pricing. A 
comforting property of the credit ratings is the property of stochastic monotonicity: default 
probabilities do seem to decrease with better ratings. 
A formulation involving credit ratings is necessary for the pricing of credit derivatives. An 
application of the Markov model, modified to have random recovery rates, can be found in Das 
and Tufano (1995). Lando (1995) describes default as the first jump time of a Cox process which 
can be thought of as a Poisson process with a random intensity and it remedies to the problem of 
deterministic credit spreads 
-as long as there are no rating changes. 
Another early use of stochastic intensity is in Madan and Unal (1995). The intensity is 
modelled as a function of the excess return on the issuer's equity, and the recovery rate is specified 
as a random variable independent of the recovery rate process. A key question is whether it is 
possible to imply out the relevant intensities and the recovery rate from observed market prices. If 
the recovery rate is zero, intensities can be implied out from market prices under technical 
conditions (Artzner and Delbaen, 1995). If the recovery rate is not zero, and all one observes is 
146 
Chapter IV: Literature Review 
the price of the bond, it is impossible in general to imply the hazard and the recovery rate 
distribution separately. For other works in which the independence assumption appears in some 
form, see Johnson and Stulz (1987), Litterman and Iben (1991), and Hull and White (1995). 
Intensity based approaches that relaxed the independence assumption, or in other words, that 
addressed the correlation between default risk and yields on default-free bonds are presented in 
Duffle and Singleton (1999) and in Duffle, Schroder and Skiadas (1995) using recursive methods 
and backward stochastic differential equations and in Lando (1994b) using Cox processes. 
Among many authors, we can mention Madan and Unal (1993), Martin (1997), Nielsen and 
Ronn (1995), Pye (1974), Schonbucher (1998), and others. 
The advantage of this approach is that it allows exogenous assumptions to be imposed only 
on observables and the derived pricing formulae can be calibrated to market data. The behaviour 
of the hazard-rate process might be fitted to market data and allowed to depend on firm specific 
or macroeconomic variables; on the other hand, the default time is not modelled directly in terms 
of the issuer's incentives or ability to meet her obligations. Also this approach can easily be 
modified to include credit rating information in the bankruptcy process, and used to price credit 
derivatives. Moreover, these models are more flexible than the first ones as all parameters may be 
inferred from market data and, since the default event is a jump-event, credit spreads at short 
maturities differ from zero. 
The main disadvantage is that the hazard rate is not linked to the value of the assets of the fine 
which allows for the possibility that default will not occur despite very low asset values. Still this 
approach is difficult to implement in practice, and in some instances, the model calibration yields 
negative default probabilities. This is because the recovery factors do not only vary over time, but 
also should be endogenously determined in the model, since the loss incurred by the debt-holders 
should depend on the value of the firm's assets. 
It should be noted that the distinction between the structural approach and the reduced form 
approach is not clear cut. Models which use the value of the fine could easily be intensity based 
by describing the value of the firm as a jump process, and intensity based models could easily 
incorporate the value of the firm by using it as a variable affecting the default intensity. So, 
perhaps, the distinction could be portrayed also as follows: the structural models typically result in 
problems similar to those encountered when extending the Black-Scholes model to include 
American options, dividends, stochastic interest rates, and exotic features; whereas the reduced 
form models result in setups which more closely resemble term structure modelling. But again, 
the classification wouldn't be precise. 
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4.4.4.7b middk'zwy appraxh 
The middle-way approach attempts to combine the two previous approaches. The main aim is 
to allow for positive credit spreads at short maturities without neglecting the causality of default, 
which is in relation to the firm's resources. Madan and Ural (1998) model the hazard rate as a 
linear function depending on the level of the interest rates and the logarithm of the value of the 
fine's assets. Zhou (1997) models the firm's assets value process by including a jump component 
Cathcart and El Jahel (1998) allow for expected an unexpected default by introducing a stochastic 
hazard rate that admits a lower boundary at which default becomes a certain event. Duffie and 
Lando (1998) derive a hazard rate process based on an unobservable value of the firm In El-Jahel 
(1998) the boundary of default depends on the level of the discount bond price and the hazard 
rate depends on the level of the stochastic variable, that is assumed to follow a mean reverting 
square root process 
-precluding, hence, the possibility of a negative hazard rate-. Credit spreads 
generated within this framework will depend on the level of the discount bonds and indirectly on 
the level of interest rates. 
All pricing in this arbitrage-based framework is linear and whether linearity is a feasible 
approximation to reality is difficult to say. Certainly, if a derivative is a very small part of the firm's 
operations it may be reasonable to assume that the value of the contract does not really influence 
the default probability. On the other hand there is the limit that if a bond issue heavily influences 
the cash-flow of a firm, it may be necessary to include the non-linear effect. Although Modgiani- 
Mller I claims that fine value does not depend on the method of finance, in the presence of 1) 
bankruptcy costs (lawyers, agency, underinvestment, reputation); 2) agency costs in terms of the 
shareholders' incentive to take on risky but not necessarily positive NPV investments; and 3) tax 
shield effect in terms of a corporate tax advantage to debt and a tax disadvantage to the 
debtholders, the irrelevance proposition does not hold any longer. Finally, as the models give an 
arbitrage-based valuation of default risk they can be used to price default risk independently of the 
risk preferences of investors. 
4.4.5. Credit spmads based netts 
Credit spread models focus on the modelling of the stochastic process driving credit spreads. 
This approach was introduced by Rxnaswamy and Sundaresan (1986). Due to credit risk, 
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corporate bonds will sell at a discount relative to government bonds, the size of which depends 
on the probability of default, the contractual provisions that define payoffs contingent on default 
and the premium demanded in the market for similar instnunents. Ramaswamy and Sundaresan 
propose, as instrumental variables, default premia on newly issued instruments with the same 
maturity and from the same risk class required by investors. Since these instruments are dose 
substitutes for the newly issued risky bonds, it is argued that the premia observed in the market 
should provide good proxies for the required premium on the risky instrument which has already 
been trading for some time. 
Assuming that both the risk-free and the expected market premium follow a mean-reverting 
square-root process, the required return differential on default-risky bonds is obtained by solving 
a valuation equation under a boundary condition. Both the boundary condition and the pricing 
equation have been criticised. The former as it is not adequate for instruments whose payoff will 
be reduced by default. The latter as it implies that a risky bond should yield the same return as a 
newly issued bond of the same type this is deary contradictory when applied over the whole life 
of the instrument. 
Solnik (1990) argued that at the time of issue, the spread is added to the risk-free rate to 
compensate both for the expected capital loss due to default and to provide a higher expected 
return on a risky bond due to risk aversion and can thus be written as the sum of these two 
components. If investors could diversify the default risk, risk premia should be expected to be 
zero but the premium required due to the possibility of default should remain. For the case of risk 
neutrality, the expected return on the bond should thus be risk-free interest rate. If agents were 
risk-averse and the risk could not be diversified Ramaswanry and Sundaresan's approach would 
hold. 
Similar in spirit is the approach of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995b) where the risk-adjusted 
process for the log of the credit spread is modelled as an Ohmstein-Uhlenbeck process, and the 
risk-less interest rate is as Vasicek (1977). The model is then used to value credit derivatives. 
The limitations of these models that make direct assumptions about the spread is that they are 
not generally derived by writing down the true process that rates follow and then showing how 
the no-arbitrage condition may be used to switch this into a risk-adjusted form Instead, a risk- 
adjusted process for the spread and a risk-adjusted valuation procedure are simply used. This 
means that the models are not derived from fundamental assumptions about the default process 
itself and, as such, the link with the pricing of other securities that depend on this process is 
necessarily complete. Thus, the models may be viewed as extremely partial relative pricing models 
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which could, in principle, be made consistent with a more general representation of the default 
process. They do, however, have the merit that they can be parameterised fairly directly to match 
the actual process followed by credit spreads, thus overcoming a fundamental weakness of many 
of the other defauk risk models (see Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995a) 
4.4.6. Cra/ix Rath2g Models 
Rating models are used to identify the risk of default for a counterparty with a knien current 
rating. These models use historical default experience to estimate the probability of a change in 
value of the security resulting from a change in the credit spread as a result from a change in rating 
(ratings migration) or default. These models also incorporate macro-economic ycles specific 
default risk as a function of two primary factors: current rating and time to maturity of the 
obligation. 
Rating based models predict wo types of default risk: 
"C mulative risk of default - measures the total default probability of a counterparty over the 
term of the obligation; 
"Marginalrisk of default- measures theA in the default probability of a counterparty oNer a 
sequence of time periods. 
Note that where a firm or entity is not rated is still possible to utilise rating-based models and 
statistics. This will usually entail a three-step rocess. First, the firm's financial data are used to 
calculate key accounting ratios, which are the same as those computed by the rating agencies. 
Second, the accounting performance as captured by the ratios is compared with the comparable 
median for rated fines in both the industry and the universe of rated entities. The comparison is 
designed to allow a rating equivalent to be determined. Third, based on the theoretical rating, the 
default probabilities appropriate for that particular ating categories is then utilised. 
This approach raises two issues. The default probability is sample specific and there may be 
significant differences between markets. Moreover, pricing is based on aggregate statistics and 
issuer level information is lost. 
An example of this alternative way of modelling spread behaviour has been pursued by Jarrow 
et at (1997) and Fons (1994). This involves characterising rating changes as Markov transitions 
between categories. With appropriate assumptions, the true probabilities of the transitions may be 
transformed into risk-adjusted probabilities and used to value contingent payoffs. The weakness 
of the approach is, however, that ratings categories do not represent homogeneous discrete 
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groups of bonds. There is considerable variation in the credit quality within a rating group, so that 
this type of model assumes too much discreteness in the structure of creditworthiness. 
4.5. The CAPM and credit selection decisions 
From a different perspective the analysis of the spread risk involved in corporate bond 
investing allows one to estimate the fair value of corporate sector spreads. This is the approach of 
Karagiannis (1994), that shows how the ideas of the CAPM may be profitably applied in credit- 
selection decisions. 
The paper attempts to apply the CAPM to the various sectors of the corporate credit market 
in order to develop a strategy that capitalises on deviations from equilibrium excess returns. In 
other terms, a strategy capable of identifying relative value in the corporate credit market is 
showed to offer investment results superior to those attainable by passive investment in a single 
sector or mix of sectors. Note that CAPM techniques are infrequently mentioned and used in the 
fixed-income market, in this way Karagiannis' work is innovative. 
A simple comparison of the current with the historical spread in a given credit sector is often 
used by investment managers to allocate assets and by brokerage firms as an indication of relative 
value. This analysis is however incomplete if the investment decision does not take into account 
the risk of investing in a specific sector and its changes over time. Each sector spread is showed to 
be proportional to the sensitivity of its changes to changes in the market spread Hence, the risk 
actually experienced by an investor in a corporate sector involves two sources of risk 
-the interest 
rate risk and the spread risk- and the correlation between the two 
-pronounced for lower ratings. 
Karagiannis (1994) focuses on the spread risk, which is the most important in the credit-sector 
selection, and maintains a neutral stance on interest rates. 
Changes in credit spreads are derived for January 1974 to December 1992 from the Lehman 
Brothers Corporate Index data. Changes in each sector's spread are regressed on changes in the 
corporate market monthly spreads (beta), and for every regression the constant is zero and the 
beta coefficient significantly positive and increasing as the sector rating declines. Beta represents 
the volatility in spreads that can be attributed to factors such as default probabilities, economic 
conditions, perceptions of the credit quality of the sector, supply and demand, and liquidity. A 
shift in the sector weighting within the overall market would also cause the sector's beta to 
change. 
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Differently from the contingent claims-based approach, YZaragiannis (1994) uses the average 
spread over the past three years as a proxy for the theoretical (or fair) value of a sector's credit 
spread As the financial markets can be out of equilibrium, and investors can have different 
expectations, actual spreads can deviate from their theoretical values. A strategy that capitalises on 
such deviations is developed through a coupon adjustment, so that the total sector fair value is 
given by the sum of the excess pread (current minus historical sector spread) and the coupon 
component (sector minus the market average coupon). The former captures only the price- 
appreciation component; the latter takes into account also the coupon income. The total sector 
value is plotted against sector beta to identify mispricings. 
The sector selection is made by choosing the sector that at the end of the year is 
undervalued" If no undervalued sector exists they select the sector that offers the best value, 
provided it's not overvalued. Only one sector is selected each period, as the various credit sectors 
are highly correlated, and there is hence no benefit to diversifying across the sectors. 
The total sector value strategy results are compared with a) the widest spread and no coupon 
strategy 
-investing in the sector with the widest spread relative to its historical average-; and b) the 
widest spread with coupon 
-based only on identifying sector value regardless of risk-. The total- 
return strategy results to be the most efficient in a long-term view and as a part of overall 
allocation within the corporate sector. 
4.6. The empirical distribution of credit spread changes 
Pedrosa and Roll (PR, 1998) represents the first study focused on a time series analysis of 
credit spreads and in particular on the empirical distributions of systematic redit spread changes. 
The data are provided by Bloomberg Financial Services and are daily credit spreads on dollar- 
denominated bonds, categorised by industry, maturity and rating. PR (1998) provide evidence 
about the nature of the intertemporal instability of credit spreads and evidence of cointegration 
among credit spread time series, suggesting that the observed non-stationarity is attributable to 
common underlying influences. 
11 To determine the optimal rebalancing period, Karagiannis checks to see if the historical evidence 
indicates reversals in the time series of returns. They chose the minimal holding period for which mean 
reversion appears. The variance ratio is a statistical test that checks for the presence of trends or reversal in 
series of price returns. If the ratio equals 1, the series follows a random walls; otherwise trends (Ratio > 1) 
or reversal (Ratio < 1) are present. The variance ratio of one-year return variance divided by 12 times the 
one-month return variance is found to be the lower dosest to 1. 
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The distribution of changes in credit spreads exhibits substantial departures from the Gaussian 
distribution, especially due to high kurtosis. Gaussian mixtures appear to provide reasonably good 
models for the thick-taled distributions of credit spread changes. Most credit spreads eries 
behave as if they were generated by two or three distinct regimes that occur randomly on a daily 
basis. 
4.7. Credit spreads and the extreme value theory 
Phoa (1999) estimates credit spread risk using extreme value theory, whose applications to 
financial risk management are relatively recent. The failure of many internal risk management 
models in occasion of the recent dramatic widening in credit spreads, stressed the importance of 
correcting assumptions like normal distribution of the innovations and making use of insufficient 
historical data. The extreme value theory focuses on the estimates of the probability distribution 
of the maxima or "extreme" events, rather than of the individual events (Embrechts, Kluppelberg, 
and Mkosch (1997), Adler, Feldman, and Taqqu (1998)). From the Fisher-Tippett theorem, we 
know that, under mild conditions, one can approximate the probability distribution of the 
maxima by the distribution of the individual observations. If the latter have a normal or 
lognormal (leptokurtic) distribution, the maxima will have a Gumbel (Frechet) distribution. 
Phoa (1999) shows that the Frechet distribution, consistent with GARC H models of financial 
time series, works well for the case of the Australian dollar swap spread data. Phoa finds also 
evidence of the possibility of asyrnn is distributions. Extreme spread tightenings are generally 
greater in magnitude than extreme spread widenings. A possible explanation is that daily spread 
shifts tend to be negatively correlated with shifts in Treasury yields, and sharp rises in Treasuries 
yields have been more common than sharp falls. He, then, suggests deriving quantile estimates for 
spread tightenings separately. 
4.8. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have seen how many micro and macroeconomic factors have been found 
to influence directly or indirectly the level of credit spreads. We have also seen showed credit 
spreads themselves are not constant over time and the reasons for their changes may he in market 
supply and demand factors, in federal budget financing needs, or in the outlook of the economy. 
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Economic conditions have a direct influence on the shape and spread of default risk 
structures. As economic conditions change, investors may place differing emphasis on the risk of 
default In the good economic years, the spreads between the certainty coefficients is small across 
all payment periods and the decrease in the certainty coefficients with increasing futurity of 
payment is very small. The opposite is observed in recession periods. 
Early studies of the term structure of credit risk note an upward-sloping risk structure for 
highly rated bonds. Conversely, when credit quality is low, researchers find a downward sloping 
risk structure. A crisis at maturity model is used to explain this unusual pattern. The crisis at 
maturity hypothesis assumes that highly leveraged firms with debt maturing over the near term 
may encounter refinancing problems. The higher default risk associated with debt maturing in the 
near term is reflected in higher spreads at shorter maturities. More recent theoretical models of 
credit risk, based on contingent-claims models of debt pricing, take a much more sophisticated 
approach to this question. 
Significant progress has been made in modelling credit risk since the pioneering work of Black 
and Scholes and Merton. The early models based on underlying asset value are now giving way to 
models based upon more direct assumptions about the default process. These models can be 
used to value derivative products that are affected by default risk simultaneously with the default 
risk itself. Most importantly, they can be parameterised to fit the current structure of prices of 
risky bonds. Considerable challenges remain, however. The numerical implementation of these 
models often requires an independence assumption. Either risk-free interest rates are assumed to 
be independent of the process driving default or the process driving the incidence of default is 
independent of the write-down in default Both these assumptions are unsatisfactory. 
Another concern is the inability of the models to explain the time-series behaviour of credit 
spreads or the relative levels of spreads in different parts of the market (Cooper and Mello, 1988). 
Many of these models cannot generate sufficient time-series variability in the spread to match 
actual rates. The behaviour of actual spreads is very complex and, as yet, no model adequately 
captures this complexity (Brown et aL 1994). Unless a model can do this, it will not be useful in 
determining the relative prices of the new credit derivatives, some of which are extremely sensitive 
to the time-series properties of the spread. 
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Chapter V 
MODELLING CREDIT SPREADS 
5.1. Introduction 
Financial institutions around the world are investing heavily in systems for measuring market 
and credit risks, responding to the request of better information by regulators and investors on 
one side, and to the internal risk monitoring needed by senior executives on the other side. The 
need for a deep understanding of credit risk is growing and will be further stimulated by several 
trends 
-financial market integration, privatisation, and disintermediation. Credit analysis is also 
likely to become more complex as new types of securities are continuously created by financial 
engineering. 
As debt markets grow more complex, they are also becoming more volatile. In an 
environment of increasing economic volatility, the task of forecasting credit risk is becoming 
more central to investment decisions and more resources will have to be committed to credit 
analysis. Investors will require access to timely and adequate information regarding the true nature 
of the credit risk to which they are exposed. 11iis will enable them to take advantage of new 
opportunities, compare relative risks across new ranges of debt instniments and cross-border 
debt issuers, maximise yields and diversify investment risk. In brief, a better understanding of 
credit risk will contribute to stabilise the access to capital mazkets by helping both issuers and 
investors. 
The traditional credit risk analysis, mainly a "straight ratios-based" analysis, is unlikely to be the 
answer to the current urgent needs. This type of approach was indeed appropriate when interest 
rates were stable and investors bought bonds to hold them to maturity. Bonds are nowadays 
traded with the purpose of making profits on interest rates movements or changes in the absolute 
or relative credit quality of the issuer. In this new environment a new modem approach is taking 
place, focusing on changes in the perceived credit risk. 
** Part of this chapter is forthcoming in a Special Issue of the Review of Financial Analysis dedicated to 
Credit Derivatives. 
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Changes in the credit quality of a fine have been estimated inspecting the counterparty's 
financial statements, or analysing financial history, historical default rates and rating migrations 
from similar credit risk However, financial statements are reports of the past and are therefore 
inherently badiward looking. Moreover, traditional methods of adjusting exposure levels would 
entail participation in the secondary loan market and boosting credit-asset origination efforts in 
the relevant markets. Nevertheless, the illiquidity of the loan marker the possibility of damaging 
the relationship with the client, and the difficulty to originate assets in non-traditional markets, 
may all in fact make difficult the application of the traditional approaches. 
The need to find viable alternatives to old mechanisms for adjusting credit-risk profiles have 
lead to adapting to credit risk variants of theories and methodologies previously used to address 
other financial risks. According to this new approach, changes in the market's expectations of 
default are directly recovered from the observation of price changes or credit spread changes. 
Alike in previous credit-risk management methodologies, looking at prices or yields that, by their 
nature, are inherently forward looking, will involve a more quantitative analysis of credit quality 
characteristics. In particular, credit risk can be measured as the fraction of price volatility that is 
related to the issuer itself and that differentiates from the price volatility generated by general 
market movements, namely market (general) risk Alternatively, credit risk can be measured by 
credit spreads, which, theoretically, are attributable entirely to the corporation's default option. 
This chapter can be considered as a new perspective to analyse credit spreads. Within the 
credit spreads literature works have so far focused on three main areas: cross-sectional 
explanation of credit spreads and yield changes, specification of the risk structure of credit 
spreads, and valuation of risky debt By contrast, we will follow a time series approach. In fact 
little is known about the forces driving credit spread changes and volatility. Moreover, we think 
that the identification of a process that describes the dynamic evolution of credit spreads is of 
great interest both to practitioners and academicians and needs to be explored more deeply. 
Specifically, we apply our analysis to the sterling Eurobond market and in particular we intend to 
identify what macroeconomic and financial factors have driven changes in the sterling Eurobond 
credit spreads in the period from January 1991 through May 1999. To our knowledge this is the 
first study of its kind on the Eurobond market. 
One way of posing this issue will be to ask whether changes in credit spreads reflect economic 
fundamentals, or whether they represent a self-generated force bearing little relation to 
fundamentals. Credit spreads, like default rates, have shown to be not constant over time and 
there is general agreement on the direct impact that the state of the economy has on them. A 
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report by Standard and Poor's (1997) states that "A healthy exnw7y in 1996 mnoibuted to a 
sign it ddzTe in dx total rnonkr of corporate defaults Con v& to 1995, defaults urm mkiwd by 
am4mlf 
.. 
". Another report by Moody's Investors Service (1996) argues that "77x sources of 
[default rate va&ii ixy] are many, but rrzru ºnic trrnds are wrwa rly the most it lluauial factors". 
We, therefore, expect credit spreads to adjust as general macroeconomic and regulatory variables, 
business environment, conditions in fimms' factor, and output markets unexpectedly change 
altering firms' credit outlooks. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
literature of credit spreads. Section 3 describes the data and extensively presents the time series 
properties of credit spreads. An appropriate model to explain the behaviour of changes in credit 
spreads is derived and estimated in Section 4. Section 5 sununarises and concludes the main 
findings of the chapter. 
5.2. Literature Review 
As mentioned in the previous section, the main studies and key findings related directly or 
indirectly to credit spreads have so far focused on three main areas: a) explanation of credit 
spreads; b) specification of the risk structure of credit spreads; c) valuation of risky debt 
Most works focused on the determinants of bond yields and yield premia 
-obtained by 
subtracting from the corporate bond yield the yield observed on a risk-less security of the same 
maturity- use cross-section regression analysis to determine the variables significant in explaining 
credit risk premia. The most common factors are: i) proxies for the default risk 
-earnings 
variability, time of no default, market equity value over par value of debt- (Fisher, 1959; 
Boardman and McEnally, 198 1; Nielsen et aL 1993; El Jahel, 1998); ii) supply and demand factors 
(Fair and Malikiel, 1971); iiii) bond specific features 
-callability, marketability, coupon rate, sinking 
fund, security status, recovery factor, industrial dassification- (Fisher, 1959; Silvers, 1973; Duffee, 
1998; Boardman and McEnally, 1981); iv) actual default rates (Fons, 1987); v) returns on the 
firm's assets (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995); vi) firm's capital structure (Leland, 1994); vii) 
business cycle and confidence variables 
-consumer sentiment, returns on stock indices, industrial 
production, inflation, unemployment- (Jaffee, 1975; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Fons, 1987) 
and viii) interest rate variables 
-short- and long-term rate, term spread, interest rate volatility and 
expectations- (Hella-Barral and Tychon, 1996, Fons, 1994; Kim et al., 1995; Duffee, 1998). 
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Another large part of the literature deals with the term structure of credit spreads. The idea 
underlying the risk structure of credit quality is that spreads on corporate bonds vary with 
maturity, cris pths. The idea reflects factors such as the crisis at maturity and the pattern of 
marginal default risk The crisis at maturity hypothesis assumes that highly leveraged firms with 
debt maturing over the near term may encounter refinancing problems, which is reflected in 
higher spreads at shorter maturities. The marginal default risk is observed to increase with 
maturity for higher rated firms and decrease with maturity for lower rated firms (Fons, 1994). 
This pattern is consistent with two strongly linked observed phenomena: the mean-reverting 
process in credit quality and the life cycle of ratings outlook Most theoretical and empirical works 
infer that high quality firms are unlike to default in the short term. Over the longer term, however, 
they may experience credit quality deterioration or ultimately default. Middle-rated firms tend to 
maintain their rating, and lower quality firms while facing immediate prospect of default, they are 
likely to overcome their state of financial distress in the long period From the credit quality mean- 
reverting feature the life cycle of ratings outlook can be inferred and explained in terns of 
different shapes of the term structure of credit spreads. Specifically, the term structure of credit 
risk is upward-sloping for highly rated bonds, hump-shaped for middle-rated firms, and strictly 
declining for low rated firms (ohnson, 1967; Merton, 1974; Kim et al., 1995; Sarig and Warn, 
1989; Jarrow, Lando and Tumbull, 1997). Nielsen et aL (1993) and El Jahel (1998) extend 
previous works showing how the term structure of credit risk is highly sensitive to changes in the 
volatility of the firm's assets. Mella-Barral and Tychon (1996) Illustrate how differences in the 
parameterisation of the event of default affect not only bond valuation, but also the implied term 
structure of credit spreads. Helwege and Turner's (1999) investigation provides some empirical 
support for the practitioners' view of an upward-sloping credit yield curve for most speculative- 
grade firms. 
The third approach of the literature concerns the valuation of risky debt. The basic idea 
underlying risky bond pricing models is that the inherent credit risk of any credit transaction 
should be compensated by a return (calculated as the spread received) commensurate with the 
risk of default (both on expected and unexpected losses), the credit exposure, and the recovery 
rate in the event of default Models for valuing defaultable bonds have developed and significant 
progress has been made in modelling credit risk since the pioneering work of Black and Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1974), both based on option theory. A number of papers (piq r vv nn-US) 
have used and extended the option-based approach and removed in turn some of its strong 
assumptions. Geske (1977) extends the analysis to risky coupon bonds that have a finite time to 
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maturity and discrete coupon payments. Black and Cox (1976) extend Merton (1974) to the study 
of safety covenants, subordination arrangements, and limits on the financing. Brennan and 
Schwartz (1977) model convertible debt with stochastic interest rates. Mason and Bhattachatya 
(1981) study the firm value as a discontinuos process and with complex boundary conditions. 
Tumbull (1979) extends the Merton's model to an economy with both corporate tax and 
bankruptcy costs. On the same line is the work by Leland (1994) which involves notions of 
optimal capital structure. Cooper and Mello (1991) and Rendleman (1993) apply Merton's model 
to the valuation and analysis of risk sharing in swaps with default risk. 
The subsequent literature on defaultable bond pricing has taken two approaches: the structural 
approach and the reduced form approach. Stnxtz ral mrdds (or models based on the value of the 
firm) specify a particular firm value process and assume that default is triggered when firm value 
hits some specific threshold. The latter is typically a function of the amount of bond outstanding. 
In these models bankruptcy is allowed to occur at a random time and the causality of default is 
directly linked to information on the asset of the firm 
-the total value of the film's assets is 
employed as the economic fundamental This approach is used in Hull and White (1995), 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1992) and Nielsen, Saa'- 
Raquejo, and Santa-Clara (1993). 
In 
, rzdformnxdds or intensity based models, alike in structural models, the default process is 
directly specified and is represented by a Poisson or "jump" process 
-to describe the idea that the 
timing of default takes the bond-holders by surprise- not explicitly depending on the firm's 
underlying assets. The default event is not defined and occurs at a random time and an exogenous 
and somewhat arbitrary recovery rate is assumed. The simplest model is presented in Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995) where the recovery rate is constant, the default process is modeled as a jump 
process, and the default time is exponentially distributed Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) 
model default time as the first time a continuous time Markov chain hits the absorbing state 
represented by the default event. An application of the Markov model, modified to have random 
recovery rates, can be found in Das and Tufano (1995). Lando (1995) describes default as the first 
jump time of a Cox process which can be thought of as a Poisson process with a random 
intensity. Another early use of stochastic intensity is in Madan and Unal (1995) where the 
intensity is modeled as a function of the excess return on the issuer's equity, and the recovery rate 
is specified as a random variable independent of the recovery rate process. Although this class of 
models is widely used in practice because of its analytical tractability, the abstraction from the 
underlying firm value makes it less useful for suggesting determinants of credit spreads. 
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It should be noted that the distinction between the structural approach and the reduced form 
approach is not dear-cut. Models which use the value of the firm could easily be intensity based 
by describing the value of the firm as a jump process, and intensity based models could easily 
incorporate the value of the firm by using it as a variable affecting the default intensity. A 
summary review of the default risk literature is contained in Sundaresan (2000), where the various 
models are compared and their impact in the industry discussed 
Alongside the literature on corporate credit spreads a number of papers have focused on 
government and emerging market credit spreads. As it is beyond the scope of this work to analyse 
directly the empirical evidence on credit spreads in these markets, we briefly present the main line 
of research in this area Globalisation, country performance variables (GDP growth, per capita 
income, inflation, external and internal balance, etc. ), currency denomination, rating, default 
history, and maturity have been the explanatory variables generally investigated to explain 
sovereign spread changes. However, the role of industrial countries short-term interest rates and 
its linkage with government spreads has received most of the attention. The presence of a positive 
relationship between interest rates and credit spreads is generally explained either in terms of a 
creditworthiness effect or through the "appetite for risk" hypothesis. Kamin and von Kleist 
(1999) find little evidence of a short-term relationship between industrial country interest rates and 
emerging market bond spreads. This result confirms findings in previous works: both the long- 
term US Treasury bond interest rate (Cline and Barnes, 1997) and the short-term US Treasury bill 
rate (Min, 1998) are found to be positively but not significantly related to credit spreads on new 
bond issues. 
Much work has been done in the credit risk field, but considerable challenges remain. The 
numerical implementation of the models described above often requires unsatisfactory 
assumptions on the independence between the risk-free interest rate and the process driving 
default. Another concern is the inability of the models to explain the time-series behaviour of 
credit spreads and the relative level of spreads in different parts of the market (Cooper and Mebo, 
1988). Moreover, most of these models cannot generate sufficient time-series variability in the 
spreads to match actual rates. Concluding, the behaviour of actual spreads is very complex and, as 
yet, no model adequately captures this complexity (Brown et aL 1994). Unless a model can do this, 
it will not be useful in determining the relative prices of new credit derivatives, some of which are 
so extremely sensitive to the time-series properties of the spreads. 
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5.3. Time series properties of credit spreads 
5.3.1. The Data 
We focus on the Eurobond market, which, we believe, has not received by the academic 
financial literature the attention commensurate with its size and importance. In particular, we 
model credit spreads on the ISMA sterling Eurobond index, which is a market-value weighted, 
redemption yield index of straight Eurobonds, calculated by ISMA Ltd, London, from December 
31,1990, and made available on a daily basis through Datastream International The daily data set 
extends from December 31,1990 to May 26,1999 for a number of 2193 observations and 
indudes such extreme events as the European exchange rate mechanism crisis in 1992. 
ISMA indices are provided for three different life-to-maturity bands: over 1 year 
-i. e. all 
maturities-, 1 to 5 years and over 5 years. We decided to use the index associated to the larger 
maturity band. The rationale underlying our choice was to match as much as possible the maturity 
of the Eurobond index with the maturity of the UK-government bond index used as a 
benchmark Both indices are indeed characterised by an average life to maturity of 10 years. 
Though this index suffers from the aggregation problem typical of index data. It is an 
aggregate of bonds of different maturities, coupons, and credit ratings. In order to maintain the 
desired characteristics of the index it is periodically adjusted causing discontinuity in the data 
series. We are therefore aware that the results and statistical properties of the data that we detect 
later on may be affected by the shifting composition of the index. Despite these pitfalls, we 
believe that ISMA is a very reliable source of data and they used the best procedure to build this 
index, which we briefly present. 
The bonds used in calculating the index are selected once a month for indusion throughout 
the following month. The universe of bonds from which the selection is made consists of those 
bonds for which ISMA has adequate prices on the last Friday of the month. An adequate price is 
a price averaged from a minimum number of market makers with a maximum price spread. 
Bonds must be fixed rate "bullet" bonds. That is, they must not have a sinking fund or a can or a 
put option. Bonds will be rejected if i) they have special features, for example dual currency 
options and index linldng in) they are partly paid, in default; iii) they have a maturity yield vastly 
different from other bonds in the same category, iv) they are new issues, and the closing date is 
after the end of the month; v) they are fungible into another bond before the end of the next 
month; vi) zero coupon bonds are also rejected because they yield less than conventional bonds 
of similar duration. 
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Table 5.1 shows the general composition of the ISMA Eurobond index. Eurobonds included 
in the index and issued in the period 1992-1999 have been classified according to the country (or 
origin) of the issuer, the issuer credit raring, and the issue credit quality. Over the 8-year period, on 
average 59 percent of the total volume of new issued and outstanding Eurobonds was from UK, 
16 percent from a European country, 6 percent from USA, Canada and Latin America, and 5 
percent from Japan, Asia and Oceania. The share of UK borrowers in total issuance has fallen 
over time, while European and USA borrowers have increased their participation in the 
Eurobond market. As far as the maturity structure of the Eurobonds is concerned, 32 percent are 
characterised by a life to maturity between 7 and 10 years, 26 percent between 3 and 7 years, and 
20 percent between 20 and 30 years. Most important is the average credit rating of the index. 
Specifically, AAA- and AA-rated bonds constitute on average 40 and 42 percent, respectively, of 
the total market value of the issues. The stake of most creditworthy borrowers (AAA) has not 
revealed any trend over the period, while AA-rated bonds are characterised by a decreasing trend 
alongside with an increasing trend for the A-rated bond fraction. As we expected the quality of 
the bonds in the sample is generally high. The investment-grade bias reflects the fact that issuers 
traditionally need to be a high credit standing to be able to raise capital in the Eurobond market, 
together with a regulatory bias (Dale and Thomas, 1991). Our analysis will benefit from this 
feature in the sense that yields on investment-grade bonds will have relatively more of their 
volatility attributable to credit spread movements than sub-investment grade credits, which will be 
primarily driven by potential company-specific default events. 
Credit spreads (CS) are defined as the continuously compounded yield differencial between 
the ISMA index and the UK long-term (10 year) government bond index. The latter is provided 
by Datastream too12. From Favero et at (1996) we know that the simple difference between rates 
(discrete time compounding) is affected by the ktel of the reference rate. This argument might be 
termed as the "mathematical" effect and in our case it implies that credit spreads would be an 
increasing function of the level of the benchmark index yield. In the simplest case of two one- 
period interest rates, rand r'B which are the rate on a risky instrument (with probability of being 
repaid p< 1) and the rate on a safe instrument, respectively, in equilibrium the following equality 
holds: 
12 The Datastream codes for the ISMA index and for the Benchmark index are respectively: ISMSTG5(RY) 
and BMUKIOY(RY). The datatype RY stands for gross redemption yield and is a good approximation to 
the average yield of a portfolio. The RY of the index is obtained by weighting the individual bond yields by 
the size of the holding multiplied by the duration. 
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1998 1999 
Panel A: Origin of Issuer 62% 59% 61% 54% 51% 
50% 
69% 68% UK 
12% 14% 16% 17% 17% 
19% 18% 18% 
Euro 
1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 
1% 2% 1% 
Non-Euro 
5% 6% 5% 5% 4% 
4% 
Japan, Asia & Oceania 6% 
5% 
3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 
8% 10% 10% 
Canada & Latin America USA 
, 
8% 9% 11% 13% 12% 
14% 16% 18% 
Other Internationals 
Panel B: Maturity Structure 
- 
- 
3% 11% 16% 
10,3) 
- 
4% 14% 21% 32% 46% 
37% 30% 
[3, 'n 
43% 46% 42% 39% 29% 
19% 20% 18% 
[7,10) 
9% 14% 17% 12% 11% 
8% 6% 8% 
[10,15) 
9% 9% 9% 10% 8% 
8% 6% 
115,20) 15% 
27% 17% 18% 18% 13% 
11% 19% 
[20,30) 33% 1% 3% 6% 3% 
-- 
1% 1% 
> 30 
Panel C: Rating 
40% 37% 39% 34% 42% 
46% 44% 
39% 
AAA 
48% 47% 48% 45% 47% 
37% 32% 29% 
AA 
12% 13% 14% 15% 17% 
20% 20% 21% 
A 
BBB 
1% 1% - - 
o 1 /o 
BB 
1% 1% - - 
1% 1% 
B 
Panel C: Industry 45% 45% 45% 46% 47% 
45% 45% 
FINANCIAL 37% 
GOV & SUPRANATIONALS 13% 
14% 1 
31% 35% ° 43 /° 31% 32% 
28% 27% 26% 
INDUSTRIAL 
5% 5% 4% 6% 6% 
5% 
PAUT & ABS 
7% 5% 
1% 2% 2% 
0% 1% 1% 1% 1% Other 
Table 5.1 ISMA Eurobond Index composition over 
time, 1992-1999. 
down by coun k try of the issuer, maturity of the 
issue, and credit 
The ISMA Eurobond index has en been bro es of the total ta market volume of 
Eurobonds issued in 
rating of the issuer. The data are 
g expressed as percen 
the respective year. 
(5.1) 
(1+r7B) 
= p(1+ )+ (1 p)0, 
from which we can derive the formula 
for the spread as 
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7fl 
- 
, 
Il 
= 
(1+ 71B)(1 P)lp (5.2) 
As long as p< 1, increases in the risk-free interest rate lead to an increase in the amount that 
has to be repaid by the risky borrower. However, as it is not certain that the risky borrower will be 
able to repay its additional debt, the yield on the risky instrument must rise more than 
proportionately respect to the safe instrument. Hence an increase in the risk-free rate is likely to 
raise the spread only for "mathematical" reasons (Kamin and von Kleist, 1999). 
To eliminate the mathematical effect and the effect of discrete time compounding, credit 
spreads are converted to become continuous compounding by the transformation: 
cs, =ln(1+r'B)-In(1+rTB) (5.3) 
and changes in credit spreads at timet are defined as: 
dcs, 
= cs, 
- 
cs, 
_, 
, 
(5.4) 
witht= 1,2, 
..., 
2193days. 13 
Note, however, that despite the fact that credit spreads are obtained by subtracting a risk-less 
rate of interest from a yield on a corporate bond, they are not a spread that is the result of the 
interaction between two assets. In fact, in the remainder of the chapter credit spreads will be 
considered an independent financial asset. 
5.3.2. Cm & Spwads Stylised Facts 
In this section we will look at the time series pattern of both credit spread levels and changes. 
Figure 5.1 plots credit spread levels over the entire sample period We can recognise a rather 
cyclical behaviour over the period with a decreasing trend from the beginning of 1991 to the end 
of 1992. From 1997 the series appears to trend steeply upward until the end of 1998 and then 
stabilise around the same mean level it had experienced before 1992. 
13 Note that the natural logarithm specification is generally preferred as it captures the nonlinear 
relationship between yields and ratings (Kan, 1998; Cantor and Packer, 1996; and Kamin and von Kleist, 
1999). 
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Figure 5.1 plots also credit spread changes over the same sample period and shows credit 
spread volatility fluctuations over time. Credit spread volatility appears high at the end of 1992 
and in 1994, and very high from late 1998. In addition, from the plot of the absolute changes in 
credit spreads (Figure 5.1), it emerges that large absolute changes are more likely than small 
absolute changes to be followed by a large absolute change. The evidence of volatility clustering 
suggests that a suitable model for the data should capture this time varying volatility sau=re. 
It is worth focusing for a while on the recent remarkable rise in volatility observed after May 
1997, when the Thai baht was subject to severe speculative attacks and finally devaluated. The 
crisis subsequently spread to other emerging and developed markets. Until July 1998 
-Russia's 
financial crisis- however, the mature financial markets in the United States and Europe were 
generally buoyant and little affected by the Asian crisis. However, the crisis in Russia sparked a 
broad-based reassessment and repricing of risk, especially regarding emerging market investments, 
and a large-scale of portfolio rebalancing across a range of global financial markets. We can 
therefore explain the reflection of the Asian crisis on the Eurobond market in terms of 
"contagion" effect. As the crisis was worsening, the global credit crunch caused by investors' loss 
of appetite for risk began to drive up the yield spreads in the whole fixed-income universe, apart 
from the treasury markets of the strongest economies. The crisis was to a large extent a liquidity 
shock rather than a real credit event, especially for highly rated firm One way to validate this 
hypothesis is to look at spreads within the Treasury bond market. Clearly default is not an issue 
here since the spread is generated by the extremely strong demand for liquidity. In other words, 
the huge credit spread widen. ings in the last two years is mainly due to the large fall in the 
government bond yields rather than to a rise in actual borrowing costs. 
Main descriptive statistics for the CS series are presented in Table 5.2. Credit spreads present 
positive skewness (sk a 2.035), and since price changes present skewness in the opposite direction 
than that of yield changes, positive credit spreads skewness implies that the left tail of the loss 
distribution (for a long position) contains more probability than a normal one. Credit spreads are 
also leptokurtic (k = 7.734) and therefore characterised by a fairly large likelihood of small credit 
spreads, coupled with a small chance of large credit spreads. This is in line with the specific feature 
of credit risk to be subject to small frequent variations and rare large variations. Table 5.2 reports 
also various descriptive statistics for the series in differences, dCS. The series while is roughly 
symmetrically distributed, it presents fat tails (k a 8.79). Summarising, credit spread levels and 
changes present signs of the typical fat-tailed behaviour and in both cases the Jarque-Bera x2 
statistic for the null hypothesis of normality is far beyond the critical value at the 1 percent level, 
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which suggests that the two series are far from a normal distribution. The significant deviation 
from normality can be a symptom of dependence or nonlinear dynamics (Fang et al. 1994). 
Before going into any f rther discussion, we have first to identify the process generating credit 
spreads. 
5.3.3. The Variables 
As the risk of a change in credit quality varies over time, we collected a set of variables in order 
to test for their correlation and influence on the time series of Eurobonds credit spread levels and 
changes. Since the credit spreads we are using are computed on an index, we expect them to be 
affected mainly by financial and macroeconomic variables, rather than by firmspecific factors. 
We present the variables below. la 
- 
RAE and DY' are the return and the dividend yield series on the FESE All Share index, 
respectively. The former is a proxy for the economic confidence and we would expect credit 
spreads to narrow as RAE increases. The correlation of credit spreads to equity indices is 
consistent with the Black and Scholen model (Black and Scholes, 1973) of firm capital structure. 
The higher the leverage of the firm (larger Cv), the lower is the positive difference between 
the value of the firm and the value of the bonds, and in turn the lower correlated are changes in 
bond value and in the risk-free bond values. Moreover, while considering constant the firm's 
probability of default, changes in credit spreads may occur due to changes in the expected 
recovery rate. The expected recovery rate, in turn, is likely to be a function of the general business 
climate (Altman and Kishore, 1996). As a result, in a poor economic climate investors will move 
to a more conservative credit risk exposure (#& to quality), and credit spreads will widen. 
Following the same logic, we expect credit spreads to narrow in periods of boom. As far the 
DY"E is concerned, we expect a positive relation with credit spreads. Increases in the dividend 
yield make indeed the equity market more as a yield-bearing investment. 
14 All the variables are available from Datastream International. 
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Figure 5.1 Time Series of Daily Credit Spread Levels, Changes and Absolute Changes 
Credit spreads, defined as the continuously compounded yield differencial between the ISMA 
Eurobond index and the UK long term (10 year) government bond index, are plotted over the period 
from 31/12/1990 to 26/5/1999. The time series pattern is also presented for credit spread changes and 
absolute changes, over the same sample period. 
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Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N 
CS 
. 
074 
. 
070 
. 
199 
. 
039 
. 
024 2.035 7.734 2193 
(3.083) 
ACS 
. 
000027 
. 
000 
. 
024 
-. 
024 
. 
004 
-. 
070 8.791 2192 
(0.007) 
ADOLLAR 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
047 
-. 
061 
. 
010 
-. 
337 6.948 2192 
(0.000) 
4SHORT 
-. 
004 
. 
000 
. 
531 
-. 
844 
. 
074 
-2.392 36.61 2192 (-0.054) 
ALONG 
-. 
003 
-. 
001 
. 
333 
-. 
556 
. 
063 
-. 
065 8.383 2192 
(-0.048) 
ATERM 
. 
001 
-. 
001 
. 
756 
-. 
775 
. 
093 
. 
524 15.75 2192 
(0.011) 
RFTSE 
. 
001 
. 
000 
. 
059 
-. 
035 
. 
008 
. 
156 6.794 2192 
(0.125) 
RIEUROBOND 8.381 8.410 11.89 5.100 1.582 
-. 
009 2.460 2192 
(5.298) 
IMARK 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
055 
-. 
110 
. 
013 
-. 
509 7.856 2192 
(0.000) 
ALT DY 
. 
000 
. 
000 
. 
125 
-. 
106 
. 
018 
-. 
081 6.885 2192 
(0.000) 
ADeTSE 
-. 
001 
. 
000 
. 
180 
-. 
280 
. 
031 
-. 
677 1.26 2192 
(-0.032) 
Table 5.2 Unconditional Daily Distributions 
The table summarises the daily distributions of the main variables. The sample covers the period from 
January 1,1991 through May 26,1999, for a total of 2193 observations. Yields on the Eurobond Index 
are from ISMA Ltd. All the other data are from Datastream International. T-statistics are presented in 
paretheses. 
- 
SHORTand LONG are the interest rate on the 3-month Treasury bill and the redemption yield 
on the UK government bond index with 15 years life to maturity, respectively. While the short- 
term interest rate should reflect the stance of monetary policy and hence the country (UK) 
liquidity, the long-term interest rate should capture the expectations of future UK inflation. If we 
consider a corporate bond as being equivalent to a portfolio composed of a risk-free asset and a 
short position in a put option on the value of the firm (Merton, 1974), a rise in the default-free 
rate of interest would reduce the value of the put option that bondholders have granted to 
shareholders. This, in turn, increases the value of corporate bonds and reduces their yield. 
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Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) reach the same conclusion pointing out that the static effect of a 
higher spot rate is to increase the risk-neutral drift of the firm value process. A higher drift reduces 
the incidence of default, and in turn, reduces the credit spreads. From the demand and supply 
perspective, a decline in interest rates may cause the supply of corporate bonds to increase which 
lowers their price and hence raise their spreads. On the other hand, a positive relationship 
between interest rates and credit spreads may be explained in terms of a creditworthiness effect 
and through the "appetite for risk" hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, an increase in the 
interest rates increase the debt burden by borrowers, thereby reducing their ability to pay and 
lowering their creditworthiness. Moreover, in front of a general reduction in interest rates 
investors will enhance portfolio returns by increasing their risk exposure, the demand for 
corporate and higher yield bonds will raise and credit spreads in turn will narrow. The final and 
net impact of interest rate changes on spreads is therefore a matter of empirical evidence. A weak 
but significant negative relationship between changes in credit spreads and interest rates is found 
by Duffee (1998) on a sample of non-callable bonds. A negative short-term relationship is also 
found in Morris, Neal and Rolph (1998) and Bevan and Garzarelli (2000) who explain that in the 
short-term spreads narrow because a given rise in Treasuries produces a proportionally smaller 
rise in corporate rates. However, cointegration analysis shows that over the long run this relation 
is reversed. 
- 
TERM represents the term spread, calculated as the difference between the long-term interest 
rate and the three-month interest rate (LONG-SHORT). The slope of the Treasury yield curve is 
a proxy for the real interest rate risk. This measure has been used in many bond and interest rate 
studies (see Clare et aL 2000, Nelson and Schaefer, 1983). If the short rate dynamics depend upon 
the long rate (Brennan and Schwartz, 1979), we can here extend the logic of Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995). If the short rate is expected to mean-revert to the long rate, then an increase in 
the slope of the Treasury curve should increase the expected future short rate, again leading to a 
decrease in credit spreads. From a different perspective, we would expect the flattening of the 
benchmark curve imply a weakening economy on one side and a steepening of generic and 
individual issuer yield curve on the other side. Moreover, the expected recovery rate might 
decrease in times of recessions and corporate investors presumably would demand a higher risk 
premium (more long spreads) to extend the maturity from 10 years to 30 years with a flatter 
underlying yield curve. All these factors therefore support a negative relationship between credit 
spreads and the slope of the Treasuryyield curve. 
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- 
LT DYis the bond to equityyield ratio. Specifically, it is the ratio of the yield on UK long-term 
government bonds to the dividend yield on the FTSE All Share index. This has been formalised 
for the UK equity market in a predictive time series ense by Clare, Thomas and Wichen (1994) 
and as a macroeconomic-financial source of risk priced in the UK equity market by Clare and 
Thomas (1994). From this perspective, the ratio can be interpreted as reflecting a substitution 
effect between the bond and the equity markets within the current economic-financial outlook. In 
an increasingly risky environment, we expect investors to move from the equity to the gilt market, 
and for demand and offer laws bond prices will rise, lowering credit spreads. As a result a negative 
relationship is lilcely to be observed between the two variables. 
- 
DOLLAR and MARC are the US dollar and German mark to UK sterling exchange rates, 
respectively. They are a measure of the relative strenght of the UK sterling and are expressed as 
US dollars or German mares per unit of sterling. Since the bonds pay UK sterling, the stability of 
the exchange rate helps to support the sterling Eurobond market by limiting the currency risk 
faced by overseas borrowers. Moreover, in the event of an increasing strenght of the sterling, 
overseas issuers will face a higher price of their debt. This heavier debt burden might compromise 
their ability to repay the debt and their creditworthiness, raising the bond yields. We would 
therefore expect an increase in the exchange rate to lead to a widening of credit spreads. The 
existence of a relationship of this kind is supported by Clare et aL (2000), where a positive risk 
premium on Eurodollar bonds is found attached to the rate of change in the US effective 
exchange rate. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables discussed above are presented in Table 5.2. We can 
generally see that most of the variables in differences present means not statistically different from 
zero. However, despite low skewness values, the unconditional distributions of all series show 
high kurtosis, and are therefore non-normal. 
Table 5.3 presents the correlations between credit spreads and the financial variables presented 
above. Credit spreads are significantly and positively correlated with changes in credit spreads and 
with the exchange rate against the dollar. The higher the exchange rate, that is the stronger the 
sterling, the larger the credit spreads. Moreover, credit spreads are strongly negative correlated 
with the term spread and with the long-term rate, but positively correlated with the short-term 
interest rate level Finally a negative correlation is measured against the dividend yield of the FTSE 
All Share Index while credit spreads are positively correlated with the FTSE All Share Return 
index and the long-term interest rate to dividend yield on the FTSE All Share Return index ratio. 
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Table 5.3 presents also correlations for credit spread changes. We can see how changes in 
credit spreads are negatively correlated with changes in the interest rate variables 
-especially high 
is the correlation coefficient with changes in the term spread and in the long-term interest rate. 
Positive correlation is found with the return on the FTSE All Share index. Finally negative 
correlation is observed with changes in the long rate/dividend yield ratio and with changes in the 
dividend yield of the FTSE All Share index 
CS DCS 
ACS 0.083 CS 0.083 
(0.00) (0.000) 
N=2191 N=2191 
DOLLAR 
. 
230 
(0.00) 
N=2193 
LDOLLAR 
-. 
032 
(0.148) 
N=2191 
PRICEFTSE 
. 
357** RFTSE 0.161** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
N=2193 N=2191 
DY' ODYFrSE 
-. 
161 ' 
(0.00) (0.00) 
N=2193 N=2191 
LONG 
-. 
44 ALONG 
-. 
676 
(0.00) (0.00) 
N=2193 N=2191 
LT_DY 
. 
672 ALT_DY 
-. 
474 
(0.00) (0.00) 
N=2154 N=2152 
SHORT 
. 
122 OSHORT 
. 
009 
(0.00) (0.674) 
N=2193 I N=2191 
(0.00) 
N=2193 
ATERM 
(0.00) 
N=2191 
Table 5.3 Bivariate Unconditional Daily Correlations 
Bivariate correlations between CS and ACS and basic financial variables are 
computed and measured as Pearson's correlation coefficients with their 
significance levels in parenthesis. Note: **, * Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively (2-tailed). 
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5.3.4. Automndation Stnuture 
We proceed now to explore the time-series properties of credit spreads employing the Box 
and Jenkins (1976) methodolor for appropriate model selection. In a first step, identification 
stage, we address the question of dependence in credit spreads. Since a series cannot be 
independently distributed if any of its autocon-elation coefficients are non-zero, we compute the 
autocorrelation function (ACO of CS and dCS series followed by tests that the serial correlation 
coefficients are zero. The pattern of autoconelations and partial autocorrelations (PAC is also 
important in indicating the plausible structure and nonlinear dynamics of the CS process. 
In Panel A of Table 5.4 we present the sample autocorrelations from lag 1 to 5 and 10,20,40, 
70 and 100 for CS, CS 
, 
and(CS)2. In addition, the autocorrelogram of CS, I CS l, and (a)2 
from lag 1 to lag 100 is plotted in Figure 5.2 with the dotted lines representing the 95 percent 
confidence interval for the estimated sample autocorrelations if the CS process was independently 
and identically distributed (Lid. ). The sample correlogram shows a smooth decay for the CS series, 
and the sample partial correlogram in Figure 5.3 shows two significant spikes in correspondence 
of the first two lags, suggesting a simple second-order autoregressive model. The first lag 
autocorrelation for CS is 0.988, which indicates the presence of a unit root for credit spreads. 
Panel B in Table 5.4 exhibits the sample autocorrelations for dCS, I dCS I, and (dC S)2, and the 
autocorrelograms of dCS, I dCS I, and (dC5)2 are plotted in Figure 5.2. Firstly, we note that about 
one sixth of the sample autocorrelations within lag 100 are outside the 95 percent confidence 
interval Secondly, if dCS was as an iid process then any transformation of it should also be an 
Lid process. In other words, if the dCS series had a finite variance, then the standard error of the 
sample autocorrelations of I dCS I would be still within the confidence interval and the same 
standard error would be applicable for the sample autocorrelations of (dCS)2, providing that CS 
has also finite kurtosis. From Figure 5.2 it emerges that not only most of the autocorrelations of 
I dCS I and (dCS)Z are outside the confidence interval, but also that they are all positive, which 
suggests hat dCS2 series might be characterised by a long-term memory structure. In other words, 
the dependence between dose observations may not necessarily be stronger than that one 
between distant observations, or the most recent market information may not necessarily be more 
useful than past infonnation. 
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Pi P2 P3 P4 P5 Pio P20 P40 P70 Pioo Q(5) Q(20) 
Panel A 
CS 
. 
988 
. 
983 
. 
977 
. 
971 
. 
965 
. 
940 
. 
879 
. 
776 
. 
719 
. 
547 10482 38624 
[. 00] [. 00] 
CSI 
. 
988 
. 
983 
. 
977 
. 
971 
. 
965 
. 
940 
. 
879 
. 
776 
. 
719 
. 
547 10482 38624 
[. 00] [. 00] 
CS2 
. 
989 
. 
982 
. 
974 
. 
965 
. 
956 
. 
924 
. 
839 
. 
713 
. 
689 
. 
471 10409 37126 
[. 00] [. 00] 
Panel B 
ACS 
-. 
32 
. 
024 
. 
007 
. 
019 
-. 
006 
. 
040 
. 
025 
-. 
002 
. 
013 
-. 
009 227.33 259.59 
[. 00] [. 00] 
dCS I 
. 
323 
. 
179 
. 
191 
. 
142 
. 
127 
. 
133 
. 
107 
. 
098 
. 
087 
. 
002 46.28 1098.8 
[. 00] [. 00] 
ACS2 
. 
237 
. 
121 
. 
169 
. 
085 
. 
078 
. 
095 
. 
075 
. 
061 
. 
064 
-. 
001 247.51 578.65 
[. 00] [. 00] 
Panel C 
E -. 003 - -. 004 . 021 -. 024 . 043 . 015 -. 025 . 01 . 001 2.27 31.22 
. 
002 [. 81] [. 05] 
EI . 212 . 179 . 189 . 138 . 118 . 149 . 101 . 081 . 076 . 005 319.73 886.54 [. 00] [. 00] 
Ez 
. 
135 
. 
131 
. 
172 
. 
081 
. 
052 
. 
116 
. 
057 
. 
048 
. 
036 
. 
001 162.9 516.6 
[. 00] [. 00] 
Table 5.4 Autocorrelation structure 
Autocorrelation coefficients for lags up to 5, and for lags 10,20,40,70 and 100 are presented for daily CS, I CS I 
and (CS)2 in Panel A); for daily ACS, I ACS I and (ACS)2 in Panel B and for the realised, absolute and squared 
daily residuals from the model: 
dcst 
=a+ ßldc 
_1 
+ ß2dcst-2 + er 
in Panel C. The last two columns reported are the Ljung-Box Q-statistics with their p-values in brackets. The Q- 
statistic at lag k is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order k. Under the null 
hypothesis, Q is asymptotically distributed as a x2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags. The null 
hypothesis is rejected at a significant level of less than 1 percent for all lags for both the series CS and LCS. 
In order to provide a more robust test for long term dependence in the daily credit spread 
changes, we used the R/S methodology that looks at the scaling behaviour of the rescaled 
cumulative deviations of dCS2 from the mean. We estimated the Hurst exponent (Hurst, 1951), 
which is expected to be between 0.5 and 1 if the long memory structure exists. The sample period 
has been split into sub-samples according to the pattern of the volatility as resulting form the 
CUSCJM square test for variance stability (see Section 5.4.1). Specifically we have identified five 
sub-periods as follows: 2 January 1991 to 15 October 1991 (205 obs), 16 October 1991 to 21 June 
1994 (700 obs), 22 June 1994 to 25 Apn7 1995 (220 obs), 26 April 1995 to 26 February 1999 
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(1003 obs), and 27 February 1999 to 26 June 1999 (63 obs). The Hurst coefficient (H) was 
computed for the whole sample period and for each sub-period (with their respective expected 
values in brackets). Results indicate significant positive long-term memory for the whole sample 
(H=0.85, R2=0.99), the third (H=0.684, [0.587]), and marginally the second periods (H=0.576, 
[0.574] ). The null hypothesis of no long-term dependence could not be rejected for the first 
(H=0.578, [0.5911, fourth (H=0551, [0.574] and fifth sub-periods (H=0.573, [0.616j). In 
conclusion the evidence so far is not in favour of an Ed process for the credit spread changes 
process. 
1.1 
0.9 
_ 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
0.1 
(a) 
. 
o., 
Jf- 
abs ((S) & CS G'S"2 ci. c. i. 
0 35 
0.3 
025 
0.2 
015 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
-0.05 
-0.1 
abs (dCS) dCS"2 C i. 
-- ------- 
c. i. dCS 
Figure 5.2 Sample Autocorrelation Function for daily (a) CS, ICS land (CS)2 
and (b) dCS, %dCS / and (dCS 1 ) 
The autocorrelation function of CS, absolute CS and CS squared is plotted up to lag 100 in part (a). The autocorrelation 
function for ACS, absolute ACS and ECS squared is also presented in part (b). The dotted lines (c. i. ) in the plots of the 
autocorrelations are the approximate two standard error bounds computed as ± 1.96/j 
. 
Autocorrelation coefficients 
within these bounds are not significantly different from zero at (approximately) the 5% significance level. 
176 
Chapter V. 
" 
Modelling Credit Spreads 
0.8 
_ 
0.6 
_ 
0.4 
0.2 
_ 
0 
-0.2 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
-0.05 
-0.1 
-0.15 
-0.2 
-025 
_ 
-03 
-0.35 
------------- - --------- - 
'36 ýýýý 
6ý 
I16ý ý6 
71 76'I81 86 91 
111 
(b): DCS 
95% confidence interval 
Figure 5.3 Sample Partial Autocorrelation Function (PAF) for CS and ACS. 
The partial autocorrelation at lags from I to 100 is plotted both for CS and ACS. The PAF measures the correlation 
of values that are k periods apart after removing the correlation from the intervening lags. If the pattern of 
autocorrelation can be captured by an autoregression of order less than k, then the partial autocorrelation at lag k 
will be close to zero. The dotted lines in the plots of the partial autocorrelations are the approximate two standard 
error bounds computed as ± 1.96/, %T 
. 
Partial autocorrelation coefficients within these bounds are significantly 
different from zero at (approximately) the 5% significance level. 
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Despite the strenght of the evidence in favour of long memory, we should take into account 
that this result may be due to the aggregation effect deriving from the use of a bond index. The 
key idea is that the aggregation of weakly dependent series can produce a strong dependent series 
(Lobato and Savin, 1996). This possibility could be examined at a later stage in two ways 
analysing the long memory properties of a subsample of individual bonds included in the index, 
and applying the modified R/S analysis to produce a new R/S statistic (Lo, 1991) robust to short- 
term dependence, heterogeneities and nonstationatity. 
From the observation of the correlogram for dCS it is dear that both the ACF and the PACF 
are dose to zero after two lags. The negative sign of the first autocorrelation coefficient (=-0.32) 
suggests a mean-reverting behaviour of credit spreads. We presume an AR(2) specification is a 
parsimonious representation of the process governing the residuals and we consequently present 
in Panel C of Table 5.4 autocorrelations of the residuals, squared and absolute residuals of an 
AR(2) model for dCS: 
Acs, 
=a + ß, Acs, 
_, 
+, 8, + E, (5.5) 
An AR(2) specification was selected as the best specification. Despite this specification was 
able to remove all serial correlation in the residuals up to lag 5, the correlograms of the absolute 
and squared residuals display a very similar pattern to their counterparts in the dCS series. The 
Box-Pierce Q statistics for all lags up to 100 are much higher than the critical values, rejecting the 
null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. This implies that the residuals exhibit high levels of 
intertemporal dependence and suggests the need of a model able to capture all the stylised facts 
emerged so far lack of independence, nonlinearities in the series, implied persistence in 
conditional variance and excess kurtosis. 
5.3.5. Cmtt Spreads Statia1arity 
The second step towards the identification of the best model fitting the data consists in 
recording evidence about credit spreads intertemporal stationarity in order to avoid any potential 
spurious regression problem The autocorrelation functions were examined and the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADP) test for the presence of a unit root was implemented to determine the 
integration order of the series. The ADF test was first applied to credit spread levels. Since, the CS 
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series does not exhibit any trend and has a mean dose to zero, neither a trend nor a constant were 
introduced in the test regression. Both Akaike and Schwarz's information criteria selected an 
autoregressive model of order (2). For the ADF test, the test statistic is the t-statistic for the lagged 
dependent variable in the test regression. As the t-statistic is 0.029 and lower (m absolute terms) 
than the 95 percent MacKinnon critical value (1.93), the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in the CS series at any significance level The ADF test was successively applied to the 
first difference of the CS series and in this case the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cwld be 
rejected (t-statistic=-41.48, critical value=-1.93). The dCS series is found to be stationary at any 
significance level In conclusion, the CS series is integrated of order 1, I(1). 
As the ADF test assumes a moving average process for the error series (Said and Dickey, 
1984), we implemented also the Phillips-Perron (PP, 1988) test, which is a semi-parametric (Z- 
statistic) method that allows for higher-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in a series. 
The PP test results to be desiderable for its weaker set of assumptions concerning the error 
process and for its greater power to reject a false null hypothesis of a unit root. 15 The PP Z- 
statistic is 
-0.018 and -67.43 for CS and dCS, respectively, and the critical value at the 95 percent 
level is still-1.93. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected only for the dCS series. The results 
obtained performing the PP test are therefore totally consistent with those provided by the ADF 
test. 
An alternative way to test for stationatity is to focus on the nature of the variance of the CS 
series, that is implementing the variance ratio test (Poterba and Summers, 1988). If the CS series is 
I(1) taking 
d cs, = cs, 
- 
cs, 
_k , 
(5.6) 
k 
d cs, = cs, - cs, 
_, 
, 
(5.7) 
and the ratio 
var d cs (5.8) 
var d cs, 
15 The cost of weaker assumptions lies in the fact that in the presence of negative moving average terms, 
the P-P test tends to reject the null of a unit root whether or not the actual data-generating process 
contains a negative unit root. Hence, it is preferable to use the ADF test when the true model contains 
negative moving average terms and the Phillips-Perron test when the true model contains positive moving 
average terms. 
179 
Chapter V. 
" 
Modelling Credit Spreads 
a plot of X against k should be an increasing (straight) line. If CS does not have a unit root both Lk 
CS and Ol CS w71 be constant, so that the ratio ? does not change after k becomes large enough 
However, as Figure 5.4 shows, the variance ratio is increasing with k, suggesting the presence of a 
unit root and confirming the results from the ADF and PP tests. The variance ratio test has also 
been applied to credit spread changes. The value of the ratio displays an oscillating behaviour 
around its mean value of 0.756 for any value of k (Figure 5.4), which is evidence of stationarity for 
the dCS series. According to Poterba and Summers (1988), the fact that the variance ratios he 
below unity is also evidence of mean reversion. 
5.3.6. Coi it ration Analysis 
The ADF test was also applied to all the macroeconomic and financial series in levels 
presented in Section 5.3.3 and all of them were found to be non-stationary and I(1). In this 
section we are interested in determining whether the CS series is cointegrated with any of the 
financial variables, and if it is, in identifying the cointegration or long-run equilibrium relationship. 
Two previous studies estimated the long-run relationship implied in the yield premium using 
cointegration analysis. A cointegrating vector was found between Treasury yields, noninvestment 
grade bond yields, and default rates by Barnhill, Joutz, and Maxwell (2000). Moreover, Morris, 
Neal and Rolph (1998) show that corporate rates are cointegrated with government rates and the 
relation between Treasury rates and credit spreads on Moody's seasoned bond indices is negative 
in the short-run and reverses to be positive in the long-run. 
The Johansen's cointegration methodology was employed as it has been proven to be more 
powerful respect to other alternative techniques (Gonzalo, 1994). Furthermore, the Johansen 
approach offers a test statistic for the number of cointegrating vectors and allows direct 
hypothesis tests of the coefficients entering the cointegrating vector. 
The only variable that showed to be cointegrated with credit spreads is the FTSE All Share 
Price index. We now turn to see how the test develops. In the Johansen procedure, maximum 
likelihood is applied to an autoregressive representation of the form given by the following 
equation: 
dCS 
rL 
dCS, 
-' +n 
CS 
+ 
[c; c 
5.9 [LIPFTSEj 
-() AP 
, 
-, 
P FTSE 
, eP, 
7 
) 
180 
Chapter V. 
" 
Modelling Credit Spreads 
where I'(L) is a2x2 matrix of polynomials in the lag operator. The Johansen test is on the rank 
of the long-run impact matrix II. In the absence of cointegration, II is a singular matrix (rank 
- 
0). Hence, in our case, the rank of H could be between zero and two, the number of variables in 
the system. The appropriate lag structure to use in the VAR was determined from the log- 
hicelihood, Akaike and Schwarz's information criteria, and the F-statistic for comparison of the 
restricted and unrestricted models. We selected an autoregressive model of order (3) as the 
appropriate lag structure. The maximum eigenvalue statistic for no cointegrating vector (rank 
-0) 
was 0.0058 and the trace statistic was 15.93. The 95 percent critical value for the trace statistic was 
12.53, implying that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector could be rejected. Successively, 
the null hypothesis of at most 1 cointegration relation (rank 
- 
1) was tested The maxinnun 
eigenvalue for r-1 was 0.0014 and the trace statistic (3.04) was lower than the 95 percent critical 
value (3.84), indicating that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. We concluded that there is 
one cointegrating vector between credit spreads and the FTSE All Share Return index and the 
normalised cointegrated relation can be written as follows: 
CS + 0.003165 * LogP'7m) = 0. (5.10) 
As cointegrated variables CS and P' are characterised by time paths influenced by any 
deviation from the long run equilibrium. If the sum of CS and P' is large relative to the long 
run relationship, either the FTSE must fall ultimately relative to the CS, or CS must fall relative to 
the VISE. Without a full dynamic specification of the model, we cannot determine which of the 
two possibilities will eventually occur. But we know that the short run dynamics must be 
influenced by the deviation from the long run relationship. According to this result, we will add an 
error con-ection variable (EC4 to the dynamic models we will present later on, so that they will 
actually be error con-ection models. If the error correction component will result to be statistically 
significant, his will consolidate the cointegration analysis results and demonstrate the importance 
of the long-run relationship. We conclude this section, focusing the reader's attention on Figure 
5.5 and, in particular on the dear change in the slope of the long run relation around mid eighties, 
which suggests the possibility for a further investigation about the presence of a nonlinear 
cointegration relationship. 16 
16 For the interested reader we recall that the basic concept underlying this theory is that the error 
correction term derives from the nonlinear combination of two or more integrated variables. For details on 
nonlinear cointegration we advice to see the pioneer work in this field by Granger and Hallman (1991), 
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Figure 5.4 The variance ratio test for stationarity 
The variance ratio ? is plotted against k periods ahead both for CS and ECS and is 
computed by dividing the variance of CS (ACS) estimated from longer intervals by the 
variance of CS (ACS) estimated from shorter intervals, (for the same measurement 
period), and then normalizing this value to one by dividing it by the ratio of the longer 
interval to the shorter interval. The variance ratio is an increasing (straight) line if the 
series presents a unit root. In the absence of a unit root the value of the ratio oscillates 
around a mean value for any value of k We can also infer evidence of mean reversion if 
the variance ratio lies below unity. 
successively extended by Haekfe and Helmenstein (1996), Escribano and Granger (1998), and Maikellos 
(1998). 
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Figure 5.5 Cointegration between credit spreads and the FTSEAll Share Price Index 
The CS series is plotted against the Log(FTSE Price) series. A linear negative relationship between 
the two series is apparent for values of the Log(FTSE Price) series up to 9.3, or in other words up to 
May 1997, which is also the starting date for the Asian crisis. After this period the relation seems to 
invert to become positive 
5.4. Modelling Credit Spreads 
The time-series properties of credit spreads broadly discussed in the previous section provide 
strong evidence for nonlinear dependence, changing volatility, and high levels of intertemporal 
dependence in the credit spreads generating process. We will carry on our analysis on the basis of 
these results by modelling the credit spreads process as time dependent As credit spreads are 
proved to be non stationary, and since in this case asymptotic distributions are never achieved, 
they would produce not reliable statistical results. For this reason we will concentrate on the 
behaviour of credit spread changes. 
In this section we will proceed going through the last two stages of the Box Jenkins 
methodology, the estimation stage and the diagnostic checking stage. In the estimation stage 
different models are fitted and parameters estimated. In the diagnostic checking stage models are 
compared using the parsimony principle (AIC, SBC tests... ), t-statistics, stationarity and 
invertibility tests. We will start with modelling credit spread changes as a simple OLS model and 
" 
so 
1000 
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its unabi7ity to account for some important features of the data will lead us to introduce more 
complex models, namely autoregressive heteroskedastic models. 
ARCH techniques to model interest rate data have been applied to the term structure of 
interest rates. In particular ARCH models were estimated on corporate bond yields (Weiss, 1984) 
and on the differential returns between bills with different maturities (Engle, Uien and Robins, 
1987; Engle, Ng and Rothschild, 1990), while ARCH-M specifications were applied to the term 
premium by Enge, Lien and Robins (1987). However, applications of ARCH or GARCH 
models to credit spreads have never been implemented so far. 
5.4.1. The OLS madel 
The first model we introduce for credit spread changes is a simple homoskedastic model: - 
dCS, 
=c+ß, *dCSt_, +ß2 *dCSt_2 +ß, * Rt-; SE +ß4 dTERM +ßs dDOLLA , +et 
After tatting into consideration all the financial variables presented in Section 5.3.3, we used 
the adjusted RZ criterion, the Akailce and Schwarz information criteria, and the likelihood ratio 
(LR) test to select the most parsimonious model The White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
method was used to estimate the coefficient covariance matrix. The results and the main 
diagnostic tests are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, respectively. The first and the second order 
autoregressive parameters are estimated to be 
-0.31 and -0.074, respectively, and both are 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level. Credit spread changes are 
negatively and significantly influenced by the return on the FISE All Share index lagged one 
period (e, ) with a coefficient of 
-0.021 and by the contemporaneous change in the term 
spread (DTERK with a coefficient of 
-0.017. The change in the exchange rate against the dollar 
(ADOLLAIQ lagged one period has a positive impact, weh a parameter estimate of 0.011. All 
the signs are as expected. 
We first test forpaxwxer aiiný stability. The plot of the recursive coefficient estimates -which 
shows the evolution of estimates for any coefficient in the OLS model as more and more of the 
sample data are used in the estimation- produces no indication of instability. None of the 
coefficients displays significant variation or jumps typical of a structural break. We notice, 
however, that most of the coefficients how either a small drop or a spike in correspondence of 
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the end of 1992. The Chow's breakpoint test was implemented in order to see whether the event 
of the exit from the EMS on September 16,1992 represents astructural break. The idea of this 
test is to split the sample in correspondence of the potential break, fit the equation separately for 
each subsample and chech for any significant difference in the estimated equations. The results of 
the test are presented in Table 5.5. Neither the F test nor the L #elihood Ratio statistic rejects 
the null hypothesis of no structural change. Moreover, to reflect a possible structure break, a 
dummy variable was included for September 1992, and lagged one month to encompass any 
anticipation effect. The di mit r coefficient estimate was positive (0.0011) but not significant 
(t=1.22), confirming the absence of any structural break 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 16/9/1992 
F-statistic 1.204 Probability 0.30 
Log likelihood ratio 7.244 Probability 0.29 
Table 5.5 The Chow's breakpoint test 
The breakpoint Chow test is performed to test for the presence of a structural break. Two 
test statistics for the Chow test are reported. The F-statistic has an exact finite sample F- 
distribution if the errors are independent and identically distributed normal random 
variables. The log likelihood ratio statistic is based on the comparison of the restricted and 
unrestricted maximum of the (Gaussian) log likelihood function. The LR test statistic has 
an asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis of no structural change. 
Two additional tests for parameter stability are developed: the CUSUM test based on the 
cumulative sum of the recursive residuals, and the CUSUM of squared residuals (see Figure 5.6). 
The first test indicates no parameter instability as the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals 
lays always within the 5 percent critical lines. The CUSUM of squared residuals is suggestive of 
residual variance instability since the cumulative sum of the squared residuals periodically lies 
outside the area between the two (parallel) critical lines. Specifically significant departures from the 
confidence intervals are observed in the October 1991 June 1994 and April 1995-February 1999 
periods. 
Serial Cana &s. From the autoconelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the 
standardised residuals, we observe that the OLS model is able to remove serial correlation in the 
residuals only up to lag 5 (fable 5.7). The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
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correlation was also implemented. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals up 
to lag 20 could not be rejected. 
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Figure 5.6 The CUSUM test for OLS residuals and squared residuals 
The CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. The test finds 
parameter instability if the cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two 5% 
critical lines, the distance between which increases with t. Movement of the statistic outside 
the critical lines is suggestive of coefficient instability. For the CUSUM of squares the 
significance of the departure of the statistic from its expected value is assessed by reference 
to a pair of parallel 5% critical straight lines around the expected value. Movement outside 
the critical lines is suggestive of parameter or variance instability. We present (a) the 
CUSUM test and (b) the CUSUM of squares test for residuals from the OLS regression 
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Ile ms's t for heteroskedasticity n the residuals was also applied The test statistic was 
equal to 287, which is significantly higher than the critical value at any significance level. This 
implies that the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is to be rejected However, as the null 
hypothesis assumes that the errors are both homoskedatic and independent of the regressors, and 
that the linear specification of the model is correct, the high value of the test statistic might be due 
to the failure of any one of these conditions. 
ARCHeffais tests. Both the Ljung Box Q-statistic for the squared residuals and the AR(H-LM 
test up to lag 20 in Table 5.7 indicate the presence of strong ARCH effects in the residuals. This 
may lead to serious model misspecification if it is ignored. As with all forms of heteroskedasticity, 
the analysis will result in inappropriate parameter standard errors, which will be typicallytoo small. 
As a consequence the equation for credit spread changes should be re-specified. 
5.4.2. GARCHModels 
Generally, it is argued that the lack of independence arises from the presence of nonlinearities 
in the series. The dependence between the series and its past history raises the issue of how to 
summarise such dependence in a useful way. One way is to treat functions of ACS as being 
determined by models such as ARMEI, ARCH or GARCIi Defining the expectation of a 
random variable conditioned upon its past history as Et_ these models make Et-1 (g(OCS)) a 
function of ACS,.,. When g(ACS) 
_ 
ACSt2 
, 
and Et-, (ACS) a 0, Et-1 (ACS tý) = a, Z which we 
indicate as the conditional variance of OCSL Having generated iCSt2 by such models makes ate 
potentially dependent upon the past. 
As we have seen in Table 5.4 the squares of credit spreads are correlated and the slow decline 
in the autocor elation coefficients may be used to argue that the correlation is very persistent, and 
that ECS squared possess long-memory. In order to capture the ARCH effects and to represent 
the observed autocorrelation structure in daily credit spread changes, we estimate a number of 
conditional heteroskedastic time series models. GARCH (p, q) models with different values of p 
and q are tested from 1,0 to 3,3 applying likelihood ratio tests until the improvement in the 
likelihood function becomes insignificant. 
Non linear optimisation techniques are used to calculate the maximum likelihood estimates 
based on the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHI) algorithm. Since we suspect the residuals are 
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not conditionally nominally distributed, the quasi-maximum likelihood covariances and robust t- 
statistics are calculated using the Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) procedure. " 
5.4.2.1. ARCH(4) Model 
A simple ARC I(4) process is firstly fitted to daily credit spread changes (see Table 5. y). The 
fourth order of the process is found by using the information criteria mentioned above (the 
Schwarz information criterion and the Likelihood Ratio test). The mean equation does not differ 
from the mean equation in the OLS and all the variables maintain the same sign as before. The 
variance equation is as follows 
ht 
=0(0 +OLlE2 1 +a2Eý 2 +OL3Et 3 +O(4Eý 4 +Ut 
The estimate of the constant term (as) is positive and smaller than the sample variance obtained 
in the OLS model This is due to the changing conditional variance over time and its eventual 
contribution to the unconditional variance. The sum of the other ARCH parameters 
(a, +a2+a, +aa is substantially smaller than unity (0.67'), indicating that the fitted model is 
second-order stationary and that at least the second moment exists (Bollerslev, 1986). Finally, the 
ARCH model is able to totally remove the serial correlation in the residuals but not in the squared 
residuals. The Qz stars and the Lagrangean multiplier reject the presence of significant ARCH 
effects left only up to lag 5. 
5.4.2.2. GAR CH (1,1) 
In order to find a more parsimonious pecification for the dCS process we model credit 
spread changes as a GARCH process. Within the class of GARCH processes, we first estimated a
simple GARCH (1,1) incorporating first-order GARCI-I effects in the residuals c. While the 
mean equation is similar to the OIS and ARCS I(4) specifications, the structure of the variance 
equation is 
ht 
=«o +«, Eý, +ph, 
_, 
+u, 
17 Non robust standard errors would tend to under-estimate the true parameter estimator uncertainty and in 
the case of GARCH-M models, the GARCH-M parameter would tend to become significant. 
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The GARC H persistence parameter 03) and the ARCH parameter (a) are estimated to be 0.826 
and 0.115, respectively, with their sum slightly below unity 
-necessary condition for stability to 
hold. So the stationary GARCH formulation seems adequate to model the time variant credit 
spread changes volatility. However, the degree of persistence in shocks to volatility 
-given by the 
sum of the coefficients a, +Q- is quite high, which implies that shocks to the Eurobond market 
have highly persistent effects and the response function of volatility decays at a relatively slow 
pace. The volatility of credit spread changes is driven mainly by the variance observed in the 
previous trading day 
-as indicated by the size of the GARCH coefficient, which measures the 
long-term persistence in volatility". With respect to the estimates of the other parameters in the 
model, all the variables mantain the same sign and approximately the same magnitude as before 
except for the return on the FTSE index and the exchange rate parameters which become 
significant at the 1 percent level. The maximised loglikelihood showed an increase of 214 points 
over the homoskedastic model and the loglikelihood ratio (LR) strongly rejects homoskedasticity 
at better than the 1 percent level Being able to remove the ARCH effects also after lag 5, the 
GARC ET model represents an improvement over the ARCH model, with generally better 
diagnostic tests. 
5.4.2.3. GARCH (1,1)-Carnpincnt 
We proceed introducing additional variables in the variance equation of GARCH (1,1) in 
order to test whether they are helpful in reducing the degree of persistence of volatility. In 
particular we found that the credit spreads level is good for our purpose We leave the mean 
equation unchanged as before and we focus on the variance equation parameter estimates: 
ht 
= «o +«1E 
, 
+pht_, +yCS, +ut 
Small credit spreads are associated with low risk and reduced default frequency and thus to 
low volatility in the corporate bond market Conversely, when the economy is in a downturn and 
defaults become more and more frequent, spreads are high and tend to react significantly to every 
new default in the market. Thus high credit spread levels are naturally associated with high 
18 Note also that only persistent changes in volatility are associated to an adjustment in the risk premium. 
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volatility. Credit spreads level is proven to be an important source of time variation in volatility 
and volatility itself shows to be directional, rising in periods of rising spreads. Respect to the 
previous GARCH models, this new model shows to have a better goodness-of-fit, lower kurtosis 
in the standardised residuals, and higher logbkelihood value. The sum of the ARCH and GARCFI 
coefficients decreases to 0.87. The tests for serial correlation and for ARCH effects are even more 
strongly rejected. Despite these improvements, non-normality in the residuals is styl quite strong. 
To corroborate our general results we finally have replaced changes in credit spread as defined in 
Eqs. (5.3)-(5.4) with changes in relative credit spreads (OrCS) following the methodology in 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). We have run the same regressions introducing this new 
dependent variable and we compared the new estimates with the previous ones. The signs and 
the magnitude of the new coefficient estimates are similar to the previous parameter estimates. 
The Res of the new specification are generally slightly lower than those presented in Table 5.6, 
ranging from 0.272 to 0.289. The DW values also appear to be lower in the new regression 
specifications. The standardised residual mean and kurtosis coefficients result to be larger when 
taking into considerations relative CS. We can generally conclude that changes in credit spreads 
and changes in relative spreads lead to similar results. However the presence of slightly better 
diagnostic statistics in the "simple" model specification might be a reasonable argument to prefer 
it to the "relative" counterpart. 
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Exp. Sign OLS ARCH(4) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) Comp 
Mean Equation: 
C*105 6.850 
-6.730 6.730 3.890 
(. 00006) (. 00005) (. 00005) (. 00005) 
ACS(-1) 
-. 
310"* 
-. 
385*** 
-. 
307*** 
-. 
331*** 
(. 02865) (. 02395) (. 02246) (. 02221) 
ACS(-2) 
-. 
074*** 
-. 
133'** 
-. 
078*** 
-. 
082'** 
(. 02810) (. 02419) (. 02274) (. 02163) 
RFTsE(-1) 
- -. 
021* 
-. 
021" 
-. 
035*** 
-. 
030`*. 
(. 01202) (. 00859) (. 00843) (. 00835) 
ATER111 
- 
-. 
017. " 
-. 
015. " 
-. 
015- 
-. 
015. " 
(. 00151) (. 00106) (. 00117) (. 00115) 
'DOLLAR(-1) + 
. 
011 
. 
013" 
. 
017*" 
. 
016"' 
(. 00701) (. 00535) (. 00555) (. 00571) 
Variance Equation: 
C*106 
- 
3.470" 
. 
376... 
-. 
815" 
(3.53* 10-7) (1.28* 10-7) (3.15* 10-7) 
Arch(1) 
- 
. 
247*** 
. 
115*** 
. 
121"* 
(. 06196) (. 02932) (. 02846) 
Arch(2) 
- 
. 
108" 
-- 
(. 04850) 
Arch(3) 
- 
. 
168*" 
- 
(. 05757) 
Arch(4) 
- 
. 
145" 
-- 
(. 05231) 
Garch (1) 
-- 
. 
826*** 
. 
754S** 
(. 04184) (. 05069) 
CS +---2.53*10-5 *** 
(7.44*10-6 
Table 5.6 Linear and nonlinear estimates for daily credit spread changes 
The summary parameters and statistics for the linear and nonlinear models for credit spread changes are presented. 
The sample period is from January 1991 to May 1999 for a total of 2192 observations. The dependent variable is 
the daily change in the credit spread. In the OLS model the coefficient covariances are corrected for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) covariance estimator. All the nonlinear models are estimated under the 
assumption of not conditionally normally distributed residuals. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis) are obtained 
using the method presented in Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). NOTE: Significantly different from 
zero at the 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively (using a two-tailed test). 
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Diagnostic Checks OLS ARCH(4) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) Comp 
as +ß 
- 
0.67 0.93 0.87 
Adj. R2 0.307 0.297 0.304 0.303 
Log. Lik. 9668 9882 9915 9943 
Mean 
-7.64E-20 0.038 -. 00067 0.00069 
St. Dev. 0.0029 0.999 1.057 0.995 
Skewness 0.177 0.217 0.24 0.19 
Kurtosis 11.91 7.76 7.53 7.04 
Jarque-Bera 7267 2085 1892 1508 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DW 2.00 1.85 2.00 1.96 
Q(5) 4.558 2.721 5.275 6.324 
(0.47) (0.74) (0.38) (0.27) 
Q(20) 42.46 23.72 26.75 27.712 
(0.00) (0.25) (0.14) (0.11) 
LM Arch Test 20 lags 13.32 2.338 0.999 0.717 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.81) 
Q2(5) 136.94 3.976 3.065 2.8747 
(0.00) (0.55) (0.69) (0.72) 
Q2(20) 424.92 47.86 20.50 14.719 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.79) 
Akaike I. C. 
-8.82 -9.015 -9.046 -9.072 
Schwartz I. C. 
-8.80 -8.987 -9.023 -9.046 
N 2190 2190 2190 2190 
Table 5.7 Residuals Diagnostic Checking 
Q(5), Q(20) and Q2(5), Q2(20) are the Box-Pierce portmanteau test statistics, with 5 and 20 degrees of freedom, 
applied to the standardised and squared standardised residuals, respectively. They provide a test for the presence of 
autocorrelation and ARCH effects, respectively. Their P-values are reported in parentheses. In addition the Durbin 
Watson statistic (DW) for first-order serial correlation and the LM statistic test for the presence of remaining 
significant ARCH effects are presented. Skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality of the 
standardised residuals are also reported. 
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5.4.2.4. Additional Tests 
Summarising, we have found that estimates of the variance quation provide strong evidence 
of changing conditional volatility for credit spread changes. In all the models presented the 
estimated sum of the GARCH coefficients (a, + ß) provides a measure for the persistence of 
volatility since expected future volatility decays towards the unconditional variance ae2 according 
to the equation: 
a0 
` 1-(a, +ß) 
(5.11) 
The sum ai +ß results to be very dose to one. This means that multi-step forecasts from the 
model will approach the unconditional variance quite slowly: the estimated mean lag of this 
variance expression, 1/(1-ß), ranges between 4 to 6 days. Another way to view the volatility 
persistence is by calculating the half life of volatk shocks, which is computed as ln(0.5) over 
ln(a+ ß). The half-life of volatility shocks ranges f rom 2 to 10 days. 
We tested if the second-order system admits periodic solutions, that is if the following relation 
holds: 
al <- ß2/4 (5.12) 
Substituting the paramer estimates we obtain 
-0.082 < -0.027, which is a standard result implying 
periodic cycles (Bidargota, 1996). Further and more formal tests might be applied to confirm this 
preliminary piece of evidence. 
As a final comparison of the performance of the various models, we analysed the residuals 
from the various models and their 95 percent forecast intervals ± 1.96 WV'. Residuals appear to 
be almost indistinguishable, indicating that any model may not provide a significant improvement 
over the others in terms of point forecasts. The forecast intervals, however, are very different. In 
particular, it emerges that the conditional variance derived from the GARCH (1,1)-component 
model seems to reflect more accurately the behaviour of the series. During periods of low 
volatility, such as before 1992 and from 1996 to 1997 the forecast intervals of the ARCH model 
frequently decline to the lower bound ±1.96 (oc, )'12. However, for both the GARC II Models, 
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during the same periods, the forecast intervals become smaller than ±1.96 (aý'2. As we should 
expect from a good conditional variance model, the series can be predicted with higher 
confidence during less volatile periods. Therefore, from the confidence intervals analysis, the 
GARC-I(1,1) models appear to be most attractive, confirming results in Table 5.7. 
5.4.3. Asynvna? ic Analysis 
The main limitations of the GARCH model derive from the property of linearity and from the 
quadratic form of the conditional variance that this model displays. The impact of past values of 
the innovation on the current volatility is only a function of their magnitude and not of their sign. 
However, we might expect bad news to have a bigger impact on the predictable volatility of CS 
than good news of similar magnitude, we therefore proceed testing this hypothesis. 
The simplest approach to examine the eventual dependence of the conditional volatility of 
ACS(t) upon the past is to plot (OCSt 
- 
µ)Z against CSt_l, which is done in Figure 5.7. a. The 
evidence of a level effect its not very dear. Alternatively, we can look at the cross correlation 
between the squared standardised residuals and lagged standardised residuals. These cross 
correlations should be zero for a symmetric GARCI-i model and negative for asymmetric 
GARC I models (TARCH or EGARQ". From Figure 5.7. b it emerges that volatility does not 
depend upon the sign of credit spread changes; in fact, neither the magnitude of the conrlations 
is high, nor the sign is persistent over time. However, the cross correlation only picks up linear 
associations between the two series and may miss nonlinear dependence between the two series. 
As an alternative approach to check for any level effect we can investigate if the observed 
conditional heteroskedasticity in the data might be better accounted for by an asymmetric 
GARC E process 
-TARO H or EGARC -L The Threshold GARCH (TARCH) model, 
introduced by Zakoian (1990) and Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), differentiates from a 
GARCH model since the quadratic form of the residuals in the standard GARCH is replaced by 
a linear function, allowing for different reactions of volatility to the sign of the past errors. 
Another useful parameterisation is the exponential GARCH (EGARC. " proposed by Nelson 
(1991): 
log(C2) 
=ao+ß, log(ý,, )+a, E`' 
-ll- +Yý`' (5.13) 
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where the parameter y is essentially the parameter that allows for asymmetry. If y is not 
significantly different from zero, then a positive surprise has the same effect on volatility as a 
negative surprise of the same magnitude. If y >0, a negative surprise (c > C) increases volatility 
more than a positive surprise (c <0). Note that a bad news in the case of credit spreads is 
identifiable by a positive shock c >Q If c >0 the credit spread level increases and the credit risk as 
well For this reason we expect y >0 if volatility increases with bad news (E > 0). Flom the 
estimation of the TARCEI (1,1) and EGARC I (1,1) we obtain values for the leverage effect 
parameter y not significantly different from zero. 
A graphical and more intuitive presentation of these results is offered by the news impact 
curve. This curve relates past credit spread changes shocks (news) to current volatility and 
measures how new information is incorporated into volatility estimates. In other words, the 
curves show whether the volatility of the two subsets reacts in the same manner after a bad or 
good unexpected event. The news impact curve for a TGARCH (1,1), for example, is given by 
Q, ' =A+a, " s, Z, , for c, 
-, 
<0 (5.14) 
a, " =A+ (a, + y) " i5, _,, for c, >0 where (5.15) 
(5.16) A= ao +, ß, a U. 
where alln is the unconditional variance. From our estimates we obtain that: 
Q, ' = -1.93E - 06 + 0.203 " c,, for s, 
_, 
<0 (5.17) 
Q; ' = -2.71E - 06 + 0.206 " s,?, for s, 
-, 
> 0. (5.18) 
Eqs. 5.17 and 5.18 are represented in Figure 5.7. c and 5.7. d equivalently. We can see how bad 
news (E> 0) have just slightly bigger impact on conditional volatility as indicated by the steeper 
slope for the positive side. 
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5.4.4. Swrnnary insults 
The explanatory power of linear and nonlinear models is very similar with adjusted R2 around 
30 percent The variables able to explain changes in credit spreads are the two autoregressive 
terms, the return on the FTSE All Share index (lagged one period), the change in the exchange 
rate against the dollar (lagged one period), and the contemporaneous change in the TERM 
spread. The signs of the estimated coefficients are all consistent with our expectations. Credit 
spread changes are mainly explained by autoregressive components, which present a negative sign 
implying mean reversion in the credit spread process. Moreover, credit spreads increase as the 
slope of the term structure decreases and increase as the sterling appreciates. The return of FISE 
in the previous period has a negative impact on credit spreads in the current period. The 
coefficient of changes in the risk-free short-term rate is negative but not significant either 
statistically or economically. Finally, credit spreads volatilityis increasing with credit spreads level 
A GARC HM (1,1) model was also estimated with a mean equation similar to the mean 
equation of previous models except for the presence of an additional term, h, representing the 
impact of the conditional standard deviation on the conditional mean. The trade-off parameter y, 
which is the estimated coefficient for the h term, can be interpreted as the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion according to Merton (1980) and Campbell and Hentschel (1992). The sign and the 
magnitude of this parameter depend on the utility functions of the agents and the supply 
conditions of the assets. Hence, y can take a positive, negative, or a zero value (Engle et a1 1987). 
Note also that y is the price for systematic risk, that is the price for the risk component that 
cannot be diversified. If fluctuations in volatility are mostlydue to shocks to the unsystematic risk, 
y can have any sign. In other words, an increase in the conditional variance, which is a measure 
for the total risk, does not need to be accompanied by an increase in the risk premium. The 
GARC IM parameter is positive but not significant. Volatility, therefore, does not contribute to 
the premium for credit risk. 
We also tested whether among the other explanatory variables the error correction mechanism 
(ECM) is significant and if its coefficient is negative as we expect in accord with convergence 
toward the long-run equilibrium. To this aim we included the ECM in the mean equation 
interpreting its coefficient as a speed of adjustment parameter. If credit spreads start to increase 
more rapidly than is consistent with the steady state solution, the term (cs(1 
+0.003165*LwJP,, (-1))) increases. However, since the coefficient is less than zero, the overall 
effect is to slow down the short-term growth in credit spreads, forcing credit spreads at time t 
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back towards their long run growth path In other words, changes in credit spreads partially 
correct last period's disequilibrium and move towards the new equilibrium in response to 
movements in its detenninants (long-term interest rates, return index on the FrSE All Share 
index and short-term interest rate conditional volatility). In fact we found that the estimated ECM 
coefficient in the mean equation is actually negative but not significant This does not convalidate 
the cointegon analysis before developed, confirming that a more appropriate methodolor 
should be applied to shed some light on credit spreads long-term relationships. 
5.5. Conclusions 
The main results of our investigation about the behaviour of credit spreads on the sterling 
Eurobond index can be summarised as follows. Credit spreads show to be characterised by a 
cyclical behaviour and by a clustering of outliers across time, which is symptomatic of a persistent 
volatility process. This argues against homoskedastic models for credit spreads in favour of 
conditionally heteroskedastic models. The unconditional distribution of both credit spread levels 
and changes is more peaked and displays fatter tails than a normal distribution. Short-run co- 
movements with the main financial and economic variables are measured by correlation 
coefficients. Changes in credit spreads appear to be negatively correlated with interest rates 
variables, and with the exchange rate against the dollar. On the other hand, credit spreads are 
positively correlated with variables proxy for the consumer confidence or business cycle. From 
the intertemporal stationarity analysis credit spreads result to be integrated of order 1, and long- 
run comovements (cointegration) are weakly observed with the FTSE All Share Price index. 
Moreover, credit spread levels and changes are proved not to be an Lid process and from the 
autoconelation structure analysis a few stylised facts emerged short-term dependence, 
nonlinearities, and persistence in the conditional variance. The evidence, hence, suggests nonlinear 
dynamics and time-varying volatility structure. 
We estimated linear and nonlinear models to identify the factors driving changes in credit 
spreads. Our results show that the factors suggested by traditional models of default risk explain 
30 percent of the variation in credit spreads as measured by the adjusted W. We find that the signs 
of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are in line with what the analysis would predict. An 
increase in the return on the FTSE leads to a contraction in credit spreads. Moreover, Eurobond 
spreads are positively related to the exchange rate and negatively related to the slope of the term 
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structure. The ECM as derived from the cointegration analysis, was also added in the model, but 
its estimate was found not significant. 
The analysis of the residuals hows that nonlinear models remove the autocorrelation but 
cannot fully account for the leptokurtosis they reveal. The study also finds a preliminary piece of 
evidence in favour of periodicity in the time series of changes in credit spreads. Finally, no 
statistically significant evidence of asymmetries in the persistence of positive and negative shocks 
is documented. 
Our empirical results contribute to understanding the time series process of credit risk. Ibis 
has implications for term structure models of corporate yields, the pricing of credit derivatives, 
and methods for measuring credit risk. Our investigations can be refined by further exploring the 
long memory structure of credit spreads in the presence of nonlinearities and by a future 
investigation about the presence of periodic cycles, which might be exploited for forecasting 
purposes. It remains also to be investigated whether GARU I models with thick-tailed errors can 
account for all the leptokurtosis observed in the data. The hypothesis of a mixture of normal 
distributions 
- 
that might explain both the shape of the densities and the excess kurtosis of the 
data- and the nonlinear cointegration hypothesis night also be the focus of new research in the 
field of credit spreads. 
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changes in the variance of abnormal yields will provide results different from those obtained using 
a standard event-study methodology. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, we review the evidence to 
date on this topic. Data and methodology are explained in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we 
document and present the results regarding the effect of corporate and government rating 
revision announcements on daily spread mean and volatility. Conclusions are drawn in the last 
Section. 
6.2. Literature Review 
Research on the information value of bond-rating revisions has produced mixed results so far. 
Two ways to approach the question have been explored in the literature. The first is to examine 
whether bond yields are related to rating information. The second is to examine price reactions to 
rating changes. Using the first approach, West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984), Ederington, Yawitz 
and Roberts (1984,1987) and others relate yield spreads (i. e., the difference between corporate 
bond yields and the yields of equal maturity default risk-free bonds) to ratings, controlling for firm 
and issue characteristics. In general these studies find that credit ratings help explaining cross- 
sectional differences in yield spreads, and have a statistically significant independent effect on 
yields. In other words, ratings seem to convey pertinent information to investors in addition to 
what they can deduce from publicly available data. 
It is not dear, however, whether ating information is pricing relevant per se or merely proxies 
for omitted, publicly available, variables that affect yield spreads. This is investigated by studies 
taking the second approach and examining the reaction of bond and stock prices to 
announcements of rating changes. The advantage of this approach is that each firm serves as its 
own control, which means that all pricing-relevant factors are controlled for. We briefly present 
below the main works related to rating revisions and stock price reaction. We look more 
extensively at rating changes and bond prices reaction. 
21 See, for example, Foster et al. (1984), "Earnings Releases, anomalies and the behaviour of security 
returns", The Aatwuing Reciew, 59,4, p. 574-603; and Bernard and Thomas (1989), "Post-Earnings 
Announcements", Journal of Accounting Research, 27, Suppl., p. 1-36. 
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6.2 1. Stock Market Reaction 
Most of the literature has focused on the adjustment of equity prices to the release of new 
rating infonnaation. Griffin and Sanvincente (1982), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), Wansley and Clauretie (1985), Cornell, Landsman and Shapiro 
(1989), Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), Ederington and Goh (1998) have all established that stock 
market reacts negatively to bond downgrade announcements, while upgrades are not found to be 
associated with significant abnormal returns. Claris, Dellva and Foster (1993), through the use of 
influence statistics, find a positive relationship between bond rating changes and changes in the 
beta of the fine. Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro (1989) examine whether the response of stock 
prices is affected by the nature of the firm's assets and suggest hat the impact of new information 
on a firm's value is likely to depend on the firm's net intangible assets. Goh and Ederington 
(1993) find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the reaction to downgrades depends on the 
exact reason for the downgrade. The market reaction is sizeable and significant only when rating 
changes are related to the performance or deterioration in the fine' financial prospects. On the 
other hand, rating downgrades due to an increase in leverage have positive implications for 
stockholders, but as they are generally in response to past known leverage increases, no equity 
market reaction is observed for them. Finally, Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997) find 
significantly negative valuation effects for rating downgrades, and they show how this effect is 
transmitted throughout the whole industry. Dichev and Pietroski (1998) find that stocks with 
upgrades outperform stocks with downgrades for up to one year following the announcement. 
Further evidence suggests that this divergence between upgrades and downgrades is primarily due 
to the reams of small fines and firms with non-investment grade debt. 
The general consensus is that the market for common stocks is relatively efficient. However, 
much less is known about bond market efficiency mostly because of the lack of data on bond 
pricing. We proceed introducing and briefly discussing the main empirical works focused on 
bond market reaction to rating change announcements. 
6.2.2. Bond Market Reaction 
Weinstein (1977) uses 132 rating changes from 1962 to 1974 to examine the difference 
between the holding period return both on utility and industrial bonds with changed ratings and 
on bonds with the original unchanged rating. He finds marginal evidence of a price reaction in the 
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period 18 months to 6 months before the rating change and no evidence of abnormal returns in 
the period from 6 months before to 6 months after the event. However, none of the 23 excess 
holding period return averages that Weinstein presents in the paper are significantly different 
from zero. Moreover, the use of non-transaction-based monthly prices raises questions about the 
study's findings. 
Wakeman (1978) uses weekly bond returns and confirms Weinstein's results in not finding any 
price reaction at the time of a rating change. On the same line Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) 
and Pinches and Singleton (1978) report that rating changes for investment-grade public utility 
bonds provide little or no information of value to shareholders. They state there is a lag that 
ensures that any information content is fully discounted by the month of the change. Wakeman 
(1981) argues that rating changes, which lag rather than lead security price changes, provide a code 
that incorporates all the major ingredients of the bond's risk. Moreover, since rating changes are 
triggered by economic events, it is not dear how much of the price reaction is due to the rating 
announcement and how much is due to the triggering economic event itself. 
McCarthy and Melicher (1988) introduce a constrained optimisation approach using a mean- 
variance framework to examine bond-rating changes in the context of a bond portfolio. The 
bonds with rating changes are matched with bonds that have not been re-rated. The relative 
demand for two closely matched bonds is expected to be similar under conditions of equilibrium. 
Changing conditions should alter this relationship. In particular, the relative demand for a bond is 
expected to rise if its risk-return attributes and rating are improving and to decline in the opposite 
case. As a consequence, divergence in investment proportions between matched change and non- 
changed bonds is used to identify market anticipations. The results show that in over two-thirds 
of the cases, the market anticipated the formal announcement of a rating change. Furthermore, 
the average market adjustment occurred earlier for downgraded bonds than for upgraded bonds. 
However, a number of studies do find significant bond price reactions after the ratings 
announcement. Katz (1974) collects monthly bond yields for electric utility companies spanning 
the 1966-1972 period. The purpose of the study is to test the hypothesis of a semi-strong efficient 
bond market. The change in yield to maturity is taken as measure of market adjustment. 
Regression models are developed to forecast the expected yield to maturity of a reclassified bond 
for both its old and new rating dass in the twelve months prior to and five months after the rating 
change. The actual yield is then compared to the two expected yields to determine to what degree 
an adjustment has taken place. The empirical results indicate that no anticipation existed prior to a 
public announcement of reclassification. In addition a slight lag is found to exist in the adjustment 
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process subsequent o the announcement, and 100 percent adjustment prevails only 6-10 weeks 
after a reclassification. 
Grier and Katz (1976) examine 96 industrial and utility issues down-rated by S&P between 
1966 and 1972. In this case average monthly dollar and percentage changes in market prices are 
used as measure of market adjustment Re-rated bonds are compared with single issues with 
approximately the same coupon and maturity. They conclude that the market reacts after, not 
before, a rating change, thought no formal statistical analysis is performed to sustain this 
conclusion. 
Ingram, Brooks and Copeland (1983) examine the information content of municipal bond 
rating changes by evaluating monthly price adjustments during the period surrounding the rating 
change. Subtracting from the yield to maturity of each municipal issue the estimated yield to 
maturity of a US Treasury bond with similar maturity and coupon, a yield premium for each 
municipality for each month is derived. The effect of bond rating changes is assessed by 
comparing the average yield premium for municipalities that experienced a rating change with the 
average yield premium for equivalently rated municipalities that experienced no rating change. 
Rating changes were limited to the period May 1977 through April 1978 to enable the derivation 
of yield premix for a minimum of 8 months prior and 8 months after the rating change. Test 
statistics on yield premium differentials show that the impact of rating changes occurred during 
the month of the change. The yield premium differential does not appear to anticipate the 
impending rating change. 
Wansley, Glascock and Clauretie (1992) use institutional bond weekly prices from Merrill 
Lynch Bond Pricing Service instead of listed quotes, which are infrequently traded. From this 
study the bond market appears to be highly efficient with respect o changes in bond rating 
grades. A strong negative announcement effect is found during the week of bond rating 
reductions and no price reaction is observed during the weeks after the rating change. While bond 
downgrades convey considerable information, bond-rating increases are not associated with 
announcement effects. Additionally, this study, breaking down the sample according to the 
industry sector, provides evidence that industrial bonds may be more sensitive to rating changes 
than utilities. 
Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) is the first study that uses daily data to examine the 
price reaction of bonds to rating changes between 1977 and 1982. Pricing information was 
collected from 60 days before to 60 days after rating change announcement. Hand et aL use 
exchange transactions data and find that anticipated rating changes produce no reaction in either 
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the bond or stock markets. By contrast, wr d vnjade announcements cause significantly 
negative bond and stock returns; and wrVecmi upgrade announcements cause relatively little 
positive movement in bond prices. Moreover for downgrades, the average excess bond returns 
result to be stronger for below investment grade bonds than for investment-grade bonds. 
However, we recall that exchange-traded debt instruments suffer of a sample bias toward 
non-investment grade debt in the dimensions of listing, volume, and frequency of trade. 
In addition the irregularity of trading and the thinness of the market made it infeasible to 
investigate the issue of when a bond began to exhibit abnormal returns. 
Hite and Warga (1997) use a database of more than 1500 industrial firms' trader quotes. The 
time period spans from March 1985 through March 1995 and all S&P and Moody's rating 
changes are analysed from 12 months before to 12 months after the rating change. Their findings 
reveal a significant announcement effect (m terms of abnormal bond returns) to downgraded 
firms in both the announcement month and pre-announcement period The magnitude of the 
downgrading effects increase dramatically moving from investment-grade to non-investment 
grade firms. Also in this study upgrades effects are much weaker in magnitude and significance 
than downgrade effects. The evidence for downgrades is generally stronger in terms of event- 
month and pre-event price reactions if the sample is restricted to events that are uncontaminated 
(Le., not preceded by a rating change in the six-month pre-event period) and in which both 
agencies imultaneously re-rate. 
Kliger and Sarig (1999) collect monthly information on bonds included in the Lehman 
Brothers Bond Indices. Their objective is to test if the release of new rating information affects 
both the value of the firm as a whole, as well as its division between stockholders and 
bondholders. They find that bond and stock prices and yield spread information provided by 
Moodys is valuable. They find no evidence of any impact on the firm value as a whole and they 
interpret this explaining that bankruptcy costs are small and that the incremental information of 
bond rating is largely about diversiflable risks. This is because if bankruptcy costs are significant or 
if default risk is systematic, the rating information that affects debt and equity values will also 
affect firn value. Lastly, they find that the effect of rating information on bond prices is 
monotonic in firm leverage: the more levered the fine is, the stronger is its bond-price reaction to 
new rating information. 
]ark, Foster and Ghani (1997) focus on the information effect of bond rating changes by 
examining financial analysts' reactions rather than the market reaction. The specific focus is on the 
effect of firm size on the short-term forecasts. Large firms are expected to provide significantly 
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more information to the market than small firms. This is because of a belief that the benefit of 
such information sharing exceeds the cost and because they have fewer competitive concerns 
than small firms. Their sample consists of 440 corporations downgraded by S&P between 1986 
and 1992. Finns are split in two groups on the basis of market capitalisation. Average earnings 
forecast revisions and abnormal earnings forecast revisions for small and large firths are estimated 
and tested for significance in the months 
-6 to +6 respect to the event month. Results indicate 
that rating information is value-relevant with respect to small firms. The evidence does not 
support similar value-relevance for large fines. This would imply that rating agencies diminish 
information asymmetries in the capital markets by communicating valuable new information 
about firms that tend to operate in less precise information environments. 
6.2.3. Event studies and Eunt-Inducd Vari v" 
Although most traditional event-study methods assume aconstant variance through both pre- 
and post-event periods, a number of studies have documented that the classical event study 
methodology exhibits a bias toward detecting "effects", irrespective of whether such effects 
actually exist. " Brown and Warner (1985) verify that event studies work well when an event has an 
identical effect on all fines. They also warn that when an event has different effects on firms, the 
variance of the variable we are considering (returns, yields, etc. ) will increase 
-due to a temporary 
change in the firm's systematic risk. Moreover if variance is underestimated, the test statistic will 
lead to rejection of the null hypothesis more frequently than it should, even when the average 
performance is zero. 
The first paper that takes into consideration variance aspects is Hettenhouse and Sartoris 
(1976). They construct an F-ratio of the variance of yield differentials six months before and after 
the revision, and one month before and one month after. The results don't allow them to reject 
the hypothesis of no difference in the variance before and after the revision. In other words rating 
changes showed to be not useful to homogenize investor opinion. One additional possibility 
examined is that the conformity of opinion on yields would be greater closer to the rating revision. 
F-ratios are then calculated by dividing the variance for the six-month time period by the variance 
for the one-month time period The data, however, provide little support for the hypothesis that 
the variability is reduced by proximity to the revision date. 
22 See, for example, the papers by Boehmer, Musumei and Poulsen (1991), Brown and Warner (1985), and 
Frankfurter and McGoun (1993). 
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More recently, a number of papers dealing with stock market reaction to various events, have 
analysed the importance of adjusting for autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (ARCH) 
effects in the residuals obtained from the conventional market models. This adjustment has been 
motivated by the idea that the ability to reliably form statistical inferences can be seriously 
compromised by failing to consider the ARCH error structure (Connolly, 1989; Schwert and 
Seguin, 1990). Brockett, Chen and Larven (1998), for example, use a market model that 
incorporates ARCH effects, time-varying systematic risk parameter (beta), and time-varying 
conditional variance. With this new methodology they reach exactly the opposite conclusion of 
previous empirical studies regarding the effects of a significant regulatory event (specifically, the 
passage of California's Proposition 103). 
Since ARCH effects have been shown to be generally significant in financial time series and 
specifically significant in the Eurobond yields series, we take this into consideration in our model 
by applying GARCH models to the abnormal yield series. No previous work has modelled bond 
yields or prices reaction taking into consideration both cross-sectional and time series changing 
variance. 
6.3. Data and methodology 
We collected data on all sterling Eurobonds rating revisions by Standard and Poor's between 
January 1992 to December 1999. From Datastream International we retrieved the daily time 
series of ratings for each bond starting from the date it was issued. Credit rating information was 
available for 477 fixed coupon straight Eurobonds. The data were screened using the following 
process. The whole sample was split on the basis of rating migrations during the life of the issue. 
313 Eurobonds were not re-rated over the sample period, while 164 experienced a rating revision, 
of which 123 downgrades and 41 upgrades. Eight bonds were re-rated within 60 days from a 
previous revision and therefore excluded from the sample as causing overlapping observations. 
After this first screening, the data set reduces to 117 downgrades and 39 upgrades. 
In order to separate the effect of a downgrade upon a bond's yield from the effect of a change 
in the general credit market conditions we collected a control group of bonds similar in all 
respects to the group of re-rated bonds. The sole difference being that the control group did not 
experience a rating change. We successively matched individually each re-rated Eurobond with a 
Eurobond in the non re-rated sample with similar characteristics in terms of original rating, 
industry sector, time to maturity on the date of the rating's change, coupon and market value. For 
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the bonds that have been re-rated over the period and for the matched (contra» bonds we 
collected daily time series of redemption yields and maturity dates. Coupon rates and number of 
days accrued towards the coupon payment date were also collected. The last screening step was to 
select issues for which two or more features 
-among rating, maturity, and industry- could not be 
properly matched. These issues were dropped from the sample with the resulting data set finally 
consisting of 107 downgraded and 29 upgraded bonds. While we were able to match exactly the 
original ratings, 105 bonds were not matched on one criterion 
-maturity or industry. Average 
absolute differences in maturities are 1.85 years and industry is matched 80% of the times. 
6.3.1. Rating Transition Matrix 
Table 6.1 presents the rating transition matrix defined over the whole sample period 1992- 
1999 and for all the bonds (477) for which rating information is available. It depicts the size and 
the direction of typical rating changes. The rows of the matrix indicate the rating at the time the 
bond is issued. The columns relate to the new rating in correspondence of each first re-rating of 
each bond. The number in each cell represents the number of observations that have the 
respective old and new rating. 
The upper left-hand corner of Table 6.1 indicates that 90% of AAA-rated bonds have 
remained at that level over the period from 1992 to 1999. In other words, AAA-rated issues have 
the greatest stability, in terms of retaining their initial rating. This is not surprising as a triple A 
bond can change in only one direction. The next cell to the right indicates that 10% of AAAs 
have been downgraded to AA+. Moreover, the table indicates that 10% of all AA- rated 
companies experienced an improvement of one letter rating (to AA). The vast majority of across- 
rating changes occur within one dass (within-one-class changes are on the two diagonals 
immediately above the and below the main diagonal). Only 39 observations, or about 8% of the 
sample, are across two or more rating classes. 
Cells along the main diagonal of the matrix contain the number of bonds in each 
correspondent rating category that remained unchanged over the whole period. Unchanged 
bonds account for 313 observations, or about 65% of the sample, indicating that the most likely 
rating for an issuer is the original rating the issuer was assigned when issued. As we move off of 
the diagonal values are generally lower. This is simply explained by the infrequent large changes in 
credit quality over the period. Cells above and below the main diagonal provide number and 
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percentage of bonds that have been downgraded (sum equal to 123) and upgraded (sum equal to 
41), respectively. 
In the next steps we will examine how the observed credit quality and magnitude of rating 
changes in our sample are related to the strenght of the information effect of bond rating changes. 
AAA AA+ A AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- Total 
AAA 130 15 
----- (0.9) (0.10) 145 
- 
(0.49) (0.24) (0.20) (0.02) (0.05) 
---- - 
41 
9 26 8 -i-- 1121 
(0.19) (0.54) (0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
48 
`4A_ 
6 37 20 
(0.10) (0.59) (0.32) 63 
A+ 5' 20 24 6 (0.09) (0.36) (0.44) (0.11) SS 
A 1 25 57 (0.03) (0.66) (0.13) (0.18) 
, 
II 
38 
A- 
_ 8 25 3-i 
(0.22) (0.68) (0.08) --; -- (0.03) 
- 
37 
BBB+ 3 11 
---- (0.21) (0.79) 14 
BBB 181 (0.09) (0.09) (0.73) 1 (0.09) -- Il 
BBB- 
- (040) (0.20) (0_20) (0.20) s 
BB+ 
BB 
-21 (0.50) (0.25) 
---- 
1(-- 
(0.25) 
--- 
4 
j (0.67) (0.33) 
B- 
B+ 
(0.50) 
ý- 
--ý-- ----- 
--1 
0.50 () 
_ýl11 
2 
4 
t--1 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
-- 
B 
------- - - (0.67) (0.33) 3 
B- (14 4 
Total 130 44 42 59 42 58 42 23 11 6 3 4/ 4 35 477 
Table 6.1 Rating Transition Matrix, 1992-1999. 
The rating transition matrix is defined over the whole sample period 1992-1999. The size and the direction of typical 
rating changes are presented. Rows indicate the rating at the time the bond is issued. Columns correspond to the new 
rating in correspondence of each first re-rating of each bond. In each cell we report the frequency and the probability in 
brackets. Along the diagonal there is the probability for a bond in each correspondent rating category to remain unchanged 
over the whole period. 
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6.3.2. Standani Evert Study 
We first conduct a standard event study of the bond market (price) reaction to the 
announcement of a rating change. We use an event window of (-60; + 60) days around the event 
day (day zero). The event window is split in five sub-periods, TT, with ja1,2, 
..., 
5. T, (T) 
indudes the period 
- 
(+)60 to 
- 
(+) 16 days before (after) the event; T2 (T4) indudes the period 
- 
(+) 15 to 
- 
(+)2 days before (after) the event (pre-announcement and post-announcement 
periods); and T, is the small 
-1 to +1 event window (announcement period). Daily returns for 
changed and non changed bonds are computed as follows: 
R i, = 
n n-1 (pit 
-P4`_')+360C 360C (6. i)n P`t-I + 
360 
C 
with n= days accrued towards the next coupon payment and C= coupon payment. 
Abnormal Returns (ARs) are successively measured by subtracting from the return on a 
changed bond the return on a non-revised bond having the same rating, industry and matu ity 
classification as the bond in question. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are successively 
computed for various event windows and for downgrades and upgrades separately. Their 
magnitude is tested in order to see if the adjustment lag for bonds is of economic significance. In 
other words, we want to provide preliminary evidence about the possibility for a trader to make a 
profit upon announcement of a rating change by selling the redassified bond and later 
repurchasing it23 
Besides splitting the sample in positive and negative revisions, downgraded bonds are broken 
down into various categories on the basis of industry, rating, guarantee, country of origin of the 
borrower, coupon, marketability, maturity on the day of rating change, and the presence of a 
previous rating change (rating history). We aim to test for the existence of profitable trading rules 
and significant differences among the various categories of bonds. A simple t-test and one-sample 
signed rank test are used to test the null hypothesis that the mean and the median, respectively, of 
the population from which the data sample is drawn is equal to zero. 
23 The current analysis does not take into account commission fees. 
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6.3.3. Asyirnnetric Responses 
In the second step, we use the same event study methodology to examine the impact of rating 
changes announcements on bond yields. The first hypothesis we want to test is the different 
response of bond yields to positive and negative rating revisions. Empirical evidence occasionally 
has revealed that both the stock and bond market react to downgrades but not to upgrades 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Wansley et al., 1992; Hand, 
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992; Hite and Warga, 1997). The hypotheses that may help explain 
this asymmetric response are the following i) companies voluntarily may release favourable 
information but may be reluctant to release unfavourable information; ii) rating agencies may 
spend more resources in detecting deterioration rather than improvement in credit quality 
(Ederington and Goh, 1998); or ii) bondholders (stockholders) may be more concerned with 
increases (downgrades) rather than decreases (upgrades) in risk. 
An alternative explanation is provided by the stakeholder hypothesis (Cornell, Landsman and 
Shapiro, 1989). Implicit claims have components that are analogous to bonds in that the 
maximum payout is fixed. A firm that has been performing well is unl wly to improve its 
performance significantly in the regard of default risk if its financial conditions strengthen. On the 
downside, however, stakeholders face significant risk. If a company runs into financial difficulties, 
the payouts on implicit claims may be cut substantially. The exception is a firm whose rating is 
already low that its stakeholders are not expecting payments on many implicit claims. If such a 
firm experiences an upgrade, the price of its implicit claims could rise substantially 
We want to test also for different responses between groups of bonds according to various 
factors whose impact on bond value is well understood. To this aim observations have been 
classified into different groups according to maturity, original rating, coupon, industrial secor 
(financial/industrial), country of the issuer, guarantee attached, liquidity, and rating history. We 
discuss them below. 
bufiaiial Sawn. We have split our sample in industrial and financial bonds to compare the 
magnitude and the volatility of their yield adjustments to rating reclassification. While some 
evidence exists which suggests that industrial bonds are more sensitive to rating changes than 
utilities (Grier and Katz, 1976; Wansley and Clauretie, 1985), no empirical evidence has ever been 
provided regarding any different behaviour between industrial and financial bonds. We will 
provide an important piece of evidence regarding this matter. 
G gxn. Bonds have been split into low-coupon bonds and high-coupon bonds on the basis of 
the median coupon rate. The higher the coupon rate, the larger will be the amount of obligations 
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the firm will miss in case of default. For a given yield change, higher coupon bonds are inherently 
riskier than lower coupon bonds, so that a change in their rating represents a significantly higher 
increase in the default risk On the other hand, bond price theorems indicate that bonds with 
lower coupon rates are characterised by more price volatility than similar bonds with higher 
coupon. As we are dealing with rating revisions rather than with default events, the latter 
hypothesis may be more appropriate. 
Caairy of dx Ism. As we are dealing with the Eurobond market, and in particular, with 
Eurobonds issued in sterling, we expect bonds issued by non-UK borrowers to bear a higher risk 
component compensating for the exchange rate risk they are subject to. Evidence of the existence 
of a positive relation between yields on Eurobonds and the exchange rate risk is provided in Clare 
et at (2000) and in Chapter V. In the event of an appreciation of the sterling, overseas borrowers 
face a higher price of their debt. This heavier debt burden might compromise their ability to repay 
the debt and their creditworthiness, raising their bond yields. According to this interpretation non- 
UK issues should be inherently riskier and a bigger reaction is expected in case a rating revision 
GG w We distinguish between bonds with attached negative pledge guarantee (NP) and 
bonds with no such guarantee attached In the presence of a negative pledge clause, if the company 
issues new debt, the old debt niest be secured as the new one. It is designed to protect the 
bondholder from credit deterioration as a result of the issuers actions. The breach of the clause may 
accelerate the date for the repayment of the principal and put into place procedures to enforce 
repayment. As the presence of this indenture should reduce the credit risk for bondholders, we 
expect the yield effects of bond rating changes to be stronger for bonds with a negative pledge. 
This can be explained in terms of the relation between the probability for a bond to be 
downgraded with the attachment to the bond of a NP guarantee. Anticipating here a result 
obtained in the next chapter, bonds with NP clause are less expected to be downgraded. Their 
yields therefore will react more in case of an unexpected change in the rating. 
Liqud The amount of bonds outstanding can be viewed as a proxy for the marketability of 
the bond The smaller the amount outstanding, the less frequently we expect the bonds to be 
traded and the thinner their market. The uncertainty and the scarce disclosure of information 
associated to the lower marketability would make the market less efficient. However, if 
marketability results to be not significant, this might be due to the bond market efficienciency or 
to a misspecüfication of the variable used as a proxy for marketability. 
211 
Chapter VI. Bond Yield Reaction to Rating Revisions 
Rat iI zmy Bonds having experienced a rating revision in the past have been classified as 
PC, while bonds never re-rated since they have been issued have been classified as NPG It has 
been observed aserial correlation in the rating changes (Dichev and Piotroski, 1998), according to 
which a rating change is expected be followed by a new change in the same direction later on. 
Following this logic, the surprise of a rating change for a PC bond should be smaller than the 
surprise associated to a re-rating of a never revised bond, NPC. In other words, we expect higher 
yield jumps for non-previously re-rated bonds than for previously re-rated bonds. 
6.3.4. OLS Panel Estrinatmn 
In order to be able to test for the market reaction, daily yield spread data are computed as the 
difference between the yield on a re-rated bond and the yield on the correspondent matched 
bond for the window-spanning period 
-60 to + 60 days. To test our hypotheses abnormal yields 
daily time series/cross-section data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to 
estimate a least squares model (LS) where the dependent variable is the abnormal yields series. 
This methodology, although fails to account for the information related to the sample outside the 
(60; +60) data window, it has the advantage that any general change in bond prices (or yields) 
caused by a change in the general credit market conditions is captured by the control group of 
bonds. Rating changes are therefore assumed to be only relevant factor affecting the life of the 
bond over the selected time window. 
We indicate the abnormal yield series as AY. We plot the average movements in yield spreads 
around the time of negative and positive announcement in Figure 6.1. The plot shows the pattern 
of spreads (A ) sixty days before and after rating changes. The shaded area in the figure highlights 
the event window (1; + 1). Dining the forty-five days preceding negative rating announcements, 
yield spreads show a stable pattern around a mean value of 6-7 basis points (bps). In the next 
fifteen days (prior to the announcement), the yield spread level increase of 1 bp and increases 3 
bps further to reach a 10 bps level during the announcement period. The upward trend continues 
also in the last two time windows with an increase of 2 bps in each of them As far as the spread 
mean dynamics before, during, and after an upward rating revision is concerned, we observe a 
generally stable 15 bps level in the days before the pre-announcement period. Spreads successively 
tend to fall fairly smoothly of about 0.8 bps during the pre-announcement period and further 
decrease of 2 bps in the event window. The negative drift is still discernible in the post- 
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announcement period after which the adjustment seems complete and the mean level finally 
stabilises around a mean level of 
-20 bps in the last time interval 
Summary statistics for the pooled AY series are provided in Table 6.2. Abnormal yields both 
for downgrades and upgrades are negatively skewed and slightly leptoku tic, as indicated by the 
skewness and excess kurtosis statistics. The null hypothesis of normality is rejected at the 0.01 level 
in both cases as indicated by the Jarque-Bera f statistic. Average and variance figures for time 
interval sub-samples provide a first general idea of the mean and volatility patterns over time for 
the A Yseries. 
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Figure 6.1 Abnormal Yields for Downgrades and Upgrades 
Abnormal yields were computed as difference between yields of re-rated bonds 
and yields of matched bonds. We present graphs both for downgraded bonds 
(N=107) and upgraded bonds (N=29). The event window spans from 
-60 days 
before the announcement of the revision of the rating to +60 days afterwards. The 
-1; +1 event window is shadowed to allow a clearer comprehension of what is 
happening closely around the event day. 
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Average Median Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera VR 
Panel A: 
Downs 
(N=107) 
Total 0.064 0.062 0.094 
-0.117 4.595 1375 (0.00) 
T, 0.048 0.048 0.005 0.109 0.091 1.000 
T2 0.042 0.045 0.003 
-0.036 0.193 0.635 
T, 0.063 0.063 0.001 
-0.011 - 0.178 
T4 0.076 0.077 0.002 
-0.128 0.013 0.394 
T, 0.076 0.078 0.005 
-0.021 -0.122 1.216 
Panel B: 
Ups 
(N=29) 
Total 
-0.178 -0.171 0.111 -0.319 3.089 61 (0.00) 
T, 
-0.152 -0.155 0.007 -0.125 -0.024 1.000 
TJ 
-0.161 -0.157 0.005 0.049 -0.007 1.142 
T3 
-0.182 -0.177 0.003 -0.129 - 0.699 
T4 
-0.200 -0.201 0.002 0.206 0.588 0.539 
Ts 
-0.193 -0.204 0.004 0.161 -0.173 0.837 
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Abnormal Yields (A Y) 
Descriptive statistics for abnormal spreads (AY) are computed as average values across all 
the firms and are reported separately for downgrades and upgrades, for the whole time 
window (-60; +60), and for each time interval Tj (j= 1,2, 
..., 
5) 
. 
Variance ratios are also 
presented in the last column of the table. 
A preliminary analysis to test for differences in the AY variance over time is performed 
comparing variance ratios computed in the various time intervals. Firstly, we have computed the 
variance of A Yin each event window for each issue i (&; T, with T- 1,2,3,4, and 5). Then, ratios of 
each variance (c ) over the variance in the first time period (az, ) are computed (VR, 
-r) for each 
issue i. The Wq, ratios are pooled across firms in each sub-sample of downgraded and upgraded 
bonds. Both parametric (tw) and non-parametric (the Wkxm signs ranks tee and the sigic ißt) 
tests are used. The results are quite strong and indicate a significant decline in downgraded bond 
volatility over the period 
-15 to + 15. After day + 15, volatility starts rising to go back to the initial 
level Z' Mean volatility in the last period is indeed not significantly different from its mean level as 
before the pre-announcement period (mean difference 
- -0.049 and p-value - 0.85). As far as the 
24 Both mean and median paired differences are significant different from zero. Because of the non- 
normality of the data, we report only the Wilcoxon signed ranks Z-values for each paired period with their 
significance in parentheses: [-15; 
-2 and -1; +1] - -5.44 (0.00); [-1; +1 and +2; +15] - -4.66 (0.00); [+2; 
+15 and +16; +60] - -6.80 (0.00); [-15; -2 and +16; +60]--6.01 (0.00). 
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volatility pattern for upgrades is concerned, volatility declines during the announcement and post 
announcement periods and starts rising up after day + 15.25 These preliminary findings suggest 
evidence of resolution of uncertainty around the event window. 
We attempted to provide more accurate and formal evidence about the different bond yields 
reaction between downgrades and upgrades (and between the other categories mentioned above) 
introducing a pooled Least Square (LS) estimation. Before estimating the model, univariate time 
series analysis of the dependent variable, AYQ, was performed to determine the order of the 
autoregressive and moving average processes. We recall that estimators that ignore autocorrelated 
errors are biased, inconsistent and inefficient26. The number of statistically significant partial 
correlations suggests an autoregressive process of order two, with the first and the second lag 
partial autocorrelation coefficients are 0.98 and 0.17, respectively. An ARMA(2,0) model was 
selected on the basis of likelihood ratio tests and the principle of parsimony. 
To identify the different effects of negative and positive rating revisions, issues were classified 
as downgrades and upgrades and two dumnry variables were introduced which take value 1 or 0 
depending on whether the bond has been downgraded (DOWA) or upgraded (UF). Additionally, 
we built a set of dummies (D; with i=1,2, 
... , 
136), each one for each of the bonds, able to capture 
the presence of potential heteroskedasticity across firms. Moreover, in order to test for a pre-rating 
and post-rating drift we split our event window in five sub-periods, T;, with j=1,2, 
... , 
5. As we 
mentioned above, T, (T) includes the period 
- 
(+)60 to 
- 
(+)16 days before (after) the event; TZ 
(T) includes the period 
- 
(+)15 to 
- 
(+)2 days before (after) the event (pre-announcement and 
post-announcement periods); and T3 is the small 
-1 to +1 event window (announcement period). 
We refer the reader to the classic paper by Gujarati (1970) on using dummies to test for equality 
between coefficients. 
The general linear regression takes the form 
107 136 
AYt 
=I'aiDi + Z'aiDi +ß1AYi. r-IDOP +fl2AYir-2DOWN+fl3AYit_IUP +ß4AYt-2UPi + i=1 i=108 
ss 
(6.2) 
+j: SjTjDOW1N+j: gp1T, UP +Ac +elt 
1=Z /=Z 
25 The Wi coxon signed ranks Z-values for each paired period with their significance in parentheses are as 
follows: [-15; 
-2 and 1; +1]- -1.67 (0.09); [-1; +1 and +2; +15] - -2.21 (0.02); [+2; +15 and +16; +60] -- 2.75 (0.00); [-15; 
-2 and +16; +60]--2.54 (0.01). 
26 See Greene (1993, p. 419) 
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where AYt is the abnormal yield for issue i at time t and eu is a white noise error with mean zero 
and variance h. Assuming independent, normally distributed and homoskedastic error terms, we 
will interpret the linear regression coefficient estimates as follows. 1Eai and 1Eai will be the i=1 i=108 
average abnormal yield over the period (60; 
-16) for downgraded and upgraded bonds, 
respectively; 6, and 
, 
6, 
, 
and 63 and, 6, are the estimated coefficients of the first and second 
autoregressive terms for downgrades and upgrades, respectively. The coefficients8J (with j-2,3, 
4, and 5) represent the difference of the average AY for downgrades in periods T2, TX T, and TS 
respect to the average AYin the first time window, T1. By the same logic, 0, coefficients will 
have the same interpretation but with respect to upgraded bonds. According to this, if we want to 
know the absolute level of A Yin the event window (T) for downgraded bonds we will have to 
sum up 
/E 
a; coefficients and the estimate for 4. The m 3t will directly give the significance of the 
1=1 
differences respect to the initial window. 
Successively dummy variables were introduced to represent each of the previously formed 
groups and were combined both with the time dummy variables for the five windows around the 
event date (Ts) and with DOWNS and UP dummy variables. The total panel (unbalanced) 
observations are 16433. 
6.3.5. Ez jitRelatad GAR CH 
The simple OLS estimation with pooled data models the mean of AY in the different time- 
windows without taking into consideration the possibility that the variance of AY may change 
over time. Ignoring any event-induced changes in the variance of the A Yseries may of course lead 
to biased and unreliable results. The effect of rating changes announcements on abnormal yield 
volatility may also be of interest. 
For these reasons we introduce a GARC ! model, which is able to model simultaneously the 
mean and the variance of AY series. From the autoconrelation of squared AY for each class of 
bonds we cannot reject the hypothesis of serial correlation. This preliminary test of ARCH-effects 
supports the introduction of a GARC H model. The model for abnormal yields incorporates the 
temporal information diffusion from lagged abnormal spreads, the effect of news on conditional 
volatility and autoregression in conditional volatility. The mean equation in the GARCH model is 
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the same as in the OIS modeL The mean and the variance equations are similarly structured as 
follows: 
107 136 
AY ir = 
Ea1D; + Ea, Dt +ß1AYr r_1DOW1 +#ZAYst_2DOW1'{ +ß3AYjt_1UP +ß4AYu-2UP; + 
t=1 s=1os 
ss 
(6.3 
+1: aj Tj DOWN +I Tj UR +, iar +e; r 
l=2 1=2 
136 55 
hu 
=c+ 
Za; D; +LbjTjDOWN; +EdjTýUP, +B, ha_, +o2ht_2 + st +u; t 
(6.4) 
i=los J=2 j=2 
with e,, --' N(O, h1) (6.5) 
where r, is a white noise error with conditional variance h,. According to Equations (6.4)-(6.5), the 
variance is allowed to differ across bonds and events (subscript z) and also across days within each 
time window (subscript t). We are therefore able to take into account all the three sources of 
heteroskedasticity explained above. 
The specification in Equations (6.3)-(6.5) istherefore ARMA(2,0) for the mean equation and 
GARCH(1,2). The GARCH(1,2) specification was selected as the best specification according to 
the parsimony principle (AIC and SBC criteria, and Likelihood Ratio test) as shown in Table A9. 
The variance on day t is conditional on the variance on the two previous days, according to the t% 
parameter estimates, and on the most recent squares hock, according to the estimate for ý. The 
constant term c captures the average level of volatility in the first period among downgraded 
bonds; Fa, provides the average level of volatility in the (60; 
-10 period among upgraded bond 
bis and dfs represent the difference in the volatility level in the various time windows relatively to 
the initial time window for downgrades and upgrades. As in the case discussed for the mean 
equation, the absolute level of volatility that downgraded bonds experience for instance in the 
event window (T) is found simply slumming up the constant teen with the estimate for b, 
Moreover, the GARCIT-type methodology allows us to test for the persistence of 
announcement shocks. On one side, the lack of persistence would imply that bond prices (yields) 
giddy incorporate public information and that the trading process does not generate persistent 
volatility in response to news. On the other hand, strong persistence would suggest that either 
information-gathering or some feature of the trading process itself would cause volatility to be 
autocorrelated. 
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6.4. Empirical Results 
Tests on memZ and ma&m CARS. Table 6.3 presents mean and median coupon adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample and for different time windows. Our statistical 
inference is based on simple t-tests and ane-wnple signal rank tests to test the null hypothesis that 
the mean and the median, respectively, of the population from which the data sample is drawn is 
equal to zero. Results for downgrades and upgrades are presented in Panel A of Table 6.3. 
Downgraded bonds experience significantly negative mean CARs of 98 bps from 
-15 to + 15 days 
around the event day; 56 bps from 
-5 to +5 days; 78 bps from +2 to + 15 days and 91 bps from 
+2 to +60 days. Upgraded bonds don't show CARs significantly different from zero in any of the 
time windows. 
For comparative purposes, Panel B splits the downgraded bonds in various categories (as 
described above). As we want to find out if a profitable trading rule exists, for which category, and 
if it is of some economic significance, we are particularly interested in bond returns after the event. 
Bonds with a negative pledge lause attached (NP) behave significantly different from bonds with 
no negative pledge guarantee. In particular, NP bonds experience a significant negative return of 
165bps in the window +2 to + 15. Financial bonds and UK-firm bonds show a significant return 
decrease of 196 bps and 130 bps, respectively, in the period +2 to +60 days. Low coupon bonds, 
high maturity bonds and previously downgraded bonds show relevant negative returns of 145 bps, 
134 bps, and 172 bps, respectively, from day 2 to day 15 after the event day. As far the various 
rating categories is concerned, returns were significantly negative only for AA-rated bonds (92 bps 
and 154 bps in the windows +2, +15 and +2, +60, respectively), which are also the bonds most 
l to be re-rated (see Chapter VII). 
OLS Panel Estes. Table 6.4 presents coefficient estimates from Eq. (6.2). The 
autoregressive terms at lag 1 and 2 are both positive and highly significant with their sum equal to 
0.86 and 0.73 for downgrades and upgrades, respectively. 
Aule we observe a significant negative bond market reaction to downgrades, upgraded bonds 
seem not to show any relevant reaction, with the coefficient estimates all not significantly different 
from zero. The lack of response following positive rating revision confirms the general previous 
evidence, implying that the market apparently views downgrades but not upgrades as 
informational events. We will then focus on downgrades. The small positive increase in the pre- 
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announcement period is not significant, implying the absence of any relevant anticipation of the 
rating event. Abnormal yields significantly increase in the three days around the event date, after 
which they quickly adjust to the new significantly higher equilibrium level 
Additional regressions were rim to test for differences in the reaction of various sub-samples. 
Due to the small number of observations among the upgraded bonds, we will not comment our 
results with respect o this category, which was however included in the estimation. To save space, 
OLS estimates are not presented for all the categories, but main results are mentioned below. 
Mean abnormal yields among downgrades are significantly higher for longer maturity issues, 
financial issues, lower coupon bonds, issues accompanied by a negative pledge guarantee, non-UK 
issues, more liquid issues (in terms of larger amount of bonds outstanding), and AA-rated bonds. 
For these same categories a significant positive post-announcement drift is generally observed in 
both the (+2; + 15) and (+ 16; + 60) periods. These results confirm the findings for the whole 
sample and provide a robustness check We, now, proceed to analyse the results of the pooled 
GARCHmodel. 
GARCHPanel Estnnation. 5mple OIS estimates are inefficient because they fad to account 
for conditional heteroskedasticity. We therefore present results from the maximum likelihood 
estimation of model (6.3)-(6.5) using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHI iterative 
optimisation algorithm. 
There is still a significantly asymmetric pattern of response to downgrade and upgrade 
announcements. While positive rating news releases have still no impact at all on bond yields, 
rating downgrades drive yields to rise within the small event window. However this increase 
becomes more strongly significant after properly allowing for heteroskedasticity. The Wald test 
indicates a5 percent significance level in contrast to a previous weak 10 percent level In addition, 
no significant pre- or post-announcement drift is found, and the weak evidence of a small 
overreaction in the event period is also found to be not significant. 
Variance coefficient estimates are presented in Table 6.527 and pattern of volatility over the 
whole time interval (-60; +60) is depicted in Figure 6.2. The null hypothesis of homoskedastic 
errors is strongly rejected. The a and 6 coefficients are significantly positive, with the direct effect 
of a shock on tomorrows conditional volatility being around 0.18. 'Ms effect decays at rate 0.6 
subsequently. That is, about one sixth of the most recent squared error is incorporated in the 
subsequent volatility estimate, while lagged volatility has a weight of about two-thirds. The sum of 
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a and 
,6 is 0.68, well below unity, necessary condition for variance stationarity. We can therefore 
measure the volatility persistence as a half-life, that is, as the time it takes on average for the 
conditional variance to revert halfway to its unconditional value. This is computed as 
-ln(2)/ln(a 
+ ßs) and yields a value of approximately 1.8 (days). 
The variance profile depicted in Figure 6.2 seems to present particular and separate shapes to 
the spread series urrounding positive and negative revisions. The impact of a rating decrease on 
volatility around the event date is strongly depressing in the pre-announcement period reaching its 
minimum right in the event window. Once the disclosure is made, and its effects assimilated, 
volatility starts rising up over time to reach and exceed its "nommal" or long run level. In the case of 
a rating increase, volatility falls in the pre-announcement and post-announcement periods, but 
peaks in the 3-day event window to approach the initial level during the (+16; +60) days period 
after the announcement In both cases, the effect on volatility seems to dissipate substantially after 
the post-announcement interval. Volatility for downgraded bonds stabilises around a mean level 
significantly higher than the long-run level before the announcement. This is consistent with the 
increase in risk that the event itself has brought to the downward revised bonds. No relevant effect 
is observed for the volatility of upgraded bonds. 
Individual autocorrelations of the residuals and squared residuals (not shown) are small, the 
highest being 0.031 at lag ten for the standardised residuals and 0.005 at lag twenty-one for the 
standardised squared residuals. The model is able to remove serial correlation only up to lag four. 
The Ljung-Box Q statistic for the standardised residuals is indeed significant at the 1 percent level 
at lags 10 and 20. The Ljung-Box Q statistic for the squared standardised residuals is not 
significant at lags 10 and 20. The standardised residuals have a skewness coefficient of 
-0.07, 
which although statistically significant, does not indicate severe skewness. They are also 
leptokurtic, with a kurtosis coefficient of 16. This latter finding supports the need to model the 
errors as t-distributed. 
27 To save space coefficients for first time interval dummy variables D1 (-1,2, 
..., 
136), are not shown. 
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Time 
Window 
DOWNS 
(N=107) 
Coefficient Cumulative 
UPS 
(N=29) 
Coefficient Cumulative 
Autoregressive 
Terms 
-60; -16 0.0065 0.0065 -0.0279 -0.0279 (31 0.7485'** (0.0091) 
-15; -2 0.0009 0.0073 0.0002 -0.0277 ß2 0.1216"' (0.0016) (0.0031) (0.0088) 
-1; +1 0.0071" 0.0135' -0.0058 -0.0337 p3 0.6563"' (0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0143) 
+2; +15 0.0047" 0.0111 0.0037 
-0.0315 ß4 0.1889"' (0.0016) (0.0031) (0.0138) 
*** +16; +60 0.0056 0.0120 
-0.0032 -0.0311 (0.0011) (0.0021) 
Totäl C6. 0.0056 
-0.0032 (-60; +60) (86%) 1 (-12%) 
Table 6.4 OLS Pooled Estimation forAbnorinal Yields (A19 around event dates, 1992-1999. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a least squares model (LS). The total 
panel (unbalanced) observations are 16433. Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the 
difference between the cumulative coefficient in Tj and the cumulative coefficient in Tj_, according to the Wald test 
statistic. The regression equation is structured as follows: 
107 136 55 
AY 
=Ea; D; + I: a, D, +ßIAY_1DOWIj+ß2AYu_ZDOWIj+ß3AY, 
_IUA; +ß4AYu_2UP; +jöjTjDOLY7 +joo1TjUP; +e;, i=1 i=108 1=2 1=2 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9727, SE=0.0546, DW=1.91 
We also tested for the significance of a risk pricing term (A. ) in eq. (6.3). The sign of A is of 
special interest since time series analyses of securities returns have produced both positive and 
negative relationships between conditional returns and conditional variances. In our application 
we would expect a negative sign as suggested by the risk aversion hypothesis. As we are modelling 
abnormal yields, a positive shock (in terms of good news) would be in this case represented by a 
negative error (c>0), which would indeed represent a decline in the bond risk (yield) and in tuen 
an increase in bond returns. An AR(2)-GARC HM (1,2) model was estimated The risk premium 
term was indeed found to be significantly negative (X, 
--0.127, t- 
-2.269). All the other parameter 
estimates were consistent with previous results. 
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Time 
Window 
DOWNS 
(N=107) 
Coefficient Cumulative 
Mean Equation 
UPS 
(N=29) 
Coefficient Cumulative 
Autoregressive 
Terms 
-60; -16 0.0086 0.0086 -0.0363 -0.0363 ßi 0.6808"' [t=0.17] ft---0.61] (0.0163) 
-15; -2 -0.0034 0.0053 0.0078' -0.0285 (j2 0.1651"' (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0155) 
-1; +1 0.0062' 0.0148" -0.0033 -0.0396 ß3 0.5869'** (0.0036) (0.0085) (0.0152) 
+2; +15 0.0041 0.0128 0.0032 
-0.0332 R4 0.2348"' (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0183) 
+16; +60 0.0072"' 0.0159 
-0.0037 -0.0400' (0.0019) (0.0031) 
Total Ch. 0.0072 
-0.0037 (-60; +60) (84%) (-10%) 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
E2t_1 0.1395"' 
(0.0068) 
h, 
_, 
0.4819*" 
(0.558) 
hi. 2 0.1613" (0.0449) 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Table 6.5 GARCHPooled Estimation forAbnormal Yields (AI) around event dates, 1992-1999. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,2) type model. The total panel 
(unbalanced) observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative 
coefficient in T, and the cumulative coefficient in Ti_I according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance 
equation are structured as follows: 
107 136 AY =Ep; D; + r, D, +ß1AY, F, DO1V Ffl2AY 2DOW? 4ý3AYIUP+ß4AY, 
-2UP; + 
»jT DOW1 14E SUP; +r,, j=2 j=2 
107 55 
hu 
=c+ YaiDi + 2: bjTJDOWNi +2: djTjUPi +B1hi, 
_I +o2h; t_2 +rile 
t +oit 
i=108 j=2 j=2 
Eir 
- 
N(O, hi, ) 
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Figure 6.2 The impact of rating revision announcement on Eurobond mean and volatility spreads 
Mean and variance abnormal spreads (AY) are reported over the observation period of 
-60; +60. The figures on the 
x-axis are time periods (days) relative to the announcement time (day zero). The asymptotes, represented by the 
dashed line, have been built as 
(f1a, 
+, 8, T, 
)/(l 
-A- ßz ) (for the downgrades, and similarly for the upgrades) 
according to the GARCH model coefficient estimates. The continuous lines were plotted adjusting each daily 
observation for the autoregressive part of the change. 
The conclusion we draw is that rating announcements in our sample seem to have negatively 
impact on the yield volatility of downgraded bonds, but they positively impact the yield volatility 
of upgraded bonds in the event window. Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) were the first to 
examine the possibility that conformity of investor opinion on yields would be greater dose to the 
rating revision. Evidence of increases in security returns volatility was also provided in 
Damodaran (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and Ross (1989) and explained in terms of 
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trades related to the arrival of private information. A more recent investigation of both volatility 
behaviours is carried out by DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997). They find that unscheduled policy 
news announcements tend to be associated with lower volatility, while scheduled news is 
associated with significant increase in volatility during the time interval the news is released. This 
result for scheduled news is consistent with results of Ederington and Lee (1993) and with the 
Eades (1982) signalling model that predicts that changes in "equilibrium" dividend levels are 
negatively correlated with changes in risk. Finally, Jayaraman and Shastri (1993) provide evidence 
of decreases in option prices implied volatility following the announcements of dividend 
increases. 
We also observe asymmetric responses within various subsamples of our data. While 
abnormal yields of financial issues react positively to downgrade news, industrial issues show a 
much smaller reaction. No significant coefficient was found among the upgrades, either financial 
or industrial. Volatility significantly decreases during the pre-announcement, announcement and 
post-announcement periods both for downgraded financial and industrial issues. Volatility for the 
industry sub-sample follows the pattern observed for the whole sample, decreasing in the pre- 
announcement and post-announcement periods and rising in the announcement (event) window. 
Without going into a too detailed description of the results (which the interested reader can 
acquire from Tables Al A8 at the end of this Chapter), we note that further investigations reveal 
significantly bigger reaction in the event window for longer-maturity, lower-coupon, non-UK, 
negative pledge, higher-liquid, AA-rated and not previously re-rated bonds respect to their 
counterparts that do not present any relevant response. All these findings are consistent with our 
expectations. 
6.5. Conclusions 
Using daily data this chapter estimates the effect of rating changes announcements on 
Eurobond abnormal yield level and volatility. We have assumed that the major rating agencies 
have revised ratings simultaneously and that rating changes are the only relevant factor affecting 
the relative yield spread of the bond over the selected time window. Ratings changes have been 
separated into downgrades and upgrades. While downgrades are accompanied by significant 
increase in the yield spreads during the announcement and post-announcement periods, we 
found that for upgrades, the incremental information content of bond revision is not statistically 
significant. The result for upgraded bonds might be due to the small sample size or to the fact that 
corporate news announcements are either not value-relevant or they have been fully anticipated 
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long time before28. Alternatively, it could be the case that markets are inefficient, but given the 
results for downgrade announcements, this last hypothesis may be excluded 
The hypotheses that may help explain this asymmetric response are the following: i) 
companies voluntarily may release favourable information but may be reluctant to release 
unfavourable information; ii) rating agencies may spend more resources in detecting deterioration 
rather than improvement in credit quality (Ederington and Goh, 1998); or iii) bondholders (stock- 
holders) may be more concerned with increases rather than decreases in risk. 
The effects of news on volatility vary according to the news categories. Upgrades are associated 
with significant increases in volatility during and around the event period For bonds being 
downgraded the results are reversed. Volatility is significantly depressed during and around the 
time the information is released. This finding may be consistent with a calming effect of such 
announcements, due to either a temporary reduction in information asymmetry or simply a "time- 
out" during which traders attempt to assess the news. One possible effect of the rating revision 
might be to increase the confonnity of investors' opinion at the time or after the revision and this 
maybe reflected in an adjustment of volatility downward. According to this interpretation, results 
for upgrades may be explained either in terms of the small size of the sample, or by considering 
that investors anticipate the news. DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997) find similar results for 
exchange rate volatility in response to scheduled news. 
The persistence of volatility is also evaluated and we found that announcement shocks do not 
persist, and rating information takes 1-2 days to be incorporated into yields. This implies that 
bond yields quickly incorporate public information and that the trading process does not generate 
persistent volatility in response to news. 
According to this asymmetric behaviour both in the mean and the volatility dynamics for 
downgrades and upgrades, if it is in fact known in ackwxv that a rating revision is taking place in the 
near future, one might anticipate changes in the mean (or variance) during the period immediately 
preceding and following the disclosure and act consequently. According to our results there seems 
to be a preliminary evidence of significant cumulative abnormal returns for downgrades (78% 
from +2 to + 15 days and 91% from +2 to +60 days) and various subsamples of downgraded 
bonds (NP, financial, UK, low coupon, high maturity, AA rated and previously revised issues). 
Further research could focus on the economic significance of gains deriving from the anticipation 
of rating change event. 
Interesting would be also to relate the cause of the rating change with the likelihood that it 
canies significant new information to the market. Bond rating changes could be classified by 
28 See Bahattacharya et al. (2000) 
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cause of change. A new issue that simply refinances current debt and does not involve any change 
in the investment decision of the firm probably will not convey new information about the firm 
Similarly mergers, leverage buyouts and share repurchases are not expected to have any impact as 
they are known in advance of the rating change. On the other side, a rating change due to changes 
in the fine's financial prospects might cause a market reaction. Future research may also 
investigate whether significant changes in volatility lead the way to profitable trading strategies. In 
other words, using options to trade on anticipated volatility effects, can we make economically 
significant profits once transaction costs are taken into account? 
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Table Al GARCH(1,1) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (A 19 broken down by Industry Sector. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,1) type model. Observations have been 
classified as financial (FIN) or industrial (IND) according to the industry sector. The total panel (unbalanced) observations are 16433. 
Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients 
refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative coefficient in TT and the cumulative coefficient in Tß. 1 according to the 
Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance equation are structured as follows: 
Yr 
= 
30 
a, D FIN+ 
Ec4DIND+ EgD; FIN+ Fa, D, IND+ AA DOWN+ý1 tAY, 
-sDOWN+ß3 f AY, -IUP+ß/ ! AYt_2UP+ 
5 8Tj FIN+ " Axj DOWN IND+ L ýJr-1 
W i=31 1=99 W08 J=2 
JJ 
J=l 
JJ 
SJ 
+± s8, T!! P " FIN+ I wjT JP " IND++I, 
J=2 J=2 
h30 a1DFIN98aDr"IND+Iýa, "DFIN+ bTss " FIN + 
Jm 
TUP /ND+9hit-, + e2 +v 
- !! Yr1J JDOWN FIN+ 
FdJTIDOWN /ND+ 2, glTIUP YIJý it rr 
r=l 1=31 1=99 J=2 j=2 J=2 J=2 
s;, - N(0, h) 
Time 
Window 
Downs 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Mean A 
FIN 
Coeff. Cumulative 
ion Variance Equation 
IND FIN IND 
Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) (*102) (*102) 
(N=68) (N=30) (N=68) 
0.0065 0.0065 0.0782 0.0782 0.0592 0.0592 
-0.0005 0.0065 -0.0272"* 0.0510 -0.0122'" 0.0470 (0.0018) (1.69.10'5) (2.21.10"5) 
0.0045' 0.0110' 
-0.0272'" 0.0510 -0.0164'" 0.0428 (0.0027) (1.15.10'5) (3.90.10'5) 
0.0027' 0.0092 
-0.0218'" 0.0564" -0.0169'" 0.0423 (0.0015) (1.86.10'5) (1.46.10'5) 
0.0035 0.0100 0.0184" 0.0966'" 0.0469'" 0.1061" 
(0.0023) (4.55.10-5) (3.84.10 3) 
0.0035 0.0184' 10'2 0.047.10.2 
(54%) (24%) (79%) 
(N=30) 
0.0131 0.0131 
-0.0029 0.0103 (0.0021) 
0.0073" 0.0204- 
(0.0026) 
0.0073*" 0.0204 
(0.0021) 
0.0091" 0.0222 
(0.0028) 
Total Ch. 0.0091 
(-60; +60) (69%) 
Ups (N=9) 
-60; -16 -0.0293 -0.0293 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Pl 
P2 
P3 
Pi 
0.0167" 
-0.0126 (0.0067) 
0.0212 
-0.0081 (0.0138) 
0.0083 
-0.0211 (0.0062) 
0.0051 
-0.0242 (0.0074) 
0.0051 
(18%) 
(0.0135) 
(N=15) 
-0.0268 -0.0268 
0.0059 
-0.0209 (0.0054) 
-0.0184 -0.0453 (0.0126) 
-0.0014 -0.0283 (0.0051) 
0.0015 
-0.0254 (0.0059) 
0.0015 
(-6%) 
(N=9) 
0.1211 0.1211 
-0.0642" 0.1047 (7.78.10"5) 
0.0309 0.1042** 
(40.6.10-5) 
-0.0686" 0.1680" (5.85.10-5) 
0.0026 0.0569"* 
(11.4.10") 
-0.064* 10.2 (-53%) 
(N=15) 
0.1128 0.1128 
(4.97.10') 
-0.0701" 0.1437 (10.2.10') 
0.0234 0.0442" 
(39.3.10"5) 
-0.0823*" 0.1154" (9.06.10-) 
0.0307'' 0.0427*** 
(6.01.10'5) 
-0.0701' 10,2 (-62%) 
0.1886*** 0.1001*** 
(0.0134) (0.0058) 
0.6282" 0.6963 
(0.0205) (0.0083) 
0.2499*** 
(0.0219) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9712, SE=0.0561, DW=1.70 
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Table A2 GARCH(1,1) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (Al') broken down by Maturity. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,1) type model. Bonds have been classified 
as High_Mat or Low Mat according to whether the time to maturity on the day of the rating change was above or below the median 
value, respectively. The total panel (unbalanced) observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the 
cumulative coefficient in T, and the cumulative coefficient in Tj_j according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance 
equation are structured as follows: 
49 97 AY; 
_ 
aD, High Mat+ EgDLow Mat+ 
Ycr, DHigh Mat+ IEzD1Low Mat+ß/AY, 
_IDOWN+ß2AYt_1DOWN+ 
ß3AY"; 
_IUP+ß, 
AY, 
_2UP+ 
=I J 
l=50 1=98 
s 
i=112 
S3 
+ 6, T DOWN" High Mat+ Z KITIDOWN" Low Mat+E OjT7/P " High Mat+ E mjTjUP " Low Mat+e, j=2 j=2 j=2 j=2 
"9 97 I 
= c+Y-a; D; High_Mat Ea; D, Low_Mat+ Y-a1D; High_Mat+LbjTjDOWN High_Mat+EdjTjDOWN"Low-Mat + 
111 
i=l l=JO 1=98 j=2 J=2 
+ 
EgjTjUP"High_Mat+ 
±mjTIUP"Low_Mat+9 h;; 
_I +F e +ur, J=2 l=2 
öu ^' N(O. k, i 
Mean Equation 
Time High_Mat Low Mat 
Window Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative 
Downs 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Ups 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
(N=49) 
0.0077 0.0077 
0.0014 0.0092 
(0.0025) 
0.0123*" 0.0200- 
(0.0032) 
0.0040 0.0118- 
(0.0023) 
0.0073*" 0.0150 
(0.0028) 
0.0073 
(95%) 
(N=14) 
-0.0235 -0.0235 
0.0258 (30%) 
(N=14) 
0.0886 0.0886 
-0.0032 -0.0267 0.0189"* -0.0336 -0.0201'" (0.0037) (0.0063) (5.42-10-5) 
-0.0258'" -0.0493'" 0.0359**' -0.0166' 0.0111 (0.0077) (0.0092) (22.10-5) 
-0.0168'" -0.0403 0.0179*** -0.0345" -0.0219'" (0.0031) (0.0053) (4.66.10) 
-0.0180'" -0.0415 0.0100' -0.0425' 0.0123' (0.0038) (0.0058) (6.42-10-5) 
-0.0180 0.0100 (-77%) (+19%) 
(N=48) 
0.0025 0.0025 
-0.0013 0.0012 (0.0019) 
0.0038 0.0063 
(0.0031) 
0.0019 0.0044 
(0.0017) 
0.0036 0.0060 
(0.0019) 
0.0036 
(144%) 
(N=/5) 
-0.0525 -0.0525 
R. 0.7201""" 
(0.0151) 
Rý 0.2022"' 
(0.0147) 
03 0.5681 *" 
(0.0207) 
0.2237"' 
(0.0226) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9708, SE=0.0564, DW=1.74 
Variance Equation 
High_Mat 
Coeff. 
(*102) 
Cumulative 
(*102) 
(N=49) 
0.0862 0.0862 
-0.0425*** 0.0437 (3.92.10-5) 
-0.0454" 0.0408 (4.84.10"5) 
-0.0435" 0.0427 (3.01.10"5) 
0.0258m 0.1120"' 
(4.35.10"5) 
Low-Mat 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(* 102) (* 102) 
(N=48) 
0.0543 0.0543 
-0.0126w 0.0417 (2.34.10"5) 
-0.0130" 0.0413 (6.08.10"5) 
-0.0162'" 0.0381 (1.81.10"5) 
0.0422'" 0.0965"' 
(3.91.10") 
0.0422 
(78%) 
0.0685 
0.0997 
0.0667 
0.1009- 
0.0123 
(14%) 
(N=15) 
0.1170*" 0.1170 
(5.05.10'5) 
-0.0825" 0.0345 (12.2.10') 
-0.0707" 0.0463 (35.10"5) 
-0.0972*** 0.0198 (11.10-5) 
0.0235*" 0.1405'" 
(6.93.10'5) 
0.0235 
(20%) 
k 
9 
0.7016*** 
(0.0076) 
0.1029*" 
(0.0059) 
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Table A3 GARCH(1,2) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (A 19 broken down by Coupon Rate. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,2) type model. Bonds have been classified 
as having high coupon (High_C) or low coupon (Low_C) according to the median coupon rate. The total panel (unbalanced) 
observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for 
the cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative coefficient in Ti and the cumulative 
coefficient in TI_, according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance equation are structured as follows: 
49 107 125 137 
Y-o; D, Low C+ Ec High C+ J: aD; Low C+ß1AY, 
_; 
DOWN+ß2AYit_1DOWN+/i3AY; 
_IUP+ß4AYt_2UP+ AY _ 
Y_gD1High C+ ' 
1=1 i=50 J=/08 t=1? 6 SSss 
+5 DOWN- High C+ E xjT DOWN" Low C+± 6jTUP " High C+ E a7jTjUP " Low C+s;, 
r1 1=' j=z j=1 
107 
h, 
1 =c+Y-a1D, 
High_CEa1D, Low_C+ 1Y-a; DlHigh_C+EbjTjDOWN"High_C+EdjTjDOWN"LowC+ 
. =1 =so 1=108 j=2 j=2 ss 
+Y_gjT3UP"High_C+Em3TýUP"Low_C+9, h; 
_, 
+9, h, 
_2+ ej +u;, j=2 j=2 
ei, ~ N(O. h) 
Mean Equation 
Time High_C Low_C 
Window Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Ups 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Pi 
P2 
P3 
Pi 
(N=49) 
0.0009 0.0009 
-0.0041 
*" 
-0.0032 (0.0006) 
0.0025 0.0034'" 
(0.0016) 
-0.0015 -0.0005" (0.0018) 
0.0012 0.0021 
(0.0024) 
0.0012 (124%) 
(N=18) 
-0.0262 -0.0262 
0.0116" 
-0.0147 (0.0037) 
0.0084" 
-0.0178 (0.0002) 
0.0074" 
-0.0189 (0.0036) 
0.0062 
-0.0200 (0.0041) 
0.0062 
(24%) 
0.6518--- 
(0.0152) 
0.1834*" 
(0.0144) 
0.5648" 
(0.0218) 
0.2293*** 
(0.0235) 
(N=58) 
0.0216 0.0216 
-0.0016 0.0200 (0.0020) 
0.0085*** 0.0301" 
(0.0030) 
0.0070*** 0.0286 
(0.0019) 
0.0076" 0.029 
(0.0022) 
0.0076 
(35%) 
(N=11) 
-0.0465 -0.0465 
0.0009 
-0.0456 (0.0062) 
-0.0095 -0.0560 (0.0136) 
-0.0144 
* 
-0.0609 (0.0067) 
-0.0196*" -0.0661 (0.0056) 
-0.0196 (-42%) 
Variance Equation 
High_C 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) 
(N=49) 
0.0939 0.0939 
-0.0500*** 0.0439 (2.70.10'5) 
-0.0635*" 0.0304- (2.40.10-5) 
-0.0537"' 0.0402*" (1.08.10-5) 
0.0023 0.0962*** 
(5.58.10'5) 
0.0023 
(2%) 
Low 
-C 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) 
(N=58) 
0.1223 0.1223 
-0.0246" 0.0977 (3.22.10-5) 
-0.0279" 0.0944 (6.29.10") 
-0.0290"* 0.0933 (1.81.10"5) 
0.0352*** 0.1575'" 
(5.42.10"5) 
0.0352 
(29%) 
w=ist 
0.1856*" 0.1856 
(0.0001) 
-0.0537" 0.1319 (4.30.10') 
-0.0658'" 0.1198 (8.45.10-5) 
-0.0545*" 0.1311 
(4.01.10') 
-0.0034 0.1822*** (9.64.10') 
-0.0034 (-2%) 
(N=11) 
0.1404 0.1404 
-0.1300" 0.0104 (2.42.10') 
0.0739 0.2143"' 
(5.45.10'4) 
-0.1297*" 0.0107*" (2.35.10) 
-0.0440'" 0.0964"* (1.38.10'4) 
-0.0440 (-31%) 
0.1117""" 
(0.0082) 
$ý 0.4518" 
(0.0564) 
82 0.1361"* 
(0.0473) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. RZ=, O 
. 
9718, SE=0.0555, DW=1.66 
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Table A4 GARCH(1,1) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (AY) broken down by Negative Pledge Guarantee. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,1) type model. Bonds have been separated in to 
issues with a negative pledge guarantee attached (NP) and issues with no negative pledge guarantee attached (NON_NP). The total panel (unbalanced) observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative coefficient in T3 and the 
cumulative coefficient in Tß_1 according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance equation are structured as follows: 
I9 /07 /2J 137 
AY, 
= 
Ea, DNP+ jiL NON NP+ Ea, DNP+ EaDlNON NP+ß, AY, 
_/DOWN+fl2AY_2DOWN+/03AY, _/JP+AAYi_2UP+ j=1 1=50 1=108 1=126 
555J 
+E 8ITjDOWN" NP+ Y_KjTýDOWN" NON NP+Y-OjTUP " NP+ E mjTjUP " NON NP+e J=2 j=2 j=2 j=2 
411 h;, 
=c+Ia, D1NP/Y_a/D; NON_NP+ 
/Ya1D, NP+EbjTDOWN"NP+EdjTjDOWN"NON_NP+ 
1=1 ; =50 1=108 j=2 J=2 
JJ 
+ lgjTUP"NP+ Fm, TjUP"NON_ NP+9/hj, 
_/+ý e +v j=2 J=2 
Etr - N(O. h,, ) 
Time 
Window 
Downs 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Ups 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
Mean 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(N=40) 
0.0032 0.0032 
0.0007 0.0039 
(0.0024) 
0.0132" 0.0165*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0089" 0.0121 
(0.0022) 
0.0080*" 0.0112 
(0.0029) 
0.0080 (247%) 
(N=14) 
-0.0367 -0.0367 
0.0073* 
-0.0295 (0.0041) 
-0.0114 -0.0481 
ý 
(0.0086) 
0.0011 
-0.0357 (0.0036) 
-0.0018 -0.0385 (0.0043) 
-0.0018 (-5%) 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(N=66) 
0.0104 0.0104 
-0.0055"' 0.0049 (0.0018) 
-0.0017 0.0087 (0.0024) 
-0.0083"' 0.0021 (0.0018) 
-0.0038 0.0066' (0.0025) 
-0.0038 (-37%) 
(N=15) 
-0.0378 -0.0378 
0.0106 
-0.0271 (0.0056) 
0.0105 
-0.0273 (0.0111) 
0.0102' 
-0.0276 (0.0061) 
0.0042 
-0.0336 (0.0059) 
0.0042 
(11%) 
NON_NP 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(N=66) 
0.0732 0.0732 
-0.0247*" 0.0485 (1.59.10-5) 
-0.0302*** 0.0430 (2.59.10') 
-0.0241" 0.0491 
(1.35.10-5) 
0.0421" 0.1153*** 
(4.01.10-5) 
0.0421 
(57%) 
(N=15) 
0.1172*" 0.1172 
(6.00.10-5) 
-0.0835*** 0.0337 (9.83.10"5) 
0.0082 0.1254" 
(32.9.10"5) 
-0.0761*" 0.0411" (10.4.10-5) 
0.0277" 0.1449"' 
(7.16.10-5) 
0.0277 
(24%) 
ce Equation 
NP 
Coeff. 
(*102) 
Cumulative 
(*102) 
(N=40) 
0.0618 0.0618 
-0.0206*** 0.0412 (2.16.10"5) 
-0.0213" 0.0405 (4.80.10'5) 
-0.0228"' 0.0390 (0.92.10'5) 
0.0295"' 0.0913*** 
(4.05.10"5) 
0.0295 
(48%) 
Rý 0.7211""" 0.1020""" 
(0.0156) (0.0064) 
P2 0.2105" 0.7045 
(0.0151) (0.0080) 
P3 0.5982*** 
(0.0233) 
R1 ¬ 0.2311 
(0.0244) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. RZ=0.9707, SE=0.0566, DW=1.76 
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(N=14) 
0.0783 0.0783 
-0.0119*" 0.0664 (4.24.10"3) 
0.0117 0.0900 
(19.3.10-5) 
-0.0184" 0.0599 (1.61.10'5) 
0.0284"" 0.1067'" 
(7.01.10"5) 
0.0284 
(36%) 
Table A5 GARCH(1,2) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (A Y) broken down by Amount of Bonds Outstanding. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,2) type model. Bonds have been classified as 
more liquid (High_AOS) or less liquid (Low AOS) according to whether their outstanding amount was above or below the median value, 
respectively. The total panel (unbalanced) observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative 
coefficient in Tj and the cumulative coefficient in T_j according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance equation are 
structured as follows. 
26 107 113 136 
AY,, 
= 
Ea; DHigh AOS+ ZccfJ Low AOS+ Eo; DHigh AOS+ Ea; D; Low AOS+ß, AYt_'DOWN+ý62AY, t_2DOWN+/33AYt_PP+ß4AY, 
_2UP+ 14 1=27 i=108 i=14 53J3 
+ Y-SjT DOWN" High AOS+ E KTjDOWN" Low AOS+Y-¢ý1 JJP " High AOS+ 7 mjT1UP " Low AOS+sr, j=2 J=2 J=2 J=2 
26 
h11 
=c+Za"D"High_AOSýýa, D; Low 
_AOS+ 
ýEa, D, High 
_AOS+F_bjTDOWN"High_ AOS+EdjTjDOWN"Low- AOS+ 
, =1 i=27 j=108 j=2 J=2 
+ 
2gjTjUP"High_ 
AOS+ EmjTjUP"Low_AOS+9, h;, 
_, 
+92h17.2+f e, +vit 
l=2 j=2 
Ear ^ ' N(O, 1, ) 
Mean Equation 
Time 
Window 
High_AOS 
Coeff. Cumulative 
Low_AOS 
Coeff. Cumulative 
High AOS 
Coeff. Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) 
Coeff Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) 
Downs (N=26) (N=81) (N=26) (N=81) 
-60; -16 -0.0081 -0.0081 0.0161 0.0161 0.0878 0.0878 0.0958 0.0958 
-15; -2 0.0027 -0.0054 -0.0042" 0.0120 -0.0254*" 0.0624 -0.0324" 0.0634 (0.0028) (0.0017) (3.24.10-5) (1.83.10'5) 
-1; +1 0.0100" 0.0019 0.0045" 0.0206*" -0.0194 0.0684 -0.0422*** 0.0536*" (0.0048) (0.0018) (12.105) (1.81.10 
+2; +15 0.0125"' 0.0044 0.0004 0.0165"' -0.0199*" 0.0679 -0.0376'" 0.0582*** (0.0030) (0.0016) (5.11.10'5) (0.42.10'5) 
+16; +60 0.0136- 0.0054 0.0026 0.0187 0.0389" 0.1267" 0.0190" 0.1148" 
(0.0031) (0.0019) (6.79.10'5) (4.15.10"5) 
Total Ch. 0.0136 0.0026 0.0389 0.0190 
(-60; +60) (167%) (16%) (44%) (20%) 
Ups (N=6) (N=23) (N=6) (N=23) 
-60; -16 -0.0341 -0.0341 -0.0371 -0.0371 
0.1282 0.1282 0.1441"' 0.1441 
(9.11.10'5) 
-15; -2 0.0064 -0.0278 0.0030 -0.0341 -0.0596*" 0.0686 -0.0889*" 0.0552 (0.0065) (0.0043) (8.39.10'5) (13.8-10'5) 
-1; +1 0.0084 -0.0257 -0.0079 -0.0450 -0.0757*" 
0.0525 0.0554 0.1995" 
(0.0068) (0.0097) (7.88.10'5) (33.7.10"5) 
+2; +15 0.0027 
-0.0314 -0.0052 -0.0423 -0.0611 
*" 0.0671 
-0.0809*" 0.0632"' 
(0.0067) (0.0047) (11.510'5) (13.110'5) 
+16; +60 0.0064 
-0.0277 -0.0074' -0.0445 -0.0386*" 0.0896vß 0.0038 0.1479" (0.0063) (0.0042) (11.3.10'5) (8.74.105) 
Total Ch. 0.0064 
-0.0074 -0.0386 0.0038 
(-60; +60) (19%) (-20%) (-30%) (3%) 
ßi 0.6401 0.1138" 
(0.0144) (0.0073) 
ß2 i 0.1934 ** $' 0.4817*** 
(0.0137) (0.0534) 
a3 0.5836 " $2 0.1349 ** 
(0.0206) (0.0450) 
ßi 0.2173*" 
(0.0223) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9718, SE=0.0555, DW=I. 66 
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Table A6 GARCH(1,1) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (A Y) broken down by Rating History. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,1) type model. Bonds have been classified 
according to their rating history into previously re-rated (PC) and not previously re-rated (NPC) bonds. The total panel (unbalanced) 
observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for the 
cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative coefficient in T1 and the cumulative coefficient in 
Tß_1 according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance equation are structured as follows: 
AT DOWN" PC+ Yr 
= 
Ea, D; PC+ Ea, E4NPC+ 
Ec4EiPC+ ý136ai' i /'/ r nNPC+RAX_1DOWN+/' AYE 2DOWN+ßAY_/UP+Q AYr_/UP+ 
E8I q? 
r- 3 tr f 
i=l 1=31 1=108 W14 I_Z 
J55 
+ZKITIDOWN-NPC+ESITUP-PC+Y_w, I7JP"NPC-F I 1=2 j=2 J=2 
30 107 5h 
=c+Y-a DPCZaD NPC+ 
113arD PC+Eb T"DOWN. PC+ 5 dIT DOWN"NPC+ Eg T UP. PC+ 1 u- rr 
x_31 
r1 i_108 I_I 
ý 
J=2 
52 
I 
+EmITIUP-NPC+91hir_/+f e +vlr 
s;, ~ N(0, h;, ) 
Mean Equation 
Time PC NPC 
Window Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative 
Variance Equation 
PC 
Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) (*102) 
Downs (N=30) (N=77) (N=30) (N=77) 
-60; -16 -0.0066 -0.0066 0.0048 0.0048 0.0768 0.0768 0.0694 0.0694 
-15; -2 0.0058 -0.0009 0.0035" 0.0082 -0.0190"' 0.0578 -0.0254'" 0.0440 (0.0032) (0.0016) (3.82.10'5) (1.14.10 5) 
-1; +1 0.0078 0.0012 0.0121* 0.0169- -0.0133 0.0635 -0.0275*" 0.0419 (0.0063) (0.0021) (9.38.10-5) (1.75.10-5) 
+2; +15 ": 0.0078" 0.0011 0.0083*** 0.0130" -0.0228*" 0.0540 -0.0265"' 0.0429 (0.0029) (0.0016) (1.80.10"5) (0.21.10-5) 
+16; +60 0.0109 0.0043 0.0073*" 0.0121 0.0245*** 0.1013" 0.0379"' 0.1073*" (0.0032) (0.0021) (5.24-10-5) (3.64.10'5) 
Total Ch. 0.0109 0.0073 0.0245 0.0379 
(-60; +60) (164%) (154%) (32%) (55%) 
Ups (N=6) (N=23) (N=6) (N=23) 
-60; -16 -0.0312 -0.0312 -0.0391 -0.0391 0.0870 0.0870 0.0985" 0.0985 (5.25.10-5) 
-15; -2 0.0042 -0.0270 0.0078* -0.0313 -0.0007 0.0863 -0.0669"' 0.0316 (0.0072) (0.0043) (16.4.10'5) (8.54.10'5) 
_1; +1 -0.0094 -0.0406 -0.0035 -0.0427 -0.0181 0.0689 0.0722" 0.1707" (0.0119) (0.0093) (44.2.10-3) (27.3.10'5) 
+2; +15 
-0.0068 -0.0380 0.0043 -0.0348 -0.0084 0.0787 -0.0627*" 0.0358*" (0.0071) (0.0046) (16.9.10'5) (8.05.10'5) 
+16; +60 
-0.0158" -0.0470 -0.0037 -0.0428 0.0333" 0.1203" 0.0346" 0.1331" (0.0062) (0.0043) (14.6.10-5) (5.85.10-5) 
Total Ch. 
-0.0158 -0.0037 0.0333 0.0346 
(_60; +60) (-51%) (-9%) (38%) (35%) 
ßi 0.6904 0.1043*" 
(0.0149) (0.0062) 
ß2 0.1981"' 0.6977"' 
(0.0145) (0.0085) 
R3 0.5726"" 
(0.0182) 
ßl 0.2232"' 
(0.0203) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9711, SE=0.05613, DW=1.70 
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Table A7 GARCH(1,1) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (A Y) broken down by Country of the Issuer. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,1) type model. Bonds have been classifies as 
UK if the country of the issuer is UK-based, or NON_UK if the origin of the issuer is any other country. The total panel (unbalanced) 
observations are 16433. Parameter estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for the 
cumulative coefficients refer to the significance of the difference between the cumulative coefficient in Tj and the cumulative coefficient in 
Tj_1 according to the Wald test statistic. The regression mean and variance equation are structured as follows: 
72 107 123 136 5 
AYu=EaD; UK+ Ya4D, Non UK+ YaDUK+ EaDNonUK+ß1AY, t_1DOW74-ß2AY_IDOWMß3AY_, UP+Q', AYi_1UP+ B, TDOWNUK+ 
i=] : =73 +=108 t=11< 1=1 SSS 
+ Y_ KIT DOWN-Non U K+ F_ g, T UP " UK+ 7- m, TU P" NonU K+ c,, 
1=1 Y=1 1=1 
g, T, UP"UK+ 
72 h 
=c+Ia, D1UKýEa; D, Non_UK+ tEa, D, UK+E býTýDOWN"UK+E d, TýDOWN"Non_UK+ 5 
8=1 i=73 8=108 1=1 j=2 1=1 52 
+ Y_ mý Tý UP " Non_ UK+ 9jh_j+i et +u 
1=1 
s ~ N(0, h;, ) 
Time lJ iý 1. Vl. 
-u 11 UI 1\vl\-u11 
Window Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative Coeff. Cumulative 
(*102) (*102) (*102) (*102) 
Downs (N=72) (N=35) (N=72) (N=35) 
-60; -16 0.0066 0.0066 0.0115 0.0115 0.0848 0.0848 0.0812 0.0812 
-15; -2 -0.0002 0.0065 -0.0049' 0.0066 -0.0299'" 0.0549 -0.0255"* 0.0557 (0.0021) (0.0026) (2.09.10-) (3.38.10's) 
-1; +1 0.0054' 0.0121' 0.0117" 0.0231'" -0.0311" 0.0537 -0.0346'" 0.0466 (0.0030) (0.0034) (3.92.10-5) (5.88.10-5) 
+2; +15 0.0030 0.0097 0.0071'" 0.0186 -0.0358"+ 0.0490 -0.0218"- 0.0594' 
(0.0018) (0.0027) (0.62.10-5) (3.52.10-5) 
+16; +60 0.0063" 0.0130 0.0068" 0.0183 0.0283"* 0.1131'" 0.0214'" 0.1026" 
(0.0023) (0.0030) (4.30 10-') (5.39 10"5) 
Total Ch. 0.0063 0.0068 0.0283 0.0214 
(-60; +60) (95%) (59%) (33%) (26%) 
Ups (N=16) (N=13) (N=16) (N=13) 
-60; -16 -0.0370 -0.0370 -0.0373 -0.0373 0.0999 0.0999 0.1131'" 0.1131 (9.40.10'5) 
-15; -2 0.0168" -0.0202 -0.0094 -0.0467 -0.0397 
*' 0.0602 
-0.0562'" 0.0569 (0.0043) (0.0063) { (5.28105) (18.3.10"5) 
-1; +1 0.0151 -0.0219 -0.0197 -0.0570 -0.0322'" 0.0677 0.0791 0.1922" (0.0072) (0.0146) (4.64.10-5) (53.8.10'5) 
+2; +15 0.0055 0.0315 0.0097 0.0470 -0.0496" 0.0503'" -0.0197 0.0934' 
(0.0034) (0.0072) (0.74.10'5) (18.2.10'5) 
+16; +60 
-0.0011 -0.0381 
* 
-0.0116" -0.0489 0.0007 0.1005" 0.0302'" 0.1433" 
(0.0044) (0.0054) (7.78.10-5) (8.79.10-5) 
Total Ch. 
-0.0011 -0.0116 0.0007 0.0302 
(-60; +60) (-3%) (-31%) (1%) (27%) 
"' '" Rý 0.6669 ! 0.1142 
(0.0157) (0.0064) 
RZ 0.1816 " 0.6721""" 
(0.0153) (0.0089) 
R3 0.5925" 
(0.0111) 
Rl 0.2100"' (0.0156) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9718, SE=0.0554, DW=1.70 
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Table A8 GARCH(1,1) Pooled Estimation for Abnormal Yields (A Y) broken down by Rating. 
Daily data from January 1992 to December 1999 have been pooled to estimate a GARCH(1,1) type model. The whole sample has been 
broken down by class of rating into AAA, AA, A, and BBB subsamples. The total panel (unbalanced) observations are 16433. Parameter 
estimates are obtained using the BHHH algorithm. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks for the cumulative coefficients refer to 
the significance of the difference between the cumulative coefficient in T1 and the cumulative coefficient in Tj_] according to the Wald 
test statistic. Results are presented only for downgrades. The regression mean and variance equation are structured as follows: 
15 66 107 118 130 136 
AY=Ea, D, AAA+Y-aD, AA+Ea, D, A+ Ea, D, AA+ Y_a, D, A+ Ea, D, BBB+ß1AY_]DOWN-ß2AYit_7DOWMß3AY_]UP+ß4AY_2UP+ 
1d 5 i=16 '=67 5 id08 8119 =131 555 
+75, T]DOW 
. 
AAA+T_ KIT/DOW 
. 
AA+Y_p1T/DOWNA+Y- 0TI UP"AA+Em]T/UPA+ p]T/UP"BBB+s 
1=7 1=2 1=1 1=2 1=2 1=1 
15 66 107 118 130 $$ 
h=c+la, D, AAA+Za, DAA+I: a, DA+ E a, DAA+ Ea, D, A+Eb]T/DOWN"AAA +d1T/DOWN"AA + 
i=1 '=16 s=67 8=108 1=119 1=2 1=2 35 
+Ee, T/DOWN" A+I g1T/UP" AA +E m/TUP" A+ Y- n/TUP " BBB+9/h] +r; e2 +o 
1=2 1=2 j=2 1=2 
Eir - N(O, kt ) 
Mean Equation 
Time AAA A 
Window (N=15) (N=51) (N=41) 
Coefficient Cumulative Coefficient Cumulative I Coefficient Cumulative 
iý- 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
0.0052 0.0052 
0.0004 0.0057 
(0.0039) 
0.0108 0.0160* 
(0.0065) 
0.0012 0.0065 
(0.0039) 
0.0086 0.0086 
0.0015 0.0101 
(0.0015) 
0.0104" 0.0190" 
(0.0028) 
0.0072*" 0.0158 
(0.0022) 
0.0085" 0.0171 
(0.0026) 
0.0014 0.0066 
(0.0048) 
0.0014 0.0085 
(26%) (98%) 
-60; -16 
-15; -2 
-1; +1 
+2; +15 
+16; +60 
Total Ch. 
(-60; +60) 
0.0808 0.0808 
-0.0407'" 0.0401 (2.25.10-5) 
-0.0134 0.0674" 
(12.3.10-5) 
-0.0379*" 0.0429 (2.90.10') 
0.0104 0.0912*** 
(7.48.10-5) 
0.0104 
(13%) 
0.0437 
(60%) 
-0.0028 -0.0028 
0.0026 
-0.0002 (0.0028) 
0.0067 0.0039 
(0.0046) 
0.0044 0.0016 
(0.0026) 
0.0065" 0.0037 
(0.0030) 
0.0065 
(232%) 
0.0855 0.0855 
-0.0351 *" 0.0504 (2.99.10') 
-0.0313*" 0.0542 (7.22.10-5) 
-0.0411" 0.0444 (0.98.10"S) 
0.0166*" 0.1021 " 
(4.66.10-5) 
0.0166 
(19%) 
Pi 0.6992... 
(0.0156) 
R: 0.2052... 0.0998... (0.0152) (0.0065) 
P3 0.6002*** 0.6949*" 
(0.244) (0.0084) 
Pi 0.21'74*" 
(0.0253) 
Notes: Regression statistics: Adj. R2=0.9709, SE=0.0563, DW=1.73 
Variance Equation ° 
0.0728 0.0728 
-0.0179*** 0.0549 (3.25.10-5) 
-0.0393**' 0.0335*" (3.74.10-5) 
-0.0213*" 0.0515" (2.14.10-5) 
0.0437"' 0.1165*** 
(4.54.10-5) 
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Table A9 
OLS with no AR term 
R-squared 0.851 Mean dependent var 0.084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.849 S. D. dependent var 0.990 
S. E. of regression 0.384 Akaike info criterion 
-1.013 
Sum squared resid 2343 Schwarz criterion 
-0.927 
Log likelihood 8302 F-statistic 505.9 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.067 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
GARCH(1,1) 
R-squared 0.978 Mean dependent var 0.084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978 S. D. dependent var 0.990 
S. E. of regression 0.056 Akaike info criterion 
-1.791 
Sum squared resid 341 Schwarz criterion 
-1.702 
Log likelihood 14536 F-statistic 3901.5 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.705 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
GARCH(1,2) 
R-squared 0.979 Mean dependent var 0.084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978 S. D. dependent var 0.990 
S. E. of regression 0.050 Akaike info criterion 
-1.837 
Sum squared resid 335 Schwarz criterion 
-1.749 
Log likelihood 14910 F-statistic 3961.0 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.755 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
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Chapter VII 
MODELLING EUROBOND CREDIT RATINGS 
AND FORECASTING THE DOWNGRADE PROBABILITY 
7.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the role of company financial statement information in 
de=m ining the risk of downgrade of firms issuing sterling-denominated Eurobonds in the period 
from 1992 to 1999. The contribution of long-term instability (loolfing at the firm's profitability, 
market significance, and leverage) and short-term liquidity problems (considering liquid assets and 
short-term liabilities of the firm) are specifically investigated. Alongside with accounting and financial 
variables, we will investigate the role of credit risk in affecting the probability for a firm to be 
downgraded, which we indicate as Pt(D) A simple multivariate regression of Pr D) on the rating 
category variable and other firm specific factors would not do a good job to help us in our objective 
-that is predicting P/ fD). The main drawback of this procedure is an identification problem. It may 
indeed happen that some of the bonds' contractual characteristics and the issuing firms' operating 
figures affect both the rating and Pr(D As a consequence, we could not correctly identify the 
"dean" effect of the rating variable removing its interaction effect with the other factors. 
To overcome this problem we develop a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step a 
conditional expectation of the default risk (rating class) is estimated as a function of bond specific 
and firm specific characteristics by an Ordered Probit Model (OP). The Ordered Probit seeins to be 
a good procedure as it takes into account the ordinal nature of bond ratings and avoids any 
assumption about the multivariate distribution of the independent variables. In the second step, we 
estimate the disentangled effects of default risk, as obtained from the conditional mean estimate in 
step 1, and financial variables on the downgrade probability Pi(D). The two-step model ends up 
with providing a one-year estimated downgrade probability for individual issuers. 
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The forecast performance of the probabilistic model for downgrades is finally evaluated. Block 
and full cross validation are performed and the model is bendumrked against both a nazve constant 
probability model, which assumes all firms to be non-downgraded, and a more complex neural 
networks model. 
We recall that rating agencies assign aedit ratings employing both publicly available information, 
such as financial variables and statements, and possibly other non-public information, such as 
confidential reports from the firne management. However the exact set of information is generally 
not made public. The guidelines used in the rating process are not disclosed because such a 
disclosure would allow manipulation. Furthermore, the agencies state that the rating assessment 
requires expert subjective judgement in addition to the statistical analysis of financial data. It is thus 
generally believed that ratings are to a certain extent determined on the basis of subjective factors 
which are not easily quantifiable, and of variables not directly related to the specificity of the firm - 
such as the general economic situation, changes in management, currency fluctuations. 
Due to these ambiguities in the bond rating process, ratings cannot be reproduced with loo 
percent accuracy, and financial institutions are dependent on the rating agencies for the "official 
raring". However, it is useful to be able to evaluate the firm default risk independently by estimating 
appropriate rating models for two reasons. First, rating agencies do not rate bonds for every firm, 
and financial institutions might be interested in investing in a firm for which no rating is available 
from standard sources. Second, changes in official ratings occur infrequently, when important 
developments that affect a firm's default risk occur. Bond investors and corporate financial 
managers are concerned about rating changes, since reclassification usually affects the firm's cost of 
borrowing and stock price as well as the bond's price. Given the considerable value in being able to 
anticipate rating changes, researchers and practitioners, during the last thirty years, have built models 
that use firms and bonds observed characteristics to explain observed corporate bond ratings. 
While the first part of this study is in line with these studies, we believe that the real contribution 
is provided in the second part where the downgrade probablity is modelled. Modelling transitions 
has started only very recently and only within the framework of rating transition matrices. 
Reasons for the early stage of these studies may be the following: the recent release of data 
about rating actions by rating agencies, the traditional "default mode" way of thinking of most 
banks, the general consensus in viewing transitions as non-fundamental economic event. 
However, it is increasingly common for banks to embrace activities with the objective to transfer 
credit risk. Ihis leads banks to shift from a "default mode" approach to a transition short of default 
perspective. Moreover, despite default remains the ultimate outcome, it is not the only credit event 
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Events such as distress and rating migration may have significant impact on the pricing of credit risk 
as verified in Chapter VL For an investor holding a bond, a downgrade in the bond's rating can 
result in a financial loss even if the bond's issuer has continued to make all scheduled payments. 
Furthermore, running in parallel both a model of downgrade and a model of default may provide 
evidence on the possibly different causes driving the two events. Finally, while a downgrade model 
might serve during periods of relative stability in the economy, a failure model might be an essential 
tool during periods of exceptionally high failure rate. 
While a large number of studies have modelled default and bankruptcy events29, no publicly 
available empirical work has been devoted to model and predict directly the probability for a firm 
(bond) to have its rating revised downward. We attempt to fill this gap identifying the factors 
beneficial to predict a rating downgrade, and that may not necessarily be the same explaining the 
rating level or the default probability. 
As well explained by Carey and Hrycay (2001), the advantages of scoring models like this he in 
their mechanical nature and the possibility to match the model's time horizon with that of the 
portfolio credit risk model However, scoring models rely on large and representative samples and 
encompass the risk of biased estimates. Despite the drawback of a limited sample size, our exercise 
has several practical benefits for credit zisk management practices. This type of model should be 
useful for the following reasons. First, updating Eurobond ratings ahead of ratings agency 
announcements and monitoring short-term changes in the credit quality of corporate obligors. 
Second, identifying profitable bond strategies especially in light of the evidence of significant CAR 
and yield spread reaction in Chapter VL Third, improving the pricing of credit derivative products. 
Finally, as a first step in the valuation of credit risk in a fixed-income portfolio, in general, and in the 
context of the overall value-at-risk methodology, in particular. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 briefly outlines the literature 
concerning the explanatory factors of bond ratings. The sample, the data and the methodolor are 
described in Section 7.3. Empirical findings are presented in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 summarises and 
concludes the main findings of the chapter. 
29 See Kao (2000) for an overview and discussion of the credit risk models. 
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7.2. Review of the Bond Rating Related Literature 
Marry studies attempt to assess how the rating agencies use public information in setting quality 
ratings, though most are mainly US based Although theory provides some guidance in the choice 
of explanatory variables, the choice of method (parametric u non-parametric, logfit vow probit) 
is not indicated by either theory or empirical evidence. There is a general consensus on the 
inappropriateness of least squares methods to rate bonds. There is also concern over the use of 
methods (such as mulrinomial discriminant analysis) which ignore the ordinal nature of bond rating. 
However, no real guidance exists as to what sort of statistical model is optimal for bond rating and 
no single method dominates in the empirical literature. We will try to cover the essential aspects by 
briefly presenting the main works on the basis of the methodology they used 
7.2.1. Linear Regmsion Analysis 
Honigar (1966) is the first study that estimates and predicts bond ratings based on the 
characteristics of bonds and issuing firms. On the basis of a sample of 200 US corporate bonds with 
unchanged ratings in the period 1959-1964, Honigan uses a simple linear regression analysis to 
predict both the ratings of newly issued bonds and their rating changes in the period 1961-1964. 
The Moody's and S&P's bond rating series are coded on a nine-point scale (with 9-AAA, 8=AA, 
... , 
1=C) and regressed on a set of accounting data and ratios. Harigan is able to explain 65 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable through the following explanatory variables: total 
assets, net worth to total debt (book values), net operating profit to sales, working capital to sales, 
sales to net worth, and the subordination status. 
West (1970) differentiates from Honigan (1966) for the introduction of new explanatory 
variables and for using a regression model in logarithmic form to explain ratings assigned to 
outstanding US bonds. The dependent variable is constructed as in Hccrigan (1966) and regressed 
on the variables that Fisher (1959) had previously used to explain bond risk premia -i. e. earnings 
variability, fair's reliability, capital structure and marketability. The logarithmic form intends to 
improve the fit of the model by allowing for some interaction effects among the independent 
variables. The impact of each independent variable is indeed a function of the levels of the other 
independent variables. However, West (1970) cannot improve the predictive ability of Honigan's 
model. 
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Pogue and Soldofsky (1969) introduce a new procedure to avoid coding the ordinal bond raring 
onto an interval scale by comparing only two categories at the time. Moody's bond ratings are 
collected for industrial, udEty and rail US outstanding corporate bonds (20 observations in each 
group) in the 1961-1966 period A dummy variable 0-1 for all the possible pair-wise comparisons is 
used as dependent variable and regressed on the following variables: long term debt to total assets, 
coefficient of variation of earnings, and total assets. This procedure is, however, unable to make use 
of all the available information. Moreover, the sample size of 10 bonds in each rating class is not 
large enough to invoke the OLS asymptotic properties. 
Ordinary least-squares analysis assumes that the underlying dependent variable (default risk in 
our case) has been categorised into equally spaced discrete intervals (rating categories). That is, the 
risk differential between an AA-rated bond and an A-rated bond is the same as between a BBB- 
rated and a BB-rated bond. While we can think bond ratings as conveying ordinal information, we 
cannot interpret ratings as equal intervals on a scale from investment-grade to speculative bonds. 
Treating ordinal variables as interval variables leads inevitably to misspecific ation. In particular the 
expected value of the error term does not equal zero, the variance of the error term is not constant 
as a function of the independent variables, and the error term is not normally distributed (McKelvey 
and Zavoina, 1975). Taking into account these considerations, the subsequent studies attempt to 
overcome these problems introducing new methodologies to dassify bonds into bond-rating 
categories. In a chronological order the next methodology to be employed is the multiple 
discrirninant analysis. 
7 2.2. Multiple dithninant anaisis (MDA) 
Discriminant analysis has been one of the most popular techniques used to analyse financial data 
in the context of financial distress. The pioneering and still most widely used publicly available 
model is Altman's Z-Score model for default prediction (Ahman, 1968,1977,1995) which uses a 
particular implementation of the linear discriminant analysis (LDA). The model consists of a linear 
function of financial ratios that produces the best classification of firms either distressed or non- 
distressed categories, based on a representative learning set of data. A separation line is found which 
madmises the separation between the two categories of firma. This linear function is then used to 
classify out-of-sample companies as belonging to one of the two groups. Most importantly, the 
magnitude of the LDA score can be interpreted as an indicator of the probability of belonging to 
the distressed group and not as the probability of default itself, The ratios (variables) embedded in 
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the most recent (1995) Z-Score model are the working capital to total assets ratio, retained earnings 
to total assets ratio, earnings before interest and taxes over total assets, book value of equity over 
book value of total debt. One of the main reasons for the popularity of Altnan's methodology is 
that it provides a standard benchmark for comparison of companies in similar industries. 
Pinches and Mingo (PM, 1973) introduce a multiple discriminant analysis (4DA) to classify 
bonds into rating categories. Their estimation sample includes 132 newly issued US industrial bonds 
rated by Moody's in the years 1967-68. After an a prxaii screening of all the financial and accounting 
variables, PM proceed developing the discriminant analysis. They finally identify the following 
factors as being important size, leverage, return on investment, earnings stability, debt coverage, plus 
a subordination status variable, which results to be the most relevant "explanatory" variable. In 
order to make a comparison with previous empirical findings, PM (1973) apply the multiple 
discriminant analysis to the independent variables used in the previous studies and conclude that 
their own set of independent variables has higher predictive ability. 
Altman and Katz (AK, 1976) apply this methodology to the bond ratings of companies in the 
electric public utility industry 
. 
Through a series of ad lxr procedures AK produce a set of variables 
from the large initial list and end up with the following apparently significant variables: the interest 
coverage ratio, earnings variabi ity, interest coverage variability, return on investment, and 
maintenance and depreciation expense to operating revenues. 
The use of MDA is intended to avoid the interval scale assumption required by U. S. To this 
aim MDA concentrates on differences between categories of variables. A series of functions is 
computed to maximise the ratio of between-group deviation sum of squares to within-group 
deviation sum of squares (Eisenbeis and Avery, 1972). However, MDA treats ratings as classifying 
bonds into separate categories and consequently is not able to exploit the ordinal nature of ratings. 
In other words, MDA treats the nine rating categories from AAA to C as nine different outcomes 
ignoring, however, that these nine categories can be viewed as partitions of perhaps unequal widths 
of a single risk dimension, the probability of default In addition, MDA also requires strong 
multivariate normality distributional assumptions on the independent (classifying) variables and 
assumes that the group variance-covariance is equal across groups. In addition it does not provide 
convenient tests of significance. MDA is in fact unable to identify insignificant variables through 
formal significance tests on the individual coefficients. The next studies start off from these 
limitations and introduce ordered probit models that treat the different values of the dependent 
variable as an ordinal variable (but not necessarily on a linear scale) avoiding, at the same time, the 
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restrictive statistical requirements posed by MDA. Fore detailed treatn=t of discriminant analysis, 
the reader may refer to L. achenbnich (1975). 
7 2.3. Probit Models 
Wlvle IDA is solved through the error squares minimisation, binory choice models (Logft and 
Probit) proceeds through the maximisation of the logarithm of a likelihood function (that is a loft 
and a normal cumulative probability in the two cases, respectively). Kaplan and Urwitz (KU, 1979) 
is the first study that applies ordered probit analysis to outstanding and newly issued industrial US 
bonds rated by Moody's in the period between 1970 and 1974. In particular, KU use an ordinal 
probit model that allows the use of maxinnurn likelihood (ML) estimators, that under general 
conditions, are consistent, asymptotically efficient, and have a known asymptotic distribution (They, 
1971, chap. 8). A set of financial ratios is first selected on the basis of previous studies and 
successively computed using a 5-year average of the annual ratios to avoid temporary anomalies. 
The subordination variable, size, financial leverage, and profitability are the variables found to be 
significant. No substantial difference in the results is revealed by the successive use of industry- 
adjusted ratios. 
Kao and Wu (1990) estimate the default risk of new debt issued by industrial and utility Mood/, s 
rated companies for the period January 1984 
- 
December 1985. The default risk is estimated as a 
function of indenture provisions and bond and issuing firm characteristics by the use of an ordered 
probit. The results indicate that leverage (the debt to total capitalisation ratio), profitability gOA), 
size (total assets), subordination and industry dummy variables, and financing restriction provision 
play all an important role to determining the risk of default Particular interest is devoted to test 
empirically the impact of bond indenture provisions on ratings. To this aim a sinking fund 
amortisation rate variable is introduced in the model and its impact is studied separately for different 
categories of credit quality bonds. Results indicate that the effect of sinking funds on default risk is 
negative for investment-grade bonds and positive for speculative-grade bonds, suggesting that 
sinking funds do not reduce the default risk of speculative-grade bonds. 
Blume, Lim and MacKinley (BLM, 1998) is the most recent paper on this subject. They 
generalise and extend the methodology of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979). BLM abandon the cross- 
section analysis so far utilised and introduce a panel data of S&Ps bond ratings for all corporate 
bonds included in the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Index covering the period 1978-1995. 
The availability of data in a panel format allows them to examine whether, conditional on the 
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included variables, rating standards have become more stringent over time and, if so, to assess the 
importance of this phenomenon in explaining the recent prevalence of downgrades over upgrades. 
The specific accounting ratios used to explain credit ratings are pre-tax interest coverage, operating 
income to sales, long-term debt to assets, and total debt to assets. All the ratios result to be 
significant, with the first two and the last two positively and negatively related to higher credit 
ratings, respectively. From the model BLM also obtain estimates of the intercept-dummies for each 
year in the estimation period The steady downward trend over time of the intercepts is consistent 
with the hypothesis of more st ingent standards over time in assigning ratings. 
7 2.4. Neural Heizwrks 
The use of a neural network approach (ANN) in accounting and financial research and to model 
corporate bond rating has been growing rapidly in the last ten years. In particular neural nett vrks 
are recommended in Dutta and Shekhar (1988), Surkan and Ying (1991), Moody (1994), Kim et aL 
(1993), and Daniels, Kamp and Verkooijen (1997). ANN is a non-parametric (non-linear) modelling 
technique in which the data series themselves identify the relationships among the variables. The 
logit and probit models characterise the probability that a bond will be downgraded as a single 
nonlinear (sigmoid) function of the explanatory variables. Neural networks generalise this by making 
the downgrade probability the sum of (possibly nested) sigmoid functions. The result is that the 
relation between the downgrade probability and the explanatory variables may be highly nonlinear. 
The main justification for the use of neural networks with bond ratings prediction lies indeed in its 
potential to capture nonlinearities in the data which linear regression models cannot capture. Since 
ANN does not rely on restrictive parametric assumptions such as normality, stationarity, cr 
sample-path continuity, it is also robust to specification errors troubling parametric models. In 
addition, the absence of a complete a pmn specification of a 
functional form for the data-generation 
process of bond ratings suggests the use of a non-parametric modelling approach. In the above 
studies, neural network models have been proved to have the potential to achieve a higher 
percentage of correct risk classifications than alternative methods. The concern with this approach 
remains the typical limited size of the data set relative to the large number of parameters in a typical 
network Since neural networks rely consistently on the quality of the data, they are likely to fail or to 
be trapped in overfitting if the dataset is not large enough 
-which is not a rare problem when 
working with corporate bond data. 
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7.3. Data and Methodology 
73.1. Sample Sek ion 
The sample was chosen from all bullet, that is with no sinking fund or call/put option attached, 
sterling Eurobonds issued from 1/1/1992 to 31/12/1999. From Datastream International. we 
retrieved monthly time series of Standard and Poor's ratings for each bond starting from the date it 
was issued Rating data from Moodys are also provided in Datatastream International However 
we decided to consider only ratings assigned by Standard & Poor's as they constitute a larger 
number. We preferred not to merge the data provided by the two agencies as significant 
differences have been observed in the credit rating assigned to the same fine (Cantor and Packer, 
1995), compromising the homogeneity of the data. S&P's credit rating information was available 
for 473 Eurobonds. 
The whole sample was split on the basis of rating migrations during the life of the issue. 312 
Eurobonds were not re-rated over the sample period, while 161 issues experienced a rating change. 
Among the re-rated bonds, 124 were downgraded and 37 were upgraded, reflecting the generally 
recently observed high proportion of downgrades to upgrades. We selected the downgraded 
bonds3° and we excluded bonds issued by government and supranational entities, remaining with 
109 (downgraded) corporate bonds (see Figure 7.1 for the distribution over time of the Eurobond 
downgrades and Figure 7.2 for time, geographic, maturity and rating distribution of the data). We 
noticed that bonds issued by the same firm were often downrated on the same day as a 
consequence of the film's re-rating. In these cases we selected the most senior bond and we 
dropped the others from the sample. Successively, each Eurobond was individually matched with a 
couple of bonds in the non-changed sample with similar characteristics in terms of original rating, 
industry sector, and time to maturity on the date of the rating's change. In a second stage, bonds 
were also matched by coupon and by market value when feasible. We finally proceeded collecting all 
the available accounting information for both the changed and non-changed samples, and we ended 
up with a final sample of 105 bonds, of which 35 (out of 109) downgraded and 70 non-changed. 
For both samples financial figures and ratios were collected from Company Analysis and were all 
taken at the date of the last balance sheet before the event. The variables are summarily presented in 
Table 7.1 and more extensively described in the following section. 
30 Due to the mA mumber of upgrades no robust analysis could have been performed on tlh s sub-sample. 
245 
Chapter VII. Modelling Credit Ratings and Forecasting the Downgrade Probability 
7.3.2. Variables 
The review of previous studies suggests that a relatively small set of independent variables seems 
important in explaining and predicting bond ratings. These variables include size, earnings' stability 
, 
leverage, earning coverage of interest, working capital and profitability. 
The size of the company is usually considered as inversely related to credit risk: the smaller the 
company, the higher the risk, cris pv hLs. The rationale is that larger fimis tend to be older, with 
more established product lines, more varied sources of revenues and access to a wider variety of 
capital markets. More diversification might in turn imply less vulnerability to adverse shocks or 
cyclical fluctuations in one particular line of production and more stable cash flows. In other terms, 
larger firn is have productive assets that can be sold to raise cash without disrupting core lines of 
business. As a consequence of all these factors, financial distress risk is likely to be lower for larger 
firms. Moreover, it may also be that larger fines have easier access to government aid when they fall 
on bad times. We therefore allow for the potential impact of firm's size on the rating classification 
by including the logarithm of total assets. 
As an explicit measure of earnings instability we use the standard deviation of the earnings to 
equity ratio (EARN VOL) computed over the three years before the rating change. We expect 
financial markets to regard a fum's volatile earnings as the results of poor management herefore 
demanding an extra prn for this risk. According to this line of argument, earnings' volatility 
should be positively related to the probability of being downgraded. 
3ý 
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Figure 7.1 Number of Eurobond Downgrades by Year, 1992-1999 
The total number of rating downgrades over the period 1992-1999 is 109. The figure plots both the 
number of downgraded bonds and the pattern of the return on the FTSE All Share Index over the same 
sample period. A negative relationship between the two series clearly emerges. Increases in the stock 
market returns are accompanied by decreases in the number of negative rating revisions 
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Table 7.1 Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
RATING AAA-. 1 AA-2 A-3 BBB-4 
Size: 
CAP Log of the Market Capitalization at Balance Sheet date 
ASSETS Log of the Total Assets of the firm 
Performance: 
ROA Return on Assets = (EBIT 
- 
Tax)/Total Assets 
ROE Return on Equity 
- 
Net Income/Shareholders' Equity 
QRATIO 
-- 
(Market Capitalization + Liabilities)/Total Assets 
--- -- ý-- Financial Leverage: 
DEBT CE (Short-term Debt + Long-Term Debt)/(Shareholders' Equity + Short-Term 
Debt + Long-Term Debt) 
DEBT ASS (Short-term Debt + Long-Term Debt)/Total Assets 
STDEBT Short-term Debt/Total Assets 
LTDEBT Long-term Debt/Total Assets 
COVER (EBIT+Depreciation)/Interest Paid 
PINT DEBT Interests Paid/Long-Term Debt 
Liquidity: - ----- - -- 
WC (Current Assets 
- 
Current Liabilities)/Total Assets 
CASH ASS (Cash + Short-term Securities)/Current Liabilities 
Growth: 
INV CE Investments/Capital Employed 
P 
-E 
Stock Price/Earnings per Share 
Others: 
TAX CHARGE Tax Charge/PBT 
RET EARN (Earnings 
- 
Dividends)/Earnings 
PAYOUT Dividends/Earnings 
SEC UNSEC Secured Loans/Unsecured Loans 
BLOAN_DEBT (Bank Loans & Overdrafts)/Long-term Debt 
dTANG Increase in Tangible Fixed Assets/Total Tangible Fixed Assets 
EARN_VOL Annual standard deviation of the earnings to Equity ratio (based on the three 
previous years) 
NP Dummy 
-1 if the bond is issued with a negative pledge guarantee; 0 
otherwise. 
FIN Dummy 
-1 if the firm belongs to the financial sector; 0 if it belongs to the 
industrial sector. 
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Profitability is another key factor in affecting the firm's ability to pay its debt obligations. The 
ratios we used to measure firm's profitability include ROA (defined as the ratio of operating income 
to total assets), ROE (defined as net income to shareholders' equity), and QRATIO (defined as the 
sum of market capitalisarion and liabilities over total assets). We expect profitability to be negatively 
related with default risk and positively related with the probability of being highly rated 
The leverage of the firm is probably generally considered to be the most important determinant 
of default risk and debt rating valuation. The more debt the firm employs in its capital structure, the 
less the fine wM be liI; ely to meet its debt service obligations in the event of even modest 
fluctuations in firm value. Several ratios are generally used to measure leverage, some merely variants 
of each other. DEBT CE (defined as the book value of long-term debt plus short-term debt to the 
capital employed 
-the book value of equity plus the book value of total debt) and DEBT ASS 
(defined as total debt to total assets) are introduced to reflect the market's perspective of current- 
value financial leverage relative to rating. LTDEBT and STDEBT are the ratios of long-term debt 
and short-term to total assets, respectively, and are introduced to capture the possible part played by 
the maturityof the debt. 
As the debt ratios previously discussed are balance sheet ratios, they do not record changes in the 
values of debt and equity from the issue date. To overcome this problem we introduced also the 
coverage ratio (COVER), which is a flow ratio based on annual flows rather than on book values. 
The COVER ratio (defined as operating income to interest charges) measures the extent to which 
the cash flows needed to serve debt holders are covered by the film's income, and is therefore 
predicted to be negatively correlated with credit risk. 
To assess hort 
-term liquidity risk we computed the working capital ratio, WC (defined as 
can nt assets less current liabilities over total assets) and the cash ratio, CASH ASS. These ratios 
are useful to assess whether the firm has enough liquid sources to meet its immediate cash needs in 
case of a liquidity crunch We would expect that the higher either ratio is, the more liquid is the 
issuing firm and the lower is the risk of default due to unavailability of sufficient funds to meet 
short-term cash demands. 
As a prow for the variations in the tangibility of the firm we introduce the increase in tangible 
fixed assets over the total tangible fixed assets (dTANG). We expect a negative relation between 
increases in tangible fixed assets and the probability of being assigned a lower rating. The rationale 
underlying this relation is that tangible assets are easy to collateralize and are the most widely 
accepted sources for bank borrowing and raising secured debt. 
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S&P's do not view common dividend payments as fixed obligation. Dividends can be cut or 
omitted without triggering debt repayment or covenant default, or increasing the risk of such 
default. However, many companies are extremely reluctant o cut their dividends as this may be 
considered as a signal of bad conditions of the firm Following this theory we would expect higher 
risk to be associated with lower dividends. On the other hand, the agency theory supports the 
inverse relationship through the conflict of interests between shareholders and bondholders, so that 
the higher the dividend paid, the higher the risk of default. The relation between dividends and risk 
of default will be tested on two variables related to the dividend behaviour. the dividend payout ratio 
(PAYOUT) and the retained earnings ratio (RET EARN). 
As proxies for the growth rate of the company we computed the price to earnings ratio (P E) 
and the investments to capital employed ratio (INK CLE). We expect firms with either mmanely 
valuable or negative growth opportunities to have more severe potential financial difficulties. 
Moreover, we expect default risk to be negatively related both to the proportion of bank loans 
relatively to long term debt (BLOAN DEBT) and the proportion of secured respect to unsecured 
debt (SEC UNSEC). 
In addition to the financial and accounting ratios, we have also built two dummy variables, one 
for the industrial sector (FIN) and one for the negative pledge guarantee (NP). The dummy FFN 
(-1 if the firm belongs to the financial sector and -0 if the firm belongs to the industrial sector) has 
been introduced to test for the importance of sector differences in credit risk A few recent reports 
by rating agencies and a proposed change in the bank capital regulation by the Basel Conunittee 
indicate that increasing attention has being paid to sector comparisons (Standard and Pooi's, 1999; 
Basel Committee on Banlflng and Supervision, 1999). If these sector differences are in fact 
observed, the risk associated to firms in different industries will be weighted depending on both the 
credit rating and the sector. The literature on sector differences in the measurement of credit risk is 
fairly limited and generally does not support any strong evidence. Our study will eventually provide 
an additional contribution to this specific topic. 
'The dumrny NP has been assigned a value one if the bond is accompanied by a negative pledge 
guarantee and zero otherwise. In the presence of a negative pledge lause, if the companyissues new 
debt, the old debt must be secured as the new one. It is designed to protect the bondholder from 
credit deterioration as a result of the issuer's actions. The breach of the clause may accelerate the 
date for the repayment of the principal and put into place procedures to enforce repayment. The 
presence of this indenture should reduce the credit risk for bondholders, implying a negative 
relationship between NP and the probability of being transferred to a lower rating class. However 
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the reverse relationship might occur when riskier firms issue bonds with such a guarantee attached 
to be able to allocate their bonds. As a result relatively risky bonds are more likely to have a NP 
guarantee. 
So far we have described the explanatory variables of the ordered probit and the binary probit 
models. We now briefly present the dependent variables for the two models. Bond ratings in the 
sample range from AAA to BBB, but are not homogeneously distributed. Ile in other studies, the 
+ and 
- 
signs were omitted, i. e. AA +, AA, and AA- were all considered AA. For estimation 
purposes, the credit rating scale (RATING) was cardinalised and translated into numbers as follows: 
AAA 
- 
1, AA a 2, Aa3, and BBB Q4 and used as dependent variable in the ordinary probit 
model In the binary probit model the dependent variable is the dichotomous variable Pº(D), which 
is equal to one if the fine is down-rated within one year and zero otherwise. As all default and rating 
migration studies have found an unambiguous correlation between credit quality and default 
remoteness 
-irrespectively of the time horizon-, we expect that the higher the rating, the lower is the 
probability of default". 
7.3.3. P'reli'nthay Statistics 
Table 7.2 provides summary descriptive statistics for the variables we found to be significant in 
our study. In Panel A descriptive statistics are computed on individual samples, that is using all the 
available information (observations) for each variable. In Panel B the same statistics are based on a 
common sample, that is we included only the observations for which we have all the information. 
This is approximately the same sample our probit models will be based on. 
Table 7.3 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables we collected splitting the sample into 
"downgaaded" and "stable" bonds. The Lewr's F test was used to test for homogeneity-of-variance. 
For each case (variable), the Lmmr F test computes the absolute difference between the value of 
that case and its mean and performs a one-way analysis of variance on those differences. 
Successively, a parametric t test and a non-parametric (Um Mil y test) test were performed to test 
for equal means and equal medians, respectively. The non-parametric test is equivalent o the t-test 
and uses the ranks of the cases to test whether two independent samples are from the same 
population. The parametric test was performed under the assumption of equal or different mean, 
according to what resulted from the Lew c test for each variable. The variables for which a 
31 See Nuisdl, Parawdin and Varouo (2000) for a recent "univariate" and "multivariate" analysis of rating transition 
n=& m 
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significant difference emerges between the two groups of bonds (downgraded and stable) are 
highlighted by a shaded area. Earnings' volatility and working capital present significantly higher 
variance and higher mean for bonds that have been down-rated than for non re-rated bonds". The 
investment ratio and the net income to sales ratio are on average higher for the "changed" sample. 
Finally, downgraded bonds have lower and less volatile short 
-term debt ratio, more volatile dividend 
payout and higher secured to unsecured ratio than non re-rated bonds. 
Panel A: 
Iý Sxnple Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis N 
ASSETS 16.2165 15.6458 19.9073 13.0994 1.6265 0.7177 2.4877 105 
CAP 15.6587 15.5875 17.9950 13.3770 0.9214 0.2361 2.7016 94 
COVER 6.6585 5.6245 22.6613 
-19.4091 4.7748 -1.2529 13.7369 81 
DEBT ASS 0.3073 0.2999 1.4084 0.0512 0.1698 2.9444 20.4562 93 
DEBT CE 0.5071 0.4685 0.9711 0.1638 0.1904 0.4757 2.6616 92 
dTANG 0.0691 0.0618 0.4623 
-0.1998 0.1275 0.8849 4.6653 84 
EARN VOL 0.0181 0.0105 0.1385 0.0003 0.0215 2.7794 13.7981 100 
INV CE 0.1049 0.0964 0.5287 
-0.1531 0.1104 1.2293 5.9205 92 
ROA 0.0852 0.0842 0.2876 
-0.0430 0.0667 0.7657 3.6300 104 
WC 0.1220 0.0892 0.5175 
-0.1117 0.1268 0.7460 3.2375 93 
Panel B: 
Comm Smnple 
ASSETS 16.1096 15.4940 19.9074 13.6163 1.5307 0.9366 2.7397 68 
CAP 15.5771 15.5592 17.9951 13.3770 0.9521 0.2828 2.8442 68 
COVER 7.1553 6.0753 22.6613 1.3625 3.8254 1.4145 6.0741 68 
DEBT ASS 0.2741 0.2852 0.5544 0.0512 0.1192 0.0548 2.3058 68 
DEBT CE 0.5128 0.4685 0.9711 0.1638 0.2023 0.3833 2.2678 68 
dTANG 0.0575 0.0549 0.4623 
-0.1998 0.1227 0.7647 4.7963 68 
EARN_VOL 0.0171 0.0110 0.1385 0.0003 0.0209 3.2146 17.9750 68 
INV CE 0.0934 0.0782 0.5287 
-0.1531 0.1043 1.3191 7.6620 68 
ROA 0.0979 0.0893 0.2876 0.0080 0.0682 0.8668 3.6210 68 
WC 0.1388 0.1129 0.5175 
-0.1117 0.1293 0.6747 3.1926 68 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample 
Descriptive statistics in Panel A are obtained using all the available observations for each individual variable. Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics computed using only the observations for which we have a complete set of information. 
32 The higher liquidity observed in the downgraded sample may be due to a build up in their inventories 
which, according to the computation of the Working Capital variable (WG) are not deducted from the 
current assets. 
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D N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Levene's 
Test 
(Eq. Var) 
Mean 
Difference 
t-test 
Eq. Means 
(Sig) 
Mann- 
Whitney 
(Asynt. Sig) 
CAP 0 62 9805861 9899278 0.0091 107677 0.0456 923 
1 32 9698184 12535325 (0.92) (0.96) (0.58) 
ASSETS 0 70 42684618 67122717 2.1713 
-7851786 -0.4574 1079 
1 35 50536404 108112894 (0.14) (0.65) (0.32) 
EARN_ VOL 0 65 0.0114 0.0123 11.00 
-0.0191 -3.7809 545 
1 35 0.0305 0.0285 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
WC 0 63 0.0913 0.1067 3.16 
-0.0953 -3.2544 566 
1 30 0.1865 0.1424 (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) 
INV_CE 0 60 0.0851 0.0956 2.5240 
-0.0568 -2.4134 728 
1 32 0.1419 0.1273 (0.12) (0.02) (0.06) 
DEBT CE 0 62 0.5194 0.2050 2.4045 0.0375 0.8857 850 
1 30 0.4818 0.1560 (0.12) (0.38) (0.51) 
DEBT ASS 0 63 0.3034 0.1920 0.4238 
-0.0119 -0.3150 808 
1 30 0.3153 0.1121 (0.52) (0.75) (0.26) 
STDEBT 0 63 0.3412 0.2515 18.48 0.0932 2.3119 799 
1 30 0.2479 0.1366 (0.00) (0.02) (0.23) 
LTDEBT 0 65 0.2082 0.1850 0.2330 
-0.0337 -0.9260 809 
1 31 0.2419 0.1176 (0.63) (0.36) (0.12) 
dTANG 0 55 0.0682 0.1298 0.0041 
-0.0027 -0.0911 788 
1 29 0.0709 0.1254 (0.95) (0.93) (0.93) 
COVER 0 52 7.1014 3.4525 1.7408 1.2370 1.1196 633 
1 29 5.8644 6.5124 (0.19) (0.27) (0.23) 
PAYOUT 0 68 0.5416 0.3551 26.24 
-0.4165 -1.6005 1148 
1 35 0.9581 1.5183 (0.00) (0.12) (0.77) 
CASH_ASS 0 64 0.0319 0.0432 0.0143 0.0033 0.3709 943 
1 33 0.0286 0.0387 (0.91) (0.71) (0.39) 
ROA 0 69 0.0808 0.0656 0.0077 
-0.0132 -0.9505 1051 
1 35 0.0940 0.0689 (0.93) (0.34) (0.28) 
EBIT_CE 0 70 0.1439 0.3846 0.5383 0.0213 0.3211 1059 
1 35 0.1227 0.0999 (0.46) (0.75) (0.26) 
ROE 0 70 0.1772 0.1967 0.5253 0.0241 0.5927 1087 
1 35 0.1531 0.1960 (0.47) (0.55) (0.35) 
QRATIO 0 61 1.7937 0.6708 2.4422 
-0.2194 -0.8614 934 
1 31 2.0131 1.7611 (0.12) (0.39) (0.92) 
SEC17NSEC 0 27 0.3954 0.9683 11.17 
-3.6469 -1.0973 134 
1 12 4.0422 11.4951 (0.00) (0.30) (0.39) 
OPI SALES 0 45 0.2441 0.1857 0.6465 0.0570 1.4634 562 
1 29 0.1871 0.1214 (0.42) (0.15) (0.32) 
NI SALES 0 45 0.1440 0.1371 0.4833 0.0521 1.7765 531 
1 29 0.0919 0.0972 (0.49) (0.08) (0.18) 
BANKL_DEBT 0 38 0.5343 0.7157 2.1406 0.2070 1.4341 416 
1 27 0.3273 0.2602 (0.15) (0.16) (0.20) 
PINT DEBT 0 51 0.0814 0.0398 2.7654 
-0.0163 -1.3072 666 
1 28 0.0978 0.0716 (0.10) (0.20) (0.62) 
Table 7.3 Mean, Median and Variance Differences Tests for downgraded and stable firms 
Mean and standard deviation of variables for downgraded (mal) and non-downgraded (D=O) firms are presented. The Levene's F 
test for homogeneity-of-variance is performed. The values of a parametric (t-test) and a non parametric (Mann-Whitney test) tests for 
equal means and equal medians, respectively, are also presented (with probability in parentheses). 
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73.4. Estnnation Prix irre 
We first set up an ad kw procedure to investigate the "true" role of credit risk and other fine 
specific factors in affecting the probability for af rm to be downgraded A simple multivariate 
regression of Pr(D) on the rating category variable and other factors is likely to incur in an 
identification problem since it may occur that some of the bonds' contractual characteristics and the 
issuing firms' operatingfiguresaffect both theratingand1 )) Asa consequence, we could not 
correctly identify the "dean" effect of the rating variable. To overcome this problem, we represent 
the relationship between the probability of downgrade, I3 D), and credit risk by the following 
system of two equations: 
` ýp` 
Sr 
L; t=L 
Apxiip + y-V2sýyý w2is +YY2i + F'li 
` "1) 
P=1 s=1 
S V2) Yet'=IA is ß'62i s=r 
where ia1,2, 
... , 
Nis the number of observations; 
pa1,2, 
..., 
P is the number of explanatory variables X, affecting only Pr(D) 
-i. e Y,, 
s. 1,2, 
... ,S is the number of explanatoryvariables W2 affecting 
both Pi (D) and the credit risk 
-i. e 
Y2 
Y,; is a dump r variable which takes value 1 if the firm has been downgraded and 0 if there was no 
change in the firm's rating over the sample period; 
Y. is a latent random variable used to identify the rate in the S8&P's rating decision process; 
ß, P, S2, and 
S,, are regressions' coefficients; 
c,; and c, are disturbances terms normally distributed with mean equal to 0 and covariance matrix 
E_0-' 
0 
0 a1 
V. 3) 
In the first step we w11 focus on equation (7.2) and we will use an ordered probit model to estimate 
a conditional expectation of the default risk (rating class) as a function of bond specific and firm 
specific acs. In the second step, we will proceed estimating the pure effects of default risk 
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-as obtained from the conditional mean estimate in step one- and financial variables on the 
probability of downgrade R (D) employing a binary probit and using cross section data over 
downgraded and non downgraded finns. 
STEP I: ORDERED PROBIT (OP) ESTIMATION 
Bond ratings can be viewed as resulting from a continuous, unobserved creditworthiness index. 
Each credit rating corresponds to a specific range of the creditworthiness index, with higher ratings 
corresponding to a lower range of creditworthiness values. Since ratings are a typical example of 
multinomial-choice (qualitative) variables inherently ordered, the estimation of a model for such a 
dependent variable requires a special technique. 
Our aim is to model the true credit risk -which is not observable- as a function of a few 
explanatory variables. To account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable an ordered probit 
is used to model the observed variable for the risk of default (credit rating class) by considering a
latent variable Yh' according to the following rule 
1 if Y2i < Y, 
2 if Yr: Y <Yz 
Y 
3 if r25 Y2t<Y3 
4 if YZ, ? Y3 
(7.4) 
In other tenns, a bond belongs to the rating class R; if Y, ' falls into the interval yrl <_ Y; <_ yj. hour 
sample we have four raring classes, so that we will obtain three cutoff points y which define the 
ranges of the creditworthiness index. As we have assigned lower values to 
higher credit quality 
lasses 
-that is to lower default risk- (AAA a 1, AA -2, ... ) we obtain negative values for the ys and 
we have yl < Yz < y, " For example y, can 
be interpreted as the maximum value for fines rated 
AAA, and y3 will be the lowest value for firms rated BBB. The ovidrhs of the intervals defining the 
risk categories may not be equal -that is, the interval for A-rated firms may be different from the 
interval for AA-rated firms. 
The threshold values for the rating categories are estimated along with the 8 coefficients. 
Maiiman LkeMood (ML) estimates of %3s and ys are obtained using the generalised linear model 
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(GLM) method to exploit the asymptotic properties of ML estimators -i. e. consistency, normal 
distribution and efficiency. The estimation algorithm employed is the one proposed by Berndt, Hall, 
Hall, and Hausman (BHHE-1,1974) and that uses first derivatives to determine both iteration 
updates and the covariance matrix estimates. We chose a tolerance level of 0.001 for the 
convergence criterion as they suggested 
From the results of the ordered probit we proceed to estimate aconditional expectation value of 
Y for each raring dass j as follows 
E(Yz, I R; ) =E SztsWzu +m $=1 (7.5) 
where M. is the average rror of the corresponding rating class from the ordered pmbit. The sum of 
the new residual series and the series of the estimated values for the rating constitutes the new 
default risk variable 
-which we indicate as ADJ RISK- to insert in the following binary probit 
model for downgraded and non downgraded fines. 
STEP II: BINARY PROBIT (BP) ESTIMATION 
The dependent variable in the binary probit model may take value one in the occurrence of a 
downgrade and value zero in the absence of any rating change. We are then interested in 
modelling changes in the rating status of each firm in our sample and we aim to quantify the 
relationship between the firm's characteristics and the credit risk, on one side, and the probability 
of being downgraded, on the other side. 
The unknown default risk variable Y is replaced by an estimate obtained from its conditional 
mean (ADL RIW. The additional explanatory variables have been modified through a two-step 
procedure to correct for the presence of multicollinearity. In particular, each series -a part 
from 
the dummy NP- has been replaced with the residual series from the linear regression of the 
variable itself on the other independent variables included in the model and with which it showed 
to be correlated As a consequence, the coefficient estimate we obtain for each variable represents 
the dean effect that that variable has on the downgrade probability -any interaction effect being 
removed. 
As with the ordered probit model and for the same reasons, the binary probit model is estimated 
using the GLM method for robust standard errors and the estimation algorithm emplcryed is the 
BIM. The main results of the model are discussed in the following section. 
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7.4. Empirical Results 
7.4.1.0rde & Pmbit Results 
The results from the ordered probit are reported in Table 7.4. We will briefly list here the 
explanatory variables resulted to be significant and we refer the reader to Table 7.1 for an extensive 
description of the variables themselves. The factors found to be useful to explain (at least in part) the 
probabk of being assigned a higher (or poorer) rating -which we indicate with RATING - are size, 
growth, leverage, profitability, tangibLy, interest coverage ratio and the provision of a negative 
pledge guarantee. The estimated coefficients have all the expected sign. The lower part of Table 7.4 
presents also the estimates of the limit points y coefficients and the associated standard en-ors and 
probability values. A pseudo-R2 of 0.39 is obtained, which is quite a good fit for the amount of 
infomaiion in the estimation. 
However, the coefficients in Table 7.4 must be interpreted with care. The sign of ß; shows the 
direcdon of the diange in the probabil y of falling in the endpoint rankings (Y a 1,2,3 or 4) when 
) changes. Pr(Y a 1) changes in the opposite direction of the sign of j and Pr(Y - 4) changes in 
the same direction as the sign of 5;. However, the effects on the probability of falling in the middle 
ranking (Y -2 or 3) cannot be determined a pnrpi and can be either direction. 
Following this logic, the probability of falling in the highest (lowest) rating class declines 
(increases) as the DEBT CE and INV CE variables increase (decrease). In other words, fines with 
higher growth rates and higher debt ratios are viewed as riskier than mature fines. The opposite 
occurs for the variables with negative estimated coefficients, namely SIZE, RQ4, dTANG, 
CD VER. Firms of bigger size, with better performance, with higher coverage ratios and which 
experienced an increase in tangible fixed assets have lower probability of being assigned to a lower 
rating dass. The negative pledge guarantee (NIA), for which we could not determine any a pri 'i sign, 
shows to be positively correlated with credit risk. 
The values of the, 8 coefficients do not estimate the change in the probability RATING due to a 
unit change in the relevant explanatory variable. By contrast, his probability change is given by the 
partial derivative of the expression for Pr(Y=i) with respect to X;, which is a function of ß; and of 
normal density functions at the value of X; for which the partial derivative is calculated To obtain 
the marginal effects of the continuos variables, we must calculate the standard normal density 
function ((D) evaluated at 6T and (y - QX) where X is the median value of the regressor. The 
predicted probabilities are (D(ß? ), (D(y -, 6T) - «(QX ), and 1- (D(y - 6T) for Y-1, Y-2 or 3 
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and Y-4 respectively. Figure 7.3 shows the marginal contribution of each explanatory variable to 
the change in the probability of falling in each class y of default risk. 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient Z-Statistic 
CAP 
- -0.2321* -1.7650 (0.1315) 
NP 1.6801"' 5.1499 
(0.3262) 
INV CE + 3.6563" 2.2576 
(1.6195) 
DEBT CE + 1.3110" 1.6753 
(0.7825) 
ROA 
- -4.553r -2.2758 (2.0010) 
dTANG 
- -2.1031"" -3.3724 (0.6236) 
COVER 
- -0.0956"' -2.1112 (0.0453) 
Limit Points 
LIMIT_I 
-6.4488"" -3.8997 (1.6537) 
LIMIT_2 
-3.3897" -2.0322 (1.6681) 
LIMIT_3 2.1116 0.0613 
(34.46) 
Table 7.4 Ordered Probit Model Estimates for Eurobond Ratings, 1992-1999 
The estimates are for the following ordered probit model: 
RATING 
= 
ßJ(CAP) + ß2(NP) + ß3(INV CE) + ß4(DEBT CE) + ßs(ROA) +4 (dTANG) 
+ f47(COVER) +s 
The estimation sample includes 105 observations from 1992 to 1999. The dependent variable 
(RATING) is translated into numbers as follows: AAA = 1, AA = 2, A=3, and BBB = 4. 
Consequently, we will interpret higher values for RATING as higher credit risk. The expected 
signs for each independent variable, coefficient estimates and Z-statistics are presented. 
Parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained using the BHHH 
algorithm and the generalized linear model (GLM) method, respectively. The z-statistics are 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate under the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is zero, i. e., it is the parameter estimate divided by its asymptotic standard error. The 
residuals of the model result to be not autocorrelated and normally distributed (with mean equal 
to 
-0.001, std. dev. equal to 0.7, skewness and kurtosis equal to 0.16 and 3.10, respectively). 
NOTE: ""* "" ": Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, using 
a two- tailed test. The Log likelihood is equal to 
-33.63. The LR 17 do statistic is significantly different 
from zero (equal to 44.67 with a P-value of 1.58E-07). The LR index (or Pseudo-R2) is 0.40. 
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Figure 7.3 The marginal effects of the explanatory variables 
To obtain the marginal effects of the continuous variables, we have calculated the standard normal density function evaluated 
at 8X and (y 
- 
ßX ) where X and y are the median values of the regressors and the mean of the limit points, respectively. 
The predicted probabilities are (D(- ßX ), (D(y 
- 
ßX) 
- 
(D(-/3X ), and I- (1)(y 
- , 
6X) for Y=1, Y=2 or 3 and Y=4 
respectively. 
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To clarify what we have explained so far, we consider as an example the graph of SIZE in Figure 
7.3. The top left-hand side chart shows how the probability of falling into the lower rating class 
monotonically decreases as the firm's size increases. Looking at the top right-hand side chart we can 
see that the probability of falling into the higher rating group monotonically increases with the size. 
The chart in the middle shows a negative but less steep slope of the probability function. The same 
reasoning can be applied to the graphs of the other variables. 
7 4.2. Binary tzw-step Probit Model Results 
Table 7.5 depicts the results from the binary probit model. A positive (negative) sign on any 
explanatory variable's coefficient indicates that higher values of the variable raise (reduce) the 
likelihood for a firm to be downgraded. Table 7.5 presents also the product of each explanatory 
variable estimated coefficient and the corresponding standard deviation of the independent variable. 
This product represents the change in the conditional expectation of I- (D) in response to a change 
of one standard deviation in the value of this explanatoryvariables. 
To understand the contribution of the factors included in the regression we take for example the 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the growth variable (INK CL) which indicates 
that, other things being the same, as firm's growth increases, the likelihood of a downgrade 
decreases. Similarly, we can say that the likelihood of a downgrade increases as earnings' instability 
and tangible assets increase. Firm size (ASSETS) does not play a significant role in determining the 
probability of downgrade. On the other hand, a downgrade is less llcely to happen in the presence 
of a negative pledge guarantee (NF). The signs of AT, NV-CE, and dTANG require a brief 
comment From Table 7.4 it emerges that credit risk decreases for increases in tangible assets, but 
this additional risk is not reflected on a greater probability of downgrade, which, instead, 
increases 
with dTANG The same logic can be applied in a reverse way to the NP and INV CE variables. 
The explanation of the change in the sign of some coefficient can be found in the different stories 
that Tables 7.4. and 7.5. tell us. While a NP guarantee may be used by weaker credits to obtain a 
higher rating or to lower the credit risk premium, these credits may still be weak and obtain a lower 
initial rating. However the NP guarantee seems to be successful in reducing the likelihood of a 
future downgrade 
-presenting a negative sign in Table 7.5. 
Also company indebtedness and default risk deserve our attention and further comments. Table 
7.5 and more manifestly Figure 7.4 show the presence of a non-linear relationship between leverage 
and downgrade probability on one side and risk of default and downgrade probability on the other 
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side. As expected PqD) is positively related to the credit risk variable (ADJ RIW, but the relation is 
not linear. The downgrade probability increases initially with default risk (as rating lowers) reaching a
peak in correspondence of level3 (rating A). After this point (inflection point) the relation becomes 
negative and the downgrade probability decreases for lower classes of credit rating. This piece of 
evidence confirms somehow and goes further the general finding that lower rated firms 
experience higher cumulative default rates (Moods Investor Service, 1995). 
From Figure 7.4 it is also apparent the quadratic response of the probability of downgrade to 
the company leverage (DEBT ASS). P()) decreases as leverage increases up to a critical level 
-i. e. 
when the debt ratio equals 0.28. As debt raises over this level the downgrade probability starts rising 
up to 1 for values of the debt ratio greater than 0.45. 
Similarly to previous findings, the interest coverage variable is not significant This ratio appears 
prominently in traditional writings of credit-rating analysts and has also proved to be useful in 
banknzptcy prediction studies. Apparently whatever the importance of this variable is, it is already 
captured by a linear combination of the financial leverage ratio and the profitability ratio. Finally, the 
insignificant coefficient of the industrial sector dummy variable (FIN supports the lack of evidence 
of sector differences. Financial fines are not subject to higher default risk than industrial firths. This 
is a piece of evidence that credit ratings have been consistent and perfectly calibrated across issuer 
SeCtorsl3 
Following Flannery (1986) and Covitz and Harrison (1999) we additionally tested if long 
maturity debt issuance sends a negative signal of fine rating migration relative to short-term debt 
issuance. The intuition behind this idea is that the interest cost of issuing short 
-term debt and then 
rolling it over is lower for firms with low unobserved default probabilities than for finns with highly 
unobserved default probabilities. Therefore, long-term debt would signal negative information while 
short-term would signal positive information to the market. To this aim the total debt is split into 
longterm debt and short-term debt and the (DEBT ASS) variable has been replaced with these 
two new variables. Their coefficients resulted to be not significantly different from zero rejecting any 
signalling hypothesis. 
II he probit estimate coefficients we have so far explained represent how much difference a unit 
change in the independent makes in temps of the cumulative normal probability of the dependent 
variable. This means that the effect of a unit change in the independent variables on the downgrade 
probability depends on the level of the independents. Therefore, to assess the effect of the probit 
33 See Ammer and Packer (2000) for a recent overview and empirical evidence on sectoral differences in the 
measurement of credit ride. 
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coefficients it is necessary to choose some reference level of the independents 
-i. e. their sample 
medians. We then introduce probability response curves to plot the fitted probabilities as a function 
of one of the independent variables, fixing the values of the other explanatory variables at their 
sample median. In Figure 7.4 Pr(D) represents the predicted probabilities generated using the 
original data and parameter estimates. If we have N explanatory variables X Xp 
... 
XN, the 
forecasted probabilities are obtained by solving the following equation: 
CumNormal(C+ß, X, +ß2R2 +... +fNXN) (7.6) 
where C and (3s are the coefficients estimated from the binary probit model In Figure 7.4 we 
present the charts for the variables included in the model Let's consider the variable ADJ 
. 
RISK as 
an example. The chart on the top right-hand side is the plot of the probability of being downgraded 
against different values of default risk (ADJ RISK). From the depicted pattern we can derive the 
marginal effect of a unit change in the value of ADJ RISK on the conditional probability PqD). 
Note that while all the regressors are involved in computing the change in the probability ß1D), the 
direction of the effect of a change in ADJ RISK depends only on the sign of its estimated 
coefficient. The positive ADJ RISK coefficient implies that increasing the default risk will increase 
the probability of the response. Negative values for f3 would have implied the opposite. 
As the credit risk implications of a set of financial ratio values might be different for financial 
and non-financial fines (Carey and Hryray, 2001), we assessed for this possibility multiplying each 
explanatory variable for a dummy variable taking value 1 or 0 according to the industrial sector. 
Wald tests on the coefficient estimates showed no statistically significant differences, excluding the 
need for a parallel model-building for financial and industrial firms. 
In Table 7.5 we also present estimation results from a naive probit model in which the 
observed S&Fs credit ratings (RATING) replace the estimated credit risk variable (ADJ RISK) 
from the two-step model The RATING coefficient is not significant and also most of the 
remaining explanatory variables lose their significance. The coefficients of NP, INV CE, and 
credit risk (RATING) change their signs becoming unexpected The overall power of the model 
becomes weaker as shown by some measures of goodness of fit of the models on the bottom of 
the table. A detailed iscussion of these measures follows in the next section. 
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TWO-STEP RATING 
MODEL MODEL 
Exp. Sign Coefficient Coeff * St. Dev. I Coefficient Coeff * St. Dev. 
C 4.7088 
- 
3.3651 
- (6.7983) (5.6919) 
LOG(EARN VOL) + 3.4831'"" 4.3997 1.1107'"" 1.4030 
(1.0702) (0.3051) 
NP 
- -5.5983""" - 0.1193 - (2.1961) (0.6909) 
dTANG 
- 
14.843- 1.8196 2.1659 0.2655 
(5.2179) (2.1490) 
ASSETS 0.2972 0.4834 0.2933 0.4771 
(0.3080) (0.2672) 
RISK ADJ + 10.971"' 9.7536 
- - 
_ (4.3704) 
ADJ_RISK A2 
-1.9511"" - - - (0.8333) 
DEBT ASS + 
-40.89'" -4.8659 0.2691 0.0320 (19.902) (2.0939) 
ASSA2 DEBT 71.039"" 
- 
0.0469 
- 
_ (35.805) (11.7247) 
INV CE + 
-19.080" -1.9900 1.4119 0.1473 (9.0058) (3.5108) 
NC + 7.2960 0.9433 4.0369 0.5219 
(4.6024) (3.2233) 
RATING +-- 
-1.2069 
-0.7124 (0.9265) 
Log Likelihood 
-15.91 -26.69 
LR(dq 55.58(lo dtv 34.03(9 dtv (P-value) 2.45E-08 8.80E-05 
McFadden R2 0.64 0.39 
Table 7.5 Two Step Probit Model Estimates for Eurobond Downgrades, 1992-1999 
The two-step probit model we have developed and estimated is the following: 
Y 
=a+ ß, * Log(EARN 
_ 
VOL)+ ß: * NP+ ß, * dTANG+ ß, * ASSETS+ ßs * ADJ 
_ 
RISK +ß6 * (ADJ 
_ 
RISK)' + 
+ß, *DEBT_ASS+ß, *(DEBT_ASS)' +ßfl *INV_CE+ß, a *WC+s 
The dependent variable Y is a binary variable that takes value 0 if the firm rating is stable over time (i. e. no re-rating) and 
value I if the firm has been downgraded. We included in the sample 24 observations Y=1 and 43 observations Y=O. The 
explanatory variables have been modified to correct for multicollinearity. In particular, each series 
-except for the 
durruny NP- has been replaced with the residual series from the linear regression of the variable itself on the independent 
variables with which it showed to be correlated As a consequence, the coefficient estimate we obtain for each variable 
represents the pure effect that that variable has on the probability of downgrade 
-any interaction effect being removed. 
Coefficient estimates are presented both for the two-step model and for the simple RATING model, where the rating 
variable has replaced the ADJ_RISK variable. In both cases estimates are obtained using the GLM method for robust 
standard errors and the estimation algorithm employed is BHHH. An approximate estimate of the marginal effect of each 
explanatory variable has been computed as the product of the coefficient estimate and the standard deviation of the 
independent series. 
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Figure 7.4 Probability Response Functions 
Probability response curves plot the fitted probabilities as a function of one of the independent variables, fixing the values 
of the other explanatory variables at their sample medians. Pr(D) represents the predicted probability of downgrade 
generated using the original data and parameter estimates. Given N explanatory variables Xi, X2, 
... 
XN, the forecasted 
probabilities are obtained by solving the following model: 
p= Cum Normal(C+ß, X, +ß, X, +... +ß,, XN, ) 
where C and ßs are the coefficients estimated from the binary probit model. 
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Z 4.2 1. Measuring Goockzw of Fit 
In order to express an evaluation on the goodness of fit of our model we focus our attention on 
the LR statistics and the McFadden R-square presented at the bottom of Table 7.5. The former 
tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients, except the constant, are zero. This is the 
analogue of the F statistic in linear regression models and tests the overall significance of the model. 
The McFadden R-squarai is the likelihood ratio index As the name suggests, this is an analogue to 
then sgraiin a conventional regression model The LR is high (=55.58) and statisticallysignificant 
in the corresponding asymptotic chi-squared distribution with ten degrees of freedom. The psado- 
Reis quite high (=0.64) indicatingtbat firms downgrades can be predicted largely on the basis of the 
explanatory variables included in Table 7.5. 
In Table 7.6 we have presented the results of an additional test of goodness of fit, the Homer- 
Laneslazx 01-1,1984) test The HL test is a Pearsm j 
-type of goodness-of-fit test. Indicating 
D=1 the occurrence of the event (downgrade) and D=0 the non-event case, the data are grouped 
on the basis of the predicted probability that D=1 into j =1,2, 
... ,J groups and m 
is the number of 
observations in group j. The test compares the fitted expected values to the actual values by group. 
If these differences are large, the model is rejected as providing an insufficient fit to the data. 
Defining Y; as the number of observations in group j and p; as the average of predicted values in 
group j, we obtain: 
yj= ESE; Y; 
AA 
Pj = ESE1 P, gym; =Y_1E)(1-F(-X ß)igym; 
and the H-L test is computed as: 
HL-±(yj-m, pj)2 
i=1 m, p; (1- p; ) 
(7") 
(7.8) 
If the model is correct the distribution is well approximated by a x2 distribution with a-2) degrees 
of freedom. Since the properties of the statistic require that the number of observations in each 
group is large, we select J-3. The high and low value of the predicted probability for each quantle 
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is presented in columns a and b labelled "quanties of risk". Cdumns cf thaw the actual and 
eq)ected number of observations in each group. Column h presents the contribution of each 
group to the overall HL statistic. Since the H-L test presented at the bottom of Table 7.6 is 
higher than 0.05 we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
observed and predicted values of the dependent. This implies that the model's estimates fit the 
data at an acceptable level The statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. As the HL test 
has been criticised to depend on arbitrary cut points on predicted probabilities, we have 
performed the same test also for j-4,5, 
..., 
10 (Table Al) and in all the cases we could not 
reject the estimated model. 
Quantile of Risk Pr(D)=0 Pr(D)=l 
(a) (1) (c) (d) (e) ifl l (8) ih) 
Low High Actual Expected Actual Expertal I N H-L Value 
1I 0.0000 0.0128 22 21.9516 0 0.04841 22 0.04851 
2 0.0193 0.4561 17 17.9374 5 4.06257 22 0.26530 
3 0.5054 1.0000 4 3.24102 19 19.7590 23 0.20689 
Total 43 43.1300 24 23.8700 67 0.52071 
H-L Sit stic" 0.52 Pitb[Chi-Sq(1 df)J. " 0.47 
Table 7.6 Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
Data are grouped on the basis of the predicted probability into j=1,2,3 groups and ny is the number of observations 
in the jn group. The test compares the fitted expected values to the actual values by group. If these differences are 
large, we reject the model as providing an insufficient fit to the data. 
In evaluating the explanatory power of our downgrade probability model, it is helpful to define 
two types of prediction enDr. Tye I error occurs when a company is downgraded (b=1) but is 
predicted to remain the same (Pr(D)=0), typ: II error occurs when a company maintains the same 
rating (D=0) but is predicted to be down-rated (Pr(D)-1). Reducing one type of error necessarily 
comes necessarily at the expense of increasing the other type of error. Tja I and t) II error rates 
depend on the number of companies predicted to be downgraded 
-which, in turn, depends on the 
cut off probability chosen for the model The higher (lower) the number of companies whose rating 
is predicted to deteriorate, the smaller (larger) is the typ I error rate and the larger (smaller) is the tyjx 
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II en-or ate. We will use these error definitions in the next section to measure the forecast ability of 
our model 
7 4.2 2. In-Sinnple Fit 
A useful presentation of the predictive ability of the model is the classification table of the hits 
and misses of a prediction rule. This is a contingency table of the predicted response classified 
against the observed dependent variable on the basis of a cut-off point Table 7.7 displays the 
"correct" and "inconect" classifications based on a) a specified prediction reale, and b) expected 
value calculations. The observation is classified as "correct", if the predicted probability is less than 
or equal to the cut off point and the observation is D-0, or when the predicted probability is greater 
than the cut-off point and the observation is D-1. In other words, tt I and tt II error rates 
depend on the cut-off value, which in turn, depends critically on the sample selection criterion. We 
set different prediction cut-off values in a range from 0.35 to 0.7, 
but we will look particularly at the 
cut-off probability of 0.35. This is indeed the appropriate or "benchmark" cut-off value obtained as 
the proportion of events and non-events in the sample -ie. 24 events out of 67 observations in our 
study`. In panel A observations are classified as having predicted probabilities (p =1- F(-X%3)) 
above or below each cut-off value. In panel B observations are classified using the predicted 
probabilities p given by the sample of D-1 observations. This probability is computed from 
estimating a model that includes only the intercept term C. 
Table 77 shows that in correspondence of a cut-off value equal to 0.35,38 of the 43 non-event 
(D-0) observations and 22 of the 24 event (Da 1) observations are correctly classified bythe model 
In other terms, the model has a spacr xity of 88.37% and a sazsixithy of 91.67%. Overall, the 
estimated model correctly predicts 89.55% of the observations. The predictive ability of the model 
is 
measured by the percentage gain (as a percentage of the incorrect classifications in the constant 
probability model) presented in the last row of Table 7.7. Overall, the estimated equation represents 
an 83.72% improvement over the correct prediction of a naive constant probability model. We 
finally implemented a test of independence and we obtained a value of 33.38 which rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 1 percent level when comparing the fitted model with a simple "chance" model. 
34 -lbe proportim of eve= in the population of sterling Eurobonds is about 0.39 (-124/312). 
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7 4.2.3. Ocut-of Swnple Foraasts 
In this section we perform both block and full cross-validation of our probabilistic model The 
binary probit model presented above was estimated using the data over the entire period. As this 
infomnarion would not have been available in real time, the technique of "hold-out" regressions was 
used to determine whether this probabilistic model would provide useful real time forecasts. To this 
aim the model's validation is carried out both out-of-sample and out-of-time. The whole sample is 
split into five sets of observations of approximately the same number of point forecasts and 
subsequent in time The idea is to re-estimate our explanatory probabilistic model using in turn data 
from four sets to identify downgraded fines for the hold-out (fifth) set. In other words, the out-of- 
sample forecasts will yield five sets of predictions on which we will successively perform a block 
cross validation analysis. The objective is also to test if classification results may depend on the date 
on which the exercise is done or on the historical period covered by the underlying data 
-i. e the 
scoring model's estimation period. 
As the number of observations for the estimation sample is now reduced by one fifth, we 
derived a more parsimonious 5-variable nested model from our previous 10-variable model In 
order to identify the variables to be included in the nested model, we proceeded exduding the 
variables not significant at the 1 percent level We finally obtained the following predictive modelU. 
Pr(D)- a+ /31(ADJ RISK) + ß2(ADJ RISK1) +, 8%DEBT ASSE) + ß, (EARN VOL) + Q, (WC) + (7.9) 
where adjusted default-risk and leverage -in their quadratic form-, working capital and earnings' 
volatility are found to be helpful predictor variables. To evaluate the out-of-sample acauacy, the 
forecasting performance of this parsimonious specification of the original probabilistic model is 
evaluated as follows. 
Table 7.8 presents ty I and ty Herror rates for this re-estimated model during the five-holdout 
periods. The forecasts generated from the recursive probit regressions are probabilities, so that for a 
cut-off value of 0.35, we assume that if the estimated probability, AfD), is above (below) 0.35 and 
the fine has (not) actually been downgraded, the forecast has been successful. By the same logic, if 
Pr(D) is found to be lower (higher) than 0.35 and the firm has (not) been downgaded, the forecast 
has failed In addition to the percentage of observations correctly (hit ratio) and incorrectly (error 
rate) predicted by the model, we employed both a /test and a Brier Score (BS) test as measures of 
performance. The former tests for independence between predicted and expected frequencies, 
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where expected frequencies were derived from a "chance" model The latter is a measure specifically 
designed to evaluate probability forecasts for binary events and which assesses the overall accuracy 
of the model The Brier score is equivalent o the mean square error (MSL) for ordinary regressions 
and it measures the difference between forecast probability (r) and observed probability (c) as 
follows: 
BS 
N 
(7.10) 
where N is the total number of forecasts in the sample, r refers to the forecast vector, and d refers to 
the observation vector. The Brier score can vary between 0 and 1, and has a negative orientation; 
that is, smaller values of BS indicate more accurate forecasts, and a value of zero would indicate a 
perfect prediction. 
Cutoff Value 
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 
Pang' A: Tuo-Step Probit Modal (BP) 
Correct Evau 22 22 20 19 19 18 18 17 
Nonecit 38 38 39 39 40 41 42 42 
Incorrect Ezent 2 2 4 5 5 6 6 7 
Nonewit 5 5 4 4 
......... 
3 2 1 
............ 
1 
Corma 89.55 89.55 88.06 86.57 88.06 88.06 89.55 88.06 
Percentage 
smmirvity 91.67 83.33 79.17 79.17 75.00 75.00 70.83 
Speificity 88.37 88.37 90.70 90.70 93.02 95.35 97.67 97.67 
Panel B: Conutmt N)h"ity Model (CPM) 
Correct E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nonewis 43 43 43 43 43 43 
......... 
43 43 
Incorrect Event 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Noneumt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% Gain of üae PM oue- t/ CPM 83.72 70.83 66.67 62.50 66.67 62.50 70.83 66.67 
Table 7.7 The Expectation-Prediction Table 
The predicted responses from the two-step probit model are classified against the observed dependent variable. The 
predicted responses are based a) on the probit model specification (Panel A), and b) on a model that includes only the 
intercept term C 
-i. e. expected value calculations (Panel B). We set different prediction cutoff values in a range from 
0.35 to 0.7. Each observation is then classified as having a predicted probability that lies above or below this cutoff. 
The observation is classified as "correct", if the predicted probability is less than or equal to the cutoff point and the 
observation is a non-event (D=O), or when the predicted probability is greater than the cutoff point and the observation 
is an event (mal). The predictive ability of the model is measured by the percentage Gain. This represents the 
percentage improvement over the correct prediction of the default (constant probability model). 
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Chi-square values were computed for the five sets of predictions and their values presented in 
Table 7.8. In all cases the null hypothesis of no dependence was rejected at a minimum significance 
level of 95%. Brier scores for the five sets of forecasts are also presented in Table 7.8 with their 
values ranging from 0.052 to 0.183. Concluding, the null hypothesis of no predictive effectiveness 
respect to a naive model could be rejected in all (five) sets of out-of-sample predictions by both the 
tests. Moreover, the forecasting model was able to conec ly identify 85% (on average) of the 
observations. A comparison of Tables 77 and 7.8 show that there is little difference between the 
accuracy of the model in the estimation and for the holdout samples. 
In addition to the block validation, we investigated the performance of model (7.9) also by full 
cross validation or "leaving-one-out" method Unlike the previous validation method, this approach 
validates the model across the population of firms preserving its original distiibution35. This method 
was implemented estimating the model on all -but-one-observation of the data, and successively 
using the estimated model to forecast the remaining observation, the holdout observation. The 
process is repeated leaving out and forecasting each single observation in turn. Finally all the 
individual point forecasts are collected and the performance of the model measured. In this case, the 
hit ratio and the probability score (B) are 82% and 0.17, respectively. 
7.4.2.4. Foitrastingwith Neural Netumks 
The in-sample and oil-of-sample performance of the Binary Probit model (BP) is also 
benchmarked against an artificial neural networks model (ANI in Table 7.9. Neural networks have 
been shown to perform well as classifiers for problems containing complex and imperfect data and 
relationships. For comparison purposes, inputs to the neural network consist of the same factors 
used in model (7.9) -that is ADJ RISK DEBT ASS, EARN VOL and WC, and the output is the 
downgrade prosy 36. The whole sample was used to assess the in sample prediction ability of 
the ANN model, while out-of-sample results were based the same five-fold holdout sample method 
implemented in the regression analysis. The algorithm employed is the standard and common back 
propagation network described in Rumelhart et al. (1986) and that is an iterative least squares 
procedure applied to the connections of a multlayer network (with one or more hidden layers). 
The method is based on the minimisation of the total squared error of the output computed by 
35 See Sobehart et at (2p0()) for a dear and extensive description of the techniques for credit risk model validation and 
bendm ad % 
36 Note that squared variables are not included in the inputs as the neural network should be able to make an 
approidmation to the data automatically. 
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the network The training algorithm involves three stages: the feed-forward of the input training 
set, the calculation and backpropagation of the error, and the adjustment of the weights 
(Chaveesuk, Srivaree-ratans, and Smith, 199. First, inputs (ADJ RISK, DEBT ASS, 
EARN VOL and WC) are passed forward to the hidden layers and multiplied by their respective 
weights to compute a weight sum. The weighted sum is successively modified by a sigmoid 
transfer function and then sent to the output layer. Third, the output layer recalculates the 
weighted sum and applies the transfer function to produce the output value. Finally an error 
signal is computed as the difference between the output value and the target (actual) value and 
"backpropagated" to the hidden layers and then to the input layers. This training process 
continues interactively until an acceptable mean squared error is achieved within the necessary 
time for convergence. 
The performance measure used to compare the models was the percentage of accurate 
classifications (I'(X) according to a cutoff value of 0.35 in order to be consistent with the previous 
analysis. The best classification results were obtained for three nodes in the hidden layer training 
with a learning rate of 1, a momentum rate of 0.1, and a sigmoid activation function in the output 
layer. As the optimal neural networks architecture can only be found through trial and error, thirty 
replic ors" were performed and evaluated varying in turn the number of hidden layers (between 2 
and 4) and the learning and the momentum rates (between 0 and 1). Training was accomplished on 
four subsets while testing was performed on the remaining fifth subset. Training revealed that 
connection weights were well stabilised by 1200 epochs or learning cycles. This is therefore the 
ANN airhitectuue chosen for the final network. The ANN seems to outperform probit regression 
analysis in terms of more correct in-sample predictions (Panel A, Table 7.9). For each data set and 
corresponding holdout sample the percentage of correct predictions was calculated and the results 
presented in Panel B. The ANN model on average results in a hit ratio of 76% vovis a higher 85% 
for the Probit model Results on the training sets provide a POC ranging between 65% and 85%, 
which does not differ from the POC obtained for the testing (holdout) samples38. 
Although BP regressions are less flexible than ANN in the form of relationship they can model, 
they result to be more straightforward to construct and validate, quicker to compute, more 
transparent and easier to interpret and replicate. Additionally, with the probit analysis we can identify 
the (possible) right set of predictor variables contributing most in predicting the variation in the 
37 Replications involve using the same architecture and learning parameters but with different sets of random initial 
W 1601M 
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dependent variable. It remains that the poorer performance of the ANN may be due to overfitting 
or local optima problems generally associated with a small data set In addition, most ANN cannot 
guarantee neither an optimal solution to a problem nor a complete solution. Sometimes, the 
repeatibIty itself with the same input data is not assured, making investigators nervous about 
interpreting the models obtained. Results however do not allow us reaching straightforward 
conclusions about the rejection of ANN. On the contrary, they encourage further research and 
suggest acombined approach for predictive corroboration. 
7 4.2.5. Ccimbmvag Foiwasts 
In order to test for the statistical significance of BP and ANN models we introduced 
encompassing tests. According to these tests, if a model represents more congruently the data- 
generating process, it must be able to account for the salient features of rival models. In more 
specific teens, a given model BP is considered superior to a model ANN if model BP's 
forecasts 
significantly explain model's ANN forecasting errors. Model BP would in this case in fact 
incorporate relevant information neglected by model ANN. The encompassing test is implemented 
by testing the significance of the, 6and Scoefficients in the following two equations: 
ýP-PW, ) 
=ßPPPt +--l (7.11) 
(P 
- 
ABA) 
=SP,,,,,, t + yr 
(7.12) 
where P,, and P are the forecasts of models ANN and BP, respectively; while the terms 
in 
parentheses represent the forecasting errors from the two models, and - and v are random errors. 
The null hypothesis is that neither model encompasses (outperforms) the other. If 8 (bj is 
significantly different from zero but 8(ß) is not, then we reject he null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis that model BP encompasses model ANN as information (errors) not 
captured by ANN is explained by BP. From the estimation of the two regressions (see Table A2) 
we obtain coefficient estimates both not significantly different from zero with /3 - -0.06 (t- -0.69) 
39 The icon Bracy achieved maesing the complexityof the network, that is increasingthcriumber of inputs, 
does not improve over the simpler (4 inputs) network. With a small data set complex networks tend indeed to adopt 
either oscillating or non-convergent behaviour. 
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and 5- 
-0.007 (t- -0.07). We therefore fail to reject he null hypothesis and conclude that neither 
model encompasses the other, each of them providing different information. 
This last evidence leads us to finally investigate whether combining BP forecasts with ANN 
forecasts we could get better results. The weight combination resulting in the best forecasts was 
0.9 and 0.1 in BP and ANN, respectively, ielding a hit ratio of 87% and a Brier score of 0.12. 
Combined forecasts therefore perform only slightly better and provide slightly more accurate 
forecasts than individual methods. 
7 4.2.6. Foraast stability 
The forecast performance of the two-step BP (and ANI scoring model seems to deteriorate 
after June 1998, during the recent turmoil in the capital markets. As it is apparent from Tables 7.8 
and 7.10 the hit ratio significantly declines from a high 90 percent to a lower 77 percent raising the 
issue of the stability of the model Chi-square tests still support the superiority of the model respect 
to a naive one, but it is worth considering some explanations for this decline in the predictive ability. 
First, there has been a regime shift in the general market volatility, which may have driven a shift also 
in the credit risk of the fines in the Eurobond market 39. Second, we note the remarkable increase in 
the number of downgrades over the last period and, the increase in the correlation between 
downgrades during times of highly volatility (Andersen et a. 2000). Estimating the model over a 
sample period where a small number of events (downgrades) have occurred may generate noisy 
results4°. Whatever the explanation is, the evidence suggests that underlying macroeconomic 
volatility is a key factor in credit risk modelling and must therefore be taken into account in a future 
work. 
7.4.2.7. Small and Large Finns 
We finally split the sample by firm size and we indicate with LARGE and SMALL the subset of 
observations relative to the firrns whose total assets are above and below, respectively, the median 
value (C6,236 millions). Table 7.10 depicts the results of the probit model ran on the two sets of 
39 Note that regime switching has been found in the conditional mean dynamics of interest rates (Hamilton, 1988; 
Cecchetti, Lam and Malik, 1990) and ecdiange rates (Engel and Hamilton, 1990), and in the conditional variance 
dynamics of stock reiums 0iacnlton and Susmd, 1994). 
46 See ,re, and jjryam, (2001) for a complete explanation of this point. 
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observations. The objective is to test the conjecture xpressed in Blume, Lim and Madkinlay (1998) 
that firm dlaracterisrics, accounting ratios and market-based risk measures are more informative for 
larger firms than for smaller firms. Default risk and earnings instability positively affect both small 
and large finns' probability of downgrade. Liquidity risk results to explain the downgrade probability 
of small fines only: as liquidity dries up small fines seem to be more likely to be downgraded 
Moreover, leverage seems to have a negative impact on large finrns' PI1'D) and a positive impact on 
small firms' P41)). Firm size is generally considered positively related to leverage (Harris and Raviv, 
1991) and the most effective argument is that informational asymmetries are less severe for larger 
fimns than for smaller firms. If the public is more aware of what is going on at larger firms, the fine 
will find it easier to raise debt. Following these considerations, our result might be explained in temps 
of the ade sda-ti z phenomenon in a context of asymmetric infoxmation. Small fines with higher 
levels of leverage are those that are willing to pay higher price (interest rate) for their loans. These 
firms successively result to be "not good" and will finally be downgraded. On the other hand, larger 
firms do not suffer from informational asynunetries between insiders and the capital markets and 
when they turn to banks asking for loans, banks are perfectly aware of their financial situation. As a 
consequence, banks will offer credit only to the ones that prove to deserve it and that are also the 
firms that result to be less hrely to be downgraded in the future. 
Comparing the variances of the standardised residuals of the two models as a measure of 
confidence of the prediction of the model we observe a lower value for the LARGE model. The 
importance and implications of these results for regulatory issues and for detennining a firm's cost 
of capital require fiuther investigation, which goes beyond the purpose of this chapter. 
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Panel A- In-sample Forecasts 
Whole Sample 
N-67 
Panel B- Out-of-sample Forecasts 
Holdout sample Predicted cases 
hit Ratio 
PROBIT ANN 
89.55% 95.52% 
hit Ratio 
PROBIT ANN 
1 14 85.71% 85.71% 
2 13 92.31% 76.92% 
3 13 92.31% 84.61% 
4 14 78.57% 71.42% 
5 13 76.92% 61.53% 
Total 67 85.16% 76.04% 
Table 7.9 Comparison of the Prediction Accuracy of the two-step Probit Model 
and a Neural NetKorks Model 
Forecasting results f-om an artificial neural networks model (ANN) are presented and compared 
with the Binary Probit model (BP). Inputs to the neural network consist of the same factors used in 
the BP model 
-that is ADJ_RISK, DEBT_ASS, EARN_VOL and WC- and the output is the 
downgrade probability Pr(D). Training was accomplished on four subsets while testing was 
performed on the renaming fifth subset. The number of epochs (learning cycles) was fixed at 
1200. The performance measure used to compare the models is the percentage of accurate 
classifications (hit ratio) according to a cutoff value of 0.35. The best classification results for 
ANN were obtained for a backpropagation architecture with three hidden layers, a learning rate of 
1. a momentum rate of 0.1, and a sigmoid activation function in the output layer. Backpropagation 
seems to outperform probet regression analysis in terns of more correct in-sample predictions. The 
ANN model on average results in a hit ratio of 76% versus a higher 85% for the BP model. 
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VanaH LARGE SMALL 
C 8.742" 
-0.401 (3.643) (2.905) 
ADJ RISK 1.675* 3.422- 
(0.935) (1.229) 
ADJ_RISA4 
- -0.854"' (0.279) 
Log(EARN V OL) 1.959" 1.263- 
(0.773) (0.471) 
DEBT ASS 
-14.229" 8.526"' (6.794) (3.351) 
CAShI_ASS 
- -0.644"' (0.215) 
S. E. of regression 0.278 0.336 
Log likelihood 
-6.471 -11.33 
LR statistic (x di) 23.708(&.. 3) 25.455(df-5) 
Probabil, ty-(LR star) 2.87E-05 1.03E-04 
McFadden R-squared 0.647 0.529 
d (Standardised Residuals) 0.567 0.835 
Obs with Dep=O 21 22 
Obs with Dep=1 9 14 
Table 7.10 Downgrade Model for Small and Large Firms 
In order to test whether the probabilistic model is more informative for larger firms than for smaller firms the 
sample has been split on the basis of the median value of the total assets. Specifically, we classified as 
LARGE and SMALL firms whose total assets are above and below £6,236 millions, respectively. Two 
separate regressions have been run for each sub-sample. Coefficient estimates, their standard errors (in 
parentheses) and the regression standard errors are presented below. The Log likelihood -the maximised 
value of the log likelihood function- and the LR statistic test -for the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero-, and tests of the overall significance of the model (the number in 
parentheses is the degrees of fivcdon, which is the number of restrictions under test) are presented below. 
Probability (LR stat) is the p-value of the LR test statistic. McFadden R-squared is the likelihood ratio index 
computed as I-V%, v here / is the restricted log likelihood. The variance of the standard errors of the probit 
models is showed as a measure of confidence of the predictive ability of the models. The total number of 
observations for the large and small samples is 30 and 35, respectively. 
Note """ "" ": Significantly different fron zoo at the 11/6,5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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7.5. Conclusions 
In this last arc we addressed the modelling of Eurobond ratings and rating downgrades. 
LJnllte in precious tudies our key point is the transition probability and not the ultimate default. In 
order to assess and forecast the downgrade probability we developed a two-step estimation 
procedure. In the firs step a conditional ccpeaation of default risk was estimated as a function of 
bond specific and firm specific characteristics by an ordered probit. In the second step, we 
proceeded esvnzmng the disentangled effects of default risk 
-as obtained from the conditional 
mean estimate in step I- and fin al variables on the downgrade probab&y. 
The pcobalxlity of falling in the higher rating dass is found to be inversely related to leverage and 
directly related to size, profitability and earnings coverage. In addition we find that firms with higher 
growth rates tend to be riskier -in terms of their "creditworthiness"- than mature firms. On the 
other hand, fimu experiencing an increase in tangible fixed assets are associated to a lower 
probability to move to a kn-er rating class. 
The results from the binary probit model show that, other things being the same, a downgrade is 
less likely to happen in the presence of a negative pledge guarantee and higher growth opportunities. 
In contrast he doe -. ade is tread by positive changes in tangible assets and by earnings' 
instabuity Firm size, interest ornrrage, and industrial sector do not play a significant role in 
deternining the probability of downgrade. Additional interesting remarks may be proposed in 
relation to both company indebtedness and default risk. Our findings present evidence of a non- 
linear relationship bette-een le%vrage and downgrade probability on one side and risk of default and 
downgrade probability on the other side. 
Incorporating these two quadratic effects and replacing the rating variable with its conditional 
mean shows to imp -e both the explanatory power and the predictive accuracy of our two-step 
model Passing from one step to the second, we observe that the sign of some variables changes 
producing apparently inconsistent results. However, this is supply explained by the fact that the two 
steps pro ide two different types of infonnition. While the first step (ordinary probit) presents 
infonnazicn on the initial level of the rating, the second step (binary probit) presents information on 
the l wod of ruing downg-ade. 
In order to validate our model err assessed its forecasting performance both in sample and out- 
of-sample. Our probabilistic modd shows to outperform -in terms of correct out-of-sample 
classifications- both a naive constant probability model, with the downgrade probability fixed at the 
sample proportion of events (cut off value) and a more complicated artificial neural network model. 
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Nnal? y, our findings support he oonje = expressed in Blume, Lint and Maddnlay (1998) that 
firm diaracteiistics, accottnting ratios, and market based risk measures are more informative for 
Luger than for smaller firms. The leverage variable has been observed to have different impact on 
the da%ngrade probahility aoýootdng to the size of the firm. These results are important both for 
ry issues and for determining a fine's cost of capital. 
We generally confide that despite the scarce availability of rating and accounting data, the 
findings of this study are consistent with most of our expectations. The forecast performance of 
bah BP and ANN models declines in the last two-fifths of the time period under observation, 
suggesting the necessity of a larger and longer sample. The time-varying performance of the models 
may also indicate that the coefficients that assign weights to the various risk factors are not stable 
over time, dhangng with different economic conditions. If some variables were major predictors of 
corporate performance in some }pus but not others, a model with frozen coefficients would not do 
a good ob over time. This rests the necessity to re-esthete the model from time to time- 
Aa=ding to this, a s% ing regt e model in the line with Bangia, Diebold, and Schuermann 
(2000) may be profitably explored in future works to predict razing downgrades in both stable 
(expansion) and unstable (recession) periods. 
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Table Al 
Quantile of Risk Dep O Dep=1 Total H-L 
Low 11igb Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
J=4 
00000 0.0013 16 15.9986 0 0.00138 16 0.00138 
2 00023 0.1245 16 16.1510 1 0.84901 17 0.02827 
3 01335 0.7585 10 10.1132 7 6.88684 17 0.00313 
4 0 7700 1 0000 I 0.86498 16 16.1350 17 0.02221 
Total 43 43.1277 24 23.8723 67 0.05498 
H-L Statistic: 0 0550 Prob[Chi-Sq(2 df)]: 0.9729 
J=5 
0.0000 6. E-06 13 13.0000 0 1.1E-05 13 1.1E-05 
2 2. E-05 0.0720 13 12.8275 0 0.17248 13 0.17480 
3 0.0720 0.3197 12 11.9053 2 2.09466 14 0.00503 
4 04230 08965 4 4.98832 9 8.01168 13 0.31773 
5 09058 1.0000 1 0.40657 13 13.5934 14 0.89206 
Total 43 43 1277 24 23.8723 67 1.38963 
H-L Statistic 1.3896 Prob[Chi-Sq(3 df)]: 0.7080 
J=6 
1 00000 2. E-06 11 11.0000 0 2.8E-06 11 2.8E-06 
2 2 E-06 00088 11 10.9678 0 0.03216 11 0.03226 
3 0.0142 0.1245 10 10.1818 I 0.81822 11 0.04363 
4 0 1335 04654 7 7.81056 4 3.18944 11 0.29011 
5 04727 0.9095 3 294570 8 8.05430 11 0.00137 
6 09206 1.0000 1 0.22187 11 11.7781 12 2.78039 
Total 43 43.1277 24 23.8723 67 3.14776 
li-L Statistic 3.1478 Prob[Chi-Sq(4 df)]: 0.5334 
J=7 
0.0000 6. E-08 9 9.00000 0 1.0E-07 9 1.0E-07 
2 4 E-07 0.0038 10 9.98901 0 0.01099 10 0.01100 
3 00049 00720 9 869440 0 0.30560 9 0.31634 
4 0.0836 0.2212 9 8.59182 1 1.40818 10 0.13771 
5 02227 0.6019 4 5.04487 5 3.95513 9 0.49245 
6 06038 09270 2 1.73823 8 8.26177 10 0.04772 
7 09788 1 0000 0 0.06942 10 9.93058 10 0.06990 
Total 43 43.1277 24 23.8723 67 1.07512 
H-L Statistic. 1.0751 Prob[Chi-Sq(5 df)]: 0.9563 
J=8 
0.0000 4. E-08 8 8.00000 0 4.8E-08 8 4.8E-08 
2 6 E-08 0.0013 8 799862 0 0.00138 8 0.00138 
3 0.0023 0.0367 9 8,90094 0 0.09906 9 0.10016 
4 00720 0 1245 7 7 25005 1 0.74995 8 0.09200 
5 0 1335 04230 7 6.16021 1 1.83979 8 0.49781 
6 04243 0.7585 3 3.95295 6 5.04705 9 0.40966 
7 07700 09788 I 0.81671 7 7.18329 8 0.04581 
8 09833 1.0000 0 0.04827 9 8.95173 9 0.04853 
Total 43 43.1277 24 23.8723 67 1.19536 
H-L Statistic- 1.1954 Prob[Chi-Sq(6 df)]: 0.9771 
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Table Al Continued 
J=9 
0.0000 3 E-09 7 700000 0 6.5E-09 7 6.5E-09 
2 4 E-08 2 E-05 7 699997 0 3.2E-05 7 3.2E-05 
3 4 E-05 0 0088 8 7.96786 0 0.03214 8 0.03227 
4 00142 00836 7 6.63199 0 0.36801 7 0.38843 
5 01014 02024 7 6.89659 1 1.10341 8 0.01124 
6 02212 04654 3 4.46376 4 2.53624 7 1.32479 
7 04727 0 8752 3 2.65749 5 5.34251 8 0.06610 
8 0 8965 09833 1 0.47855 6 6.52145 7 0.60989 
9 0.9882 100(X) 0 0.03154 8 7.96846 8 0.03166 
Total 43 43.1277 24 23.8723 67 2.46442 
H-L Statistic 24644 Prob[Chi-Sq(7 df)]: 0.9298 
J=10 
1 00000 3 E-09 6 6.00000 0 3.4E-09 6 3.4E-09 
2 3 E-09 6. E-06 7 6.99999 0 1.1E-05 7 1.1E-05 
3 2. E-05 00049 7 6.98413 0 0.01587 7 0.01590 
4 00074 00720 6 5.84339 0 0.15661 6 0.16081 
5 0.0720 0 1245 6 6.32210 1 0.67790 7 0.16946 
6 0.1335 0.3197 6 5.58324 1 1.41676 7 0.15371 
7 04230 05655 2 3.18913 4 2.81087 6 0.94644 
8 06019 0.8965 2 1.79920 5 5.20080 7 0.03016 
9 09058 09882 1 0.38685 6 6.61315 7 1.02867 
10 0 9906 10000 0 0.01972 7 6.98028 7 0.01978 
Total 43 43.1277 24 23.8723 67 2.52495 
H-L Statistic 25249 Prob[Chi-Sq(8 df)]: 0.9606 
Table A2 
Eq. 7.11 Eq. 7.12 
a (t-stat) 
-0.061 -0.007 
(-0.690) (-0.070) 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.187 0.184 
R Square 0.035 0.034 
Adjusted R Square 0.020 0.019 
Standard Error 0.324 0.249 
Observations 69 69 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We end this thesis by briefly reviewing our journey through the world of credit risk. We look back 
critically discussing mbar we have done and thinking, from an ex past perspective, of what we 
could have done more or differently. We finally mention new directions in which future research 
might evolve in this young and fascinating field. 
Results, implications, and directions for future research 
&edit risk has been a very active area of research over the past few years under the joint 
pressure of regulators and shareholders. Much progress has been made in improving the classic 
firm-value based model of Melton (1974). On the other hand, the empirical literature has lagged 
theoretical papers by a few years. In particular, little empirical research has been carried out on 
ratings based models. Kiesel, Perraudin, and Taylor (1999) for example have shown that most risk 
stems from spread changes mithin a credit risk dass rather than from class changes, especially for 
highly rated bonds. Our analysis concerns with both these sources of risk within the sterling 
Eurobond market, typically accessible by highly regarded borrowers. 
In the first part of this auk we have presented the credit risk models proposed by the largest 
banks. We have explained haw these models are used for quantifying credit risk, estimating the 
probability density function of credit losses, and internally allocating capital against hose risks. We 
have also explained how infoimition from credit risk models may be usefully incorporated into 
regulatory or supervisory capital policies. Nevertheless, modelling credit risk is neither analytically 
or practically easy 
. 
Skewed return distributions with long and fat tails, credit correlations, and 
interest rate interactions represent he three biggest challenges. The evolution of better models for 
credit risk n mment ail depend on haw these challenges will be taken and will be reinforced 
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by the development of be ter tools for credit risk management. In particular, the combined effect 
of evaluating; and c ng credit risks aal be profound as technology becomes more 
widespread, the necessary due become more accessible, and credit derivatives liquidity improves. 
In the second part of this u ui,, we have presented our empirical investigations. We briefly 
ouffir herze the intentions that motivated our research, the results we achieved, and their main 
In our first empirical study, the generating process for credit spread changes is examined We 
study the dynamics of the credit spread between the ISMA sterling Eurobond index and a UK 
government bond index. We attempted to infer from the data what acceptable process can be 
used to model aggregate credit spreads for option pricing or risk management purposes. We did 
not attempt to describe the awe credit spread curve, which would have required the joint 
modelling of the risky and risk-less term structures. We focused instead on the dywua of the 
spread index, considered an independent financial asset. 
Though this index suffers from the aggregation problem typical of index data (it is an 
aggregate of bonds of different mimes and credit ratings), there are two reasons for studying 
the index series. First, reflecting the average yield spread on a well-diversified corporate bond 
portfolio with long maturity, they serve as an indicator of the level of credit spreads for many 
investors. Investors holding such a portfolio may find it convenient to protect themselves against 
moves in the general level of corporate spreads in a given class rather than hedge each individual 
issue. Second, they can be used as underlying for credit spread options whose payoff depends on 
the tmninA 
, -alue and/or the path taken by the yield spread of an instrument over the yield on a 
risk-free bond. 
The existing literature on credit risk premia is extended through the use of high-frequency 
(daily) and non-US data. From the methodological point of view, GARNI models have never 
before been used to describe the time series behaviour of credit spreads. Searching for the 
underlying generating process, credit spread differences proved to possess characteristics 
consistent with non-linear d}n mics. Using daily aggregates, we propose a GARC I mean 
- 
reverting model to fit credit spread changes and capture the observed stylised facts. The empirical 
results indicate that periodical rebalancing of a fixed income portfolio based on spread short-term 
forecasts is defensible. Results have also implications for term stn]cture models of corporate 
yields, the pricing of credit deriv=i es, and methods for measuring credit risk. 
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However, (G)ARG! is not the only model recognised to produce symptoms of non linearity 
Long mesrxxy and demos are non-linear models as well. VA &e we have extensively studied the 
first type of models and we have tentatively investigated long-term dependence, we believe that 
the analysis could be refined by fiutlter ocploring the long memory structure and a possible 
chaotic process for credit spreads. Identifying the source of nonlinearity is important as different 
generating mechanisms have totally different implications for understanding price behaviour and 
for trading purposes. Further analysis therefore could be conducted using Autoregressive 
Fractionally Integrated Moving A--nerage (ARFIMA) models, the newest development in long 
memory process studies. It could also be introduced a new non-linear model, a combination of an 
ARIMA mean model and a long-memory variance model. Alternatively, following Hauser and 
Kunst er (1994) a fractionally difference model with ARCH errors, that is a combination of an 
AFA 1A mean model and an ARCH variance model, could be beneficially developed 
Moreover, if a series proves to exhibit long memory, persistent temporal dependence even 
between distant observations can be observed. In other worts, distinct, but non-periodic, cyclical 
patterns may cause a potentially predictable component in the series dynamics. Modelling the 
series wich a long-memory or chaotic process can be used to uncover trading opportunities. 
Therefore, more work on the implications of non-linear dynamics on trading practices may be 
needed In this perspective, an additional contribution would concern the development of simple 
portfolio switdiing stategies for exploiting the existence of mean reversion. Moreover, exploring 
such trading riles allows the mexnuermnt of the economic significance of the mean reversion 
results, providing a further robustness check to our estimates. 
Another target for further im gation is the liquidity premium included in the observed 
credit spreads. The spreads we computed are not only due to credit risk but they also reflect the 
relate  liquidity of corporate and Treasury bonds. For this reason we should be careful in their 
interpretation. Changes in the spreads may reflect not only adjustments in the default probability 
but also liquidity and risk aversion variations. While changes in credit risk fluctuate with real 
economic variables uch as the business cycle and are therefore rather long lasting, changes in 
liquidity pcw are very vdatile and depend a lot on market sentiment. It is therefore reasonable 
to expect hat mean reversion in the liquidity component of spreads hould be much higher than 
that of the credit component If AAA spreads are explained in a greater proportion by liquidity 
they should intuiti%* revert more quickly to their long-term average than BBB spreads. 
Modelling both the credit and the liquidity components at the same time and distinguishing 
between in t grade and speculative bonds would provide interesting insight on the source 
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of the observed mean rev Assessing the speed of mean reversion across rating classes have 
also implications for tactical asset allocation strategies. For example, if faster mean reversion is 
documented for higher rued bond yields, when expecting the end of a crisis where spreads are far 
above their long-term mean, it may be appropriate to invest first in AAA bonds (which recover 
faster) and then progressively move to more speculative securities (see Goldman, 1998). 
Modelling credit spreads as GARGI and/or mean-reverting process has also implications for 
the pricing of credit derirn ý %iiere the determinant variable is the evolution of the credit 
spread. The literature is still fairly thin on the pricing of these options and has been mainly 
published in practinoriers' journals An important exception is the work by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) we the mean-reversion character of credit spreads sometimes makes 
European option prices less than the intrinsic value. Intuitively, in-the-money calls are less likely to 
remain in the maney over time, because the credit spread tends to decline towards its long-run 
me= An additional implication for credit spread option is that because of the mean-reversion, 
the dynamics of the credit spread do not satisfy the first-degree homogeneity property necessary 
for options to be convex functions (Merton, 1973). This implies that the delta of a GARCH 
credit spread call could be a decreasing function of the underlying credit spread. 
The analysis mould fins y benefit from the implementation of a panel approach to test for 
non-linear effects and mean reversion. By exploiting cross-sectional variation, the power of the 
panel test aal be enhanced, providing more accurate estimates. The hypothesis of a mixture of 
normal distributions and the non-linear cointegration hypothesis might also be the focus of new 
research in the field of credit spreads. The possible use of weekly and monthly data would allow 
testing GARCH models across different time frequencies. It may be also useful estimating the 
spread components and the speed of mean-reversion separately for various maturity bands and 
rating classes. For an investor thinking about purchasing a corporate bond, the size of each 
component for each rating class aal affect the decision of whether to purchase a particular class 
of bonds or a her to purchase corporate bonds at all. 
fl second empirical study, examining bond yields reaction to raring changes, provides insight 
on the information value of rating agencies' revisions. The question of the impact of rating 
changes on bond and stock prices has been well studied in the literature. The main contribution 
of our study is that it employs a novel regression-GARCH approach allowing the rating change to 
impact vthr1ity as u-@ as market yields. The s xk also differs in examining non-US bonds and is 
one of the relative few using daily bond data. 
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As}mnrr is responses for both mean and volatility of yield spreads are observed for positive 
and negative re%isioas. The increnrrital information content of bond revisions is statistically 
significant for do, %mgrades, but not for upgrades. At the same time upgrades are associated with 
significant increases in volatility during and around the event period, while volatility is significantly 
depressed uring and around the time the information is released. This finding could be related to 
either a temporary reduction in information asymmetry or simply a "time-out" during which 
traders attempt to assess the news. How ever, alternative explanations and interpretations of these 
results, especially regarding the volatility pattern, could be beneficial. 
Given the mean and volatility asy=netnc dynamics and the evidence of significant cunmlative 
abnormal returns even after the rating change announcement, appropriate trading strategies could 
be developed accordingly. In particular, it may be investigated whether significant changes in 
volatility lead the away to profitable option trading on anticipated volatk effects. Further research 
could also focus on the economic significance of gains deriving from the anticipation and/or 
riding of the rating change vent. Interesting would be also to relate the cause of the rating change 
aith the likelihood that it curies significant new information to the market. Bond rating changes 
could be classified by cause of change and their different information value about the firm (bond) 
Fumy, whole this study examines only the response to rating revisions by Standard and Poor's, 
there are other raring announcements of note occurring at around the same time. First, most S&P 
rating revisions are preceded by news (Gaditwatch) that S&P is reconsidering the rating with 
negati e, posim-e, or neutral implications. Further research could be conducted to assess whether 
part of the yjdd adjustments obsen-ed prior to the rating revision reflects the impact of this 
information release. On the other hand, our regression-approach provides a much better way to 
handle these than previous studies. Whiffle previous studies examine the reaction 
to these armouncements separately, %e introduce an integrated approach by defining separate 
dummy variaHes for the va ions announcements. 
After looking at the rating change event, we narrow our focus to the downgrade event and we 
m odd the re-grade ptobaL*lity itself. In particular we canine the power- of the aedit rating and 
various finzntial and accounting ratios to forecast Eurobond downgrades one year in advance. 
Wfuie thane is a volumirwuu study on the prediction of defaults and bankruptcies, little research 
has been done to forecast the doRingrade probability. Ming this information gap should be of 
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r crm to imvstc , Lxx dhokkn and to the credit corntunity to detemmne maturity exposure 
Emas 
=Vor to n= re cr t risk in the cocztet of v1 at-risk models. 
Rig 
-er cs, like repAx *, are concerned mich the likelihood of f rm default and aim to 
nie jai losses to creditom Gwen this sinul city in objectives, we expect a swng 
rtLi hip bcmvm ac& ratite and finandal/accounting ratios. This prey ents us from simply 
introAximg both sets of variataks in the focecasing model. Mxmfore, we develop a two-step 
cszizricm procedure. In the first step, we find the factors explaining credit ratings. In the second 
nep, we ii=ih factors praicting the dost de probahläy. This methodolor allows as to 
esurnxr the 'clip' conrilution of the credit rating and the financial variables removing any 
irm'm effect in terms of correct out-of-sample classifications the two-step model 
wtpesfoctm bah a naiv constant probabliry model and a more complicated artificial neural 
nem-Ork =di 
VTkk the U of the er aruto y variables are gem-Ay consistent with our expectations, 
ti e assets 
. 
und investment f foes go in an unexpected dire an regarding their contnbution to 
the dcnmgxic prob 1 ity. Recalling that these variables wane pr sent, with the cornea sign, in the 
first (rte) reg ssiran, ur explain this result in terms of a possible over-weighting of their 
oc ºzion to the assessment of the credit quality, as represented by the rating, in the first place. 
R- u v%-cr. ar realiZe that this vac ituuitiw explanation eeds further thought 
Des* the extensive validation of the model, we must recognise that our sample is rather 
uTuJ (1 obsm coons). Still this a cuk can be considered as a first effort to directly design a 
ciaa rile nxxkl The inar=ig mvalahlity of data aal certainly conuibute to testing the 
robustness of the m odds results and further investigate their implications. Beneficial a-M also be 
runnurg in priM a model of del wlt This would help to examine more closely the causes of 
don, i mich atry be different from the causes of outright fahrt Moreover, a s%itdiing 
mpnr model in tae Kith Bangia, Diebold and Schuermann (2000) may be designed to predict 
rxing do%mgxies in both stable (expansion) and unstable (recession) periods. Finally, although 
ratur. and sch ratios can explain the doangade outcome to some extent, it remains to 
evalwte the possible incrtniental benefit of including market data. In pamcular we may want to 
consider the relevance of the information contained in the credit spreads relatively to the bond's 
future rrgade. 
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